


Mohammad Ali JINNAH

A POLITICAL STUDY

M. H. SAIYID

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Preface

This book was first published in 1945 in the form of a detailed documentary. That it has been an inspiration or at any rate a source of many a subsequent book is no small compliment to the time and labour it involved.

Two years later our national life was no longer in transition, but as Mohammad Ali Jinnah's gigantic efforts for national realisation came to fruition, it entered the phase of permanency. From the present edition too many details, which were then necessary, have been expunged but in no way has it suffered in its essential quality of being a documentary.

Lives of great men are connected with events of public importance. Biographies and memoirs are sources of true guidance and inspiration, in circumstances similar to the ones through which our elders have lived. They ensure stability in corporate thought and action. Lack of information on the other hand begets unhealthy speculation, rumour and intrigue.

Our national efforts in the past have been directed to educate the foreigner more than our own Nationals. The result is that few of us can anticipate or even read events in their true perspective. The last few chapters which bring this edition up-to-date may suffer from want of detail, which would have been probably available had the author been a foreigner. Nevertheless, it is the outcome of a patriotic duty and devotion to its subject, which none can challenge and few may excel.

Karachi M. H. S.
August 17, 1953.

To —

Zuleikha, my wife, who has, for the education of our little Farid and Minhaj, set before herself three models — Mohammad, Ali and Jinnah.

Foreword
to the first edition

The words 'biography' and its Urdu equivalent سوانح عمری really and strictly mean a *detailed account* of the life and career of a man, but in practice the term 'biography' includes all kinds of accounts of a man's life. Biographies have always been an important section or department of literature for the reason that the account of the life of a notable and great man possesses an inevitable and abiding interest for men in every walk of life who live in similar conditions or circumstances because it is extremely interesting and instructive to watch the birth, growth and development of a great man and to see how he achieves, ultimately, a position of supremacy over his fellow-men, how he grapples with difficulties and overcomes adverse circumstances and forces a vast body of men to accept his standpoint about matters which affect the destinies of peoples or countries. Fundamentally, the sources of interest and inspiration are the same, whether it is the biography of a statesman or that of a general or of a conqueror or of a captain of industry or finance — the subject of a true biography must be a great man in the real sense of the term. There are two ways of writing a biography: the biographer may choose to give an exhaustive account of the subject of the biography and overload it with the most minute details and trivial and significant facts of his life and attempt to record every utterance of his. Well-known examples of this kind of biography are Boswell's *Life of Johnson,* and Lockhart's *Life of Scott*. An example of short biography may be mentioned Plutarch's *Lives*. The celebrated French writer Voltaire says in his *Life of Moliere*:

"The predilection of many readers for the frivolous, and the desire to make up a volume out of what ought to fill only pages, are the reasons why the biographies of celebrated men are nearly always ruined by the inclusion of useless details and popular fairy-tales, as false as they are insipid".

The writer of the present life of Jinnah is to be congratulated for the admirable manner in which he has done his work. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the Qaid-i-Azam of the Muslims of India, represents today the hopes, aspirations and ideals of the Muslims of India who have unbounded faith in his leadership and his ability to guide the great Muslim nation of India along the path of progress and success. At the present moment there is great need for a sober, well-balanced and accurate biography of this great leader of Indian Muslims whose words and actions are, at present time, consciously and unconsciously, misunderstood and misrepresented by those who do not want that Indian Muslims should have their just and proper share in the government of this country to which they have as much right as any other community or nation in India. In the present life of Jinnah its writer has not committed the mistake of idolising his subject (as has been done in some cases which it is not necessary to mention here). Not much space has been devoted to a detailed account of the career of Jinnah. We have been told just what is necessary for us to know about the early life of Jinnah —we see a young man, belonging to a middle-class family, who gave early proof of the strength of his character and his unshaken faith in his own abilities and powers. When Sir Charles Ollivant, the then Member in charge of the Judicial Department of the Government of Bombay, pressed young Jinnah to accept a government post the salary of which would ultimately be Rs. 1,500 per month, the intrepid and independent young man "with the usual smile on his face. . . thankfully declined saying that his ultimate ambition was to earn Rs. 1,500 a day". And he made good his word, for he rose very high in his profession. Many years later when he was asked about the secret of his success he replied:

"Character, courage, industry and perseverance are the four pillars on which the whole edifice of human life can be built, and failure is a word unknown to me".

The present life of Jinnah is of very great value because in tracing

Jinnah's political career, the writer has given an extremely valuable survey of political events and movements in India during modern times. The background of political history against which Mr. Jinnah's own political career has been placed, is given in such a masterly manner that the reader of this book will find here every important fact about the rise and development of the Congress and the Muslim League and the political and constitutional development of India during the past and present generations. One of the reasons, perhaps the main reason, why Jinnah is frequently attacked by the so-called Nationalist press of India is the fact that in the beginning he was an ardent and staunch Congressman, and now he is supposed to be its most implacable and dangerous opponent. This book makes it quite clear that Jinnah is not a turncoat or time-server, and he does not believe in creating or maintaining differences between Hindus and Muslims in order to perpetuate British rule in India. Any one who reads this book will admit that Jinnah has always tried to achieve Hindu-Muslim unity and that he has been ever fearless in advocating the freedom of India and justice to Indians at home and abroad. The passage quoted in this book from Shahani's biography of Gokhale shows the courage of young Jinnah when he spoke fearlessly in the Council about "the feelings of all classes in this country (roused) to the highest pitch of indignation and horror at the harsh and cruel treatment that is meted out to Indians in South Africa". When the President of the Council, Lord Minto, tried to browbeat Jinnah for speaking in such terms about "a friendly part of the Empire", the undaunted champion retorted that he was inclined to use "much stronger language". After the Punjab atrocities, Jinnah made passionate and brutally outspoken speeches and proclaimed that Indians could no longer abide their trust "in the Government of India or in the Government of His Majesty the King of England to represent India in matters international". Jinnah's patriotism was so much above cavil or suspicion that he was chosen as a member of the Congress delegation which went to England in 1914; at the suggestion of Mr. Lam public contributions poured in for the foundation of a Hall to mark "the great appreciation of Mr. Jinnah's services" and the famous Jinnah People's Memorial Hall was erected in Bombay; the present biographer of Jinnah rightly laments that the same Hall is being used today for discussing plans

for undermining and misrepresenting that great personality — that great leader and patriot, Jinnah!

The rise and development of the Muslim League is traced in this book in a masterly manner, and it has been clearly shown that Muslims were obliged to create the League not for the sake of fighting the Hindus, but to protect their just rights, and that communal unity was — and is — one of the main ideals of the League. Very clear account is given of the chain of events which compelled Mr. Jinnah to cut himself off from the Congress and to organize Muslims in one solid, living body fired with the zeal to establish the fact that they are a nation and that they have as much right to live in India honourably and preserve their own religion, culture and traditions as any other people; and it has been proved that Jinnah has always preached and practised the principle 'Live and let live'. No impartial reader of the present life of Jinnah can for a moment believe the libel and the lie that the Muslim League is a secret servant and agent of British Imperialists, and that it is not inspired by strong and genuine desire to achieve the freedom of India. It is also shown in this book that the much-maligned demand of the Muslims for Pakistan is not an attempt to prevent the freedom of India, but rather the only means of achieving it; for, it was that great Hindu leader Lala Lajpat Rai who first suggested that "either the Muslims of India should give up their role as a separate entity or India should be divided into Hindu States and Muslim States, failing which India could never hope to become independent". The present just demand of the Muslims for Pakistan is the logical development of this suggestion which is now regarded by the Hindus as an attempt of Muslims to perpetuate British rule in India, whereas the facts are the other way round, for Pakistan is the one and only solution of India's political problem and the only means of achieving the freedom of the country.

Not the least merit of this book is that it quotes extensively from important speeches and documents so that an impartial reader can see for himself that the conclusions which are drawn here are based upon undisputed facts.

I do not wish to make this Introduction lengthy, so I shall not refer to many other features of this admirable life of our great National Leader. I repeat my congratulations and thank the author and publisher of this work which will be of immense value to all lovers

of truth and justice, for it shows that our Qaid-i-Azam is a great patriot and that his successful efforts to awaken the Muslim community and make it a living and effective body is the surest way to achieve the freedom and salvation of India. Like Allama Iqbal, Jinnah believes that Muslims can serve their country only if they become conscious of their great destiny, become united and acquire power. Jinnah wants Muslims to become true Muslims in thought and deed, and by acquiring power show to the world how power can be used justly, how the Muslim defends and maintains the rights of others instead of trampling upon them. The clarion call of Jinnah to the Muslims is best expressed in the words of that great Muslim nationalist poet, Iqbal:

هر لحظه ہے مومن کی نئی آن نئی شان
گفتار میں کردار میں اللہ کی برہان
قہاری و غفاری و قدوسی و جبروت
یہ چار عناصر ہوں تو بنتا ہے مسلمان

سبق پھر پڑھ صداقت کا عدالت کا شجاعت کا
لیا جائے گا تجھ سے کام دنیا کی امامت کا

1945. KHWAJA NAZIM-UD-DIN

CHAPTER I

Bar and Associations

On Christmas day of the year 1876 [1] which fell on a Sunday, was born, in the city of Karachi, Mohammad Ali Jinnah to gladden the hearts of his lucky parents, for he was their first-born child. His father, the late Jinnah Poonja, was a partner in a private firm, one of the biggest exporters of hides and skins, known after the name of his elder brother, Valji Poonja. The two brothers came from a mercantile Khoja family of Rajkot and had settled down in Karachi for a number of years. The house in which the family lived was located in a congested part of the city with narrow lanes and by-lanes. Supported by huge wooden pillars with broad overhanging wooden balconies and verandahs, the house was characteristic of the architecture prevalent at the time and although the original house

1. Since the first edition of this book the author had recourse to the records of the Lincoln's Inn where Mohammad Ali Jinnah studied for the Bar. The admission register of the Inn for the year 1893 bears the entry that Mohamed Ali Jinnahbhai (the spellings of the name were later altered by a Court decree) was admitted in that year and was aged nineteen years. This brings the year of his birth to 1874. There is, however, no definite birth date. But the entries appearing on the records of Church Mission High School and Sind Madrasa, Karachi, where Jinnah received his early education, bear the date of birth as October 20, 1875. The name is spelled as originally entered in the Lincoln's Inn. These records further show that at the age of fourteen Jinnah left for Rajkot in connection with his marriage—a date which has since then been confirmed. It is also confirmed that when in 1892 Jinnah reached London in the hope of joining the Inns of the Court he found that he had to wait for two years before he could be eligible for admission, and consequently after a year's waiting he entered his name declaring himself to be one year senior. That is how perhaps the discrepancy between the records of the Lincoln's Inn and the schools of Karachi occurred.

The address entered in the Inn's records is care of King and Co. Pallmall, London. This firm later came to be known as Cox and Kings.

is no more there, the general character of the locality is still maintained.[2] Jinnah Poonja, the father of the future Muslim leader, had been from his very childhood of a tall and slim stature. He thus inherited his first name from a Gujerati word meaning lean or something to that effect, and hence it, according to the popular tradition among the Khojas, forms the surname of Mohammad Ali Jinnah.

Little Jinnah was separated from his parents at a very early stage of his life and was sent to Bombay to receive his Primary lessons at Gokul Das Tejpal School. The effect that this early detachment from his family created on the mind of the boy partly accounts for the very prominent trait of the character of the man—the habit of stern independence and self-reliance. Perhaps it was at this time of his life that he discovered the secret of a single-handed struggle for existence, which in later years helped him so much. Of his boyhood very little is known, except that he was of a reserved nature, devoted exclusively to his studies and text-books.

After a short time, however, he was again taken back to Karachi and admitted to Sind Madrasa High School; he was put finally in the Church Mission High School where he passed the Matriculation Examination of the Bombay University. While still in school the young student showed such signs of brilliance that an English friend[3] of the family advised his father that his son should be sent to England to qualify for the Bar. Consequently, in the year 1892 he sailed for England, and the "tall thin boy in a funny long yellow coat," as he was humorously described by some of his fellow-students, was admitted to Lincoln's Inn.

The author once asked him about the syllabus of studies for the Bar in England at the time. He said jokingly that it was no more difficult than to attend a number of dinners, some twenty-two of them. He went through the curriculum with distinction.

The period of four years, during which Jinnah stayed in England for his studies, marks an important period of his life. India had already begun to come in the limelight of British politics. The Government of India Act of 1892 provided for the enlargement of Indian Provincial Councils on an elective basis and so put the country on the first steps of constitutional progress. A number of Englishmen

2. This house has now been commemorated.

3. Sir Frederick Croft, Bart., a famous businessman of Bombay and Karachi.

had begun to feel that India and Indians deserved better treatment. Public opinion in England was being influenced by Indian residents at the time, among whom the name of Dadabhai Naoroji, the founder and President of Indian Society in London, was most prominent. Indian students were attracted to this Society, and the necessity of associating themselves with the Indian political struggle was being impressed upon them. It was in the midst of this electrified atmosphere, which saw the birth of a new India, that young Jinnah had reached England.

Dadabhai Naoroji was, at the time, engaged in his election to the House of Commons from Central Finsbury, and the campaign conducted in his favour, mostly by Indian students, opened the eyes of Jinnah to the graver issues of life. The activities of young Chitta Ranjan Das, a student from Bengal, who had already made several political speeches in England, repudiating the ugly insinuation of James Maclean and supporting the candidature of Naoroji, made him think of the problems of his country. It seems strange that Naoroji's success at the polls on this occasion was due, in no small measure, to the support which such a young admirer could give him on the one side, and, on the other, from the adventitious aid, which one of Queen Victoria's favourite Prime Ministers, Lord Salisbury, had, unconsciously, given to him, by calling him 'a black man.' Dadabhai Naoroji happened to have a whiter skin than Lord Salisbury had, and the affront was, therefore, taken not as a personal one but as an exhibition of racial arrogance. This set on edge the nerves of the electors of Central Finsbury and Naoroji easily walked into St. Stephens.[4]

Endowed with an enthusiastic spirit of patriotism and immense amount of energy Jinnah threw himself with the lot of others to work for the "Grand Old Man of India." Once more the merits of the young lad engaged the attention of those about him. Dadabhai Naoroji, already a veteran of mature years, saw with his experienced eye that this lad of seventeen,[5] if properly influenced and guided, would go far indeed. He singled out young Jinnah there and then for roles which would have done credit to any man.

Apart from his association with public life in England, young

4. *P. C. Ray: Life and Times of C. R. Das.*
5. See footnote 1 above.

Jinnah took a keen interest in dramatic performances as member of a Shakespearean Dramatic Club, where he also took part occasionally as an amateur actor. As a result of this unique experience, Shakespeare always, since then, pervaded his public and private utterances and writings; and a touch of dramatic gesticulation was visible throughout his career of public speaking. In the famous letter that Mohammad Ali Jinnah wrote to Gandhi in 1940 in reply to a question by him as to what prefix he should use with the name of the Muslim leader, the Shakespearean allegory employed by him is well known and is remembered to this day by Muslim youth as a matter of pride. "I thank you for your anxiety to respect my wishes," wrote the President of the All-India Muslim League, "in the matter of the prefix you should use with my name. What is a prefix after all; a rose called by any other name smells just as sweet."[6]

Having qualified himself for the profession of Law, Mohammad Ali Jinnah returned to India in the year 1896. But things were quite different now. For some time past his father had been doing none too well in business. In fact he was involved in a serious financial crisis. For the first time in his life this favourite son of fortune tasted real hardship for he was faced with sudden poverty. The struggle became harder than what he expected. He discovered that the Law Courts of Karachi could not afford him opportunities which he was bound to get in a wider field where, by the diligent exercise of his talents, he could relieve his beloved father from distress.

Indeed, however, from the very first day of his arrival in India he had made himself felt among his contemporaries in Karachi, and when he announced his decision, two of his friends, who had seen in him a lawyer with a future, offered to him posts of an assistant in their own firms, already enjoying good practice, but he thankfully declined to accept the prospects of an attached career on the ground that he would like first to give his own abilities an independent test. If, however, they were keen, he requested them to keep their offers open, so that if he withdrew from the venture, he could return and avail himself of them. One of them—Walchand by name—an old school mate of Jinnah—although senior to him by two years, with a profound feeling for the spirit of the young adventurer, said he was willing to keep his offer open for ever. With all

6. *Romeo and Juliet*: Act II, Sc. 2.

good wishes and with this little backing from a sincere friend, the young lawyer reached Bombay sometime in the year 1897.

The first three years were of great hardship and although he attended his office regularly from day to day, he wandered without a single brief. The long and crowded footpaths of Bombay may, if they could only speak, bear testimony to a young pedestrian pacing them every morning from his new abode at Charni Road to his office in the Fort, and every evening back again to his apartments after a weary, toilsome day spent in anxious expectation. But during this period through the kind offices of an old friend he was granted leave to read in the chambers of MacPherson, then acting Advocate-General of Bombay. It was a courteous concession granted, for the first time, to an Indian. The incident had created so much of a stir that it became the talk of the town among fashionable circles, from Malabar Hill to Byculla Club.

In 1900 came the first opportunity. The vacancy of a Presidency Magistrate had occurred in Bombay City. Desirous of expressing himself and of "being heard" at last—as he himself put it—Mohammad Ali Jinnah had decided that he would apply for this post. It was, however, not so easy a preferment. He needed influence to back his claim. A strenuous endeavour was made but the required support was not forthcoming. At last gazing through the window and smoking a cigarette he wondered what remained to be done. A victoria cab was slowly passing by. An idea struck him; he jumped into it and drove straight to the office of Sir Charles Ollivant, the then Member in charge of the Judicial Department. Jinnah sent word through the peon that waited outside the door of Sir Charles' office, and, contrary to all current traditions of officialdom, he was called in immediately.

"I have already heard about you," said Sir Charles, "and it is good that you came straight to me. But, in the ordinary course, I should like to have a letter of recommendation from Mr. MacPherson, who naturally knows you more than I do." And next morning when the hesitating candidate told his senior of all the facts, MacPherson told him that Sir Charles had already spoken to him. "If you wanted this job, why did you not tell me before?" asked the Advocate-General as he wrote out a letter to Sir Charles Ollivant. The young man had now to explain, and when he did so, saying that he had been already

under much obligation for the benefits he had received as a reader in his chambers and that he did not wish to worry him more with his personal matters, Jinnah made on the old man a profound impression of his sense of proportion. Thus a few lines of appreciation from an admiring senior secured for him the coveted post and Jinnah found himself installed as a Third Presidency Magistrate for a temporary period of three months in place of P. H. Dastur, who had gone on leave. The small salary so earned was enough to relieve him of the encumbrances he had incurred during the last three years of his struggle and also to save a little for the future. On the expiry of those three months, a further tenure of three months presented itself. Sander-Slater, Chief Presidency Magistrate, proceeded on leave and Hoshang Dastur, on his return, was promoted in his place, and the term of Jinnah's office was further extended likewise.

With what ability and skill the probationer conducted the proceedings of the Court and how sound his judgments were, is evident from the fact that upon the expiry of this temporary period, on the 3rd of November, Sir Charles requested Mohammad Ali Jinnah to make himself available for future, when he might require him permanently on an increased scale of pay rising upto Rs. 1,500 per month. The independence of character of the young man and his determination to achieve the ideal he had set before him would not, however, let him pause on the way, and with the usual smile on his face he thankfully declined saying that his ultimate ambition was to earn Rs. 1,500 a day. Sir Charles Ollivant thought that the sentimental young lawyer was committing a mistake. The fact is noteworthy because, even in the height of his fame as an advocate, Mohammad Ali Jinnah did not raise his professional fees to more than what he had originally fixed in mind.

"After two years," Jinnah once told the author, "Sir Charles returned to India having spent some time in England in quiet retirement. He was invited to the Orient Club in Bombay of which I was a member and I attended the function. On seeing me there, he came over and enquired as to how I was doing in Law; and when I told him I was earning more than rupees two thousand a month, he congratulated me on my courage, saying that I had done well to refuse his offer."

Mohammad Ali Jinnah had, now, moved to a decent flat near the

present location of the Taj Mahal Hotel in Bombay, and owned a carriage, which he had bought during his tenure of office in the Presidency Court. He could look back with satisfaction upon the early days when he landed in the city with only a few coins in his pocket. What was the secret of his success? He himself once explained: "Character, courage, industry and perseverance are the four pillars on which the whole edifice of human life can be built, and failure is a word unknown to me."

Relieved from the anxiety of financial stringency, Mohammad Ali Jinnah was now free to take part in public affairs. Hitherto he had kept himself abreast of political developments in the country more or less as a mere spectator. Now he seriously thought of contributing his mite towards the welfare of his people.

The political horizon of the country in general, and of Bombay Province in particular, had been murky with clouds of conflicting opinions. Political thinkers—Dadabhai Naoroji, Ranade, Pherozshah Mehta, Dinshaw Wacha, Telang, Badruddin Tyebji, Gokhale, W. C. Bonnerjea and others—were engaged in fighting the constitutional battles of India, while social reformers like Tilak, Bepin Pal, Lala Lajpat Rai and Saiyid Ahmed Khan were busy advocating the revival of their respective societies. There existed, therefore, three distinct schools of thought. One, led by Naoroji, stood for political advancement of India through peaceful negotiations and constitutional agitation. "During the time when the General Election of 1885 was pending," declared Pherozshah Mehta talking of a particular meeting, "the Bombay Presidency Association resolved to inaugurate the policy of carrying the war, as it were, into the enemy's country, of making a direct appeal to the British electors by means of leaflets and delegates, and of asking them to discriminate between the white sheep and the black sheep. . . . But of all those who took part in the proceedings of that day, there was nobody who threw himself into the movement inaugurated by the Association more earnestly or more vigorously than Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji . . . It was he who moved the principal resolution at the meeting, and struck the keynote of the situation by emphatically laying down that 'it is in Parliament our chief battles have to be fought.' To this he soon came to add another article of faith, in favour of which I had ventured to raise my solitary voice, at the meeting. It was that not

only our chief battles had to be fought in Parliament but that those battles could never be really and truly fought until Indian questions were brought within the sphere of party politics."[7]

The above quotation throws no little light as to what was the method of approach to the political problem of India.

The other school led by the trio, Bal, Pal and Lal, advocated Hindu social reform and urged India to go back to the olden days of the Vedas. In their enthusiasm the promoters of this movement were inclined to be even militant. The third led by Saiyid Ahmed Khan on the other hand warned the Muslims that a Parliamentary system of government on the lines of the Western institutions would subject them to the numeral strength of the Hindus, and that the best policy for the Muslims would be to improve their lot educationally as well as in all other walks of life, possible at the time, only by remaining loyal to the British Crown.

It is, however, curious to note that although the ultimate aim of these three schools was identical—political progress of India—they never developed amongst themselves a sense of collaboration. Lacking in confidence in each other, the different and diffident sections were incessantly engaged in feuds, and the situation not infrequently deteriorated into personal acrimony among the leaders.

These were the days of reforms, and the principle of enhancing the political status of Indians was being recognised more and more both in Great Britain and in India. It was felt that Indians should be more closely associated with the day-to-day administration of their own country. A. O. Hume had founded, in the year 1885, the Indian National Congress in order to acquaint the rulers with the trend of popular opinion and the views of political workers—a body which was committed to loyalty to Britain. Dadabhai Naoroji had become a member of the British Parliament from Central Finsbury and was effectively voicing Indian sentiment in the House of Commons. Public will in India had started to assert itself. But although Indians, like Gokhale and Pherozshah Mehta, had been criticising the Government of India for every act that they thought was not in the public interest, the general outlook of their policy remained nothing

7. Extract from the speech made at the public meeting held in the Town Hall, on Saturday, the 23rd July, 1892, under the auspices of the Bombay Presidency Association, to commemorate the election of Dadabhai Naoroji as a member of Parliament, with Sir Dinshaw Petit, Bart., as chairman.

but loyalty to the Crown. During the session of the Indian National Congress at Calcutta in 1890, in the course of his Presidential Address Pherozshah Mehta said: "I have no fears that English statesmanship will ultimately respond to the call. I have unbounded faith in the living and fertilising principles of English culture and English civilisation. It may be that at times the prospects may look dark and gloomy. If the interests of the services are antagonistic to and prevail over the interests of the Indian people, it is only one side of the shield. All the great forces of English life and society, moral, social, intellectual, political, are, if slowly, yet steadily and irresistibly declaring themselves for the choice which will make the connection of England and India a blessing to themselves and to the whole world, for countless generations."

But—England, he said "must raise India to her own level or India will drag her down to hers."

During the same session of the Congress, Gokhale, speaking on a resolution for the Reduction of Salt Duty, said: "We are appealing to the sense of justice of the Government of India. We are appealing to their statesmanship, to their righteousness, and I will even go further and say, to their mercy."

Simultaneously, some silent influences were also at work. Public-spirited men whose position in life would not allow them to devote all their time to the burning questions of the day were, nevertheless, contributing their rightful share by casting their wholesome shadows on the minds of the more active workers. They were indeed a source of inspiration and encouragement. To this class belonged Ranade, who by his constant vigilance kept the current of public fervour within control, and directed the energies of many a young man of his time in the right channels. It was he who shaped the mind of Gokhale and put him on the right track. His patriotism was of a sure, fervent and profound character and his one aspiration through life was that India should be roused from the lethargy of centuries, so that she might become a great and living nation. He had come to recognise that the contact between India and England was a providential arrangement in order that this aspiration might be realised. His conviction on this point never wavered whatever happened.

In his optimism he was never shaken. The coldest reception by

the Government to the memorials submitted through his industry was by him interpreted as something quite cheering. Thus when Gokhale himself, in his early days, would despondently complain: "What is the good of taking all this trouble and submitting these memorials if Government don't care to say anything more than that they have noted the contents of our letter?" Ranade's reply was characteristic: "These memorials are nominally addressed to Government, in reality they are addressed to the people, so that they may learn how to think in these matters. This work must be done for many years without expecting any other result, because politics of this kind is altogether new in this land."

It was really service that mattered, no matter in what domain of activity. Such were the leaders at the time. They were aware that they could not achieve anything substantial during their life-time, but they had the satisfaction of laying the foundations of a great future. They toiled and laboured for the mere love of it, and for being able to impart that essential education to their people which was necessary for political progress.

Was Tilak doing service to India in his own way? As delegate to the Bombay session of the Indian National Congress in 1889, he declared: "Freedom is my birth-right and I shall have it." Still he had the spirit of a sweeping Hindu revivalist. He was opposed to the attitude of begging favours from the British. He visualised an object before him and if force were needed to achieve it he would not mind to employ it freely. He had to organise popular belief in his favour and he knew that the Hindu religious approach could do the trick for him. He was aware that he could win the hearts of his people by a studious appeal to their sentiment through the narration of historical anecdotes by giving them a national tinge. He had expected that his doing so would completely alienate sympathies of his Muslim countrymen. But he could not help there. Tilak believed that Hindus had suffered as much at the hands of the Muslims, as they had under the British rule. Through his two journals, *Maratha*, printed in English, and *Kesari*, printed in Marathi, he was inciting his followers and Maharashtrian countrymen against both. In 1893 he organised the first public festival in honour of Ganpati, the elephant-headed god known to every village in India, and thus founded a permanent institution in opposition to the Muslim Mu-

harram ritual. The same year he founded the Anti-Cow Killing Society, and demanded, at a meeting of the Saravajanik Sabha, from the Government, the lifting of the ban on playing of music by Hindu processions in front of mosques. As a result, the Muslim members of the Sabha resigned but Tilak gained immeasurable popularity among the Hindus.

Further to consolidate Maratha sentiment and activity, Tilak determined to revive the worship of the greatest of all Maratha heroes, Shivaji, the founder of the Maratha power. In 1895 he organised and presided over the first great Shivaji festival at Raigarh, Shivaji's first capital. There was recited by one of Tilak's followers a poem written specially for the occasion, the sense of which was as follows:

Let us be prompt like Shivaji to engage in desperate enterprises. Take up your swords and shields and we shall cut off countless heads of enemies. Listen, though we shall have to risk our lives in a national war, we shall assuredly shed the life-blood of our enemies.

There also Tilak himself spoke. In Shivaji's life there had been one incident—the killing, with the notorious tiger's claw, of Afzal Khan, the opposing General with whom he was in peace conference—which laid him open to the charge of treachery. Tilak's way of treating this incident was highly significant. "It is needless to make further researches into the killing of Afzal Khan. Let us even assume that Shivaji deliberately planned and executed the murder. Did Shivaji commit a sin in killing Afzal Khan? The answer to this question can be found in *Mahabharat* itself. The divine Krishna, teaching in the *Gita*, tells us we may kill even our teachers and our kinsmen, and no blame attaches if we were not actuated by selfish desires . . . God has conferred on the foreigners no grant of Hindustan inscribed on imperishable brass. Shivaji strove to drive them forth out of the land of his birth but he was guiltless of sin of covetousness. Do not circumscribe your vision like frogs in a well. Rise above the Penal Code into the rarefied atmosphere of the sacred *Bhagwad Gita* and consider the actions of great men."

There could be no truer indication of the policy towards which Tilak was leading his men. His influence was rising day by day; and by the year 1897 he had acquired the status of a hero and earned the title of *Lokmania,* the beloved of the people.

The purpose of this apparent digression is not to consider the effect that the policy of Tilak had on the general political outlook of India, but to indicate how far the current political atmosphere of the Bombay Presidency must have influenced Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Fresh from England and having imbibed in him the political principles of English administration, coming in contact with sober-minded leaders, like Dadabhai Naoroji, Pherozshah Mehta, Gokhale and Ranade and having been for some time in their company, and above all interested in the larger issues that faced the country at the time, Jinnah could not under the circumstances vie with leaders of extreme views like Tilak. He, therefore, in the natural course of events, allied himself with people belonging to what is now generally known as the "moderate school of thought."

CHAPTER II

A Glance at the Background

The establishment in the year 1885 of the Indian National Congress marks the inauguration of the pursuit in India of the parliamentary system on the lines of Western Democracy. Although the establishment of the High Courts and Legislative Councils in India between the years 1861 and 1863 had provided scope to the Indian peoples to express themselves, there was still felt a necessity for an organisation of an all-India character which would be competent to elicit public opinion.

A. O. Hume had in 1884 conceived the idea that it would be of great advantage to the country if leading Indian politicians could be brought together once a year to discuss social matters and be upon friendly footing with one another. He did not desire that politics should form part of their discussion, for there were recognised political bodies in Calcutta, Bombay, Madras and other parts of India and he thought that these bodies might suffer in importance if, when Indian politicians came together, they discussed politics. His idea, further, was that the Governor of the Province where the politicians met should be asked to preside over their deliberations, and that thereby great cordiality should be established between the official classes and the non-official Indian politicians. Full of these ideas he saw the noble Marquis when he went to Simla early in 1885, after Lord Dufferin had in December previous assumed the viceroyalty of India. Lord Dufferin took great interest in the matter and after considering over it for some time he sent for Hume and told him that, in his opinion, Hume's project would not be of much use. He said there was no body of persons in India who performed

the functions which Her Majesty's Opposition did in England. The newspapers, even if they really represented the views of the people, were not reliable and as the English were necessarily ignorant of what was thought of them and their policy in native circles, it would be very desirable in their interests as well as the interests of the rulers that Indian politicians should meet yearly and point out to the Government in what respect the administration was defective and how it could be improved, and he asked that an assembly such as he proposes should not be presided over by the local Governor, for in his presence the people might not like to speak out their minds.[1]

The policy of the Congress, thus founded, was, therefore, naturally that of loyalty to the Crown, and the resolutions adopted therein were nothing more than mere submissions from the ruled to the rulers. Its leaders emphatically declared that they were out and out loyalists, and at the session of the Congress in 1885, its first President, W. C. Bonnerjea, assured every one "that there were no more thoroughly loyal and consistent well-wishers of the British Government than were himself and the friends around him."

Dadabhai Naoroji, the next president of the Congress, spoke thus: "Let us speak out like men and proclaim that we are loyal to the backbone, that we understand the benefits the English rule has conferred upon us; that we thoroughly appreciate the education that has been given to us, the new light which has been poured upon us, turning us from darkness into light and teaching us the new lesson that the kings are made for the people, not people for the kings, and this new lesson we have learned amidst the darkness of free English civilisation."

The address of Badruddin Tyebji, delivered in Madras during the third session of the Congress, strikes a clearer note. Said he, "Let our opponents say what they please; we the educated natives, by the mere force of our education, must be the best appreciators of the blessings of a civilised and enlightened Government and, therefore, in our own interests, the best and staunch supporters of the British Government in India." He added, "Be moderate in your demands, be just in your criticisms, be accurate in your facts, be logical in your conclusions and you may rest assured that any propo-

1. W. C. Bonnerjea: *Introduction to Indian Politics*.

sitions that you make to our rulers will be received with that benign consideration which is the characteristic of a strong and enlightened government."

This expression of appreciation and gratefulness and profession of fidelity and submission went on for a number of years, and although the Presidents and the venue of the Indian National Congress changed from year to year, its outlook remained the same. In 1890, Pherozshah Mehta, President-elect of that year, spoke thus in Bombay: "The question of our loyalty is set at rest for ever. In the debate on Lord Cross's India Reform Bill in the House of Lords, Viceroy after Viceroy bore emphatic testimony to the loyal and peaceful character of our aims and efforts. Within the last few days the voice of no less a personage than one of our former Secretaries of State has confirmed this testimony."

At the same time, however, the note of mixed hopes and fears gives a clue to the stages through which the Congress was passing at the time. "It is true," he said, "that a majority of the Congress proposals do not still seem to have made much headway. Even as regards the proposal to separate the Executive and the Judicial functions, lauded by Lord Dufferin 'as a counsel of perfection to which the Government were ready to subscribe,' Government are yet so absorbed in admiration of it that they have not recovered themselves sufficiently to take action. There is, however, no reason to despair. It was once proved upon the sworn testimony of the Bombay High Court, before the late Chief Justice Sir Westropp, that a woman required twenty-two months for parturition in the air of the province of Kathiawar. It is not impossible, gentlemen, that the air of Simla may similarly necessitate a more than ordinarily long period of gestation to perfect even counsels of perfection; and therefore we must possess our souls in more than ordinary patience, lest any precipitate pressure might occasion a miscarriage."

The progress thus set afoot resolved itself in later years sometimes into bitter criticisms of the attitude of apathy which the British officials in India and Britain manifested towards the local conditions, and sometimes into vigorous demands of political and educational reforms, of better laws, of better government, of more responsibility, of better administration of justice and of the separation of Judiciary from the Executive. The deliberations of the Congress

centred mostly on technical lines and its hitherto vague criticisms were gradually becoming precise. A growing desire, however, of self-assertion was observable as early as 1893 when Dadabhai Naoroji, after having profusely quoted from British statesmen to the effect that the retention of Eastern Empire was 'essential to the greatness and prosperity of the United Kingdom,' asked the question: "With all such deep, vast and great interests and the greatness and prosperity of the United Kingdom, essentially depending on the Eastern Empire, and indissolubly bound up with it, is it reasonable; is it just and fair, is it *British* that all the cost of such greatness, glory and prosperity of the United Kingdom should be entirely, to the last farthing, thrown upon the wretched Indians, as if the only relation existing between the United Kingdom and India were not of mutual benefit but of mere masters and slaves as Macaulay pointed out to be deprecated?" And in the course of the same speech, Dadabhai Naoroji drew the attention of his audience: "But mark the words of Lord Cross, 'I am certain that in the course of a few years the Indian people will force us to do them justice.' This is just the feature—to be forced to do justice—which I always deplore. We desire that all necessary reforms and acts of justice should be spontaneous on the part of Britain, in good grace and in good time as gifts claiming our gratitude, and not to wait till *forced*, with loss of grace from the giver and loss of gratitude from the receiver."

In the ensuing years, the Congress met with a steady progress, and Indian public asserted itself more and more. That during this period, under the able guidance of the moderate statesmen, India did gain much cannot be denied. To a student of contemporary politics, it is obvious that in spite of the Congress indulging in severe criticism of the British policy and administration in India, there existed cordial relations between the rulers and the ruled both in this country and in Great Britain. Sir Charles Elliot, speaking from his place as President of the Bengal Legislative Council, expressed the valuable sentiment: "I am quite satisfied in my own mind that the extension of the Executive Council has materially added to its strength, and to its popularity and to its power of doing good for the country. Of the Hon'ble members present there are, I think, three whose term of office will come to an end before we meet next time and who may be re-elected or who may not. If they are re-

elected we shall welcome them back; if not, we hope we shall find in their successors colleagues who are as generous and as zealous as they have been." The official correspondent on Indian affairs wrote in *The Times*, London, as follows: "The questions asked in the Supreme and Provincial Legislatures during the past two years cover the whole area of Indian administration and of the economic interest of the peoples. With scarcely an exception they have tended to a better understanding between the rulers and the ruled; and in important instances they have furnished a valuable opportunity of placing the actual facts before the public."

But the Congress was now entering a new phase of life. The year 1905 saw, under the leadership of Gopal Krishna Gokhale, the friend and model of Jinnah, the most emphatic protest against the Partition of Bengal, a measure sponsored and effected by Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India. For the first time in the history of the Congress, its politics took the shape of negative agitation. Gokhale addressing the Congress, advanced the argument. He said three things struck him forcibly—determination to dismember Bengal at all costs, an anxiety to promote the interests of Assam at the expense of Bengal, and a desire to suit everything to the interests and convenience of the Civil Service. He quoted from the statement of the Government of India issued in connection with the Bengal question the following extract:

> It cannot be for the lasting good of any country or any people that public opinion or what passes for it should be manufactured by a comparatively small number of people at a single centre and should be disseminated thence for universal adoption, all other views being discouraged and suppressed . . . From every point of view, it appears to us desirable to encourage the growth of centres of independent opinion, local ideals and to preserve the growing intelligence and enterprise of Bengal from being cramped and stunted by the process of forcing it prematurely into a mould of rigid and sterile uniformity.

Gokhale continued: "After this let no apologist of the late Viceroy pretend that the object of the Partition was administrative convenience and not political repression."

And at another place he said: "As I have already observed, the manner in which the Partition of Bengal has been carried out fur-

nishes a striking illustration of the worst features of the present system of bureaucratic rule. Happily these features are not always so conspicuously in evidence. No one also denies that a large proportion of the members of the bureaucracy bring to their work a high level of ability, a keen sense of duty and a conscientious desire, within the limit of restricted opportunities permitted by the predominance of other interests, to do what good they can do to the people. It is the system that is really at fault—a system which relegates the interests of the people to a very subordinate place and which, by putting too much power into the hands of these men, impairs their sense of responsibility and develops in them a spirit of intolerance of criticism."

The vigour of the movement had bewildered British statesmen. They were restless after having discovered the great strength the Congress had come to acquire. A few British friends still had sympathies with Indian aspirations, but after the launching of the Bengal agitation a good many of them had lost hope. It was felt that the movement had slipped out of the hands of the sober-minded leaders and had developed into a fanatic and sentimental ferment which had for its result nothing but a dark future.

The Indian leaders were, however, thinking in quite different terms. Bengal agitation was only a means for the organisation of a popular will essential to the attainment of the final end—the establishment of self-government, equal in status with other members of the Empire, the Dominions. Gokhale declared: "The goal of the Congress is that India should be governed in the interests of the Indians themselves, and that in course of time a form of government should be attained in this country similar to what exists in the self-governing Colonies of the British Empire."

Thus had Gokhale shaped the political future of India as early as 1905, and although a formal demand for self-government was not made until the next session of the Congress, the broad principles on which the political policy of the Congress had to be formulated had already been laid down. Nor did he fail to suggest as to how that goal was to be achieved.

Through education, practical training and experiment, in Gokhale's opinion, lay the salvation of the Indian people, which principle he never failed to advocate. The practical contribution that he person-

ally made in pursuance of his policy and the support that he lent to the various educational and social movements, at the sacrifice of his own personal interests, were enough to rouse and inspire any man. Gokhale's innumerable qualities manifesting themselves in the service of India attracted Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and once in a 'priceless moment of self-revelation' he confessed that it was his ambition to become the Muslim Gokhale.[2]

Thereafter came the practical translation of Gokhale's idea.

"We do not ask any favours. We only want justice. Instead of going into any further divisions or details of our right as British citizens, the whole matter can be comprised in one word—'self-government,' or *Swaraj*, like that of the United Kingdom or the Colonies."

With these words Dadabhai Naoroji enunciated the ideal of *Swaraj*, during the course of his Presidential Address delivered at the Congress session in 1906. For India also, he declared, there could be no national greatness, strength and hope except by the right political principles of self-government. But how was this end to be achieved?

In the opinion of Dadabhai Naoroji what was wanted at the time was knowledge of the lesson from Englishmen themselves—to agitate most earnestly and most perseveringly, by petitions, demonstrations, and meetings; all quite peacefully but enthusiastically conducted. Agitation was the life and soul of the whole political, social and industrial history of England.

In this memorable session of the Congress, held in Calcutta, was present Mohammad Ali Jinnah, known to be acting as Private Secretary to Dadabhai Naoroji. He was already reckoned as a rising lawyer and a coming politician. For, true to his early teaching, and fired no doubt by the virile patriotism of men like the lion-hearted Pherozshah Mehta and the indomitable Gokhale, he had long already joined the ranks of the National Congress and regularly attended its annual gatherings. Incidentally, it is interesting to note that his maiden speech at this National Assembly was made in connection with "Wakf-alal-Aulad"—a measure that was later to bring his name into prominence.

The twenty-second National Congress dispersed amidst scenes of the wildest enthusiasm and rejoicings. A vote of thanks to the

2. Mrs. Sarojini Naidu; *Ambassador of Unity*.

President was proposed by Lal Mohan Ghose, and he was loaded with garlands of flowers amid thunders of applause. A *swadeshi* umbrella from Poona was unfurled and held over him for a moment, and then he said a few words of thanks. He reminded them that, in its twenty-second session, the Congress had placed before itself a definite goal—self-government, or *Swaraj*. Now it was for the younger generation to reach it.

The younger generation did strive to reach it. Events were to prove beyond doubt that Congress politics had passed out of the hands of the older stock of leaders. In fact the twenty-second session of the Congress was a great triumph for the Extremists.

Writing about the under-currents of Indian politics the correspondent of the *Times of India*, in its issue of the 3rd of January, 1906, wrote as follows:

> For several years past it has been clear to careful observers that within the Congress a party was being slowly evolved which was inimical to its successful working as a constitutional movement. For years past this party has been striving hard to capture the Congress and make it a vehicle of its own propaganda. The late Mr. Ranade, while he lived, was a formidable obstacle to this party, and its first attempt was accordingly directed against him in 1895, at Poona, when the demand was made for the first time in the history of the movement that the Social Conference should not be held in the Congress Pavilion. The next phase of this party was to ask that the Congress should be provided with a constitution. The older and more responsible leaders realised that in the present state of public indifference the only result of giving such a constitution would be to hand over the movement to the turbulent spirits within its fold. Sir Pherozshah Mehta has incurred the implacable hostility of this section by steadily throwing his influence against their attempts. This year they counted on the differences created between Bengal and Bombay on account of the Boycott movement—the latter holding that it was perfectly ridiculous to overthrow the influence of the sober heads of the Congress, and to instal themselves in their place. But the event has shown that the party carried no weight whatever outside its immediate circle. The first resolution proposed to be taken at the Congress was

one welcoming their Royal Highnesses the Prince and Princess of Wales. When the matter was brought up in the Subjects Committee, Messrs. Lajpat Rai and Tilak strongly opposed it. Madras, Bombay and United Provinces were solidly in favour of it, and even Bengal refrained from joining hands with the dissentients.

As soon as the above article appeared in the Bombay paper, vituperations from the local press, of which vernacular papers were most vocal, started pouring upon its correspondent. Abuse was flung on opponents and Anglo-Indians. Old friends were disowned and distrusted. But facts stood as facts as is evident from the letter of one Maneckji Kawasji Patel published in the same paper on the 26th January, 1906:

Sir, I honestly feel that great injustice is being done to the correspondent, who, in a recent issue of your paper, said that Messrs. Tilak and Lajpat Rai had opposed in the Subjects Committee the resolution to welcome the Prince. The said statement of your correspondent has been vehemently called into question by the *Maratha* and the *Indu Prakash*. Now, sir, as I was present in both the meetings of the Subjects Committee and had listened to the speeches with the greatest attention, and could testify to the truth of the statement made by your correspondent, I wonder why men who call themselves patriots and express their views most emphatically in the meetings of the Subjects Committee are afraid to come forward and own the attitude taken to shield them by putting forth false versions of the matter. Without being guilty of betraying any Congress secret, I may say that the resolution in question was most strongly opposed by Messrs. Lajpat Rai and Tilak much to the disgust of sober-minded members of the Subjects Committee.

Contrary to the advice of the Congress at Benares, however, the Extremists did not fail to start the much-debated Boycott Movement in Bengal, and when, in December 1906, it met in Calcutta, the movement was in full swing. By that time also they had acquired considerable strength within the ranks of the organisation. In the midst of the atmosphere, created for the Congress in Bengal, the Moderates found themselves completely helpless and Extremists' demand, that Boycott should be made the official policy of the

Congress, could not be resisted. Ambika Charan Mozumdar moved the resolution, "that having regard to the fact that the people of this country have little or no voice in its administration, and that their representations do not receive due consideration, this Congress is of opinion that the Boycott Movement inaugurated in Bengal by way of protest against the partition of that province was and is legitimate." Bepin Chandra Pal seconded it in a vigorous speech and said that it was not a mere boycott of goods but one of honorary offices and associations with the government in East Bengal. Not one leader of the people would associate with the Lieutenant-Governor in any legislative work. The elders, dumb-found, however, declared that "they were not bound by individual speeches."

For the first time in the history of the Congress reason fell in its fight with sentiment, and frenzy and fanaticism blinded the intelligence. For the first time the East unlearnt the lesson taught to it through the ages that it had to deal with the West. A bid for power ensued and National Congress became a house divided within itself, and already not national in character ceased to be national in its outlook. In the words of Mrs. Annie Besant, the strongest and farthest-sighted men were to hold their old ideals of constitutional work and steady progress. Others, maddened by the repressive measures adopted, were to cause a partition worse than that of Lord Curzon, a division of the National Party, one part holding to the group that refused to despair of appealing to the House of Commons, and the other which became frankly antagonistic to all co-operation with the British Government. And beyond these loomed up the Anarchist Party with the bomb and revolver for its methods, the incarnation of blind hatred, without constructive policy, the mad efforts of lads, dreaming of winning liberty for their country, and succeeding only in committing a few useless crimes.

The events described in the foregoing pages had brought home to the Muslims of India the weight and worth of the sayings of a man, who, a few years ago, had warned them of the dangers of the coming events. He had envisaged that sooner or later the movement started by the Congress must inevitably resolve itself into one meant for the revival of ancient traditions, which would ultimately tend towards the Hindu conception of life and Hindu philosophy, in view, especially, of the unique position the Hindus had come to

occupy with the advent of European education and democratic institutions. His apprehensions were not wholly unjustified in view of the activities already started by a section of powerful and influential individuals, whose utterances both in public and private had amply convinced Sir Saiyid Ahmad that things might stand in the end against the interests of Muslims, and a time might come when the "national" movement would not be safe in the hands of these men. He thought that it might be then too late for Muslims to recede from their position. He had, therefore, asked them to keep out of the movement. The whole burden of Sir Saiyid's policy was, that the bulk of Indian Muslims, disorganised as it was at the time, could not under the circumstances carry weight with its opinion. Their salvation lay in organising themselves through education, through study and through social reform and then taking part in public affairs *en bloc,* after eliciting the popular will of Muslim India. For this purpose he founded the M.A.O. College at Aligarh, Muslim Educational Conference and Defence Conference.

In the year 1906, therefore, when the national politics passed on to the hands of those who refused to look beyond the domain of their qualified patriotism, the Muslim leaders thought that they could no longer hold their breath and a lead must be given to establish Muslim rights and interests. In Dacca, at the time the meeting of the Muslim Educational Conference was being held and on the 30th December, 1906, after its regular sittings, a number of Muslims met under the chairmanship of Nawab Viqarul Mulk to consider their future.

The Nawab of Dacca introduced the resolution of the day in a lengthy speech and said that a special necessity exerted for increased political activity. They had, however, been dragged into the political arena, on account of the new political institutions that had been forced on them by the inauguration of the British Rule in India. Had the Party in power in England been familiar with the position of Muslims, and had Indian public men represented justly the Muslim claims, the movement might perhaps not have been heard of, but quiet, unobtrusive work was at a discount as only those who cried loudest had a chance of being heard. The Muslims, thus, were forced against their own wishes to abandon their traditional policy in order to secure an easement of the very real disabilities and avoid

the danger to their interests which were neglected whilst other Indians benefited. A strong provincial committee was formed with Nawab Mohsinul Mulk and Nawab Viqarul Mulk as Joint Secretaries, to frame a constitution within four months and to authorise and convene a representative meeting of Indian Muslims at a suitable time and place and put the constitution before that body for its final approval and adoption. In this way was founded the great Muslim political organisation—The All-India Muslim League.

Hindu leaders were quick to suggest that the League was merely a lever encouraged by British statesmen to be used against the Indian Congress. Attack followed attack and denunciation was supplemented by denunciation. It was the result of the influence to which the Congress was subjected at the time. Sober-minded leaders, however, had not lost hope and even though they had found it difficult to handle the unwieldy extremist element, they believed that the situation had not deteriorated so much as to have gone entirely out of their control. They were sure that better counsels would prevail. The small number of Muslim Congressmen, therefore, remained with them and to this section belonged Mohammad Ali Jinnah, faithful and loyal to his creed.

The twenty-third National Congress adjourned at Surat met at Madras in December 1908, and Mohammad Ali Jinnah played his rightful role as one of the supporters of the most important resolutions, concerning the future constitution of India as envisaged in Lord Morley's Despatch. He had now come to occupy a unique position both as a rising lawyer and an ardent patriot.

This period registers an important landmark in the life of Jinnah. There were conflicting forces in operation. On the one hand the forces of bureaucratic rule were active; on the other a set of sincere British politicians were busy working in the larger interests of the peoples of India, though not altogether unmindful of their own imperialistic aims. Mischief was being wrought by the Extremists. India at large was apathetic and inert owing to gross poverty and ignorance. The peoples were divided and sub-divided amongst themselves. The hope, therefore, was centred upon the intelligentsia growing in number, who would ultimately be responsible to bring about steady progress for the better administration of the country. In the opinion of Jinnah, there was no royal road to progress.

Steady and sustained effort was indispensable. Stark realities had got to be faced. Difficulties existing in the shape of various problems that prevented the combination of various elements for a concerted and united action had to be overcome, and salvation lay in the education of mind and thought, both of the individual and of the bulk of the population. A spirit of sacrifice had to be infused in the individual and the people had to be rallied round to a common ideal.

The experience of Surat Congress had brought home to him various factors. It was no use ignoring and denying the existence of active sections of opinion. The Extremists must be brought round to the point of view of constitutional progress and Hindus must learn to coalesce with Muslims. The individual must develop a high type of character and an intense feeling of nationality must be cultivated by the whole country. Failure was never a discouraging factor, for out of it would come the strength which would accomplish great tasks. All resources must be exploited. An untiring devotion to the cause with just and reasonable aims was a force that admitted no defeat.

It was about this time, under the new reforms, that the Government of India, for the first time in the history of the British Rule, condescended to appoint one Indian Member to the Viceroy's Executive Council. The news sent a thrill of joy among those who welcomed even the slightest symptom of progress towards Indianisation of the administration. The portfolio of Law was thrown open and the choice was restricted only to lawyers of standing. It was thought that S. P. Sinha, a flourishing lawyer of Bengal, would be acceptable to the Viceroy. But in view of his enormous legal practice Sinha was not inclined to accept a far less remunerative post. The onus of convincing Sinha was thrown on Gokhale and Jinnah. Gokhale was then the founder-member of the Servants of India Society and Jinnah had established himself well as a lawyer in Bombay. The two set out for Calcutta and argued with Sinha for considerable time. "It would be a pity," said Gokhale, "if no Indian could be found suitable for the job. The Government of India would then be justified in saying that Indians are not fit for higher posts. You should accept the responsibility at least for some time. We want to establish a precedent, after which it will be difficult for the British

to go back." All this, however, would not appeal to Sinha. Two months elapsed in this battle of wits. Gokhale refused to return until he had finally extracted a promise from Sinha. But the patience of the younger colleague was exhausted and one day he took Sinha to task.

"Do you think," said Jinnah, "we are fools to waste our time like that? Do you think Gokhale is a fool to draw only seventy-five rupees from the Servants of India Society? Is he not capable of earning more? Do you think I am not losing my practice in Bombay owing to my being absent from my work? What are we begging of you for? Do you think it is something for our own personal good? We agree that you lose much but you may resume your practice after you have served for some time on the Executive Council in the interest of your country and your people." This reprimand disarmed poor Sinha and he at last agreed to serve as the first Indian Law Member for a period of a few months. The story illustrates how difficult it was to practise and pursue even patriotism in India, and to establish the claims of public good over individual convenience.

CHAPTER III

Constructive Politics

Armed with success and recognition the dynamic spirit of Jinnah was set afoot to realise the dream of his mind and he busied himself, with all the forces at his command, to muster round to one ideal—the conflicting opinions of the time, finally serving as a "cross-bencher, at the Conference of Hindu and Muslim leaders convened at Allahabad in 1910, under Sir William Wedderburn's direction to consider an *entente cordiale* between the two communities still so sharply divided by a gulf of mutual dislike and distrust."[1] Unfortunately, the Allahabad conference of which much was expected did not produce the desired result. The unbending attitude of the Hindu leaders disappointed the Muslims.

During the sessions of the Congress in 1910, it is interesting to note that Mohammad Ali Jinnah was the prime mover of the Resolution deprecating the extension or application of the principle of Separate Communal Electorates to Municipalities, District Boards or other Local Bodies. He, however, did not fail to say that the Resolution embodied his own views. In the same year, he was elected a member of the deputation that was to wait upon His Excellency the Viceroy of India to place before him the Congress point of view.

In the autumn of 1909, Mohammad Ali Jinnah had been elected by the Muslims of Bombay Presidency as their representative to the Supreme Legislative Council. The circumstances that led to his election are amusing and perhaps he himself was unaware of them. Two Knights from Bombay had quarrelled among themselves as to

1. Mrs. Sarojini Naidu: *Ambassador of Unity.*

who was the rightful representative of the Muslim interests. Each claimed the sole right of the honour. The issue had to be decided. Discussions went on for days and, in the end, they decided that none of them should seek election, but should send in a third candidate, and after careful scrutiny the choice fell on the "young noisy lawyer." The atmosphere under which these elections took place is best described by Shahani, the biographer of Gokhale.

"The Hindu-Muslim tension, already growing at an alarming pace, reached the utmost limit when the Hindus found their Muslim brethren favoured a little more than themselves under the Reforms Scheme. Gokhale had made it perfectly clear in his political creed that the interests of the minorities must be safeguarded to the utmost; and though he now found that Lord Morley had given his Muslim friends even more than what Lord Minto had at first proposed or than what he himself had thought legitimate, he refused to have any quarrel with what they had actually received. He was never weary of reminding his Hindu brethren that the present political position of the country did not allow them to wrangle among themselves: Hindus and Muslims together even were too few to obtain from the Government all that they wished for the amelioration of the country. This tone of moderation was very much appreciated by the enlightened Muslims who, to accord them full justice, recognised in Gokhale a leader of all India, regardless of any particular creed or caste and therefore a majority of them unswervingly supported him in his work on the Supreme Council and outside." Among these enlightened Muslims Jinnah stood foremost.

Immediately after his election the young Muslim representative had his first encounter with the President of the Council, Lord Minto. The debate on the Resolution on Indentured Labour for Natal came up on the 25th of February. The following is the extract from the proceedings:

The Hon. Mr. M. A. Jinnah: My Lord, I beg to support the Resolution that has been placed before the Council. The Hon'ble the mover put the question before the Council so clearly and concisely that there is very little left for any one else to say. But the importance of this question requires that at least some of us should say a few words and express our feelings on this Resolution. If I may say at the outset, it is a most painful question—a

question which has roused the feelings of all classes in this country to the highest pitch of indignation and horror at the harsh and cruel treatment that is meted out to Indians in South Africa.

His Excellency the President (*Lord Minto*): I must call the Hon'ble gentleman to order. I think that is rather too strong a word, 'cruelty.' The Hon'ble Member must remember that he is talking of a friendly part of the Empire, and he must really adapt his language to the circumstances.

The Hon. Mr. M. A. Jinnah: Well, my Lord, I should feel inclined to use much stronger language, but I am fully aware of the constitution of this Council, and I do not wish to trespass for one single moment, but I do say this, that the treatment that is meted out to Indians is the harshest which can possibly be imagined, and, as I said before, the feeling in this country is unanimous.

Such a bold stand on the part of a non-official elected member was unheared of. The local press displayed the news in headlines, and Jinnah became public favourite. But the two Knights of Bombay regretted having made a wrong choice.

The parliamentary genius of Mohammad Ali Jinnah manifested itself from the earliest times. During the course of a debate on the Resolution tabled by Babu Bhupendra Nath Basu, in the Imperial Legislative Council in March 1912, on the subject of Police Administration, Jinnah's short and pithy speech conveying vividly his attitude towards the Resolution was characteristic. Basu's Resolution really consisted of two parts, one dealing with Police Administration and the other with amendments to the Law of Confession. In both these matters inquiry through a Commission was demanded. On rising to speak, Jinnah made it clear at the outset that he did not wish to enter into any controversy either of a racial, national or personal character, and thought that it was not desirable that questions coming before the House should be viewed from that angle. The problem was primarily one affecting the administration of the country, and whether there was a particular evil that was to be remedied or a particular system that was to be altered. He, therefore, said he was going to deal with the Resolution purely on its merits. Basu had given a long list of the evils of the Police system.

Jinnah wanted to add one more from Bombay and he pointed out how a nobleman, the Chief of Hoti, was implicated in a case of abduction and was refused bail by the Presidency Magistrate, and how after being committed to the Sessions the Advocate-General had to withdraw the prosecution and how the presiding Judge made the severest remarks against the Police of the Northern India observing that such a case should never have been brought before that Court. He, therefore, agreed with the Resolution that a Commission must be appointed to inquire into the evils. As to the second part of the Resolution, he said he failed to understand the point of view of Basu. He cited two instances from the Madras and Bombay High Courts concerning the Law of Confession and opined that a Commission was not necessary but the Council and the Law Member were quite capable to deal with any legal flaws in the matter. "Why usurp this Council," concluded Jinnah, "of its proper functions and leave a matter of this kind to a Commission, when we can do that ourselves here?"

The opening sentences of Jinnah's speech in April 1912 during the sessions of the Imperial Legislative Council in support of Gokhale's Elementary Education Bill were characteristic again.

He said, "I do not think that anybody in this Council can deny the paramount importance of this measure. It has been said that this Bill is going to be thrown out. It is very often said in this Council that unless Government are willing to accept any Resolution or any measure, it cannot be passed in this Council. Now I, for one, do not wish in any way to taunt Government in this matter. In the Council, as it is constituted now, we know perfectly well that the intention is not that in this Council we can defeat the Government and replace the Government Bench by the people of this country, by non-official members. In the Council, as it is constituted now, it is well understood that it is impossible to appeal to the Council and ask them to vote on any resolution or measure according to their own convictions; but the sole function of the non-official members—a minority—is only to express their views on all questions that came before this Council. That being the sole function to which I am reduced here, I think that on an important measure of this character I should not give my silent vote, but should express my views and give my reasons in support of this Bill. I regret very much that some of

my countrymen are opposed to this Bill. Well, sir, it is our misfortune that there should be this difference of opinion. One thing I can assure this Council of and that is this, that a great and overwhelming majority of my people are with me. When I was speaking on the Marriage Bill the other day, I frankly and openly admitted that the majority of my people were opposed to that measure. But my innermost convictions were in favour of that measure, and I felt it my duty to support the motion. In the same spirit I ask those who are opposed to this Bill to concede to me that the great majority of my countrymen, Hindus and Muslims, are in favour of and support the Bill. That being so, sir, I have a double satisfaction, not only my innermost convictions are in favour of the Bill, which shall always be the first and foremost consideration with me either in opposing or supporting a measure, but I have the additional happiness that even the opinion of my countrymen, of the majority of them, is in favour of it.

"... My friend the Hon'ble Nawab Abdul Majid has said that there will be strikes and there will be Socialists amongst us, and I think the Hon'ble Nawab Majid brought in the political danger that if you give education they will become agitators. Well, sir, I honestly and sincerely appeal to the Government. Do you really think that education means sedition? I say, sir, that a frank and independent criticism of the Government or the measures of the Government is the duty of every member of the State. But let me tell you that you have no better friends in this country—I mean the friends of the Government—than the educated classes of this country. But, if I may say so, we love the British Government, we love our country more. We come forward and criticise the Government. We say, 'You are going wrong. It may be we are wrong: It does not follow because we say you are wrong therefore you are wrong.' But surely fair, free and independent criticisms of the Government do not constitute sedition."

In conclusion he argued that the proposition before the House for the moment was that the Bill in question should be referred to the Select Committee and, therefore, he did not wish to indulge in any controversy, but he thought that certain requirements would be necessary in the interest of Muslims in their current state and condition. "Therefore, I will rest content," said he, "by saying this, that

if this Bill were referred to the Select Committee, and if this Bill did not provide for certain requirements and modifications which I think are just in the interests of the Muslims, I would certainly then be the first to oppose it. But the present state of this Bill is a motion to refer it to the Select Committee and that motion I have no hesitation in supporting."

The above extracts of the speech throw a beam of light over a subject of vital importance which arose out of that ill-fated word—Nationalism. This great Muslim leader—the future hope of Muslim India—in the midst of his staunch nationalistic views did not exclude those essential features of justice and fairplay, which pervade all true sentiments of nationalism. His alliance with the Indian National Congress was in the pious hope that he could do much more for the Muslims from within the Congress than from without. He believed that the destinies of his people were linked with the rest of India's population and that by India's political progress, Muslims were bound to profit. He was not one of those who indulged in a whirlwind of catchwords and phrases. Instead he kept his eyes open to the realities of life. The backwardness of Muslims had to be faced, and exceptions had to be made to accommodate necessities.

The natural powers of analysis and the deep knowledge of law that this great man possessed are qualities which were universally recognised in him even by his severest adversaries. His speeches in the Imperial Legislative Council in 1913 in connection with the Indian Extradition Bill and the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Bill illustrate how much interest he had taken from the very beginning in the shaping and interpretation of law. His alacrity to do something substantially good for his people and the studied interest with which he took part in the Council debates, won him the praises of all his contemporaries at all times. The following extract of his speech in connection with the Criminal Law Amendment Bill is an example.

"Sir, I want first of all to put it before the Council very clearly that nobody more readily would respond to that appeal that has come from the Home Member than I would; also I wish to express that nobody condemns in stronger terms the misdeeds of which a long list was given to us a few minutes ago by the Home Member. I also wish to express that every attempt on the part of my country-

men to undermine the authority of the Government and to disturb law and order, in my opinion, deserves the strongest condemnation and the highest punishment. Those men who have a desire to undermine the authority of the Government, those men who have a desire to disturb law and order, are, in my opinion, the biggest enemies of my country and my people . . .

"The Hon'ble Home Member said: ' We have got cause, we have considered our position, and we ask the Council to take us on trust and support the Government.' Having regard to the position that I have described, I have no alternative, sir, but to take the Government on trust on this occasion. I, therefore, think, sir, that so far as the principle of this Bill is concerned I am not in a position to resist it."

The professors of the so-called puritan type of nationalism must undoubtedly have characterised such a declaration as an outcome of a reactionary mind. But happily in the good old days patriotism and national spirit were not the monopoly of a selected few. The reason why Jinnah escaped general criticism was that the aim before him was, as it had always been, public solidarity and it had to be achieved at all costs. For that end he would rather sacrifice the liberty of a few individuals, who in his opinion had been a source of friction, than impair the possibility of realising the larger liberties. Not that he was not sorry for those who were affected, but he could not help it. Jinnah maintained that it was necessary for India's safety and progress that friendly relations should be maintained with the rulers, and anarchist risings would be detrimental to a cordial atmosphere.

He, however, was not prepared to let India go unrewarded for his liberal attitude. He wanted this noble feeling to be reciprocated. The following extract from the same debate is worth mentioning:

"Sir, I will again say that this is a very serious moment—a moment at which I do not think it would be right for us in any way to embarrass the Government, but there is one thing which I wish to say, that just as there are in India certain people who are responsible for a great deal of mischief, so you have certain people who claim to be supporters of or belong to the rank and file of Government, who are also responsible for a great deal of mischief." He, then, drew attention to an article published in *The Times*, London, and continued, "The article is levelled against those stalwart men,

those patriots who head the Congress and have been serving their country. I say, sir, that I am proud that I belong to the Congress Party. That such an article should be written with these insinuation and these aspersions is likely to cause as much mischief as anything that I can think of."

Jinnah thereafter read out the extract and said, "Now, sir, the threat is held out to us that we must find out the culprit. If we do not find out the culprit our political institutions must be suspended."

The President: "I am very loath to interrupt the Hon'ble Member but he has quoted a document which is not a Government document and one which in no way pledges the Government or the policy of the Government."

Jinnah: "Yes, sir, I know that, but I only wish to point out that there is this kind of mischief going on. My appeal to the Government is this—I want the Government to take and give expression to the views, that just as you wish us to co-operate with you, just as you expect us to stand by you, in the same way you must stand by us and condemn those who are creating this mischief—just as you condemn those among us who are guilty of misdeeds, just as you expect us to join and co-operate with you in condemning our own men who are guilty of misdeeds, so you must condemn your men who are also guilty of misdeeds."

The fact that Mohammad Ali Jinnah was specially nominated to the Council by the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, for an extra term in 1913 to enable him to introduce the famous Wakf Validating Bill, bears testimony that his extraordinary abilities as a Councillor did not go unheeded. In the words of Mrs. Sarojini Naidu, his admirable skill and tact in piloting through such an intricate and controversial measure—the first instance of a Bill passing into legislation on the motion of a private member—won him not only the appreciation of his colleagues but also the first meed of general recognition from his co-religionists all over India, who, while still regarding him a little outside the orthodox pale of Islam, were so soon to seek his advice and guidance in their political affairs.

On the 11th of March, 1913, on the 30th day of its sittings, Jinnah appeared in Bombay as a witness before the Public Service Commission, presided over by Lord Islington—a chapter which will

always remain memorable in the annals of his valuable and constructive contribution towards the welfare of his people.

The march of time was working its subtle influences over the mind of Muslim India. On the one hand prominent Hindu leaders assisted by influential Muslims were discussing the feasibility of a working settlement between the two great national groups for the salvation of the country as a whole. Although the Allahabad Conference of 1910 had ended without any tangible results the leaders had not lost hope of an ultimate union. On the other hand the Royal Proclamation announced the annulment of the Partition of Bengal. This unique move on the part of the British Government, in spite of their professions that Partition was a "settled fact," explained the policy underlying the award in the reform of 1909 of a few concessions to Muslim representation in the Councils, against which Hindus and the National Congress had not failed to raise a protest. The annulment was celebrated throughout the length and breadth of India by Hindus. The Royal Proclamation naturally destroyed Muslim confidence in British intentions, and the occasion was fully exploited by Hindus to their benefit.

Side by side with this, however, certain events in the European international situation were causing much anxiety. Balkan Provinces had made a successful attempt to free themselves from the influence of the Ottoman Empire. In this they were greatly helped by England and Russia. This and the ruthless eradication of the Young Turk Movement by the Sultan with British help had aggravated Muslim public excitement. In 1912, Dr. Ansari led a medical mission to Turkey. The powerful pens of Maulana Shibli Nomani, Maulana Mohammad Ali and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad were inviting their fellowmen to keep themselves awake, and a gradual growth of political consciousness was unveiling itself.

On the other hand, the Muslim intelligentsia had been dazzled by the growing power of the dominantly Hindu organisation—the Indian National Congress. It was felt that no other organisation, however powerful, could ever combat the forces of the Congress, and that it was best to regulate Muslim politics both from within and without the Congress. Side by side, a set of strong men, both Hindus and Muslims, were busy in bringing about a union of minds between themselves. for a common ideal and a common platform

in order to secure political freedom for India. These men toiling incessantly had succeeded a great deal in easing the situation. Hindus and Muslims had now come closer—the former, because an opportunity had presented itself when they could win the favour of the Muslims, and the latter, because they had lost all faith in the British. An atmosphere of trust was created and Hindus and Muslims were now willing to reciprocate confidence in each other, for their vital interests. Among these men were included Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Gopal Krishna Gokhale who were constantly at work with a remarkable sincerity of purpose.

In 1910 and 1911, the Council of the All-India Muslim League had recommended a radical change in the constitution of the League. Mohammad Ali Jinnah was invited to attend the meetings and requested to address them. Discussions went on for a couple of years and after careful consideration it was decided during the exciting sessions of the League held in Lucknow in 1913 to adopt the ideal of the "attainment under the aegis of the British Crown of a system of self-government suitable to India through constitutional means, by bringing about, amongst others, a steady reform of the existing system of administration by promoting national unity, by fostering public spirit among the people of India, and by co-operation with other communities for the said purpose."

It is noteworthy that, as early as 1913, the League had desisted from placing before itself any model, either on the lines of Western institutions or otherwise, for the future Constitution of India. The colonial form of government embodied in the creed of the Congress did not find favour with the League. The idea of self-government was left vague, to be shaped and moulded according to the turn of events. The League creed was incorporated at the suggestion of Jinnah himself.

Jinnah's influence, however, is more vividly felt by a glance over the following resolution that the League adopted:

> The All-India Muslim League places on record its firm belief that the future development and progress of the people of India depend on the harmonious working and co-operation of the various communities and hopes that leaders of both sides will periodically meet together to find a *modus operandi* for joint and concerted action in questions of public good.

The service that Mohammad Ali Jinnah had been rendering to India in general and to the cause of Hindu-Muslim unity in particular had attracted the attention of both the Hindu and Muslim intelligentsia. His ardent patriotism and love of unity earned for him from his senior colleague, Gokhale, a tribute which would always stand out in the records of India's political history, proclaiming his creditable share to the cause. "He has true stuff in him," said Gokhale, "and that freedom from all sectarian prejudice which will make him the best ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity." Scores of admirers were drawn towards him, and as he himself told the author once, no non-Muslim could claim so much intimacy with Hindu life as he could. He had recourse to the most sacred parts of the Hindu household including the kitchen and in most cases he was regarded a member of the family. Perhaps the most ardent of Jinnah's admirers was Mrs. Sarojini Naidu. "Never was there a nature whose outer qualities provided so complete an antithesis of its inner worth. Tall and stately, but thin to the point of emaciation, languid and luxurious of habit, Mohammad Ali Jinnah's attenuated form is the deceptive sheath of a spirit of exceptional vitality and endurance."

Having won to his credit a universal recognition and admiration at home Jinnah proceeded to Europe in the middle of April 1913, in search of a long, idle holiday, with Gokhale for fellow traveller. But "once in England, however, there was no rest for this tireless worker. He was at once drawn into the tangled web of the Indian student world whose cause he espoused with such assiduous zeal and understanding. Within a few weeks of his arrival he founded the London Indian Association which formed so excellent a focus for the otherwise scattered energies and activities of Young India in foreign land; and it was mainly at his instance that a committee was appointed by the India Office to inquire into the legitimate grievances of Indian students suffering so keenly from an unnecessary and unaccountable set of new rules and restrictions hindering their admission into educational centres hitherto so hospitable and so easy of access."[2]

2. The above quotation is from Mrs. Sarojini Naidu. The reviewer in *Islamic Culture* writes as follows:

"Mr. Saiyid says that Jinnah founded the London Indian Association in April 1913. This is not correct, as the Association was functioning even in 1912, and the compiler of this review actually held the membership of the Executive Committee,

A public meeting was held on the 28th of June, 1913, at the Caxton Hall, Westminster, to discuss a scheme for the establishment of a Central Association in London for Indian students. Addressing the gathering, Jinnah said, he had done his best to make himself acquainted with the feelings of Indian students. In his opinion they were suffering from what he might call the bane of India, the caste system—a system which, admirable though it might have been when initiated, was now responsible for the backwardness of their country.

The Indian student class resident in England was typically representative of the best their country could produce, and their action and conduct reflected upon their country. They were, so to speak, the custodians of the reputation of India. Unfortunately at the time, so far as the British public was concerned, they had not a good name. Instead of conducting themselves merely as students and learning all they could of the civilisation which the British people had taken centuries to build up, they had been tempted to use strong language and take strong action in the political field.

He reminded them that they were scarcely competent to deal with the political problems presented before their country. Nobody appreciated more than he did, the honesty of their purpose or the patriotism which had induced them to do what they had done; but it was time for them seriously to consider their position. To take part in politics would simply be to injure their position as students.

What then was the proposed association to do? Through this association, he declared, they could get rid of the exclusiveness which was the outcome of having many different clubs and societies. By communion with one another, by the exchange of ideas, they would understand one another better, they would widen their outlook, and make themselves fit for the more responsible duties which would fall on them when they returned home.

With these hopes Mohammad Ali Jinnah founded the Central Association for his young countrymen. Here was a clear indication

and was the Secretary in 1912, Vice-President in 1913 and had the honour of being its President in 1914. He was thus in close touch with the London Indian Association from 1911 to 1914 and it is strange that the author should suggest that the Association did not exist before Jinnah's visit to London in April 1913."

Obviously Mrs. Naidu has confused London Indian Association with the Students Central Association at London the account of which is given subsequently. Hence the discrepancy.

as to what were his views regarding students taking part in practical politics—views which since then hardly saw any change.

On the eve of his departure for India in the autumn of 1913, he was formally enrolled a member of the All-India Muslim League, at the express desire of his friends, Maulana Mohammad Ali and Saiyid Wazir Hasan, who also happened to be in England in connection with the League work. "Typical of his exquisite, if somewhat exigent sense of honour, is it to find that even so simple an incident partook of something like a sacrament. His two sponsors were required to make a solemn preliminary covenant that loyalty to the Muslim League and the Muslim interest would in no way and at no time imply even the shadow of disloyalty to the larger national cause to which his life was dedicated."[3]

Back in India Mohammad Ali Jinnah once again found himself amid the intricate problems which his country had in store for him. The growing anxiety of Muslims, on the one hand, regarding the Turkish situation which had found an echo even in the presidential address of the Congress (the President happened to be a Muslim at the time), and the inefficiency of public administration, on the other, were questions that required his immediate attention.

On the 27th December, 1913, in the sessions of the All-India National Congress at Karachi, Bhupendra Nath Basu moved a resolution welcoming the adoption by the Muslim League of the ideal of self-government for India, and the declaration of the necessity of harmonious co-operation. Basu said that Hindus and Muslims must concentrate their attention on the one united ideal, for the India of the day was not the India of the Hindus or the Muslims, nor of the Anglo-Indians, much less of the Europeans, but the India in which all had a share. "If there had been misunderstandings in the past, let us forget them." If they were united "the India of the future will be stronger, nobler, greater, higher, and a brighter India than was realised by Asoka in the plenitude of his power, a better India than was revealed to Akbar in the wildest of his visions."

The reward due to an honest worker came to Mohammad Ali Jinnah. He himself was the prime mover of the resolution dealing with the reform of the India Council. Taking great pride in the fact that he was speaking from a platform in the city of his birth, he explained to the audience that the Council of the Secretary of State

3. Mrs. Naidu.

for India was composed of officials and was divided into several groups as committees, performing functions allocated to them. One objection—and that was the strongest in his opinion—was that the Council was entirely composed of officials who went from India. This, in his opinion, impeded the progress of the country. Indian public opinion did not find a place in the Council. He proposed that the functions of the Council should be purely advisory and not administrative, and that the salary of the Secretary of State for India should be debited to Britain, so that he should be responsible to Parliament.

The year saw Mohammad Ali Jinnah contributing his mite to the cause of India's welfare both as a staunch member of the Congress and as an influential Leaguer. The intimate knowledge that he showed with the working of the India Council, during the preceding sessions of the Congress and the Agra sessions of the League, won him a place in the Congress delegation that was to proceed to England concerning the proposed reforms of the Council and in the month of May 1914 he returned to England.

In a country where personal element forms an integral part of public success, it was no small compliment to Jinnah's social as well as mental qualities that he was chosen to be the spokesman of articulate India before the representatives of the British Parliament and the British public. The leading English journals published numerous interviews and his concise and lucid statement of the Indian case which appeared in *The Times* attracted widespread attention and comment.

At the moment the Council was composed of ten members. Two were financial experts, and the rest, who were nominated by the Secretary of State, were connected with the administration of India. Although Lord Morley had recognised that anybody who could give first-hand information on Indian matters to his Council would prove a very desirable member of that body, and although he gave effect to that view by appointing two Indian members, and while they had done excellent work, and had tried, to the best of their ability and judgment, to place the views of the Indian peoples before the Council, something more was desired. It was necessary that the Secretary of State should be kept in intimate touch with the trend of public opinion in India. Men who were connected with the admin-

istration and were brought up in the service were debarred by virtue of the rules of that very service from attending political meetings, and thereby obtaining the clear insight which was necessary for them to adequately represent Indian opinion. Jinnah wanted men who were in touch with public feeling and acquainted with public sentiment and public opinion. How were they to secure representatives of this character? His suggestion was to introduce the principle of election, and that the Council should consist of a minimum number of nine members—one-third of whom should be elected Indians. The principle of election had already been recognised over and over again in regard to this Council. But the difficulty was to form the electorates. He quite agreed that the problem presented great difficulty in times gone by, but now they had a ready-made electorate in the elected members of the Provincial Councils.

As to the character of the Council, Jinnah's suggestion was that it should be advisory and not administrative. There should be no portfolio system as it would mean duplicating the machinery and reducing the Secretary of State to a mere figure-head. No distinction should be made between the Indian members of the Council and their colleagues. The period of appointment should be five years. While it was necessary to have men who could place the public point of view before the Secretary of State, he proposed that one-third of the Council should consist of the official class, one-third of the non-official class, and the remaining one-third should be men of merit and ability in public life in the United Kingdom unconnected with the Indian administration. This third would hold the balance between the two other sections. They would bring to bear upon the deliberations of the Council that independent judgment which was so characteristic of public men in England. If these proposals were accepted, there would be a Council composed of three different groups—each specialising in a different branch, but all helping the deliberations of the Council. The Secretary of State for India, to whatever political party he belonged, had always been a British statesman who had done his best for India; but even the best of men required some kind of control and check. The Secretary of State, no doubt, was responsible to Parliament and the British public in theory, but in practice he was not really responsible and what was finally suggested was that his salary should be placed upon the

British estimates. In that case there would be real effective control by Parliament.

But soon came the disillusionment and in an interview to *The Times*, Jinnah declared: "Now that the Bill to amend the laws as to the Council of India has been introduced and gone through its first reading, I cannot but say that the provisions contained therein are most disappointing, and I feel sure that, that is how the people of India will receive it. What hope can measures like this inspire in the people of India who are looking forward to bigger and more substantial reform in time to come when in matters such as the reform of the Council of the Secretary of State for India, which is, after all, more advisory in its character than anything else, the just proposals of the deputation appointed by the Indian National Congress have not been accepted?"

The Congress delegation returned to India by the end of the year and found an echo of its services in the thanks of the Congress during the Madras sessions held in December 1914.

Since the foundation of the Students' Association in London and his pronouncements regarding the political affairs of India, outlined above, Mohammad Ali Jinnah was hailed as a leader of the young Muslims and as early as February 1915, he had been singled out by the Muslim students of Bombay to inaugurate the Muslim Students' Union—an honour which in itself did justice to the immense service he had rendered to his nation. The incident bears out the fact that he was, even at that time, as much recognised as a Muslim leader as one interested in the general welfare of the country. But from this platform also he reminded his fellow countrymen that the primary aim he had set before him and to which he had devoted his life was to unite the hearts of his peoples. His speech at the Union on this occasion was not only a lesson to his young followers but also an announcement tending a great deal towards self-revelation. He opened his heart to them and appealed to them to be instrumental in furthering the aim of his life. The mere fact, he said, that this Union was formed was a distinct sign of progress so far as the Muslims were concerned.

CHAPTER IV

Unity and Disunity

In July 1914, the Great War broke out and while Germany was knocking at the doors of France, the Indian troops sent to the front by Lord Hardinge had proved to be a great asset to the Allied Powers. While, therefore, the services of the Indian soldiery were being appreciated by the rulers, the ruled, at home, feeling proud of the help they had given, were asking for more concessions and higher political status. Both the Congress and the Muslim League were vocal in demanding the fulfilment of their ideals, which embodied practically the same principle. The one blessing that the Great War of 1914 brought to India was that it facilitated the work of those who had taken to heart, and were constantly busy in fermenting that essential union of purpose among the conflicting sections of public opinion, which is necessary for all concerted action.

The differences between the Extremists—who now styled themselves as "Nationalists"—and Moderates, within the fold of the Congress had not been made up. Mrs. Annie Besant and Subha Rao were active in reconciling the two groups. But Tilak's stiff attitude and his determination to have his own way would not, however, let them proceed with any success. Muslim League politics also were not satisfactory. Maulana Mohammad Ali, Maulana Shaukat Ali, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad were voicing the feelings of Muslim India regarding the international question, which Turkey's intervention in the war on the side of Germany had raised. While, therefore, the Extremists—both Hindus and Muslims—remained indifferent, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, once more, made an

attempt to bring the Congress and the League together. His efforts in this direction had already been fruitful to a considerable extent. The success that he met at the Karachi sessions of the Congress and the Agra sessions of the League gave him much courage.

In 1915 the Congress was to hold the sessions at Bombay. Jinnah, supported by all the leading local Muslims, sent an invitation to the All-India Muslim League to hold its annual sessions at the same place and during the same time. It was a unique idea unknown in the history of Indian patriotism, enough to shake the foundations of suspicious officialdom. In an hour of such grave and bitter crisis, as Mrs. Naidu points out, calculated to shatter the masterdream of Indian nationalism, this dauntless soldier of unity rose to the heights of invincible patriotism. With a proud and splendid indifference to all personal suffering and sacrifice, heedless alike of official dissuasion or disfavour, the aggressive malice and machinations of his opponents or even the temporary injustice of distant friends, Mohammad Ali Jinnah strove with incomparable devotion and courage.

There were at the time two distinct groups against the Bombay sessions of the League. One maintained that the promoters of the idea wanted to merge the League into the Congress and that cooperation with the Congress at the moment would mean the alliance with an anti-British element which would be harmful to the larger interests and against the principle of loyalty and fidelity to the British Crown to which Muslims were committed. The other was against holding the annual sessions altogether on the ground that owing to the undesirable turn of events of the War due to Turkey's participation against the Allies, it would be impolitic to express any sentiments from the public platform as it would necessarily encourage anti-British feeling, since Indian Muslims were bound with the Turkish people by a tie of faith. The argument continued to be advanced even after the League Council decided to hold the sessions in Bombay. To counteract the propaganda which was backed by official support, Jinnah issued an appeal to Muslim leaders to close their ranks.

"We are bound by our constitution. Reverence for and obedience to that constitution and discipline are absolutely necessary qualities to enable us to say that we are fit for real political franchise, freedom and self-government," he said.

At this juncture Muslims were being watched not only by India but by the whole of the British Empire of which they aspired to be an independent, free and equal member along with the Dominions. The Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League both had for their goal the attainment of self-government for India. The recognition of this claim would have to be judged—and would depend greatly upon how the Congress and the League organised, controlled and conducted themselves that year and in future.

"I wish to state with the greatest emphasis, that there is no truth in the baseless statements made in some quarters that any responsible Muslim leader thinks that the League should be merged into the Indian National Congress. But conference, in collaboration, if possible, is the object," declared Jinnah.

"Now that the majority of the leading representatives of the Council have decided on holding the sessions in Bombay, can we not bury our differences, show a united front and acquit ourselves with credit and honour?"

But the opponents were determined on rowdyism. A few of them were already present in the League *pandal,* accompanied by a number of police officers who had occupied the visitors' gallery. A police force was also waiting outside to intervene in time of emergency. The proceedings of the first day of the sessions began with the prominent Congress leaders as guests, and after Maulana Mazharul Haq, the President, read out his address, the League rose for the day.

On the second day the malcontents found an excuse to create disorder, when Mohammad Ali Jinnah rose to move a resolution. An ordinary interpellation between the President and Maulana Hasrat Mohani was the scene of an uproar. A confusion followed and the official peacemakers came to the forefront to handle the situation. The President, finding it difficult to proceed with the business further, adjourned the meeting and the rest of the proceedings were conducted in the Taj Mahal Hotel.

Here Mohammad Ali Jinnah moved the resolution that a committee be appointed with a view to prepare a scheme of reform for the consideration of the British Government, and that it should be authorised to consult and confer with other political organisations. It was made clear that due regard should be paid to the needs and interests of Muslims.

The League gesture produced the desired effect on the Hindu mind. The friendly atmosphere had to be availed of to the best advantage. A serious issue was in the offing. The League was prepared to undertake discussions and Hindu opinion had to be galvanised.

The All-India National Congress reciprocated the League gesture by authorising its Committee to confer with the League Executive and frame a scheme for self-government. Consequently discussions were initiated in April 1916, at Allahabad, and tentative proposals were considered at a joint meeting of the Congress Committee and the League Council in October at Calcutta.

In the autumn of 1916 Mohammad Ali Jinnah was once again elected by Muslims of his province to the Imperial Legislative Council, where he still commanded "unanimous respect and esteem by his personal dignity of character and his fearless and vigilant championship of Indian rights and demands." His election to the Council afforded him one more opportunity to throw his weight on the inner circle of politicians. Not content with his outdoor efforts to bring the Congress and the League together he began to work on similar lines among the members of the Legislature. Consequently, a memorandum was sent by nineteen members of the Council to the Viceroy in October 1916, for post-war reforms.[1]

The triple role that this great leader played as a member of the League as well as that of the Congress and the Imperial Legislature was, indeed, unique.

In the same month, Mohammad Ali Jinnah was requested to preside over the sixteenth Bombay Provincial Conference held in Ahmedabad—a fact which was in itself a grateful acknowledgment of his signal services. His presidential address is a document of facts and a thesis on practical politics. At a time, which is regarded in Jinnah's life a memorable page, when he was considered the very symbol of true nationalism, he had the courage to express his true feelings and his clear-cut views regarding the Muslim attitude on democratic India, before a gathering which was perhaps predominantly Hindu.

"Two questions," he said, "above all are uppermost in our thoughts and are engrossing our minds at the present moment—the

1. See Appendix I.

War and what is going to happen after the successful termination of this titanic struggle that has overshadowed the entire civilised world." Jinnah dealt with the various aspects of administration, representation of Indians in the services and suggested ways and means as to how evils could be eradicated and co-operation of the Indian population could be secured for better government. But the main burden of his address was the need of unity.

"I believe all thinking men are thoroughly convinced that the keynote of our real progress lies in the good-will, concord, harmony and co-operation between the two great sister communities. The true focus of progress is centred in their union, and remember this is a matter which is entirely in our own hands . . .

"The Muslims want proper, adequate and effective representation in the Council chambers of the country and in the District and Municipal Boards, a claim which no right-minded Hindu disputes for a moment. But the Muslims further require that representation in the various Boards and Council chambers should be secured to them by means of separate electorates. The question of separate electorates has been before the country ever since 1909 and rightly or wrongly the Muslim community is absolutely determined for the present to insist upon separate electorates. To most of us the question is no more open to further discussion or argument as it has become a mandate of the community. As far as I understand, the demand for separate electorates is not a matter of policy but a matter of necessity to the Muslims, who require to be roused from the coma and torpor into which they had fallen so long. I would, therefore, appeal to my Hindu brethren that in the present state of position they should try to win the confidence and the trust of the Muslims who are, after all, in the minority in the country. If they are determined to have separate electorates, no resistance should be shown to their demands.

"One thing is, however, clear. It is not a question of a few more seats going to Muslims or Hindus. It is a question, as I have already pointed out, in the first instance, of transfer of power from the bureaucracy to democracy. Let us concentrate all our attention and energy on this question alone for the moment. Hindus and Muslims should stand united and use every constitutional and legitimate means to effect that transfer as soon as possible. In conclusion, let

me tell you that, after all, a great deal depends upon ourselves Hindus and Muslims united and firm, the voice of the three hundred millions of people vibrating throughout the length and breadth of the country, will produce a force which no power on earth can resist. India has, I believe, turned a corner. She has passed through great sufferings and borne them patiently for centuries. There is now a bright and a great future in front of her. We are now on a straight road; the Promised Land is within sight."

It is an irony of fate that such a clear exposition of the national outlook, which went a long way to create a memorable harmony of thought and action among the conflicting opinions of Indian public life, initiated and sponsored by the sole efforts of this one man, should have been set aside and lessons therefrom forgotten in such a short time. The speech, among other things, illustrates the trend of events in India at the time. It also marks the views of this rising hero of Muslim history about the vital issues which had always faced India. Rightly or wrongly Muslims had decided to insist upon separate electorates, and although he himself did not subscribe to the principle, he would not oppose it. This was also the viewpoint of every thoughtful Hindu. There lay the keynote to success and to the spirit of compromise and comradeship.

The scheme of reforms thrashed out by the League and the Congress jointly had to be referred to the annual sessions of the two great organisations which were to meet once again in the same city and at the same time, at Lucknow in December 1916.

The League sessions met under the presidentship of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who by now had become the champion of the interests of Muslims, as well as a hero of all India. His presidential address, as was usual with all his public utterances, was marked by passionate devotion to the cause of Hindu-Muslim settlement, a frank analysis of the public mind and fervent appeals both to the Hindus and to the Muslims to take counsel with higher ideals and nobler sentiments.

At the same time, however, true to the dictates of duty, and conscious of the grave responsibilities he had accepted as President of the august Muslim organisation, he faithfully echoed the feelings of those over whose deliberations he was presiding, and which he had taken good care to elicit and examine dispassionately beforehand.

He recognised the various forces—conflicting forces—that existed

in the body-politic of India. He acknowledged the innumerable interests that every true lover of unity had to face. Nevertheless, he was one of those who did not get disheartened by small obstacles and hindrances. From the Muslim platform Jinnah, for the first time, made the emphatic declaration that "amid the clash of warring interests and the noise of foolish catchwords, no cool-headed student of Indian affairs can lose sight of the great obvious truism that India is, in the first and the last resort, for the Indians." And explaining the Muslim attitude towards the Indian constitutional problem and the place of Muslims in the future India the President of the League pronounced his word: "We want no favours, and crave for no partial treatment. That is demoralising to the community and injurious to the State. Muslims must learn to have self-respect. What we want is a healthy and fair impetus to be given to our aspirations and ideals as a community and it is the most sacred duty of the Government to respond to that claim. Towards the Hindus our attitude should be of good-will and brotherly feelings. Co-operation in the cause of our motherland should be our guiding principle. India's real progress can only be achieved by a true understanding and harmonious relations between the two great sister communities. With regard to our own affairs, we can depend upon nobody but ourselves."

The Lucknow sessions of the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League ended with the Congress-League agreement passed down to history as the Lucknow Pact, which was submitted later to the British Government for consideration.[2]

What difference there was between Jinnah the "nationalist" of 1916 and Jinnah the "rank communalist" of later years one fails to understand. What changes the outlook of this great man towards the position of his Muslim countrymen had undergone is hard to see. He maintained that Muslims were a separate entity. He believed that they should depend ultimately upon their own inherent strength—principles which had always formed the main burden of his policy.

About the beginning of the year 1917, Mrs. Annie Besant started a new propaganda under the cry of "Home Rule." She organised in Madras a Home Rule League with the late Subramaniya Iyer, a retired Judge of the High Court, as President, and in the course of

2. See Appendix II.

a few weeks all the theosophical organisations controlled by her took up the idea warmly and helped to establish branches of the Home Rule League all over the country. The powerful publicity campaign conducted by Mrs. Besant through her papers—*New India*, a daily and *Commonweal*, a weekly—enabled the movement to reach the farthest corners of the country. Mrs. Besant earnestly advocated the cause of India's freedom and went to such extremes that the Government of Lord Chelmsford were obliged to yield to the pressure of local Government of Madras and interned her along with her two associates. A violent agitation was soon set afoot to get her out on the one hand and to convert the Home Rule propaganda into what looked like a bitter anti-British agitation, on the other. Public indignation rose so high that it was decided to elect her as the President of the Calcutta sessions of the Indian National Congress, and in view of her absence to keep the presidential chair vacant and conduct the proceedings of the sessions through a deputy.

The election of the President again inaugurated party factions within the Congress. The Bengal Congressmen fell out amongst themselves and men like C. R. Das openly joined the extreme party to widen the gulf. In the meantime Mrs. Besant was released and was acclaimed President by the unanimous vote of all the Provincial Congress Committees.

For Mohammad Ali Jinnah the year 1917 was one of great deal of anxiety. As early as the month of February he had to busy himself, in his attempt for the realisation of the objects to which he had set his heart. He had, in the past, agitated for the Indianisation of the army and emphasised that opportunities should be given to Indian young men in the same way as were given to Europeans. The introduction of the Indian Defence Force Bill in the Legislative Council was a step towards that realisation, and Jinnah welcomed it wholeheartedly, not forgetting to strike a note of warning against the policy of discrimination.

About the same time he also supported the resolution on Primary Education that came up for discussion before the Imperial Legislative Council, and stressed the great need for following the principle suggested therein. He demanded the fulfilment of the solemn pledge held out by Harcourt Bulter, as Member for Education, five years before.

During his speech on the budget in March 1917, Mohammad Ali Jinnah again voiced the feelings of those whom he represented in the Council. He insisted upon equal justice for Indians and Europeans in the rank and file of His Majesty's forces. He urged that India must discuss the proposed scheme of constitutional reforms before it was finally incorporated in the new Government of India Act. He expressed India's desire to be adequately represented in the Imperial Parliament which at the time was in contemplation. He spoke eloquently on questions like indentured labour and cotton duties.

There was, it must be admitted, a growing sense of surprise and reproach in the minds of his followers that so ardent an apostle of Indian self-government should hold aloof from the recently organised Home Rule movement which was rousing the country. It may have been partly due to a lingering sentiment of allegiance to a school of politics in which he had been trained, but whose timid and stationary doctrines he had long since outgrown, or it may have been due to the habitual caution of a nature, slow to commit itself to new and far-reaching responsibilities. However, the news of Mrs. Besant's internment in the month of June, which evoked unparalleled demonstrations throughout India, moved Mohammad Ali Jinnah into a prompt and militant course of chivalry in defence of the immutable laws of justice and liberty, so rashly and so ruthlessly assailed. He immediately joined the Bombay Home Rule League, not merely as a member but undertook, as its President, the delicate task of guiding its fortunes and guarding its interests through that troubled period of its indignant activities.[3]

Early in July 1917 a public meeting was held under the joint auspices of the Bombay branches of the Home Rule League, to pass a resolution of confidence in Lord Hardinge, who had appealed for a verdict on his administration, not only to British public opinion but also to the Indian public. Hardinge had said that India had been "bled white" to help the Allies and that it was India whose help, at a most critical moment of the war, saved Europe. At this largely attended meeting the honour of presidentship went to Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Addressing the meeting he said he was sure that he conveyed the universal feeling of educated India that Hardinge's

3. Mrs. Sarojini Naidu.

appeal had entered deep into the Indian heart.

But Jinnah could not help striking the note that, while India was in the same frame of mind as ever, and was ready to make any sacrifice that she might be called upon to make for the British Empire, it was an unfortunate thing that a policy of repression was being pursued in various provinces. It was still more regrettable that the then Viceroy was maintaining a studied silence when India was stirred to its very depths. He hoped these humble words of his would penetrate the cloudy regions of Simla and reach the ears of the Viceroy[4] who should understand that India was really true and loyal to the Empire. India's faith was still strong.

Within a month, however, things had gone much further. It was felt that an emphatic protest against the policy of the Government should be made. Public indignation was at its height. A crowded mass meeting was held under the auspices of the Bombay Presidency Association on the 30th July and Jinnah was again made its spokesman.

He said, "It seems obvious that if we accept the policy of the Government, all constitutional and lawful agitation will, in effect, be stopped, that the freedom of speech and the Press and the right of public meeting under the British flag is henceforth to be regulated by the arbitrary judgment and decision of a Provincial Government or Governor, that the Executive are to decide what is lawful and constitutional propaganda without reference to the Courts of Justice of His Majesty the King Emperor. Is this the aim and object of those who are responsible for the actions of the Provincial Government?"

In Bengal and Delhi, public meetings had been stopped already. Why was India alone of all other parts of the Empire, to be marked out for silence, and why should the Indian people have been subjected to that repressive policy? They were shedding their blood and pouring their money ungrudgingly and unstintingly for the defence of the Empire in the war the very basis of which was to preserve the liberty and freedom of people of various countries. Was the bureaucracy of India blind? Had they lost their reason to treat loyal India in that manner? It showed an utter want of wisdom and statesmanship.

4. Lord Chelmsford.

"We protest against the internment of Mrs. Besant and her co-workers," Jinnah declared, "not only on principle but also because it is an attempt to intern the Home Rule or self-government scheme of reforms framed and adopted conjointly by the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League at Lucknow. We protest against the methods adopted and attempts that are made to silence the people of India from carrying on their constitutional agitation."

The current political situation was unprecedented as it was unfortunate; it had cast grave responsibility upon the leaders, the people and the Government alike. Times were different and changed. The people of India required at once a clear and definite enunciation of the policy of the Government. They required that the confidence of the people in the Government which had been so severely shaken within the past three months should be restored at once in order to enable them to hasten the winning of the war. The people of India were anxious to help in the progress of their country and were earnestly endeavouring to attain the status of a self-governing member of the Empire at an early date; but it was a folly to think that because of that they were not loyal to the Empire.

"In the belief and faith that British statesmanship has not come to the point of utter bankruptcy, I appeal to it that they should not lose any time in making a declaration of policy for making India a self-governing member of the British Empire at an early date, and order the reversal of the recent repressive policy."

At this time some men were planning a campaign of passive resistance in order to secure the release of the Home Rule internees. A joint meeting of the All-India Congress Committee and the Council of the All-India Muslim League met on the 28th of July, 1917, to consider the situation. A small deputation consisting of four persons was appointed, to proceed to England in the middle of September, in order to explain the general political situation in India and to promote the scheme of reforms adopted by the two great organisations. As regards passive resistance it was considered desirable that the matter be referred to the Provincial Congress Committees and the Muslim Leagues in order to elicit their opinion both in matters of principle and of its operation within a period of six weeks. The joint meeting also registered its emphatic protest against the policy of repression followed by the Government and drafted

out a statement, protesting against the Viceroy, some of the Governors and a few of the British statesmen trying to misrepresent and misinterpret the principles of the memorandum of the nineteen members of the Imperial Legislative Council. The main portions of the lengthy statement were cabled to the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister.

In the conduct of the Great War, the Mesopotamian campaign was mismanaged and a debate took place in the House of Commons, during which Austen Chamberlain, the Secretary of State, was mercilessly criticised by Montague for the muddle which had resulted from an inadequate supply of men and materials from India. Montague attacked the Indian Government as "far too wooden, far too iron, far too inelastic and far too antediluvian to subserve its purpose in modern times." The result was Chamberlain's resignation and Montague's appointment in his place. This was regarded as a victory for India; for Montague was believed to be a statesman possessing goodwill, ability, courage and first-hand knowledge about India. After assuming office and true to public expectation, he made the following announcement in Parliament, on the 20th of August, 1917:

> The policy of His Majesty's Government, with which the Government of India are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the Administration, and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire. His Majesty's Government have accordingly decided, with His Majesty's approval, that I should accept the Viceroy's invitation to proceed to India and to discuss these matters with the Viceroy and the Government of India, to consider with the Viceroy the views of Local Governments, and to receive with him the suggestions of representative bodies and others . . .
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> . . . Ample opportunity will be afforded for discussion of the proposals, which will be submitted in due course to Parliament.

The announcement was indeed very well received. For Jinnah, particularly, it was something of a great triumph. After the success of his labours for the union of the two great elements in Indian political life, the only task now left to be performed was to bring

about a union between the rulers and ruled. The news that Montague had accepted the invitation of the Viceroy to come out to India foreshadowed such a settlement. Interviewed by the press representatives in this connection Mohammad Ali Jinnah said the selection of Mr. Montague to be the Secretary of State for India had given, as was but natural, the people of India great satisfaction. It was understood in India as recognising the aspirations of the Indian people for the early grant of self-government within the Empire, and was most welcome. But in order to ensure the success of his mission before he set to work, there should be a general amnesty declared and all those interned as political prisoners be released.

Repression with one hand and concessions with the other was a policy which no self-respecting people could accept.

Meanwhile inside the Legislature Mohammad Ali Jinnah continued to lend his support to measures which contemplated a definite advance towards the betterment of the Indian administration, law and order and towards political progress. Perhaps the most characteristic example is his speech in connection with the examinations for the Indian Civil Service for which Indians had agitated that they should be held simultaneously in England and India.

In pursuance of the announcement in Parliament, the Secretary of State, Edwin Samuel Montague, arrived in India on the 10th of November, 1917, with Lord Donoughmore, Sir William Duke, Bhupendra Nath Basu and Charles Roberts, as colleagues. The mission began its work at Delhi, visiting in turn Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, and receiving deputations from all schools of political thought, and giving interviews to men representing all shades of opinion. It was in constant consultation throughout the enquiry with the members of the Government of India and, on its return to Delhi, a continuous series of conferences began; there were meetings of the Secretary of State and those associated with him and the Government of India, meetings with all the heads of Provinces; meetings with a Committee of the Ruling Princes; meetings of committees to consider the details and frequent private interviews and informal discussions. Mohammad Ali Jinnah also interviewed the Secretary of State and the following is the record of it kept by Montague in his diary.

We were face to face now with the real giants of the Indian political

world. We had not these dupes and adherents from the Provinces, but we had here a collection of the first-class politicians of the various Provinces . . . All the brains of the movement were there. But the difficulty is, as I have so often said, that owing to the thinness with which we have spread education, they have run generations away from the rest of India and whatever might be done in theory, in practice this would be only another and indigenous autocracy . . .

There were followed by Jinnah, young, perfectly mannered, impressive looking, armed to the teeth with dialectics, and insistent upon the whole of his scheme. All its shortcomings, all its drawbacks,—the elected members of the Executive Council, the power of the minority to hold up finance—all these were defended as the best makeshifts they could devise short of responsible government. Nothing else would satisfy them. They would rather have nothing if they could not get the whole lot. I was rather tired and I funked him. Chelmsford tried to argue with him, and was tied up into knots. Jinnah is a very clever man, and it is, of course, an outrage that such a man should have no chance of running the affairs of his own country.

The Memorandum of the Nineteen was submitted, the Scheme of Post-War Reforms, as embodied in the Lucknow Pact, had been handed over to the authorities concerned. Public opinion had been elicited to a great extent. But the agitation started by some Anglo-Indians and Europeans, both in India and in England, had not yet quietened. Sometime back Lord Sydenham had contributed a number of articles to the British Press attacking the Scheme of Reforms and had said that it was an outcome of German manoeuvres and propaganda carried on by agents of the Kaiser who was at war with Great Britain. Some of the Anglo-Indian newspapers had been conducting a ceaseless cold war against the reforms. It was felt that a fitting reply should be given to these men. The branches of the Home Rule League in Bombay called a public meeting in November 1917, and under the presidentship of their President, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, a discussion was held on the subject—"The Present European Agitation." In his opening speech Jinnah said he could not understand what kind of reforms the Anglo-Indians and Europeans wanted to introduce in the country. He attributed their activ-

ities to ignorance. Referring to Lord Sydenham, Jinnah said: "Lord Sydenham, that reactionary who enjoyed the hospitality of this country and earned a fat salary from the coffers of its exchequer, has been carrying on an agitation which is discreditable to any man. He says 'as soon as the masses, for whom we are the trustees, are fit for self-government, we shall instantly hand over the government to the people.' Well, gentlemen, all I can say is this. When the masses are fit for self-government they will not go to Lord Sydenham for self-government."

Once again in December 1917, when the sessions of the All-India Muslim League and of the Indian National Congress met in the same city of Calcutta, Mohammad Ali Jinnah played the unique role of supporting the important resolutions on the Congress-League Scheme in both the organisations as a member of both. His speech at the sessions of the All-India Muslim League is important in view of the stand that Jinnah had taken up later *vis-a-vis* the Congress policy.

The proposition was that if India was to be governed for the good of the people, who was to govern her? He recognised ungrudgingly that the British nation had contributed towards what modern India was. But he refused—and he emphatically refused—to say that, therefore, the English people should have the monopoly of power.

The portion of his speech, however, which seems to be in contrast to his political stand of later years is the following pronouncement.

> It is said that we are a minority and that it might afterwards become a Hindu Government. I want to give an answer to that. I particularly wish to address my Muslim friends on this point. Do you think it is possible that this country could become a Hindu Government? Do you think that Government could be conducted by ballot boxes? Do you think that because the Hindus are in the majority, they would carry a measure in the legislative assembly and there is an end of it? If seventy millions of Muslims do not approve of a measure, do you think it could be enforced and administered in this country?

It is evident from the above that Jinnah's political outlook during the last phase of his career was not really a change of his early beliefs but a result of clear indications of Hindu intentions against which he had not failed to warn them. The following pages will bear the

fact out still more clearly.

A resolution on the lines of that of the Muslim League was adopted also by the Congress and Jinnah was one of the principal speakers thereon.

With the progress of the various stages of communal settlement the note underlying his speeches became more and more emphatic until, at Calcutta, he finally declared that there should be a time-limit for the realisation of the goal set forth for India. The striking likeness of the League Resolution with that of the Congress only shows to what extent this great man exercised his personal influence over the deliberations of the leaders of both the organisations, one entirely and the other partially communal. These years saw a great personal triumph for Jinnah. Every one admired his dynamic personality and his enthusiasm, his belief in bringing about a settlement of the communal question, and his final achievement of the *entente cordiale* ending with the Congress-League pact.

The conduct of the Home Rule agitation on the lines it was run completely changed the aspect of the Indian politics. The vigorous propaganda made by Mrs. Besant took the colour of a religious appeal. "Home Rule has become so intertwined with Religion," declared Mrs. Besant during her presidential address at Calcutta in 1917, "by the prayers offered up in the great Southern Temples—sacred places of pilgrimage—and spreading from there to village temples, and also by its being preached up and down the country by Sadhus and Sanyasins." Another factor that largely contributed to the great success of the movement points out Pattabhi Sitaramayya,[5] was that from its inception it recognised the integrity of language areas, and, in organising the country, adopted the linguistic principle as determining the provincial delimitations. In this respect it went ahead of the Congress and was its forerunner in reality.

It is clear, therefore, that while the Home Rule agitation awakened among the Hindus a great deal of political consciousness, and while it kindled in them a desire of self-realisation and self-possession, it unconsciously injected in them the secret germs of religious fanaticism and linguistic provincialism. The inevitable result, therefore, was obvious. It divided the Muslims and Hindus and infused in

5. *History of the Congress.*

them the spirit of adopting different methods for the realisation of the same goal—a spirit which had persisted ever since. It also created, within the vast national assemblage, the unity of which was in sight after the Lucknow Pact, the idea of various groups that existed either on the grounds of faith or on consideration of languages. At a time when the religious feelings of the Muslims had already been roused by the deterioration of the international situation in the Balkans and the extremist sections of opinion both among the Hindus and Muslims were preaching the separatist doctrines, it was not prudent on the part of the promoters of the Home Rule movement to direct its activities into the channels of sectarianism, specially in view of the fact that sober-minded leaders had succeeded in bringing the two great organisations—the Muslim League and the Congress—together, for the realisation of a common object. But the sentiment rather than reason was at work, and in the heat of the moment few foresaw the ultimate end to which such a movement was bound to lead.

Repercussions of the religious appeal for the Home Rule propaganda started before long. Hindu-Muslim riots had broken out in many places. Arrah had seen a vigorous frenzy of rioters and Muslims had felt that they had been persecuted mercilessly by the Hindus in that town. They also felt that the studied silence of the Hindu leaders was not in harmony with the atmosphere of unity prevailing in the country, and they were getting more and more suspicious of their attitude. A resolution was moved during the sessions of the All-India Muslim League at Calcutta in 1917, by Raza Ali of the United Provinces, condemning the Hindu rioters at Arrah, and their secret sympathisers, expressing deep regret at the silence of responsible Hindu leaders at occurrences in Bihar, indignation at the failure of C,I.D. to obtain timely information of the riot and also expressing regret at the weakness shown by authorities in facing the situation. Syed Raza Ali deplored the attitude of the Indian National Congress, in not strongly condemning the action of Hindu fanatics at Arrah. The resolution was carried unanimously.

Social reform also was being fostered by men like Gandhi, a natural outcome of which was that the suspicions of Muslims were confirmed before long. In a letter addressed to the *Statesman*, Cal-

cutta, in reply to a letter written by one Mr. Irwin, Gandhi wrote: "... Rightly or wrongly, worship of the cow is ingrained in the Hindu nature and I see no escape from a most bigoted and sanguinary strife over this question between Christians and Muslims on the one hand and Hindus on the other except in the fullest recognition and practice by the Hindus of the religion of *Ahimsa,* which it is my self-imposed and humble mission in life to preach. Let the truth be faced. It must not be supposed that Hindus feel nothing about the cow-slaughter going on for the Europeans. I know that their wrath is today being buried under the awe inspired by the English rule. But there is not a Hindu throughout the length and breadth of India who does not expect one day to free his land from cow-slaughter. But contrary to the genius of Hinduism, as I know it, he would not mind forcing even at the point of the sword either the Christian or the Muhammadan to abandon cow-slaughter."

The Home Rule propaganda and Gandhi's writings were in complete contrast to Mohammad Ali Jinnah's outlook on India's political future. As time passed Muslim leaders did not fail to pick up the straws from the wind and began to think whether or not their trust in Hindu leadership was misplaced, and whether democratic institutions in a United India would ever be workable.

CHAPTER V

An Unpopular Farewell

The year 1918 opened with a new outlook.

The war was in full swing and Britain had not yet succeeded in gaining the alliance of the United States of America. The Home Government felt that the support India had given so far, in men and money, was not quite sufficient for the successful prosecution of the war and strongly urged the Government of India to make a fresh drive in order to enlist more support from the Indian public. The Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, on receiving these instructions struck upon a new device to further the cause of the Empire. He decided to convene a special War Conference at Delhi.

In the month of March, the Home Rule League had decided to send a delegation under the leadership of Tilak in order to acquaint the British public of the real situation in India. Before, however, they could reach England their passports were cancelled and they landed in Cape Town in South Africa, pending the final orders, for which the Viceroy had appealed to the British Cabinet. A public meeting of the citizens of Bombay was, therefore, held on the 8th of April, to protest against this order, and to express its warm appreciation of the wise, considerate and statesmanlike action of Chelmsford in having mitigated the severity of the instructions received from England. Jinnah presided and said that it seemed to him that the Home Government had only ears and no eyes. The incident proved that India could no longer be governed from a distance of seven thousand miles.

The British Government had, however, thought it futile for the Home Rule League deputation to visit England and they, therefore,

stuck to their decision. Public indignation rose high and Mohammad Ali Jinnah, President of the Bombay Home Rule League, sent the following telegram to the Prime Minister, the Viceroy and the Secretary of State for India:

> I am directed by the Bombay Branch of the All-India Home Rule League to state that the news that His Majesty's Government have finally refused permission to allow the Home Rule Deputation headed by Mr. B. G. Tilak to proceed to England has been received with profound regret. They feel that His Majesty's Government in taking this action must have done so under a misapprehension as to the nature and intention of the Deputation and have failed to realise the unfortunate effects of it on public opinion in this country. The Indian public would refuse to be a party to any course, which was calculated to cause embarrassment at this critical juncture to the authorities in England, and His Majesty's Government may rest assured that, had the delegates proceeded to England, they would have maintained a scrupulous regard for this sincere feeling of the Indian people. But in view of the vigorous campaign led by Lord Sydenham and other influential persons against self-government for India, now being carried on in England, they feel the emergent necessity that the representatives of the Indian National Movement should be able to place their case directly before the electors of the United Kingdom, in whose hands the ultimate decision regarding the scheme of reforms now under consideration lies. I am, therefore, to urge once more upon the serious consideration of His Majesty's Government the desirability of rescinding their orders.

In this atmosphere was held the War Conference of Delhi, wherein Mohammad Ali Jinnah and his friends brought forward a resolution on constitutional reform for India. The resolution was ruled out of order by the Chairman and caused great bitterness. Jinnah made a short speech explaining the position of those who thought that war measures were in no way prejudiced by the taking up of constitutional reform questions in connection with the Conference. There was not an Indian, he said, who was not ready to shed his last drop of blood in the defence of the Empire. Officialdom was unnecessarily alarmed and wanted to give a blow to the prestige of Indian leader-

ship at the War Conference.

The Delhi Conference was followed by the Bombay Provincial War Conference in June. The Governor, Lord Willingdon, presided and said:

> Eager and anxious as I am to feel assured of an entirely united force to assist me in this campaign, there are a certain number of gentlemen, some of whom have considerable influence with the public, many of them members of the political organisation called the Home Rule League whose activities have been such of late years, that I cannot honestly feel sure of the sincerity of their support, until I have come to a clear understanding with them and have frankly expressed to them all that is in my mind. I do not wish in any detail to criticise their actions or their methods in the past, beyond saying that they have not given the help to Government, that I think I was fairly entitled to expect from them, in these critical days; indeed I must frankly say that their object seems to have been at every available opportunity to increase the difficulties and embarrassment of Government whenever and wherever they could. I can claim that my Government have always felt that, in every country where there is any public feeling, any political instinct, there must always be an advanced party, the extreme left of our political life, which is generally opposed to Government, but which must be, like any other party, given full freedom of speech, action and opinion provided it keeps within constitutional limits. And with our record of the past I think I am justified in claiming that it has been recognised that we have acted upto this view. As I have already said, the object of the Delhi Conference was to secure unity of effort and promise a strenuous, wholehearted service. But within the last few weeks I have studied with some care the speeches and writings of some of these gentlemen since the Delhi Conference was held, and they have been of such a character that I cannot honestly feel sure of the sincerity of their desire for that unity of effort, that strenuous service, which are absolutely necessary to secure the success of our labours.
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> From reading their speeches, the position of those gentlemen seems to be this. ' We quite realise the gravity of the situation,

we are all anxious to help, but unless Home Rule is promised within a given number of years, and unless various other assurances are given us with regard to other matters, we do not think we can stir the imagination of the people, and we cannot hope for a successful issue to the recruiting campaign.' I understand that these gentlemen disclaim any suggestion that they are trying to make a bargain, and I of course accept their disclaimer, but if I have fairly stated their position, I must honestly confess that I don't think their help will be of a very active character. These gentlemen must be perfectly well aware, that no promises, of the kind they seem to desire, can possibly be given without full constitutional sanction, and as to the request, that a promise should be definitely given them of Home Rule within a certain number of years, they know very well that the whole question of political reform is being considered by the British War Cabinet, and that it is quite impossible for the Viceroy or anyone else to give such a promise as they desire. I do not expect anyone, even in these days, to give up all political action or discussion, for I fully realise that the administration of any government must be open to criticism, even in the most grave and serious times, but I do expect that criticism to be fair, to be reasonable, to be free from the bitterness, which I have sometimes noticed in the past. I can accept no uncertain, no half-hearted assistance at this juncture. And with the recollection of these speeches fresh in my mind, I ask these gentlemen to put aside their doubts and difficulties, and, as loyal citizens of the British Empire, sincerely anxious for the success of the Allied cause, to join with us all wholeheartedly and unreservedly, and do nothing by speech, writing or action which will in any way prejudice the success of our campaign.

Tilak who had returned, was then called upon to speak. He expressed on behalf of himself and all Home Rulers deep loyalty to the King-Emperor. But the resolution, he said, was defective and he regretted the rules of procedure did not allow him to move an amendment. He then proceeded to say that co-operation with the Government necessitated certain things. There could be no Home Defence without Home Rule. The President called Tilak to order and said he could not allow any political discussion. Tilak thereupon

left the platform and retired from the meeting.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who remained in the Conference, pointed out that the public response to the message of King-Emperor and the determination of the Bombay Presidency to continue to do her duty to her utmost capacity, in the great crisis, had the support of the entire educated community of India. There were also no two opinions, that India should develop her man power, and utilise her resources to the fullest extent. But before he proceeded further, he said, he was very much pained that Willingdon should have thought fit to cast doubts on the sincerity and loyalty of the Home Rule Party, and that he must enter his emphatic protest against that. They were anxious as any one else to help the defence of the motherland and the Empire. They wanted a national army or, in other words, a citizens' army and not a purely mercenary army. "I say that if you wish to enable us to help you, to facilitate and stimulate recruiting, you must make the educated people believe that they are the citizens of the Empire and the King's equal subjects. But the Government do not do so. We don't want the consideration of the matter indefinitely put off. We want action and immediate deeds."

Willingdon had said that any one could send any suggestion he wanted to be adopted later. Jinnah pointed out that the procedure had already been laid down by the Chairman, and he did not desire to challenge it. But he did not approve of the memorandum annexed to the resolution. He had had no opportunity given to him to exercise his judgment, and he refused to be a party to adopt that memorandum. Above all to doubt their sincerity and their loyalty was an insult to the Home Rule Party and, concluded he, "I will not have it."

Thus ended a sad chapter in the history of the Bombay War Conference and began one in the personal life of Lord Willingdon.

Bombay's resentment against the public insult offered to members of the Indian Home Rule League by Willingdon was fully evidenced on the 16th of June, 1918, in a huge popular demonstration. The occasion was the Home Rule Day, and was celebrated with a march of volunteers through the city making collections in aid of the League. In the evening a largely attended meeting was held. Mohammad Ali Jinnah presided and moved the following resolution:

That this meeting is of opinion that the methods and measures of

Government for the utilisation of the man power and the resources of India in the war are not such as to secure their fullest possible development in that—

(*a*) there is a spirit of distrust of the people running throughout their handling of this great national work;

(*b*) the officials in charge of the respective departments fail to seek in a spirit of equality the co-operation of the people in the prosecution of the war;

(*c*) interminable delay is taking place in the amendment of the Arms Act in order to enable the general body of people to take and carry arms if they so desire;

(*d*) the commissioned ranks in the Indian Army are not yet thrown open freely to Indians nor are all racial bars and distinctions removed;

(*e*) the recommendations of the Imperial War Conference at Delhi, for admitting Indians to existing Military Colleges and for establishing new colleges forthwith, have not been given effect to.

This meeting is of opinion that though every loyal citizen of India desires wholeheartedly to respond to the call of the Premier, it is difficult for the leaders to secure full and free response from the people in regard to military services unless the present policy of the Government of India is changed by removing the above-mentioned defects.

Jinnah declared that he did not wish to say anything more regarding Willingdon's speech at the War Conference except that his conduct was a big blunder. He had—whatever might be said by other people in his defence—insulted the Home Rule League. It was a personal matter and so long as he did not withdraw his insult, they could not attend any meeting over which he presided. If the people of India were not able to co-operate with the Government, it was because the Government's policy did not enable them to obtain man power for the prosecution of the war and defence of the country. At the outbreak of war there was a general feeling of enthusiasm and loyalty. Hundreds and thousands of educated young men in Bombay, even members of the Bar, volunteered themselves to help the prosecution of the war. That enthusiasm and loyalty was spurned by the Government. Young men studying at Oxford and Cambridge

came forward to enlist in the Territorial Army, and the answer was "No." They petitioned to the Secretary of State, and they were informed that the whole question of the Army employment would be considered after the war. What more could be expected of the people of India?

At a later date yet another opportunity arose. When the Indian Defence Force Bill was introduced into the Imperial Legislative Council, the country at large hailed that measure and welcomed it. Tilak addressed an audience appealing to the young men of Bombay to come forward and enlist themselves. But when the Bill became law and when the rules and regulations were framed the entire principle was mutilated. The bureaucracy was again behind it. It chilled the Indians. Now the Viceroy told the Delhi Conference that the situation was very critical, and that the German menace was a real one. The Conference was told that India's frontiers were not safe and full co-operation was necessary. The Conference after careful consideration formulated some recommendations, but the Government did not do anything to implement them.

"Lord Willingdon has said that the support of the Home Rule Party is half-hearted. My answer is this," retorted Jinnah, "that your policy is more half-hearted. You are playing with the people, and you are not in earnest. Your methods and policy are all wrong. I cannot believe that even a bureaucrat is so blind as not to see it."

Officialdom was also up and doing. Willingdon's term of office had expired and it was proposed that a public farewell should be given to him. Some of the citizens of Bombay under the leadership of Stanley Reed, then editor of *The Times of India*, had formed themselves into a committee and an application had been sent to the Sheriff of Bombay to secure the necessary permission to hold a public function in honour of the departing Governor. Popular will, on the other hand, was bent upon asserting itself. Mohammad Ali Jinnah again gave the lead. A letter, dated the 8th of November, signed by him and twenty-nine others was despatched to Reed and his friends intimating to them the protest and intention of the citizens of Bombay:

We understand that you and other gentlemen have constituted yourselves as a committee, of which you are appointed the Honorary Secretary, with the object of holding a public meeting

of the citizens of Bombay for the purpose of voting a memorial on behalf of the City of Bombay to His Excellency Lord Willingdon.

We feel that you cannot be unaware that, in view of the record of Lord Willingdon's administration and certain features of it, personal to himself, there will be very strong opposition to any such proposed action, if it should purport to be taken on behalf of the citizens of Bombay. And we think it desirable to give you notice, which we now do, that should any such meeting be called we shall attend the same for the purpose of opposing by motion, amendment or otherwise in a constitutional manner, any proposal to vote an address to His Excellency or otherwise to imply that the citizens of Bombay are desirous of commemorating or approving the administration of Lord Willingdon or his services as Governor of Bombay.

We beg to request, further, that if it is your intention to hold such a meeting, you will intimate to us the date of the meeting and make arrangements to afford us every reasonable facility for opposing, by amendment, speech and vote, any motion which may be put forward at the meeting and also for the taking of poll, if necessary.

We have thought it desirable to make this request in order that the proceedings may be conducted with due decorum and order and according to the recognised rules and procedure of public meetings.

A simultaneous letter for a counter meeting was also sent to the Sheriff of Bombay.

In the meantime, however, leaders like B. G. Horniman started public exposition of facts as to why Willingdon's regime did not deserve public praise. On the 26th of November the first of the series of public addresses was delivered by Horniman—a lengthy indictment which exposed a number of facts of public interest and maladministration of Willingdon's government. The portion reproduced below has twofold importance. It has bearing on current events and secondly on the part that Mohammad Ali Jinnah played in bringing the Muslim League and the Indian Congress together in 1915, in the face of a strong opposition both from the official and official-ridden classes. Horniman said that if the conspiracy which

Willingdon by his weakness allowed to be carried on, had succeeded in its object, Hindus and Muslims would not be standing where they were in regard to the political advancement of the country, which rested on the solid foundation of Hindu-Muslim *entente*. The foundation stone was laid in Bombay three years ago when owing to the efforts of Jinnah and his initiative the All-India Muslim League held its sessions in Bombay and entered into a coalition with the Indian National Congress. When Jinnah first started the idea, continued Horniman, of holding the All-India Muslim League sessions in Bombay at the time of the Indian National Congress, certain parties immediately set to work to defeat the object. It was not, in the beginning, any of the Muslims of Bombay who took the initiative in the matter but it was a certain officer of the Government, the late Commissioner of Police, Edwardes, who instigated them to do so. However that might be, the movement was carried on and it was a most disgraceful movement because it had for its ultimate object the breaking up by violence of the sessions of the Muslim League if they could not carry out their intention of preventing the League from coming to Bombay altogether. Up to a certain point during that time the movement received the active support of Edwardes and it was not until Jinnah went to the Governor and represented strongly what was being done that the impropriety of the conduct of the Commissioner of Police was recognised and the Governor himself intervened in the matter. Edwardes was then sent for and told that he was not to concern himself with this affair any more. But though Edwardes ceased giving the same active support to that movement he continued to sit in his office and encourage what was going on.

Matters at last got to such a pitch that a round table conference had to be held at the Government House at which the Governor himself was present and a solemn undertaking was given by each side that certain conditions would have to be followed. The Government of Bombay attached so much importance to the matter that they issued a Press Note, which was published in the Gazette, incorporating the pledge given by Suleman Qasim Mitha and his friends.

"And what happened at the sitting of the Muslim League?" continued Horniman. "What did Mr. Suleman Qasim Mitha do?

He went there with a gang of hooligans and by methods of violence they succeeded in breaking up for the time being the sitting of the All-India Muslim League. The Commissioner of Police and his Deputy Commissioners were sitting outside in motor cars with armed police in the offing waiting for what they thought was going to happen. On that particular morning the then acting Chief Presidency Magistrate happened, most curiously enough, to be paying a visit to the Hindu Gymkhana and whom should he see by a mere accident but the Commissioner of Police? Of course, he had the Riot Act in his pocket like a good magistrate. The acting Chief Presidency Magistrate came out and met the Commissioner of Police and the latter said: ' You had better wait here because something is happening and we may require your assistance.' When that did happen, these people came on the platform and behaved in a most disgusting way and when Mrs. Besant and others went to Mr. Edwardes and asked for the assistance to which they were entitled, to have that gang of hooligans thrown out of the place, Mr. Edwardes refused to do anything except to go into the pandal and clear everybody out. It was only owing to the great tact and ability with which the leaders behaved that further trouble was avoided.

"Was that not a most scandalous matter which any government of its own accord ought to have enquired into?" asked Horniman. "On the contrary," he said, "at the very first dinner party that Lord Willingdon gave after he came back to Bombay, at the Government House, Mr. Suleman Mitha was an honoured guest. The Bombay Presidency Association, which had been a body recognised by the Government for years, investigated the whole matter and it sent a reasoned representation couched in the most moderate language. It was not done by the Home Rulers, but by men like Sir Dinshaw Wacha, Sir Hormasji Wadia in conjunction with Mr. Jinnah and his friends and framed a charge against the Bombay Police of deliberately instigating the breaking up of the Muslim League meeting."

Willingdon did not even bother to enquire into the matter. In fact for a long time the Presidency Association did not receive a reply, but ultimately the Government of Bombay wrote to say that they did not wish to hold an enquiry. Edwardes was removed from office, but it was one of those "little kicks" which had the result of sending people a little higher. It was given out that the removal of

Edwardes was due to the disapproval by the Governor of his conduct. "But now," asked Horniman, "what do we find? Lord Willingdon unveiled the bust of Mr. Edwardes lately and eulogised that Commissioner who was still resting under that grave charge. When we are asked to give a certificate to Lord Willingdon, are we going to forget that he gave a certificate to Mr. Edwardes?"

Other such speeches by various eminent leaders followed one after another. A number of letters from the public were published in the local papers both for and against the "Willingdon Memorial." Letters were exchanged between the anti-Requisitionists and the Sheriff of Bombay, the former maintaining that the Sheriff had no authority to sanction such a meeting and the latter determined to allow the meeting to be held. At last the day came and on the 11th of December, 1918, arrangements were made in the Town Hall for conducting the function meant to bid farewell to Willingdon.

It was seven o'clock in the morning when the leaders of the anti-Requisitionists arrived at the Town Hall and were received with loud cheering by a crowd of two or three hundred of their supporters, who had arrived on the roadside in front of the Elphinstone Gardens. Overnight it had been ascertained that no one would be allowed on the Town Hall steps until the doors were opened. The whole place was in charge of a large force of the police and a letter addressed to the Commissioner of Police had failed to elicit a reply to the questions that were addressed to him in regard to the arrangements. A few hours passed in strange expectations. At ten o'clock the doors were opened, the intention to do so being communicated only a few minutes beforehand to the leaders of the opposition, who immediately took places in the queue which had been kept for them by their supporters. The first person to enter the Hall was Jinnah and he was followed by a large number of supporters. In the meanwhile Suleman Qasim Mitha had arrived on the steps and assumed command of the important operations for packing the meeting which had apparently been entrusted to him.

The first victory was gained after the anti-Requisitionists secured the front place in the queue and the second when they succeeded in resisting the audacious attempt to thrust them into the back seats. Headed by Jinnah they insisted upon their right as the first comers to take whatever seats they chose and after some argument their

claim to occupy the seats in the central part of the Hall was conceded. Mrs. Jinnah was on the hall-steps controlling the volunteers.

By five o'clock in the afternoon the Hall was uncomfortably packed. Intervening between the front rows of seats occupied by the leaders of the anti-Requisitionists and the platform was a phalanx of about one hundred Europeans, Parsis and Anglo-Indians, serving as the "stewards" of the meeting, which made it extremely difficult —and ultimately impossible—for the former to see or be seen on the platform. The arrival of the Sheriff at this time provoked an extraordinary scene. Those seated on the platform and standing on it in front raised vociferous cheers which were immediately drowned by long, continued shouts of "shame, shame." Other leaders of the Requisitionist party received the same demonstration and counter-demonstration from the two parties.

At about half past five in the evening quiet was restored. Immediately after the reading of the notice convening the meeting by the Sheriff, Horniman rose and addressed the Sheriff for the purpose of making a constitutional protest. The latter, however, refused him a hearing and his voice was drowned in the shouts of those on and near the platform supporting the Requisitionists. While Horniman was still standing and endeavouring to be heard Dinshaw Wacha rose and moved that Jamsetjee Jijibhoy should take the chair. Without any attempt to put the motion to the vote, and ignoring Horniman's shouted protest that his party wished to propose that Telang be elected chairman, Jijibhoy walked into the chair.

From that moment the fate of the meeting was sealed. For about twenty minutes the anti-Requisitionists continued their shouts of "No, no" in protest against this arbitrary procedure while the stewards, volunteers and other supporters of the platform shrieked and yelled in derision, hurling challenges and epithets at the anti-Requisitionists. What was going on at the platform, nobody could see or hear. It is said that Jijibhoy put the resolution of appreciation of Willingdon from the chair and declared it carried. The farce came to an end when the Commissioner of Police appeared on the platform, and backed by a force of police ordered the Hall to be cleared. The anti-Requisitionists headed by their leaders proceeded to leave the Hall. Unnecessary violence was used by the police in clearing the Hall and several of the anti-Requisitionists were assaulted, in-

cluding Jinnah.

When, after leaving the meeting, the leaders of the opposition appeared on the steps, they were received with a long continued roar of cheers from a huge crowd. Horniman in coming down was seized and carried shoulder-high round the circle amidst a scene of extraordinary enthusiasm, the occupants of the crowded verandahs and balconies also cheering and waving handkerchiefs. The demonstration reached its culmination in the Apollo Street where Jinnah and Horniman delivered brief speeches from the windows of an Insurance Company's office. "Gentlemen," said Horniman, "you are the citizens of Bombay, and not the hirelings of foreigners packed into the Town Hall. Today we have won a victory. It is, in fact, a victory for democracy. If we had not been sure of your support at our back we could not have achieved this triumph." Amid ringing applause the speaker then made way for Jinnah, who in answer to repeated calls from the audience said, "Your triumph today has made it clear that even the combined forces of bureaucracy and autocracy could not overawe you. December the 11th is a Red-Letter day in the history of Bombay."

At night a huge meeting took place where the leaders who were instrumental in smashing the farewell meeting of the day gave an account of the proceedings of the meeting in the Town Hall and Horniman moved the three main resolutions, one protesting against the conduct of the Sheriff of Bombay and the conveners of the proposed Willingdon Memorial, the other condemning the cruel and partial conduct of the police and the third condemning the administration of Willingdon and protesting against the proposal to raise any sort of memorial for his services.

Jinnah—the incarnation of public will, the embodiment of national pride, the symbol of unity, the upholder of civil liberties—was at once a hero, admired, honoured and loved by all. Public addresses were presented to him, garden parties were held in his honour, and every one suggested that this unique service rendered by him should be commemorated. The advocates and members of the Bar were proud to own him and held a public function to celebrate his leadership. His courage and his invincible independence were acknowledged and accepted by every one, and the long train of events and a chain of popular ovation that followed this wonderful victory of

Bombay citizens over officialdom did but due justice to him.

An attorney of Bombay, B. D. Lam, came out in the papers with a suggestion that a fund be raised in honour of this great leader, in which every one of his admirers should contribute at least one rupee, so that a memorial be raised for the purpose of perpetuating that happy occasion. "If, as a result of the meeting," wrote Lam, "anybody deserves a memorial it is Mr. Jinnah whose fine leadership and fearless courage have marked a great epoch in the public life of Bombay."

Lam's idea met with much enthusiastic response from the public and voluntary contributions began to pour in at once with great rapidity, as a result of which, within a short time, was built the famous People's Jinnah Memorial Hall, which still stands as the symbol of Bombay's affection for the great man. But alas, after a few years in that very Hall, things were discussed and plans made for how best to undermine the influence of the man who inspired the sentiment that raised it.

CHAPTER VI

Suppression and Reforms

The year 1918 also saw the publication of two important reports. The first was the report of the Committee appointed the previous year, under the presidentship of Sidney Rowlatt "to investigate and report on the nature and extent of the criminal conspiracies and to advise as to the legislation, if any, necessary to enable the Government to deal effectively with them;" and the second incorporating the Reform proposals of Montague, as a result of his tour of India. The first report gave rise to a widespread protest throughout India, and when it came for consideration before the Imperial Legislative Council, Mohammad Ali Jinnah placed before it the aspect which, as he himself said, no other speaker had put before the House. The sole purpose of appointing the Rowlatt Committee was not to discover that there were conspiracies in the land. They were there and every one knew about them. The object was to determine how to deal with these offences when India returned to normal times. The extraordinary powers that were now placed in the hands of the Government by what might be termed 'war legislation,' were to last only during the period of the war and no more. Jinnah therefore did not attach much importance to that part of the Rowlatt Report which did no more than put in a readable form the narratives of various conspiracies that had existed. He concerned himself only with the measures proposed to deal with them.

In the first instance, however, he pointed out that these conspiracies were no ordinary crimes. They were essentially political in their character, and in fact the consequence of a wrong Government policy. After all before 1905 there was no such thing as revolu-

tionary movement and it was in 1906 that the first bomb was thrown. What had happened to India? Why was there all of a sudden in 1906 this signal of a bomb throw? And why was it that since 1906 vast developments of anarchical movements took place? It was due to a wrong Government policy and because that policy was shaped without consulting the Indians. "If you want us to co-operate with you," said he, "then associate us with you and give us a certain amount of control and responsibility in the policies which you are laying down for the government of this country."

The whole question had been dealt with on the footing as if some criminal tribes had sprung up in India and were a source of danger, to eradicate which was the duty and business of everybody without any further consideration. "I say, my Lord, that no amount of laying down of laws on the Statute Book would solve this problem. You will have also to change your policy, and considerably, before you can remove the cause." Referring to the preventive measures recommended by the Rowlatt Committee, Jinnah said, "No civilised government will ever dream of putting these recommendations in the form of laws."

On the 8th of July, Montague-Chelmsford Reform proposals were published and were received in various moods. The Moderates accepted them just as the proposals stood, but asked for considerable alterations to be made in the final Act. The Home Rulers were not willing to accept them unless drastic modifications were incorporated which in their opinion would suffice for the time being. They believed that under the circumstances and in view of the tremendous pressure that was brought upon Montague and his colleagues the Reform proposals were probably the best that could be secured, in the midst of the various contending parties existing in India. The Extremists, who formed the bulk of the Congress, declined to accept the proposals altogether. Mohammad Ali Jinnah issued a press statement stating his own point of view.

Basing his observations on the essential features of the Congress-League Scheme of 1916, which incorporated the principles of broadening of franchise, direct representation, substantial majority of elected members in the Legislatures, control of the Executive and financial and fiscal policy, Jinnah said that he looked more to the essentials and principles of a scheme rather than its framework. The

Congress-League Scheme was indeed the crystallisation of the national opinion, and it was a good feature of the Reform proposals that public discussion was invited so that after eliciting further opinion necessary modifications could be made. He accepted the proposals as weighty and well considered. He recognised that the task before Montague was not an easy one and although he had to deal with an intricate problem, he had actually advanced the original proposals of the Government of India. Nevertheless, in his opinion Montague had been unduly influenced by the alarmist section. The result was enormous restriction in the way of political progress. The advancement of provincial governments was not carried to the extent it was desired. Moreover when actual division of Reserved and Transferred subjects took place the shape of provincial autonomy might even become worse. It was to be clearly understood that this scheme of things was only as a transitional stage and after five years of working there should be no necessity of keeping any subjects reserved. It was to be hoped further that when the question of taking a decision as to what subjects are to be reserved, the committee appointed for the purpose would command the confidence of the people. In fact this remark would apply to all the committees.

Jinnah could not accept the interpretation that the announcement of His Majesty's Government meant that progressive realisation of responsible government was to be confined to the provinces only. In his opinion progress must be made simultaneously in the local, provincial and central spheres. He strongly urged that the certificate of the Governor-General-in-Council should not apply except to measures and bills which affected peace, tranquillity and safety of the country. All other departments should be left to the legislature. If any Government Bill was rejected or materially amended in a matter regarded by the Government as vital, it should be referred to a Council of State, constituted on the lines laid down in the Scheme, which would pass the Bill in any form which it thought fit. The Bill as amended by the Council could be sent back to the Legislative Assembly and if rejected again, it could be referred once more to a joint session of the two Houses and the decision of the joint session would be final. The idea underlying this suggestion was that disputes should be settled after a time had been given for

full discussion, but by a body where there was a small majority of elected members. The Government of India could always persuade twelve elected members to vote for them on matters other than measures affecting the tranquillity and safety of the country. Similarly all financial proposals relating to the sources of income and items of the expenditure should be embodied in the form of Bills, which should be submitted to the legislature for voting. Jinnah urged upon his country men that they should treat the Report with due respect and give it their serious consideration. They should concentrate all their energy with a view to focussing the public opinion of the country in the direction of securing these vital changes.

A special session of the Congress was held in Bombay in the month of August. The Moderates decided not to attend and the President postponed it for a couple of days in order that the Moderates could be won over by negotiations. A formula was consequently evolved and a few of the Moderates attended the Congress. The Reform proposals were characterised as "inadequate, unsatisfactory and disappointing," yet the Congress agreed on resolutions which would widen them and make them workable, thus accommodating the point of view of the Moderates. The latter, however, also held their separate conference in October and asked for very similar amendments but added no condemnatory words. The Anglo-Indians who were at first, up in arms to condemn the proposals as measures nothing short of revolutionary changes, now awakened to their peculiar position and demanded their place in the new order of things. The All-India Muslim League also held its session in Bombay and passed resolutions similar to Moderates.

The Montford Scheme came up for discussion before the Imperial Legislative Council in September 1918, and Surendranath Bannerjee moved the following resolution:

> This Council, while thanking His Excellency the Viceroy and the Secretary of State for India for the Reform proposals, and recognising them as a genuine effort and a definite advance towards the progressive realisation of responsible government in India, recommends to the Governor-General-in-Council that a Committee consisting of all the non-official members of this Council be appointed to consider the Reforms Report and make

recommendations to the Government of India.

The Extremists raised an objection saying that they could not find their way to consider the resolution as a whole, for the first part was difficult for them to support. Chelmsford agreed to divide the resolution in two parts, which were ultimately put to vote separately. Both the parts, however, were carried with only two dissenting votes.

Montague now proceeded to put his proposals on the Parliamentary anvil. In accordance with the wishes of the Montford Report, two committees were appointed to go into the details of the electorates of the Provincial and Imperial Legislatures and to find a scheme for the division of the administrative portfolios into Reserved and Transferred subjects.

On November 11, 1918, Armistice was signed. President Wilson and Prime Minister Lloyd George had declared that the principle of self-determination would be applied to the international post-war settlement. The Delhi Congress, therefore, in Christmas of that year, met under a new atmosphere. The All-India Muslim League also held its session side by side. The Extremists had, however, got a complete hold over the Congress by now, and they were determined to have their own way even at the risk of disregarding the views of the Moderates and the compromise that was effected at Bombay. A resolution was passed totally rejecting the Reform proposals and it was decided to send a deputation to England to act upon the Delhi decision. A bitter controversy arose between the Extremists on the one hand and the Moderates and the Home Rulers on the other, and the latter two openly came out to oppose the former. The Muslim League demanded the safety and restoration of the Muslim States in the Middle East the sovereignty of which was threatened in the post-war settlement. Dr. Ansari as the chairman of the Reception Committee warned that Muslims would not allow either the Government or Hindus to shift the ground and make any changes in the right of separate representation. The exclusion of Muslim members from the Imperial War Conference was strongly deprecated.

So far for the Reforms. On the other hand as a sequel to the recommendations of the Rowlatt Committee two Bills were introduced in the Imperial Legislative Council early in 1919. One sought

to make provision in special circumstances to supplement the ordinary criminal law and for the exercise of emergency powers by the Government and the other to amend the existing criminal law. To the first Vithalbhai Patel moved an amendment "that consideration of the Bill be deferred till six months have elapsed after the expiry of the term of office of this Legislative Council." Mohammad Ali Jinnah supported the amendment on the ground that the Bill was against the fundamental principle of law and justice and that no man should lose his liberty without a judicial trial in accordance with the accepted rules of evidence and procedure. Secondly that it was "a wrong remedy for the disease." These were in fact political crimes and should be dealt with as such. Thirdly that the powers which were going to be assumed by the executive, which indeed meant the substitution of the executive for the judicial, were likely to be abused, and in the past there were instances where such powers had been abused. Fourthly that there was no parallel in any other civilised country where laws of this character had been enacted. Fifthly that it was an inopportune moment for a Bill of that kind, because on the eve of the introduction of the Reforms high hopes were raised among the people of India. Sixthly that the proposed measures were of a permanent character although originally meant only to deal with an emergency during the war. And lastly, said Mohammad Ali Jinnah, "if these measures are passed you will create in this country, from one end to the other, a discontent and agitation, the like of which you have not witnessed, and it will have, believe me, a most disastrous effect upon the good relations that have existed between the Government and the people."

The House divided and the motion was negatived. The Council then decided that the Bill be referred to a select committee. The second Bill also, after due debate and opposition from the Indian members, was referred to a select committee.

To influence the judgment of the select committees a country-wide agitation ensued as a mark of protest against the repressive measures which the Government of India proposed to adopt. Meetings were held, addresses were read, articles and pamphlets were written, lectures and speeches were delivered all over India. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, from his Sabarmati Ashram, issued the *Satyagraha* pledge which a band of his followers had already signed. The pledge

ran:

> Being conscientiously of opinion that the Bills known as the Indian Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill No. I of 1919 and the Criminal Law (Emergency Powers) Bill No. II of 1919, are unjust, subversive of the principles of liberty and justice, and destructive of the elementary rights of individuals on which the safety of the community as a whole and the State itself is based, we solemnly affirm that, in the event of these Bills becoming law and until they are withdrawn, we shall refuse civilly to obey these laws and such other laws as a Committee to be hereafter appointed may think fit, and we further affirm that in this struggle we will faithfully follow truth and refrain from violence to life, person or property.

The news of the new movement of passive resistance had electrified the country. Mrs. Annie Besant, however, had deleted from the pledge the words "such other laws," on the ground that agitation against these laws did not necessitate the disobedience of other laws. The Government of India was, however, determined to carry its intentions through in spite of public protest, and the first Bill became law. Hurt to the core, Mohammad Ali Jinnah once again gave India a lead and registered his emphatic active protest against the Act. He wrote the following famous letter to the Viceroy:

> The passing of the Rowlatt Bill by the Government of India, and the assent given to it by Your Excellency as Governor-General against the will of the people, has severely shaken the trust reposed by them in British justice. Further, it has clearly demonstrated the constitution of the Imperial Legislative Council, which is a legislature but in name—a machine propelled by a foreign Executive. Neither the unanimous opinion of the non-official Indian members nor the entire public opinion and feeling outside has met with the least respect.
>
> The Government of India and Your Excellency, however, have thought it fit to place on the Statute Book a measure admittedly obnoxious and decidedly coercive at a time of peace, thereby substituting the executive for the judicial.
>
> Besides, by passing this Bill, Your Excellency's Government have actively negatived every argument they advanced but a year ago when they appealed to India for help at the War Conference

and have ruthlessly trampled upon the principles for which Great Britain avowedly fought the war.

The fundamental principles of justice have been uprooted and the constitutional rights of the people have been violated, at a time when there is no real danger to the State, by an overfretful and incompetent bureaucracy which is neither responsible to the people nor in touch with real public opinion and their sole plea is that the powers when they are assumed will not be abused.

I, therefore, as a protest against the passing of the Bill and the manner in which it. was passed tender my resignation as a member of the Imperial Legislative Council for I feel that under the prevailing conditions I can be of no use to my people in the Council nor consistently with one's self-respect is co-operation possible with a Government that shows such utter disregard for the opinion of the representatives of the people in the Council Chamber and for the feelings and sentiments of the people outside.

In my opinion, a Government that passes or sanctions such a law in times of peace forfeits its claim to be called a civilised government and I still hope that the Secretary of State for India, Mr. Montague, will advise His Majesty to signify his disallowance to this Black Act.

The second Sunday after the passing of the Rowlatt Bill was proclaimed by Gandhi as a day of humility and prayer. The public was asked to observe cessation of business and undergo one day's fast. It fell on March 30, which was consequently observed as the *Satyagraha* Day in Delhi and many other places, where the news of the ultimate change of the day to 6th April had not reached. Delhi saw a serious tragedy. Furious rioting had broken out and police and military opened fire, as a result of which many were killed and injured.

Then came the final day—the 6th of April. Hundreds and thousands of people flocked together in their respective districts throughout India. Local leaders made fiery speeches urging Hindus, Muslims and others to unite under the leadership of Gandhi so that he might compel the Government to wipe off the Black Act from the Statute Book. Everywhere a resolution drafted by Gandhi himself was

adopted amidst tumultuous acclamations and was despatched by letter or wire to the Government of India. The next day after having attended the "national ceremonies" in Bombay, he started for Delhi *en route* to Punjab but as soon as his train reached Palwal station he was served with an order prohibiting his entry into the Punjab. On refusing to obey he was taken under police custody and an Inspector of Police accompanied him back to Bombay. The news of Gandhi's arrest excited the public all the more. People not only observed *hartal* everywhere but went through the streets compelling indifferent or antagonistic people to step down from taxis and carriages, to close shops and theatres, and to attack any Englishman they found on their way. Thus the trouble began at Ahmedabad with the burning of a cinema poster, as the Parsee owner did not agree voluntarily to cancel the shows for the day. The police and the military were very soon on the spot, and one police officer becoming impatient at the threatening crowd closing round his party lashed some people near him with a long whip. The people began to throw stones at the few English soldiers posted on the opposite side of the road. But for the timely intervention of a few local leaders the crisis would have been precipitated there and then. The Collector's Office and the Telegraph Office were quickly set on fire by enraged people, and the other crowds went through the city burning all the police stations they could lay hands on. An unfortunate English sergeant was caught up in the crowd in the main thoroughfare of the city and was done to death. Martial Law had to be proclaimed to deal with the situation.

In Amritsar, on April 11, two popular leaders were arrested and taken away in custody. A crowd, unarmed and peaceful, with the usual Hindu signs of mourning, went towards the Civil Lines to ask whither they had been removed; they were stopped by soldiers, and they sat down on the ground, mourning. In a foolish panic, they were fired on, and several were slain. It was the signal for an outburst of mad rage. The crowd collected sticks and bars, rushed back into the town and attacked banks, Government buildings, the railway station; some five Englishmen were killed, and an English woman was assailed and beaten, but rescued by some Indians. By the evening, all was quiet again. On the next day, many arrests were made, and there was no resistance; all was peace. The sudden fury

provoked by the foolish firing had died down, and there need have been no more trouble.

But troops had been sent for, and General Dyer and his men arrived on the evening of the 12th. On the next day, Sunday, April 13, he went through a few streets, and forbade the holding of any meetings. A meeting had been arranged for that day in a large open space, Jallianwala Bagh, and people came, a holiday crowd, from the surrounding country. General Dyer was told a crowd was gathering, and he did nothing. Jallianwala Bagh was a walled-in space, with some five narrow outlets. When twenty thousand people had gathered in it, he marched down with machine guns, but even the widest of the passages were too narrow for their entry. He gave the order to fire into the crowd, and himself directed the fire so as to close the small outlets with dead and dying, as the amazed and panic-stricken crowd fled before the hail of bullets, men, women, little children—tiny shoes of children in arms were found scattered about afterwards. When his ammunition was exhausted, he and his soldiers marched away, leaving the ground strewn with dead and wounded. No appeal to hospitals was made. As he said afterwards, that was not his job. He meant to give a lesson. None might be out after dark, on pain of death. There were no doctors. The wounded lay through the terrible heat of the night, a few brave persons creeping in with water at times.[1]

Then ensued a real reign of terror in the Punjab. Martial Law was proclaimed. People were made to "crawl." Orders were issued compelling every Indian to accord to British officers, "wherever met, the salutation usually accorded to Indian gentlemen of high social position in accordance with the customs of India." Students of Lahore were directed to attend roll calls four times a day. Public flogging became common, and similar other punishments were inflicted on men, women and children not excluding innocent persons.

When Gandhi learnt of the public disturbances in Delhi, Amritsar, Ahmedabad and other cities he decided to suspend *Satyagraha* and proclaimed it with a voluntary imposition of a three-day fast as a mark of penitence for this "Himalayan miscalculation," and appealed to his countrymen to undergo a similar fast for one day. He discovered that the country, as a whole, was not yet prepared to con-

1. Mrs. Besant.

form to his prerequisite condition of non-violence.

Soon after Parliament had reopened in 1919, Montague introduced into the House of Commons his India Bill, and after it had been read a second time early in June, a select committee was appointed from both the Houses of Parliament to examine its provisions and hear evidence.

A large number of deputations went from India to England for propaganda work and when the Select Committee began its sittings all shades of opinion represented. Yaqub Hasan, Jinnah and Bhurgiri gave their evidence on behalf of the Muslim League. Many officials were examined and opportunity was also provided for spokesmen of the depressed classes and the Indian Christians. Mrs. Naidu appeared on the question of women's franchise. If there was any point, says P. C. Roy, on which the bulk of the witnesses appeared to agree in a more or less general way, it was in support of the Curtis brand of dyarchy, on which Montague had inflexibly set his heart.

After the recess, the Committee met again in October, and their report was published in the middle of November. As soon as the report was received by Parliament the third reading was also rushed through. In the House of Lords, however, a slight difficulty was felt but ultimately Lord Sinha succeeded in piloting the Bill with the help of Lord Curzon and Lord Selborne. The Bill got through the Houses of Parliament about the middle of December and on the 23rd of the same month received the Royal assent. A Royal Proclamation was also issued and paved the way for what then appeared to be a smooth working course for the transitional system introduced by the Government of India Act of 1919.

During the Great War, Indian Muslims had shown their concern about the post-war settlement and the policy that would be followed by the Allies with special reference to Turkey and the Khilafat. The British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, by his various public utterances, had assured the world that the Allies had no intention to dismember Turkey and that after the war all Turkish possessions would be made over to her. Muslim India was following with expectant eyes the march of events. The peace, however, brought tutelage and not freedom to the Holy Cities of Islam. Signs were manifest that other considerations had got the better of British

judgment. Nothing short of complete disintegration of Turkey was being aimed at. This would have meant the passing off of all the Holy places into non-Muslim hands and the reduction of Turkey to a subordinate State. Muslim India was naturally enraged and demanded that the pledges given to them during the war must be honoured. All sections of thought united to form a national front on this issue.

The eleventh session of the All-India Muslim League was held in Delhi in December 1918. "I will not be surprised," said Fazl-ul-Haq, the League President, "if they take this opportunity finally to dispose of Turkey and her problems in Europe, and herein lies food for the amplest reflection. As the years roll on, the position of the Muslims in India becomes more and more critical, and demands our most anxious thought and care. In my humble opinion we should invoke divine help and guidance in all sincerity and meekness of heart. Above all, we should renounce any lurking spirit of strife and quarrel with other communities, and seek their help and assistance in our troubles and difficulties."

A marked feature of this session was the re-emergence of *Ulama* on the political stage, but they decided to form an association of their own under the guidance of the celebrated Maulana Mahmud-ul-Hasan, who had returned to India during the war from Malta, where he was interned for alleged anti-Government activities. *Jamiyat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind*, so founded was recognised to be a school of leaders completely free from the popular control and popular criticism.

The word *Ulama* means scholars of the tenets of Islam and is a sort of a College Degree and not a class distinction. Islam does not assign to them a separate place in society as Brahmins in Hinduism or priesthood in Christianity. Even Islamic propaganda is not their sole concern, for every Muslim is enjoined to propagate the teachings of the Holy Quran. *Ulama* are more or less like specialists, who may be consulted on points of Islamic Law and its interpretation, but even then they are not its sole licensed advocates. Even their interpretation is not binding on those who seek it. It is therefore not right to call them "divines" in the sense the word is generally understood. Many of the contemporary writers have been unconsciously led to this error.

The *Jamiyat* supported the cause of Khilafat, for which a movement was already afloat. Maulana Mohammad Ali and Maulana Shaukat Ali after getting out of the jail took its reins in their hands and were hailed by all as its undisputed leaders.

The refusal by the British Government of the Muslim demand for the inclusion of a Muslim member at the Imperial War Conference increased the apprehensions of Muslim India and doubts were entertained about a secret treaty for the partition of Turkey. The London League took up the issue and on the 14th of July, 1919, a deputation waited on the Secretary of State for India.

The suggestion put forward by the League President the previous year that Muslims should seek help from other communities found popular favour and in November 1919 a joint conference of Hindus and Muslims was called at Delhi and leaders of all shades of opinion were invited to attend, and in order to interest Hindus the question of cow protection was also included in the agenda of the Conference. Consequently a large section of Muslim and Hindu leaders attended the Delhi Conference and among other resolutions one suggesting some kind of non-co-operation with the Government was adopted. In this Gandhi made a substantial contribution.

It is interesting to note that a month later, after the Government of India Bill became an Act, the Congress and the League met at Amritsar. But while the League passed a resolution similar to that adopted by the Khilafat Conference at Delhi, the Congress, which was attended by Gandhi, recommended the working of the new Constitution and co-operation with the Government. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who had by now returned from England after having given his evidence before the Joint Parliamentary Committee, attended these sessions.

On return from Amritsar Gandhi began to feel the pulse of Hindus in order to find out the possibility of preparing them to throw in their weight with the Khilafat movement. Between January and March 1920, he explained his programme of non-cooperation and its implications to the public. Four progressive stages were laid down for the purpose of carrying on the agitation to a successful end. The first was to be the resignation of titles and honorary offices, the second, the withdrawal from all government services save police and military, the third, the withdrawal from the police

and military and the fourth, the suspension of payment of taxes to the State. But in spite of all his efforts Hindus in general refused to line up with Muslims, even though Khilafat movement, ironically enough, was entirely in the hands of Gandhi, who was considered to be a specialist of this kind of agitation. Accordingly in June, he extended its scope to cover, in addition to the Khilafat question, the so-called "Punjab wrongs," *Swaraj* and cow protection.

The proposed terms of peace with Turkey were published on the 14th May, 1920, and, in India, they were accompanied by a message from the Viceroy to Muslims. The message recognised that the terms were faulty and would no doubt cause pain to the Muslims, but nevertheless asked them "to brace themselves with patience and resignation in the misfortunes of their Turkish brethren." The publication of the peace terms caused deep indignation among Muslims and the whole nation was ablaze.

In September, the All-India Muslim League and the Congress both met at Calcutta in special sessions—one under the presidentship of Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the other under that of Lajpat Rai. In his address Jinnah explained:

> We have met here principally to consider the situation that has arisen owing to the studied and persistent policy of the Government since the signing of the Armistice. First came the Rowlatt Bill—accompanied by the Punjab atrocities—and then came the spoliation of the Ottoman Empire and the Khilafat. The one attacks our liberty, the other our faith. Now, every country has two principal and vital functions to perform—one to assert its voice in the international policy, and the other to maintain internally the highest ideals of justice and humanity. But one must have one's own administration in one's own hands to carry it on to one's own satisfaction. As we stand in matters international, India's voice is represented through His Majesty's Government, although nominally we happened to have two Indians who were supposed to represent us, but they were neither the chosen nor the accredited representatives of India. The result was that notwithstanding the unanimous opinion of the Muslims, and in breach of the Prime Minister's solemn pledges, unchivalrous and outrageous terms have been imposed upon Turkey and the Ottoman Empire has served for

plunder and broken up by Allies under the guise of Mandates. This, thank God, has at last convinced us, one and all, that we can no longer abide our trust either in the Government of India or in the Government of His Majesty the King of England to represent India in matters international.

He spoke thus on the questions of freedom and Government policy, but as far as the non-co-operation programme was concerned he made a non-committal statement, for, as he said himself, he had not been able to study it thoroughly. A month later, however, he arrived at a decision quite independently. While he had his sympathies with the movement, as it was supposed to be directed against the policy of the Government, he disapproved of the method adopted for the purpose. To him it all meant chaos, anarchy and bloodshed. Closing down of the schools and colleges meant a serious loss to the nation and he could never agree to it. He believed that the conditions obtained in India left no scope for this agitation to be successful. He was convinced that the greatest benefit could be derived by directing the movement to peaceful and constitutional methods. While, therefore, he restrained himself from seeking election to the Council under the new Act, he deplored that a great opportunity should be lost at the cost of India's progress.

The crisis came in October. Mrs. Annie Besant had resigned the Presidentship of the All-India Home Rule League and Gandhi was elected its new president and proposed to change its creed and rename it as *Swaraj Sabha*. A general meeting of the members of the All-India Home Rule League was held on the 3rd of October, 1920, in Bombay. Gandhi presided. After the notice convening the meeting was read, the consideration of the draft of the amended constitution of the League was taken up. The first article regarding the change of name was agreed to without discussion. But regarding Article 2, covering the objects of the *Sabha*, there was a heated discussion lasting over two hours. The article as drafted by the sub-committee of the Central Council of the League ran thus:

(*i*) To secure complete *Swaraj* for India according to the wishes of the Indian people.

(*ii*) To carry on a continuous propaganda with a view to organising the people for peaceful and effective action to achieve such *Swaraj*, and to take such action whenever necessary.

(*iii*) The interpretation of the word *Swaraj* as used herein shall not be extended beyond Article I of the Congress Constitution.

There were five amendments, two of which were tabled by Jinnah and when the discussion came up before the meeting he moved his first one that Article 2 should read "to secure *Swaraj* for India in conformity with Article 1 of the Constitution of the Indian National Congress" and clauses 2 and 3 should be omitted. In a somewhat lengthy speech he explained the reasons that had led him to press the amendment and said that the constitution of the Home Rule League laid down three things: first, to secure self-government within the British Commonwealth; second, to attain this goal by constitutional methods; and third, to maintain and strengthen British connection. Any change in the constitution, therefore, which went against these two propositions, namely, the attainment of complete self-government within the British Commonwealth and the adoption of constitutional methods was a position which could not be taken up, specially as the League was affiliated to the Indian National Congress. The proposed change meant the declaration of complete independence and severance from the British Commonwealth and it did not lay down the form of government but left it vague. The methods in the proposed change would be peaceful, but not necessarily constitutional and law-abiding. The amendment after considerable discussion, was put to vote and lost.

Jinnah then moved his second amendment that *Swaraj* should mean responsible government. This one was lost too. After this he pointed out that the constitution of the Home Rule League could not be changed except by the Council and that when three-fourths of the members voted for it. The chair, however, ruled that this meeting was competent enough to carry the changes with a bare majority, and, in reply to Dwarkadas, the Chairman announced that "it was open to any member, be he life member or otherwise, to resign his membership if he thought he could not remain a member of the *Sabha* under its altered constitution." The local Press in general supported Mohammad Ali Jinnah on this point and popular opinion went against changing the constitution of the All-India Home Rule League now called the *Swaraj Sabha*. Consequently, he along with nineteen others resigned from the League on the ground that

the "ruling validating the said procedure was both incorrect and arbitrary." The matter, however, did not end there. Gandhi wrote to Jinnah justifying his own action. Jinnah in his turn replied and at last expressed his opinion categorically regarding the recent activities of the Congress and Gandhi. He wrote:

> I thank you for your kind suggestion offering me "to take my share in the new life that has opened up before the country." If by "new life" you mean your methods and your programme, I am afraid I cannot accept them; for I am fully convinced that it must lead to disaster. But the actual new life that has opened up before the country is that we are faced with a government that pays no heed to the grievances, feelings and sentiments of the people; that our own countrymen are divided; the Moderate Party is still going wrong; that your methods have already caused split and division in almost every institution that you have approached hitherto, and in the public life of the country not only amongst Hindus and Muslims but between Hindus and Hindus and Muslims and Muslims and even between fathers and sons; people generally are desperate all over the country and your extreme programme has for the moment struck the imagination mostly of the inexperienced youth and the ignorant and the illiterate. All this means complete disorganisation and chaos. What the consequences of this may be, I shudder to contemplate; but I for one am convinced that the present policy of the Government is the primary cause of it all and unless that cause is removed, the effects must continue. I have no voice or power to remove the cause; but at the same time I do not wish my countrymen to be dragged to the brink of a precipice in order to be shattered. The only way for the nationalists is to unite and work for a programme which is universally acceptable for the early attainment of complete responsible government. Such a programme cannot be dictated by any single individual, but must have the approval and support of all the prominent Nationalist leaders in the country; and to achieve this end I am sure my colleagues and myself shall continue to work.

At Nagpur the programme of non-co-operation was to be finally discussed. The Congress and the Muslim League both held their

annual sessions there in the month of December. But while the Congress gained more and more power by the help of the Khilafat Committee, the League was being pushed aside as a nonentity, and its platform was almost deserted. The names of the Khilafat Committee and the Congress were almost synonymous and both were under the direct control and supreme leadership of Gandhi. The Nagpur sessions of the League, therefore, did nothing more than duplicating the Khilafat programme, and *The Bombay Chronicle* writing editorially suggested that the best comment it could make on the League session was to reproduce the article written on the Congress session.

CHAPTER VII

Non-Co-operation

The historic Nagpur session of the Congress met under great excitement. No less than 14,582 delegates were present, out of whom 1,050 were Muslims and 169 women. It was presided over by Vijay Raghova Chari. Colonel Wedgwood Benn, Holford Knight and Ben Spoor attended as fraternal delegates from the Labour Party. C. R. Das brought a contingent of about 250 men to oppose the resolution on non-co-operation. The session was a great personal triumph for Gandhi. The President himself, "in spite of his lukewarm attitude towards non-co-operation, co-operated with Gandhi passively, and always made a point of vacating the chair whenever a resolution came up before the open House with which he was not in agreement." Das and Lajpat Rai were not only won over, but the one moved and the other seconded the main resolution. The whole atmosphere changed suddenly and when the question was put to the House, fifty thousand of the audience recorded their approval. But out of this vast assemblage there was only one tall, thin man who had the courage to stand up and signify his dissent. This man was no other than Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Every one was astonished. But Wedgwood Benn exclaimed with satisfaction that India was definitely on the road to freedom as she was capable of producing at least one man who had the nerve to stand by his conviction in the face of such a huge opposition that would terrify any man.

Jinnah's objection was in the belief that a sort of false religious frenzy had got hold of Indian political activity and would ultimately lead the country to confusion. It would do more harm than good to India in general and Muslims in particular. He was not against

agitation, he was not against revolt. He stood for protest and demonstration of public disapproval, with all its force, of the policy followed by Britain both in the domain of international and Indian problems, but he did not agree with the method adopted by his countrymen in this regard. He, therefore, preferred to remain aloof from the non-co-operation movement.

It was a crucial moment in the life of a leader who had impressed his countrymen as the greatest patriot of his times, who had sponsored and defended the rights and interests of Muslims and who was hailed as the symbol of the dynamic spirit of Young India. It was difficult to keep himself out of a movement which raged through the length and breadth of the country. His attitude was seriously called into question, but he knew no terror from public criticism as long as his conscience was clear. And on that score he was not going to be party to a scheme of things which he honestly believed to be disastrous to the larger interests of the country. Nor did he shun the public. On the contrary he faced it squarely and with confidence. When, therefore, he was chosen as one of the speakers on the occasion of the death anniversary of Gokhale, he was expressly requested to enlighten his countrymen on the subject of non-co-operation.

Jinnah re-affirmed his honest and sincere conviction that Gandhi was leading India in the wrong direction, otherwise he would have been the first person to join the movement. He wished that in its place there had been a real political movement based on the fire that burnt in the heart of every Indian for his motherland. This programme was based on the doctrine of soul force, having for its execution destructive methods which did not take account of human nature, and which might slip out of control at any time. Jinnah declared that non-violent non-co-operation would be a miracle if accomplished. He could not contemplate how the movement could last, if all the boys were withdrawn from schools and colleges without substituting the existing educational institutions by national ones. He hoped that the Government of India would pay less attention to Gandhi's programme and more to the intelligent opinion of the country and effect a real change in their policy, which would satisfy the feelings of the Indian people. After all how many of the Congress delegates had really boycotted foreign cloth? In short even if Jinnah had to stand out alone he would still say that non-

co-operation movement was detrimental to the interests of India.

This on no account meant that he would stoop down to joining hands with any other party to crush the movement or even to prove it abortive. Towards the close of 1921, a bid was made by the Government of India to enlist co-operation from those who had kept out of the non-co-operation movement. It was he who gave an effective reply to it. In a press statement he stated:

> The non-co-operation movement is only an expression of general dissatisfaction, owing to the utter disregard of public opinion and of outstanding grievances. Every country has an extreme section of opinion but it will be impossible for that section to make any headway if the bulk of the people are satisfied. And my reading of the Indian situation is that, leave alone the bulk of the people, even the intellectual and reasonable section is far from satisfied with the present policy of the Government. It is often said that sober people should rally round the authority. How is it possible for them to support or stand by the Government when the Government has paid no heed to what even they have urged upon Lord Reading and his Government for the last nine months?

Soon after Nagpur sessions the non-co-operation movement was in full swing. Titles were renounced by a few. Attempts were made to close down some of the schools and colleges. Law Courts were boycotted at some places. Some lawyers gave up their practice. A number of graduates tore up their degrees. Government servants resigned their posts. Mob fury came into vogue. The arrest of Ali Brothers at Karachi in August added fuel to the fire. The entire Muslim population was enraged, and vigorous repression was resorted to by the Government, and in most cases Muslims suffered heavily. Government's policy excited more fury and resulted in a stricter and more repressive policy. The ultimate was, however, yet to happen. The entire propaganda and ethics of the movement, as had been pointed out by Jinnah, were based on religious philosophy and principles of soul force and self-purification. It was, therefore, natural that Hindus and Muslims, whose respective religions were poles apart, had altogether different notions about the movement and expected different results. The Muslims were mainly concerned about the Khilafat question to settle which they were inclined to

be even militant. To them questions of the *Swaraj* were of a secondary nature. The Hindus, on the other hand, concentrated in most cases on *Swaraj*, which had been promised by Gandhi "inside a year." They were looking forward to an understanding between themselves and their Muslim countrymen that would ultimately further the case of cow protection. The result was quite evident. History began to repeat itself. Consequences which followed the religious appeal of Mrs. Besant and Tilak in the past began to manifest before long and communal riots became the order of the day. Agra, Delhi and many places in the United Provinces, Bihar and Bengal were the scenes of bloodiest fight between Hindus and Muslims and co-operators and non-co-operators. In the Malabar area, Moplahs rose in armed conflict not only with the Government but also with the Hindus. Bombay saw a clash of co-operators and non-co-operators and Gandhi had once again to proclaim a fast of penitence. The forecasts of those who opposed the movement were coming true. Mohammad Ali Jinnah had hitherto remained a passive spectator, but now was the time for him to act. Once more an attempt had to be made to save the situation. Friends of the Congress and lovers of freedom and advocates of peace came forward to act as intermediaries between the Government and the non-co-operators.

An All-Parties Conference was convened at Bombay in the middle of January 1922, which unanimously condemned the Government policy of repression, and advised the Congress to abandon the resolution passed at Bardoli, which contemplated the inauguration of mass civil disobedience. It also recommended to the Government an early convening of a Round Table Conference with authority to make a settlement on the questions of Khilafat, Punjab and *Swaraj*, and with a view to providing a favourable atmosphere. It asked for the withdrawal of notifications under the Criminal Law Amendment Act banning organisations, and the Seditious Meetings Act, and release of all prisoners convicted or under trial under them as also of *Fatwa* prisoners. It further asked for a Committee to investigate the cases of persons convicted in connection with the movement under ordinary law.

The conference provided a sufficient excuse for the non-co-operators to recede from their position and to see reason. But

Gandhi laid down the condition that all political leaders must be released from jails before any pourparlers could begin with the Viceroy. The promoters of the conference therefore, were utterly helpless, as the Viceroy could not see his way to fulfil this condition, and on the 1st of February, 1922, Gandhi sent to the Viceroy his final ultimatum, that if the former did not make necessary declaration within seven days, an "aggressive" civil disobedience would be taken up.

But before the time limit of seven days could expire, a terrible incident had taken place. On the 5th of February when a procession was being taken out at Chauri Chaura, near Gorakhpur, United Provinces, twenty-one constables and a sub-inspector were rushed at by the mob in a police station and the station and the men in it, were set fire to. They all perished in the flames. The tragedy opened the eyes of Gandhi to the realities of the situation to which Mohammad Ali Jinnah had invariably drawn his attention. Gandhi realised the blunder he had committed and on the 12th of February the entire movement was called off.

The warnings that Gandhi had received from his mortal countrymen prior to starting the movement had failed to convince him, till at last, according to him, God Himself ordained him through Chauri Chaura. In regard to the political prisoners he compromised himself entirely and "sacrificed them as the first penitential act." His ultimatum to the Viceroy was replaced by "a fierce process of purification."

Mohammad Ali Jinnah's views regarding the feasibility of the non-co-operation movement were further justified when there occurred a serious split in the very ranks of the Congress. In 1922 a section of powerful leaders had showed inclination of converting the Congress to their point of view on the question of Council-entry. At Gaya the annual session was held that year under the presidentship of C. R. Das, but in spite of his heroic efforts the Congress stuck to the principle of Council boycott, and Das forthwith tendered his resignation to go against the official resolution and to organise a Swaraj Party. The other group was led by C. Rajagopalachari and later came to be known as "No-changers."

During the early months of the year 1923 a vigorous propaganda followed and Swaraj Party made a desperate attempt to bring public

opinion round to its own point of view. The country was once again plunged into a great crisis. On the one hand communal disturbances had not quietened down, and on the other the question of Council-entry foreshadowed a bitter struggle between Sawarajists and No-changers. India's destiny was entirely in the hands of her leaders and attempts were being made to find the solutions of these two immediate problems. While a number of individual Hindu and Muslim leaders were trying their best to arrive at a compromise over the communal discord; the special sessions of the Congress and Khilafat meeting at Delhi in September were to decide the Council-entry issue. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, with his characteristic independence, had, however, already decided to stand for election as an independent candidate to the Central Legislative Assembly, and on the 19th of September, 1923, issued his historic manifesto. "I have no desire to seek any post or position or title from the Government. My sole object is to serve the cause of the country as best as I can," he declared.

The Congress, too, ended with a compromise between the Changers and No-changers, and the Swarajists were allowed to proceed with their programme. Consequently, at the election time the Swarajists set up their own candidates in opposition to Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who was now face to face with two more candidates. But popular opinion went in his favour and *The Bombay Chronicle* dealt with the question editorially:

> His brilliant past record, his sterling patriotism, his rare independence which no favour can buy nor any frown diminish, and, above all his uncompromising fighting spirit mark him out as one worthier than any living citizen of Bombay to be its chosen representative. The Muslim voters of Bombay willing to exercise their franchise will, therefore, honour themselves by returning him at the head of the poll, if not unopposed.

Before long, however, every one realised that there was no use contesting with Jinnah, and the two candidates who had intended to oppose him were asked by public men to withdraw, and on the 14th of November, 1923, he was returned to the Central Assembly unopposed, still an independent candidate.

During the same year, there cropped up another question worthy of attention. Indians in Kenya had some legitimate grievances and

the treatment meted out to them by the Kenya Government had enraged public opinion in India. The recommendations of the Indian Government had been disregarded by the British Government. But instead an Imperial Conference was called and Tej Bahadur Sapru was invited to represent Indian opinion before it. A large meeting of the citizens of Bombay was called in August to discuss the various aspects of the Kenya question, to consider the withdrawal of Sapru as a protest against the attitude of indifference by the British Government, and also to examine the feasibility of India's refusal to participate in the Empire Exhibition which was organised side by side with the Conference. Mohammad Ali Jinnah had taken a leading part in the meeting and his categorical exposition of the Indian case gave rise to a general feeling of satisfaction.

Jinnah's view was that so long as India remained a dependency India and Indians would not command any respect. The Kenya decision only brought home more vividly to the people of India that it was not possible for the Indians to establish equality of status claiming a share in the government and administration of other parts of the Commonwealth. The decision was based on the ground of White domination. He did not believe that India had got the slightest chance of ever realising "citizenship of the Empire", until she became the mistress of her own house. But independence could not be attained by holding meetings and passing resolutions. It could be accomplished only by developing character, a spirit of team work and a firm determination. Unity and organisation were main things.

As for the recall of Sapru, he felt there were many difficulties. Firstly India could be represented by only those who were duly elected by the people. Sapru was nominated by the Government and therefore the demand for his recall would be misunderstood to mean that India had accepted his representative character. Secondly there was no guarantee that Sapru would resign if a request was made to him. In the same way regarding participation in the Empire Exhibition, India was helpless as the decision was made by His Majesty's Government as in the case of Kenya question.

The entry of Swaraj Party in the Councils brought fresh problems to India. It practically threw the Khilafat question to the background and almost all the leaders of India, who stood for fighting

India's battle from within the framework of the Indian constitution, were now engaged in devising ways and means to solve the domestic issues which presented a big challenge in the shape of Hindu-Muslim tension. While a solution was still to be found, the feelings of the two communities were being more and more estranged in certain provinces over the question of Council seats, and fight for supremacy between the contending parties often created more complications. Punjab was the main scene of acrimony. The Khilafat Committee and Jamiyat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind had already refused to have anything to do with the Councils. The need, therefore, was felt among Muslims that their parliamentary activity should be organised and controlled by some central organisation which should have sufficient influence over the Muslim representatives in the Councils. In March 1924, the Council of the All-India Muslim League met in Delhi to consider the venue of the next session of the League, and it was decided that in the fourth week of May the League should assemble in Lahore under the presidentship of Mohammad Ali Jinnah. The news gave rise to considerable criticism from all quarters. Jinnah was called upon to explain his attitude. Dealing with the specific questions agitating the Muslim mind at the time, Jinnah pointed out that they were two—the proportion of representation in the country's legislatures, municipal and local bodies; and percentage of Muslims in the services of the country. He said:

> The settlement with regard to these questions can only be brought about by a spirit of 'give and take.' For that purpose, it is necessary to infuse a friendly feeling and a sense of fairness on both sides. Unfortunately the recent rivalry displayed by the *Shuddhi* and the *Sanghatan* movements, roused prejudices on the cow-killing and the playing of music near mosques—these are the outstanding features of the trouble, and we desire, if possible, to make both parties cry halt in that direction and inculcate in both parties a spirit of 'live and let live.'
>
> All this can be done when we have once more made the All-India Muslim League a living and well organised political body as it was, with branches all over the country. It is then alone that leaders will be able to speak with authority and be in a position to bring about a complete settlement which will be acceptable to the Muslim public. In order to bring about this desired result,

> we may have to appoint a committee of the All-India Muslim League with power to confer with a committee or committees appointed by other organisations such as the Congress or the Hindu Mahasabha.

Hindu-Muslim settlement according to him was within the range of practical politics. There was no reason why the two communities could not sink their differences and agree to a workable arrangement as they did once at Lucknow in 1916. But of course an attempt for this would have to be made by both sides.

The League commenced its sittings on May 25, at Lahore. In his presidential address Jinnah gave a reasoned analysis of the events since 1920 and outlined his scheme for the achievement of the political goal that he had in mind. He again emphasised that the pre-requisite condition for political emancipation from foreign rule was absolute unity. Education of the people was equally important and he again reiterated his demand for compulsory primary education. The leaders, he said, must concentrate upon national planning in the social, political, educational and economic spheres of life. Then alone India could dream of achieving her goal. The system of the Government of India and the Indian Legislature must be thoroughly overhauled. Diarchy had failed in its purpose and the main task before the League was to see that an atmosphere of fraternity was created in the country between the various elements in order that a joint scheme of constitution was once again formulated as it was done in 1916 at Lucknow. To facilitate the work of the leaders in this direction the League appointed a committee in order "to frame a scheme of constitution of the Government of India in consultation with the committee or committees that may be appointed by other political organisations in the country" and to place the same before a session of the League for approval.

Curiously enough, however, the President of the Indian National Congress, an eminent Muslim at the time, was the first to doubt the *bona fides* of the League, and, with a lengthy statement from him, almost immediately after the League session, a controversy of a serious nature developed between him and Jinnah. Maulana Mohammad Ali had called into question the representative character of the League and had accused it of being under the influence of a selected few. He believed that the amendment, which was brought in by

him to the main resolution on the question of franchise and representation of Muslims in the Councils, was defeated because of the machinations of a few interested members. Jinnah's reply was categorical and he concluded it with an appeal "to my Hindu friends not to be carried away by the antics of Mr. Mohammad Ali. I have very little doubt in my mind that population basis will not be accepted by the Muslims. I am not, as it is well known, one of those who are enamoured of separate electorates and separate representation. But the Muslim opinion is so strong on this question that we might take it as a settled fact for the time being. On that basis the Muslims should have an adequate and effective representation, wherever they are in a minority. The percentage, the ratio on the population, can only be fixed by mutual goodwill and consent, in order to secure the success of any scheme that may come in force for representation to the municipalities and legislatures. I, therefore, hope that the Hindus will not misunderstand me, as I still stand a tried nationalist and if the Muslims ought to be organised it is not with a view to prejudicing national advance, or national interests, but, on the contrary, to bring them into line with the rest of India."

Jinnah's sincere efforts in the direction of unity were unquestionable and his appeal based on his past services to the country went deep into the minds of the people. But to lose him from the national democratic movement and to assign him the place of the spokesman of special Muslim interests was too much for Hindu leadership to digest. More so because his advocacy would be irresistible. He was either to be won back to the national front so that he would forget about special treatment for Muslims or in the alternative his growing influence with Muslims had to be checked. It is a pity that Hindu leaders decided upon the second course; and experiments in this direction began immediately.

However, Mohammad Ali Jinnah again earnestly engaged himself both inside and outside the legislature with a view to influencing Britain to introduce a system of government in India which would suit the Indian genius and also to bring about that happy union of minds and hearts between various elements of public life which was in his opinion absolutely necessary for the fulfilment of the final goal. With the opening of the second Legislative Assembly on

January 31, 1924, he was appointed, in recognition of his parliamentary qualifications, on the panel of Chairmen to the Assembly with three others.

A member of the Nationalist Party then, he picked up the broken threads of practical politics, which he had left ever since his resignation early in 1919 from the Assembly in the circumstances already described above. A study of the proceedings of the House shows that, of all the members, Jinnah was most active to bring home to the Government of India the fact that affairs of the Army were not being managed properly. During the Budget session that year he took up the issue and raised outspoken protests, pointed out the faults and suggested ways and means for the solution of the problem. He demanded, for the welfare of the country, a complete Indianisation of the Army. Besides this, he materially contributed to the reorganisation of the Civil Services, criticised and made useful suggestions to the recommendations of the Lee Commission, appointed by His Majesty's Government the previous year, and made a strong plea for the competitive examinations to be held simultaneously in India. To other questions, such as the grant of full self-government, return of Horniman, the editor of *Bombay Chronicle*, who had been deported in 1919, Jinnah gave his full support and was instrumental, to a very large extent, in prevailing upon the Government to take due notice of the sentiment and opinion of the Indian peoples. In the sphere of legislation he took active interest in matters relating to the Indian Penal and Criminal Laws.

On the question of the failure of the constitution, the Government showed signs of agreement, but were desirous that instead of overhauling the entire system it would be better, for the time being, to remove whatever flaws were discovered in it. With this view a Committee was appointed with Alexander Muddiman, the Home Member, as its President, who in his speech on the floor of the Assembly had declared that if this Committee would find that the Act of 1919 was beyond redemption and that a new constitution was inevitable, the Government of India would be willing to recommend to His Majesty's Government on these lines. Mohammad Ali Jinnah had seen a ray of hope in this pronouncement and accepted to serve on the Committee.

Investigations began by the middle of the year 1924 and evidence

was collected from all over the country. Leaders of all shades of opinion were given a hearing. Even when the evidence was being recorded the official group tried to carry it in their favour and very often there seemed to be a rift between the official and non-official members. But Jinnah's frequent intervention saved the situation until the report was finally submitted. Four Indian members, however, led by Mohammad Ali Jinnah annexed a separate minority report, although they were precluded-to do so by the Committee's terms of reference. They held that no improvement of the situation was possible without a structural alteration of the constitution itself. In some matters they agreed with the majority: that the control of the Secretary of State on matters affecting purely Indian interests should be relaxed; that joint deliberation between the two halves of the Provincial Governments should be definitely enjoined and enforced by a change in the devolution rules; that the Ministers' salaries should be fixed by statute at a minimum of three-fifths of the salary of an Executive Councillor; that the Finance Minister of any Provincial Government should not be placed in charge of any main spending department, and that Members and Ministers should be given enhanced powers of reappropriation. Among the recommendations of the minority were included such proposals as the abolition of the official block in the Councils, the formulation of a definite scheme of Indianisation of the Army, and the limitation of the certification powers of the Governor-General.

Indeed all this could have been done earlier. The attainment of self-government could have been expedited if the non-co-operators had only controlled themselves for a while and had realised the importance of constitutional agitation, instead of obstructing administrative machinery and concentrating their energy on a temporary atmosphere of dramatic heroism. The short-sighted policy of boycotting the Councils in 1921 and 1923 had in fact retarded the progress of India considerably. It had irritated the local administration and alienated sympathies of British statesmen. In Indian public life it created increasing confusion. The non-co-operators acted under impulse of a sort of haughty bravado and looked down upon co-operators and even those who remained neutral. The more the latter appealed for better counsels the more they were mocked and taunted. On top of it the frequent failures of subversive activities

not only convinced the Indian and British Governments of the futility of such attempts but also provided them sufficient incentive to assume increased powers and a firmer control over political affairs of the country. Furthermore the propaganda that accompanied such activities and the explanation that followed their failures sought to justify everything good or bad. The result was utter confusion in the public mind and differences between various sections became more intense. Had the Swarajists not taken a bold lead at this juncture the retrograde advance of India could never have been arrested.

CHAPTER VIII

Birth of Pakistan

By the middle of 1924 the issue of Council entry had been practically settled. Swarajists were already "wrecking the constitution" from within the Councils. Some others were fully co-operating with the Government. Although a compromise between the Changers and No-changers had been arrived at, the question of Hindu-Muslim tangle had yet to be handled. Leaders of both sides were making earnest endeavours in this direction. Mohammad Ali Jinnah naturally took a leading part in the inter-communal negotiations.

The Gaya Congress in 1922 had appointed a committee including Dr. Ansari and Lajpat Rai to draw up a National Pact, and they had submitted their report before the Cocanada Congress in 1923, but it was referred to another committee and was never heard of any more. Simultaneously C. R. Das had formulated an agreement between Hindus and Muslims covering religious as well as political questions, which also came up for consideration before the same Congress but was summarily rejected on the ground that it conceded too much to Muslims.

A stalemate followed and Jinnah explaining the circumstances declared that the Congress and the Muslim League were not in a position to "deliver the goods" and questions of this nature were naturally shelved. The press which was conducted by educated classes kept the problems alive, which in its turn created fresh bitterness and mutual distrust. In fact the dispute was no more confined to the intelligentsia. It had filtered down to the masses. The Hindus were ably organised through the Indian National Congress, the Swaraj and Liberal Parties and the Hindu Mahasabha. Muslims were

not. It was therefore necessary that Muslims should knit themselves together into one body, so that they would be able to sit at a Round Table Conference and thrash out with Hindus all the outstanding communal questions. Under the circumstances there was no other alternative.

By continued efforts of Mohammad Ali Jinnah in May, 1924 the Muslim League had taken the initiative of reviving the days of Lucknow Pact. Side by side the annual Bengal Conference was held and the passionate eloquence of C. R. Das once more carried the day and in spite of opposition from many Hindus the Bengal Pact was adopted by a large majority. In September a Unity Conference was called at Delhi by Maulana Mohammad Ali, the then President of the Congress, and an honest effort was made by every one present. Even the Anglican Metropolitan and some British representatives attended. A formula was devised for promoting unity and a Conciliation Board of fifteen members was set up, which was to intervene whenever and wherever a communal trouble arose.

One great event in the Muslim international world gave an impetus to the efforts of leaders. In March 1924 Mustafa Kamal Pasha had taken the step of abolishing the Turkish Khilafat altogether, and it had the effect of creating a most extraordinary situation in India. Muslim leaders divided among themselves on the Khilafat question. Some sided with Mustafa Kamal and others believed that abolition of Khilafat was the negation of Islam itself. However many Khilafat Committees liquidated themselves and their leaders returned to domestic politics. In November an All-Parties Conference was called at Bombay. But this time the object of the Conference was to consolidate opinion amongst all parties against the growing virulence of the repressive measures of the Government in Bengal. The Conference condemned the Government policy and appointed a committee to prepare a scheme for independence, including communal settlement. This committee was to report before March 31, 1925. To the deliberations and final conclusions of this Conference, Mohammad Ali Jinnah made a historic contribution.

In the meantime, extreme views grew deeper and deeper both amongst Hindus and Muslims. Provocative pronouncements from both sides irritated each other and both communities were gradually

drifting towards militant nationalism. Maulana Mohammad Ali and others had given indication of their extra-territorial interest in Muslim countries, while Hindu leaders like Swami Shardhanand were busy with their activities of *Shudhi* and *Shanghatan*, and were looking to eastern Asiatic nations for co-operation. In spite of this, however, even the Extremists believed that this was a passing phase and that Hindu-Muslim unity was not altogether impossible. Maulana Hasrat Mohani was the only one who refused to take part in the communal controversies, but was seriously engaged in drawing up a scheme for settlement. He had thought of a system of government, which envisaged the establishment of separate Muslim and Hindu States. Lajpat Rai, who had hitherto practically led the Hindu opposition against Muslims, was also thinking in the same terms simultaneously, and, according to him, had improved upon Maulana's Scheme. But while Hasrat Mohani was hopeful of an ultimate unity, Lajpat Rai had given up all hopes, so long as the Muslims insisted upon separate electorates or separate representation.

Rai's writings are important inasmuch as they were to form the central pivot of the Congress policy in the coming years. In the first instance, he warned the Hindus that, if Muslims were allowed to remain a separate entity, things might not go according to the wishes of the Hindus, hence the insistence on joint electorates. He had made a subtle suggestion for a method that would put both Muslims and the British Government in an awkward position at the same time. If Muslims insisted upon their demand as a separate party they could be held responsible for the delay in the attainment of self-government. If the British backed them up their action could be misconstrued as one for perpetuating the imperial hold on India. And in this way also Muslims could be induced to surrender their interests. Yet Lajpat Rai's approach to the communal problem was from a practical point of view. He had two alternatives as a solution—either the Muslims should give up their role as a separate entity or India should be divided into Hindu States and Muslim States, failing which India could never hope to become independent. The difference between him and Hasrat Mohani was that while the latter contemplated a single federation of the Hindu and Muslim States, the former made no commitment in this regard. Lajpat Rai wrote:

> Under my scheme the Muslims will have four Muslim States: (1) the Pathan Province or the North-West Frontier, (2) Western Punjab, (3) Sind, and (4) Eastern Bengal. If there are compact Muslim communities in any other part of India, sufficiently large to form a province, they should be similarly constituted. But it should be distinctly understood that this is not a united India. It means a clear partition of India into a Muslim India and a non-Muslim India.

Rai had also warned the Hindus that they had no friends outside India and that if Hindus and Muslims were to be considered as two parties to a quarrel, the only organisation that could represent the Hindus was the Hindu Mahasabha. About this time also, he wrote the letter to C. R. Das, which, after Jinnah had quoted it in his presidential address before the All-India Muslim League in 1940, attracted wide attention. "Although we can unite against the British," he wrote, "we cannot do so to rule Hindustan on British lines. We cannot do so to rule Hindustan on democratic lines. What is then the remedy? I am not afraid of the seven crores of Muslims. But I think the seven crores in Hindustan plus the armed hosts of Afghanistan, Central Asia, Arabia, Mesopotamia and Turkey will be irresistible."

Lajpat Rai was therefore the pioneer of two movements in India—one among Hindus which culminated in the final political stand of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Indian National Congress and the other among Muslims that received an impetus by the famous Lahore Resolution of the All-India Muslim League of 1940. But while one was the direct result of Rai's endeavours, the other was the inevitable shadow of his viewpoint.

Under the very canopy which housed the plenary session of the Congress at Belgaum, the Hindu Mahasabha was revived and revitalised. Belgaum also initiated extra-territorial contacts, the lack of which had already been felt by Hindu India, and although the Congress officially refused to adopt a resolution urging the need of foreign propaganda, some Hindus established connections in Japan, China, Burma and other oriental countries. Among Muslims, on the other hand, a strong opinion was being slowly and gradually centred round the idea of partition. Chaudhry Rahmat Ali, a student in London, had started working on these lines, and one fine morning

while taking a ride in a London omnibus, he conceived of a suitable nomenclature for the future Northern Independent Muslim State. Of course he had gone a step further than Lajpat Rai had done and had included the State of Kashmir in his scheme, as Kashmir's population happened to be, as it still is, overwhelmingly Muslim. Thus by taking the letters *P* from the Punjab, *A* from Afghana (North-West Frontier Province), *K* from Kashmir, *S* from Sind and *Tan* from Baluchistan, he had coined, according to Urdu usage, a word *Pakistan*, which incidentally means the land of the pure.

Soon after the Belgaum Congress, the All-India Muslim League held its annual session at Bombay and in spite of opposition from some Muslims, Mohammad Ali Jinnah had managed to invite Hindu leaders and a number of them spoke from the League platform. The main resolution concerned with communal unity and it was moved by Jinnah himself, urging that a committee be appointed to "formulate the Muslim demand regarding the representation of the Muslim community in the legislatures of the country and in other elective bodies and their due and proper share in the public services, with power to them to confer with the other political organisations and report to the Muslim League." The need for this resolution was felt because some of the Hindu leaders had suggested that they were unable to understand as to what Muslims of India wanted and that there was no definite demand put forward in their behalf. The League adopted it forthwith.

At this time Jinnah, although an influential Muslim leader and a bold spokesman of Muslim interests, was himself in favour of joint electorates and believed that political life of India should have been organised on party basis rather than on denominational lines. He also believed that a strong force of 70 million Muslims could not be ruled by Hindus, whatever their number and however strongly they might be organised. If Hindus attempted to be despotic at any time, democratic institutions could never work in India and government would be impossible if Muslims chose to resist it. At any rate Hindus would not be so unrealistic. On the Muslim side it was no use attaching too much importance to Muslims' connections outside India, for it was quite obvious that so long as Indian Muslims did not organise themselves internally no amount of foreign sympathy could help them. Nevertheless he did recognise that

differences between Hindus and Muslims, based as they were on historic and social antagonism, were real and could not be brushed aside lightly. Consequently at his instance an All-Parties Conference was called again and for its deliberations he put forward five aspects of a probable solution of the problem—firstly separate electorates with special representation, secondly representation strictly according to population, thirdly joint electorates with reservation of seats, fourthly proportional representation with single transferable vote and fifthly common electorates with no communal considerations. The Conference was held at Delhi on January 23, 1925. Prominent spokesmen of all shades of opinion participated. Jinnah represented Muslim point of view, Ramaswamy Mudaliar that of the non-Brahmans of Madras, and Malaviya, Lajpat Rai and Shardhanand spoke on behalf of the Hindus. The Conference, after long discussions, ended with the appointment of a committee to tackle the question in detail, which began its work at once. But it appointed a sub-committee of nearly fifty members, which in its turn appointed a smaller committee.

The sub-committee's deliberations, however, did not bear fruit and on March 5, its meeting was postponed *sine die* on the ground that the attendance of its members became too thin and that so far it totally failed to arrive at a solution. This was a rude shock to the country as a whole. India's best brains were associated with the committee and they made an earnest endeavour for a workable settlement. Some attributed it to the secret hands of British bureaucracy. Some to the lack of education. Some to economic poverty of India and some others to general lack of interest. But the real cause was, as Jinnah pointed out, that the leaders of respective opinions were not in the position of authoritative representatives who could be sure of deciding questions on behalf of their respective peoples. The failure of the committee was indeed one of those events which happen in a country's life when its history has decided to shape itself in altogether a different direction. Failures followed failures until the two communities took different courses for themselves.

In the meantime, there occurred another event of consequence. For some time past the Swarajists were drifting towards extremism and they were inclined to obstruct the administration from all sides and to oppose all official measures, reasonable or unreasonable. This

attitude, in the opinion of Jinnah, was unfair and harmful to the larger interests of India. Besides, it was not in keeping with the election manifesto and the pledge on which he was returned to the Assembly as an independent candidate. Consequently he along with some of his supporters severed connection with the Nationalist Party and formed an Independent Party with himself as its leader, with the object of viewing all legislative measures on their merits. During the early session of 1925, the Independents had voted with the Government benches against the Nationalists in connection with budget grants. This gave rise to criticisms from all quarters and Jinnah was classed among the orthodox communal leaders. In reply Jinnah stated, "If we cannot establish a democratic government in the near future, we can certainly establish a representative government and yet be masters of our affairs for all practical purposes. Under the present conditions of India a representative government is the first step towards the ideal."

The path of Mohammad Ali Jinnah was clear. He believed in India's political progress reaching to its final goal of complete independence. But how was this progress to be made? Jinnah felt that Indians should accept and work out whatever measures of reforms the British Government conceded and introduced in the administrative and political field. Side by side Indian leaders should concentrate upon the education of the people and their social and economic amelioration. This would lead to increased political consciousness, which would enable the Indian public to understand the meaning of representative government and elementary rules of democracy. For those who were connected with government machinery, whether as members of legislature or administration, the same programme was outlined. He had faith in co-operation and believed that all the responsible leaders of the country should "put their heads together," and discuss things with a determination to arrive at conclusions which would do honour to them and bring good to India. According to him the British Government was a party to be reckoned with, just as there were others in India—Hindus, Muslims and minorities.

From the very beginning of his public career, Mohammad Ali Jinnah placed before himself the task of assisting whichever party or individual was engaged in improving the general conditions of

the Indian people and prepare them for shouldering the responsibility of their own affairs. For some time past the leaders of His Majesty's Government and their agents in India had publicly committed themselves to a progressive policy of reforms in India. Jinnah was willing to take them at their word. He believed that if Indians co-operated with the Government of India they could place the latter in a tighter corner of obligation to keep their word, than by keeping aloof from the government machinery. In this way, he thought, the Government would be forced to introduce reforms at an accelerated speed, or otherwise they could be thoroughly exposed. While, therefore, his activities were multifarious in the realm of wise and useful legislation, such as improvements in the Indian Criminal Law, Hindu and Muslim Law, efficient working of the Railways, betterment of the conditions of Indians overseas, protection of trade and industries, currency and coinage systems and the like, he picked out a few of the broader topics to which all his efforts were mainly directed. Elementary education was the central pivot on which the whole of Indian progress was to revolve and in league with and under the guidance of Gokhale he was among the first and foremost who threw in all their weight to bring home to the Government the need of the introduction of an effective system of primary education. But in other things, on which he laid great stress, such as the Indianisation of the Army, introduction of representative institutions in the Government with increased association of Indians with them, Indianisation of the higher services and holding of examinations for recruitment in them simultaneously in India and Great Britain and the introduction of progressive political reform, he gained no small measure of success. Whenever a question arose wherein Jinnah had the remotest possibility of India's advance in the political field he whole-heartedly co-operated. It was, for him, a question of extracting power from the foreigners and establishing precedents from which there was no going back. Reform, for him, was more equivalent to an increased scope for his countrymen's association with the day-to-day administration of India. His efforts were directed to achieve this object.

In February 1925, the Legislative Assembly recommended to the Governor-General-in-Council "that a Committee including Indian members of the Legislature be immediately appointed to investigate

and report (*a*) what steps should be taken to establish a military college in India to train Indian officers for the Commissioned ranks of the Indian Army; (*b*) whether when a military college is established in India it should supersede or be supplemented by Sandhurst and Woolwich so far as the training of the Indian officers is concerned; and (*c*) to advise at what rate the Indianisation of the Army shall be accelerated for the purpose of attracting educated Indians to a military career." Consequently the Indian Sandhurst Committee under the presidentship of Lieut-General Sir Andrew Skeen, Chief of the General Staff, was appointed and Mohammad Ali Jinnah consented to serve on it. The Committee began its labours as early as August 1925 and gathered considerable evidence in India. The Committee later appointed a sub-committee under the leadership of Jinnah which went round the continent of Europe to examine the working of the various military colleges.

During the annual session of the League in December 1925, at Aligarh, he was the prime mover of a resolution which, recognising that the Government of India Act was unsatisfactory, laid down the principle of working the Reforms for what they were worth, in co-operation with the Hindus, in spite of the fact that the League President, Sir Abdur Rahim, had shown in his presidential address his inclination for separation from Hindus.

Side by side with this spirit of honest co-operation Mohammad Ali Jinnah was one of those who were extremely emphatic in their demand of self-government for India, and the reader is well aware of his activities in this direction in his various capacities as a member of the Congress, League and Legislature and as a public man. On the 11th of March, 1926, while discussing the annual Budget he was speaking on a motion in the Assembly that "demand for the Executive Council be omitted," and stressed that political progress must be accelerated and demanded the appointment of a Royal Commission that would go into the matter in detail.

Then came a real shock to all lovers of unity. Maulvi Saiyid Murtaza had brought a motion before the Assembly on Frontier Reforms. Mohammad Ali Jinnah rose to speak on the 18th of March, 1926. His speech was a pathetic piece of oration, and he was frankly disappointed to find leaders like Motilal Nehru and Malaviya opposing the motion. And indeed the history of that unfortunate debate

is a sad page in the development of Hindu public opinion. In no country of the world its people have grudged such a vestige of advance for their fellow-countrymen.

Even then Mohammad Ali Jinnah did not lose heart by this lapse of nationalism on the part of Hindus, and thought that it was a tentative phase. He believed in the communal unity and he had to labour for it. The next session of the League came to be held in Delhi and Jinnah once again moved the main resolution on the revision of the Government of India Act. The resolution ran thus:

> That the All-India Muslim League has repeatedly defined its position with regard to the real advance in the future constitution of India in its sessions in 1924 and 1925 and reaffirms the resolutions passed at its session at Aligarh in December 1925 to the following effect, namely, that
>
> whereas the speedy attainment of full responsible Government is one of the declared objects of the League and it is now generally felt and recognised that the conception of Swaraj should be translated into the realm of practical politics
>
> and whereas it is the declared policy of the British Government also to enable the people of India to take a decisive part in the moulding of their own destinies which is marked by the declaration of August 1917 and the enactment of 1919 which formed a definite epoch in the history of India, a herald of time when India will possess full autonomy and will rank as an equal with the Dominions and with the United Kingdom itself as a member of the British Commonwealth,
>
> the All-India Muslim League is of opinion that the present constitution of India must be amended and urges that for this purpose the Government should undertake the revision of the Government of India Act 1919 and without any delay appoint a Royal Commission to formulate, after due enquiry and investigation, a scheme so as to place the Indian Constitution on a sound and permanent basis with provisions for automatic progress to establish full responsible Government in India and thereby secure stability in government and willing co-operation of the people,
>
> provided however, that for any scheme of future constitution of India the All-India Muslim League re-affirms and unequi-

vocally declares that the following basic and fundamental principles must be secured and guaranteed, namely,

(1) All legislatures of the country and other elected bodies be constituted on the definite principles of an adequate and effective representation of the minorities in every province without reducing the majority in any province to a minority or even to equality,

(2) Representation of communal groups shall continue to be by means of separate electorates as at present provided that it shall be open to any community at any time to abandon its separate electorates in favour of a joint electorate,

(3) Any territorial redistribution that might at any time be necessary shall not in any way affect the Muslim majority in the Punjab, Bengal and North-West Frontier Province,

(4) Full religious liberty, that is, liberty of belief, worship, observances, propaganda, association and education shall be guaranteed to all communities,

(5) No bill or resolution or any part thereof shall be passed in any legislature or any other elected body if three-fourths of the members of any community in that particular body oppose such bill or resolution or part thereof on the ground that it would be injurious to the interests of that community or in the alternative such other method is devised as may be found feasible and practicable to deal with such case.

The League hereby appoints a committee of the following gentlemen as the Central Committee in order to formulate a scheme so far as possible in consultation with a committee or committees that may be appointed by other political organisations and to report the same to the Council of the League for the consideration of the League and for submission to the Royal Commission when it is appointed.

The League also appoints provincial committees with power to add to their number, prepare and define a scheme of future reforms to be submitted to the Central Committee for their consideration.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah headed the Central Committee.

Jinnah in moving the resolution made a long speech. He said the resolution laid down as the first proposition that the League desired that the Government of India Act 1919 must be amended and that a definite advance of a democratic character must be made. Muslims were not in agreement with any policy of non-co-operation nor did they sanction the policy of obstruction or of making the reforms impossible. From the last election it was clear that Muslims wished to work the Reforms for what they were worth. They were anxious to see that their future position in the country was thoroughly defined and secure. He then referred to the Congress point of view on the position of Muslims in the country and said it was far from reassuring. No responsible Congressman or Hindu leader had come forward with a concrete proposal with regard to the future of the Muslim community. There was no escaping away from the fact that communalism did exist in the country. By mere talk and sentiment it would not be removed. Nationalism could not be created by having mixed electorates. The history of Canada showed that separate electorate system did not prove an obstacle in the progress of representative government. He earnestly appealed to the leaders of the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha to accept the hand of Muslim fellowship and to meet, confer and exchange views in real seriousness, to find out a solution. "We desire," said he, "nothing else but justice and fairness and I assure you that if we two communities can settle our differences it will be more than half the work for responsible government done. But if unfortunately there is a failure and if it is our misfortune that we cannot come to a settlement the next course open to Muslims is that we must prepare our own case for placing before the Royal Commission and fight the battle." If the Royal Commission did not satisfy the Muslims they would carry their struggle to the highest tribunal, he added.

In November 1926, the Muslims of Bombay had once again returned Mohammad Ali Jinnah unopposed to the Assembly and he became the leader of the Independent Party. But early in the following year when the Assembly met for the first time things took the shape of presenting a possibility of a working settlement between the Swarajists and Independents and negotiations between Jinnah and Motilal materialised considerably. In the realm of his life-long ambition—Hindu-Muslim unity—Jinnah once again made

a desperate bid. Hitherto the question of separate electorates had been the main obstacle and remained still unsolved. Hindus had taken up an unbending attitude in the matter and Jinnah felt helpless. But now he thought he would try to induce his own community to tone down its demand so that an opening could be created for negotiations. On the 20th of March, 1927, a conference of Muslim leaders was held at Delhi under his presidentship and the question was examined from all angles and after long discussion a formula was evolved. The following is its text:

> Muslims should accept a settlement on the basis of the following proposals, so far as representation in the various legislatures in any future scheme of Constitution is concerned:
>
> (1) Sind should be separated from Bombay and constituted into a separate Province.
>
> (2) Reforms should be introduced in the N.W.F. Province and in Baluchistan on the same footing as any other Province. In that case, Muslims are prepared to accept a joint electorate in all Provinces so constituted, and are further willing to make to Hindu minorities in Sind, Baluchistan and the N.W. Frontier, the same concessions that Hindu majorities in other Provinces are prepared to make to Muslim minorities.
>
> In the Punjab and Bengal the proportion of representation should be in accordance with the population. In the Central Legislature, Muslim representation shall not be less than a third, and that also, by a mixed electorate.

The Delhi Muslim proposals constituted a personal triumph for Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Nowhere else had a leader been able to induce his people, by means of argument, to change their outlook or even their policy overnight, at any rate not in India, and, as M. C. Chagla[1] suggested, only the magic wand of Jinnah could accomplish the feat. Nationalist India was full of praise, and Hindu leaders, who had known how hard he had been working for it honoured him in public and in private. They all agreed that in spite of his recent advocacy of the Muslim cause, his patriotism and love of unity was unquestionable.

The Muslim proposals were, however, subject to ratification by

1. M. C. Chagla later became well-known for his anti-Pakistan speeches.

the All-India Muslim League. They were to be considered by the Hindu leaders. The Congress Working Committee had partially agreed to them and had recommended them to the All-India Congress Committee for consideration. They were also to be considered by a conference of Hindu members of the Legislature. But on the eve of this conference *The Hindustan Times*, an influential Hindu daily newspaper of Delhi, had commented upon them at great length remarking that the spirit behind them was one of "Heads I win, tails you lose." It said the Muslims felt that in conceding to the Hindus the principle of joint electorate they were entitled to expect, as a price of their concession, the separation of Sind and introduction of reforms in Baluchistan and Frontier Province, where they constituted immense majority. The paper asked in what way the establishment of joint electorates was connected with the separation of Sind and introduction of reforms in Baluchistan and the Frontier Province. If Muslims desired separation of Sind to ensure their dominance in one province, there are Hindus who would like to readjust the boundaries of Bengal and the Punjab to eliminate Muslim majorities from these two provinces. If the former were justified in urging their claim in what way were the latter not justified in pleading for theirs? In this way an adamant Hindu opinion was being gradually galvanised leading to the inevitable result, the outline of which had been already proposed by Lajpat Rai.

By the middle of May 1927, the All-India Congress Committee met at Bombay, and finally a unanimous decision was reached accepting the Muslim Formula. For those who did not see eye to eye with Mohammad Ali Jinnah in later years, the events of these years would not be without surprise, but the facts prove beyond doubt that amongst those who were sincerely labouring for unity between Hindus and Muslims he stood foremost, even as he did ever since. Some contemporary writers have treated this particular event lightly. Others have completely ignored it. But, really speaking, the period was the turning point in India's political history, as it completely exposed the Hindu mind towards the question of Reforms.

The Muslim proposals were made in a spirit of reciprocity of treatment. As matters stood Muslims of India constituted a perpetual minority and the introduction of joint electorates would provide

no chance to turn themselves into a majority at any time. The principal feature of the proposals, therefore, was that Muslims must be made to feel that their interests were safeguarded against a possible oppression by a majority rule at least during the transitory period which must elapse before the development of a full responsible government. The separation of the Muslim majority provinces as separate administrative units would provide a basis for experimentation so that the respective majorities in various provinces would be able to administer their own affairs at least in the provincial fields. This would give Hindus and Muslims an opportunity to satisfy their minorities in their respective areas and if the system worked well the task of evolving a constitution for the whole of India would become easier.

But Hindu opposition to the proposals and to the Congress decision proved that Hindus were more anxious about the pattern of government rather than its principles and that they wanted a system of democracy in which Muslims would gradually lose their identity. The result was that very soon the atmosphere of hope created by the Delhi proposals was broken up and the gulf between Hindu and Muslim opinions widened. Communal riots broke out all over India.

Soon after this, the Khilafat Committee called a Unity Conference in the month of August over which Jinnah presided and after two days a strong appeal for unity was issued. A month later the Unity Committee sat at Simla and discussed various aspects of the question but unfortunately, once again, no tangible result was achieved. A Sub-Committee was appointed and it issued another statement deprecating the communal riots and appealing to "all people and all men of light and leading throughout the country to use their best endeavours to prevent such riots, to put an end to communal tension and to persuade their co-religionists not to take the law into their own hands even under provocation." The Sub-Committee also submitted its report to the main Committee, which adjourned after some time vesting power in Jinnah to convene the Conference if he received proper requisition for it.

CHAPTER IX

Bid for Unity

Mohammad Ali Jinnah's endeavours towards the achievement of the ideal of independence were now directed from two sides. He hoped that he could ultimately bring Hindus and Muslims on one platform to achieve a common goal, and, as has been pointed out in the last chapter, he made a desperate bid for it. On the other hand, he persevered with his old policy of gradual reform and missed no opportunity to impress upon the Government that Indians should be more closely associated with the day-to-day administration of the country.

The Skeen Committee had submitted its report. In September 1927, Dr. Moonje moved a resolution in the Legislative Assembly that effect should be given forthwith to the recommendations of the Skeen Committee, and on the 22nd Mohammad Ali Jinnah rose to speak on it. It was an utterance which will ever remain memorable.

The official attitude towards the resolution demonstrated that the move was much resented. This was not in keeping with the spirit so far as other measures of the Government were concerned. In fact it was quite contrary to the general assurances that the British Government had given regarding the establishment in India of a Military College. The official attitude shocked Jinnah and he concluded his speech in the following terms:

> I am aware that a certain clique exists in England. The India Office is surrounded by it and the only place that we went to and that had its atmosphere fouled by this clique was Sandhurst. At every other place we were received and treated with every consideration. I say to the better-minded Europeans who are in this country and to the better-minded Englishmen in Great

> Britain, if your youth are not willing to co-operate, if they are not willing to work and take their rank according to their merits in this country, tear up the Declaration of August 1917, tear it up now and here and say to the people of India, we are here to rule and nothing else. It was the same old story when the Indian Civil Service was being Indianised, when we were told in this country by many who now sit on the Treasury Benches, "If you are going to Indianise the Civil Service, we shall tender our resignation; we are not going to be your servants." It was the same story when the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms were introduced. We were told by many Englishmen that they would leave this country rather than submit to these reforms. But we find, sir, we have survived those threats, and I find that the Treasury Benches are full of those gentlemen some of whom probably had threatened to resign, but they probably thought better of it.

On the 8th of November the Viceroy in his statement announced the appointment of a Statutory Commission which was to be presided over by John Simon. The Commission consisted of six other members of Parliament. The object of this Commission was to elicit Indian opinion on constitutional reforms and the Legislative Assembly was asked to appoint a Select Committee that would draw up proposals to lay before the Commission. The Provincial Legislatures were expected to do likewise.

The all-white character of the Commission was too much of an affront to be tolerated by India. Jinnah rose once more to the occasion and gave a lead. An opportunity had presented itself to him by means of which he hoped to bring about a settlement of the internal communal problem. As a purely political proposition too, the Simon Commission was wholly unacceptable. Almost immediately after the Viceroy's announcement Mohammad Ali Jinnah sent a telegram to the Labour Party in Parliament to enlist their support. In India, Jinnah had galvanised public opinion and had prepared the ground for a befitting boycott of the Commission.

The question was soon to be discussed by both the Houses of Parliament. Jinnah, therefore, thought it essential that authoritative opinion of an all-India character should be expressed in time to reach London before the final decisions were taken by His Majesty's

Government. He circulated a draft manifesto among various prominent leaders requesting them to authorise him to include their names as signatories to the manifesto if they approved of it. Consequently, he received a very powerful support from the foremost leaders of the Congress, Muslim League, Liberal Federation, Federation of Indian Chambers and Mill-Owners Association. Leaders of Hindu Mahasabha also supported but preferred to issue their own statement later. A few others accepted with slight modifications. The following was the text of the manifesto:

> We have given the most anxious consideration to the announcement made in the Houses of Parliament and the statement of His Excellency the Viceroy and the appeal of the Premier regarding the constitution and programme for the Statutory Commission. We have come to the deliberate conclusion that the exclusion of Indians from the Commission is fundamentally wrong, and that the proposals about Committees of Legislatures being allowed to submit their views to the Commission, and later to confer with the Joint Parliamentary Committee, are wholly inadequate to meet the requirements of the case. The underlying principle of the scheme, that Indians are to have no authoritative voice either in the collection of proper materials and evidence or in the taking of decisions by way of recommendations of the Commission to Parliament, is of such a character that India cannot with any self-respect acquiesce in it. Unless a Commission on which the British and Indian statesmen are invited to sit on equal terms is set up we cannot conscientiously take any part or share in the work of the Commission as at present constituted.

On the 24th November Birkenhead, Secretary of State for India, in moving the resolution on the Commission in Parliament, expressed the view that he regarded the Commission as "an exceptionally intelligent jury coming to India with no preconceived prejudice." He emphasised that the Committee of the Indian Legislature had been invited in a spirit of great sincerity to co-operate as colleagues with the Commission and that the difficulty of finding truly representative Indians stood in the way of including them on the Commission. It was no more than a customary announcement. A suitable reply had to be given. The duty was ably discharged by Mohammad

Ali Jinnah. He said:

Lord Birkenhead has relied upon the history of India written by his ancestors and drawn conclusions which are opposed to the present conditions in India. If he has convinced the British people and Parliament that India is a museum of differing communities and interests and that she is seething with warring factions, then India's case for responsible government stands condemned. What is the good of going through the farce of appointing a Parliamentary Commission by a cabinet, whose spokesman has summed up the position of India and condemned it in advance? If Lord Birkenhead, in selecting the personnel of the Commission, had to consider the conflicting schools of thought in England regarding India's advance and had to secure two members of the Tory Party, one member of the Liberal Party and two members of the Labour Party and two representing the blue blood of England, what wonder is there that we may also require a few men to represent a vast country like India and the various interests concerned?

The underlying idea is the arrogant assertion of the principle that the Indians cannot be allowed to share in the responsibility or in the decisions that are taken concerning the future constitution of India.

With great deference to those who took part in the debate in the two Houses of Parliament, I ask, is it possible that the function given to the Committee of the Central Legislature to offer criticism and objections in consultation with the Parliamentary Committee would lead to any good results, and is it expected that any substantial modifications or amendments could be made in the recommendations of a Commission of the calibre and integrity, for which they have received so eloquent a certificate not only from the Secretary of State for India but from all parties in both the Houses of Parliament, a Commission which is described as thoroughly impartial and one whose integrity cannot be questioned and who will judge according to the standards known to Parliament and whose recommendations Parliament will consider instinctively their own when they make their report?

Quoting from Birkenhead Jinnah pointed out that the object of

the Commission, seemed to be only to look for details in support of the "general point of view and principle" which were already determined by His Majesty's Government. India, therefore, could not participate in this policy and share in the work of the Commission because it was "a complete negation of India's status as partner," which had been repeatedly acknowledged by the British statesmen.

A lead given in such trenchant words had a profound effect, and the country had never known a more complete boycott than that which greeted the Simon Commission. The whole of India stood to a man to demonstrate the collective disapproval of her peoples, and once again unity and communal harmony seemed to be within reach. This encouraged the indefatigable Jinnah once more and he resolved to renew his efforts. The Congress had, for its President, a Muslim of brilliant intellect in Dr. M. A. Ansari and it was a hopeful sign. Srinivasa Iyengar, the last Congress President, had made considerable attempts in this direction and Ansari had only to pick up the threads of his endeavours. He had already contacted leaders of importance and elicited their views. An All-Parties Conference was called in February 1928. Jinnah wielded great influence among Muslims and he hastened to play his rightful part. But the reaction of the Hindu leaders to the Muslim proposals of last year had disappointed Muslims. The Calcutta Sessions of the League had demonstrated that it was not inclined to agree with Jinnah in compromising the issues of Frontier and Baluchistan Reforms and the separation of Sind with that of joint-electorates. In the meantime the attitude of Hindu Mahasabha became more hostile to Muslims. Nevertheless early in March Jinnah called a meeting of the Council of the All-India Muslim League to consider the Congress and Mahasabha proposals. But the League could not be assembled.

The Commission landed at Bombay on the 3rd of February and on the previous day the Viceroy had issued an appeal to India for co-operation with the Commission, but at the same time said that even if co-operation would not be forthcoming the Commission would do its work. Simon also issued statements and suggested a joint free conference between the members of the Commission and those of Indian Legislatures. He assured the Indian politicians that "the Commission is in no sense an instrument either of the Gov-

ernment of India or of the British Government, but enters on the duty laid upon it by the King-Emperor as a completely independent and unfettered body composed of members of Parliament who approach the Indian Legislatures as colleagues." These statements were very carefully examined by the All-Parties Conference, and after a great deal of discussion the leaders came to an unequivocal decision and advised the country that the people should have nothing to do with the Commission.

On the 5th of May, 1928, as if out of spite to the Simon Commission, Mohammad Ali Jinnah sailed for England by *s. s. Rajputana* with Srinivasa Iyengar and Dewan Chamanlal as fellow-passengers. Dewan Chamanlal wrote an article on the daily life of the two leaders on board the ship, the relevant portions of which, so far as they concern the Muslim leader, are reproduced here. The article is important for its biographical significance.

> If leisure, according to Moreáu-Christophe, is the real title of citizenship then the truest citizens are to be found on board the *Rajputana*. We have leisure to eat, a blessing that our politicians seem seldom to experience judging by their physique. We have leisure to watch humanity swimming, diving, playing deck-tennis or bridge, dancing and drinking. And above all we have leisure to talk. For we have on board two of the best talkers in India—Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Srinivasa Iyengar. It is, no doubt, their profession to talk, but here, away from the political restrictions of their second profession, they talk freely and with refreshing frankness.
>
> Of course, Mr. Jinnah has been taking full advantage of the situation. The temperature in the Red Sea had today gone down by about two degrees with the result that Mr. Jinnah found Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar reclining in my deck-chair well wrapped up against the buffeting but sultry breeze. In his usually sarcastic manner Mr. Jinnah asked Mr. Iyengar if he should lend him a blanket. It was with hesitation, induced by Mr. Jinnah's premature laughter, that the offer was declined.
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> I said at the commencement of this article that we have had plenty of talk on board the ship. A great deal of it has been of a political nature. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, it must be acknowledged, saved the situation in the Legislative Assembly over the

Simon Commission. He expected no doubt that the spirit of amicability engendered in the Chamber would be productive of real unity. Today he is, unfortunately frankly disgusted. Minor differences over Sind and majority representations by reservation and Reforms for the North-West Frontier Province have wrecked, for the moment, all chances of unity. "Give me," says Mohammad Ali Jinnah, "three leaders to join me over a united programme, which was all but accepted at Delhi, and *Swaraj* will not be a mere dream but a matter brought within the realm of real politics." I asked him to name the three men. He said: "Pandit Motilal Nehru, Pandit Madan Mohan Malviya and Lala Lajpat Rai." He added, "The first problem to solve and settle is the problem of Hindu-Muslim unity. This is not a mere phrase. It is a concrete proposition. I have talked even on board the ship with Indians belonging to every conceivable political group and each one deplores the intransigence of the leaders in not arriving at a settlement regarding the three issues named by me. Will the nation go to wreck and ruin if compromises and even surrender take place on these issues? And suppose we did settle the problem. I say that, then, the united voice of the nation would be irresistible." I told him that I had heard rumours from authentic sources that certain leaders did not in reality desire a settlement. He agreed with me. He said that personal motives had played some part. He also had heard the story from reliable sources. But he added, "You will be surprised that the people are with us whole-heartedly on the national issue. Why, in Bombay, the *hartal* which greeted the Simon Commission was entirely a spontaneous affair. I tell you if I had gone round Bombay with my colleagues on that day not a shop would have remained open and yet in spite of us the *hartal* was as near being complete as the circumstances would have permitted."

We talked of Gandhi. Humorously he alluded to the frantic attempts made by Mahatma Gandhi and Umar Sobhani to rope him into the Non-co-operation Movement. He said he felt that the movement would fail. I said he was mistaken. The movement nearly succeeded. It failed merely because the Mahatma was not a politician. Jinnah agreed with me that if Mahatma

Gandhi had had only a touch of Lenin in him the history of the last few years would have been different. "Gandhi", he said, "is not a politician"—but he added, "I wish he had been."

Jinnah is frankly in a despondent mood. He is one of the few men who have no personal motives to nurse or personal aims to advance. His integrity is beyond question. And yet he has been the loneliest of men. He has never belonged to a party unless he himself was the party. Not that he has ever refused to work shoulder to shoulder with others (as for instance, in the case of the Nationalist Party of 1924), but he has never allowed any man to compromise his sense of integrity. There is a well-known story of the law-courts which reveals the type of man he is. A client came to him one day and asked his advice. The file was a voluminous one and Jinnah's fees enormous. The client said he had only ten thousand rupees and Jinnah refused. Eventually the client pressed and suggested that Jinnah should stop looking at the file the moment the fee of ten thousand was exhausted (it was an arrangement at so much per hour) and give his opinion on what he read so far. When the accounts were made up the fee came to three thousand five hundred—and the balance was handed over by Jinnah to the client. Lahore lawyers who are quite used, of course, to such tenderness towards their clients will find nothing unfamiliar in this tale!

Let me warn your readers that Jinnah is not going to Europe merely for a joyride. Great things are bound to happen during his stay in London. Serious attempts will be made to "get at" him. The French saying is: "We shall see what we shall see." For the moment, however, this closes the chapter of St. Jinnah of the Mount Pleasant just as we are near Mount Sinai where the Lord spoke to Moses.

The Nehru Committee came into being as the result of a resolution passed by the All-Parties Conference held at Bombay on the 19th of May, 1928, in accordance with the directions of the Madras Sessions of the Indian National Congress in order to "consider and determine the principles of the constitution for India." The terms of the resolution were:

This Committee shall give the fullest consideration to the resolution of the Madras Congress on Communal Unity in conjunc-

tion with those passed by the Hindu Mahasabha, the Muslim League, the Sikh League and the other political organisations represented at the All-Parties Conference at Delhi and the suggestions that may hereafter be received by it; the Committee will give due weight to the recommendations made by the various sub-committees of the All-Parties Conference at Delhi.

The task before the Nehru Committee was stupendous inasmuch as the main problem which had to be tackled by it was that of the Hindu-Muslim unity. No doubt the Nehru Committee dealt with the question with all the seriousness it deserved, but it is clear that it failed to realise the intensity of feelings that backed the Muslim Proposals and its final conclusions were arrived at in utter disregard of the Muslim sentiments. Some of the recommendations of the Committee gave rise to bitter controversies as they raised great apprehensions in the minds of the Muslims. Said the Report, "from the constitutional point of view the communal controversies are of no very great importance. But, whatever their relative importance might be, they occupy men's minds much more than matters of greater import and cast their shadow over all political work. We thus find ourselves face to face with a number of conflicting resolutions and recommendations all of which are equally entitled to our respect. But when we find that the view of the Madras Congress and the Muslim League is diametrically opposed to that of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Sikh League, we must respectfully express our inability to accept either in its entirety." It is clear, therefore, that the Congress and the League at the time were in complete accord and that the decisions of the Nehru Committee had been considerably influenced by the views of the Mahasabha and the Sikh League.

Dealing with the question of separate electorates and separation of Sind the Report said: "The Muslims being in a minority in India as a whole fear that the majority may harass them, and to meet this difficulty they have made a novel suggestion that they should at least dominate in some parts of India. We do not here criticise their demand. It may have some justification in the present communal atmosphere, but we do feel that it has little to do with the premises we started from, unless indeed the best safeguard that one can have is to occupy a position of domination oneself. The Hindus on the

other hand, although in a great majority all over India, are in a minority in Bengal and the Punjab and in Sind, Baluchistan and the N.W.F. Province. In spite of their all-India majority, they are afraid of the Muslims in these provinces."

At another place the Report said: "We suspect that the real opposition to separation is not due to any high national considerations but grosser economic considerations; to the fear of the Hindus that their economic position might suffer if Muslims had the charge of affairs in a separated area. We are sure that Hindus of Sind are perhaps the most enterprising and adventurous. The traveller meets them in the four quarters of the world, carrying on prosperous business and enriching their people at home by their earnings abroad. No one can take away this spirit of adventure and enterprise from the Hindus of Sind and so long as they have it their future is assured. It must be remembered also that the powers of a provincial government are limited and there is the Central Government which has power in all important departments. If, however, there is still some ground for fear that is a matter for safeguards, not of opposing a just demand."

In the light of the foregoing observations, therefore, the question of Muslim representation in the Central Legislature, which formed the basic principle of the Muslim proposal, was bound to become more important than that of separate electorates or of separation of Sind. But the Report dealt with it lightly and said, "So far as the Muslim demand is concerned it only remains for us to deal with that part of it which relates to reservation of one-third of the total number of seats in the Central Legislature for Muslims. This point was not directly raised or discussed at the informal conference, but we think that it is concluded by the general recommendations we have made in regard to reservation of seats. The principle we have adopted is that wherever such reservation has to be made for the Muslim minority it must be in strict proportion to its population. The Muslims are a little less than one-fourth of the total population of British India and they cannot be allowed reservation over and above the proportion in the Central Legislature."

On top of that, the Committee also suggested that the residuary powers should vest in the Central Legislature. The result was evident. Shuaib Qureshi, a member of the Nehru Committee, recorded

his vote of dissent then and there, and the subject formed the main plank of the forthcoming discussions in the following All-Parties National Convention at Calcutta and was the source of its ultimate failure. The Nehru Report was put before a Unity Conference held at Lucknow on the 28th of August, 1928. The Conference accepted the principle laid down therein, although a few of the members were of the opinion that India's political goal should be complete independence and not Dominion Status as the Report envisaged and a bitter controversy followed.

On the 26th of October, 1928, Mohammad Ali Jinnah arrived in India by the English mail boat, *Razmak*.

Since the publication of Nehru Committee's Report and especially since the meeting of the All-Parties Conference at Lucknow, Jinnah's return was eagerly awaited by all political sections in the country. Jinnah's position in Indian politics was, indeed, unique. Standing as he did in the ranks of the greatest Indian politicians of his day, as President of the All-India Muslim League and as a trusted friend of Hindus, Jinnah exercised profound influence over his countrymen. The fact that Jinnah had not hitherto expressed any definite opinion on the Nehru Report had naturally given rise to a considerable apprehension in certain quarters.

A special representative of a local newspaper interviewed him immediately after his landing in Bombay. He said, "Judging by the Nehru Report and newspaper reports of the Lucknow Conference it seems that they have made a serious effort to meet the Delhi Muslim Proposals of March 1927. My position as President of All-India Muslim League is one which does not permit me to anticipate the decisions of the League. The Congress as usual and the League will be meeting in December next and I am hopeful that we shall yet find solution of this critical question. I would, in the meanwhile, appeal to all those who do not agree with the Lucknow proposals not to rebel but to keep calm and organise themselves with a view to pressing their point of view. I would particularly appeal to the Muslims not to be alarmed. I see no reason for consternation and stampede. Muslims should organise themselves, stand united and should press every reasonable point for the protection of their community."

Conversation then drifted towards the political parties in England

and their professions of friendship towards India. The situation in England was summarised by Jinnah as follows:

> In England, Westminster stands united, but in India we are divided. Personally I regret we were not able to solve Hindu-Muslim problem in February last. It has made a very great difference to the future of India. British opinion, as I gather, is that India has got plenty of intellect. They know that we have failed to realise the realities and we are wanting very much in discipline and organisation. They feel confident that those who are at the helm of the politics of India are lacking in statesmanship and foresight and that they will never be able to unite all parties in the country. That is the one reason why Sir John Simon is determined, of course, according to the policy laid down in the higher quarters, to carry out the so-called enquiry and investigation even, as it is wired by the *Reuters*, under police guard in the name of public meetings.

Jinnah gave his considered opinion that it was the biggest folly on the part of Indians to expect any substantial help from any one party in England. So far as India was concerned, they were all one. As a matter of fact, India was excluded from the policy and programme of every party for the purpose of the forthcoming elections. Even the annual debate with regard to Indian affairs, which by the way was a mere farce and lasted only for a few hours, had been avoided by common consent of all Parties lest some back-bencher should rebel and criticise the appointment of the Simon Commission and the scheme thereof. Ramsay MacDonald indulged in a phrase here and a phrase there, his contribution being that he had discovered in the Commission a more democratic personnel, probably because there were two Labour members, and he thought that the Commission was going to build a golden bridge for India to walk across to London. These were mere platitudes and phrases. The Labour Party was deeply committed to the Commission as any other party. There was only one hope for India and that was unity between Hindus and Muslims. Hindus should show a more generous and liberal mind and Muslims ought to show more trust.

Jinnah then adverted to the controversy regarding independence and Dominion Status. In this connection he observed that he had always maintained that India's policy could only be for the establish-

ment of Dominion Responsible Government. That was one of the reasons why he had left the Congress and at Nagpur it was one of his objections to the decisions taken there in 1919.

For the purpose of eliciting public opinion on the Nehru Report and the Draft Constitution prepared by them, an All-Parties National Convention was called to meet at Calcutta on the 22nd December, 1928, and invitations were issued to the various political organisations of the country and consequently to the Muslim League also. Mohammad Ali Jinnah was then the President of the League. He thought it would not be of any use to send the delegates to the National Convention unless the League Council previously endorsed the principles underlying the Nehru Report, and requested Motilal Nehru to postpone the Convention so that a meeting of the League Council could be held. This could not be done and, therefore, Jinnah decided to hold the session of the League at Calcutta.

Towards the end of November the Council of the Bombay Provincial Muslim League rejected the provisions and recommendations of Nehru Report. Jinnah did not commit himself but said that a part could not be regarded as a whole and that the Central Council of the League would take decision on the merits of the Report. In December when the League assembled at Calcutta it was a compound of warring elements and Jinnah's position was not very strong. The Central Khilafat Committee was also, at the time, meeting at Calcutta and its official group had decided to boycott the National Convention. It was a turning point in Muslim politics. But through the good offices of Jinnah and by advocacy and influence a strong committee was formed in order to represent the Muslim point of view on the Convention under the leadership of Jinnah himself.

The League Committee had formulated some suggestions, in the light of the Muslim proposals, to be incorporated in the Draft Constitution of the Nehru Committee and had placed before the Sub-Committee appointed by the National Convention to meet the League delegates, in the form of amendments to the Nehru Report. The three main items of the amendments were: firstly, that Muslims should be given one-third representation on the Central Legislature; secondly, that the Punjab and Bengal should have Muslim representation on the population basis for ten years, subject to revi-

sion of this principle after that period; and, thirdly, that residuary powers should be vested in the provincial legislatures and not at the Centre. The Sub-Committee of the Convention rejected all of these proposals. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, however, put forward his amendments before the open session of the Convention on the 28th of December, 1928. The debate that followed is of considerable importance and it is desirable that it should be dealt with in some detail.

Proposing the amendments Jinnah said the unity among Hindus and Muslims was prerequisite for a concerted action towards the realisation of responsible government in India and it was desirable that in the future scheme of things there would be a spirit of friendly co-operation between the communities. No country in the world had succeeded in either wresting a democratic constitution from the domination of another nation or establishing representative institutions internally without guaranteeing the security of minorities wherever such problems arose. Majorities are apt to be tyrannical and minorities are often frightened that their rights would suffer if they are not safeguarded by statutory provisions. And this apprehension, said Jinnah, was more pronounced in the case of India, where the majority happened to be religious and cultural.

Jinnah argued that Muslims must be enabled to secure one-third of representation in the Central Legislature and that the distribution of the seats to various provinces must be left to the Muslims themselves. Nehru Report proposed the adoption of joint electorates. This would mean that the Muslim majority provinces were likely to get more seats than the proportion of Muslim population in those provinces, while in the minority provinces they were likely to receive less representation than even their percentage entitled them. This would be unfair to certain provinces whose importance warranted them to have a greater voice in the legislative and administrative measures of their country. It was, therefore, necessary that in the event of adult suffrage—which he felt was not within the range of politics in the near future—not being established, Punjab and Bengal should have seats reserved on population basis and that they should not have the right to contest for more. The need for this arose because, although Muslims in these provinces were numerically in the majority, their voting strength was far below in

proportion to their population.

As to the form of the future constitution Jinnah said it should be federal and residuary powers must vest in the provinces. This question was most important from the constitutional point of view and had very little to do with the communal problem. Similarly he insisted that separation of Sind and North West Frontier Province should be taken up at once and its consideration should not be postponed. Muslims felt very strongly about this.

Tej Bahadur Sapru, supporting Jinnah, said that at the time Muslim representation in the Centre was 27 per cent and there was no reason why Muslim demand for 33 per cent should be resisted. He knew Jinnah intimately for fifteen years, and "if he is a spoilt child, I am prepared to say, give him what he wants and be finished with it. I am going to ask him to be reasonable but we must, as practical statesmen, try to solve the problem and not be misled by arithmetical figures."

But M. R. Jayakar, the Bombay Mahasabha leader, struck a different note. He dwelt at length upon the remarks of Sapru in representing Jinnah and his friends as spoilt children and said it was likely "to give a wrong lead to the debate" and also rest on a wrong foundation the claim advocated by Jinnah and his friends. "I can assure you that he comes before us today neither as a naughty boy nor as a spoiled child but as a fearless and lucid advocate of the small minority of Muslims whose claims he has put forward in the course of his speech."

Jayakar said that Jinnah represented only a small minority and if the Convention agreed to his proposals there were no prospects of winning over the entire Muslim community. He also pointed out that he had great difficulty in restraining his Mahasabha friends of Bombay from openly rebelling against the Nehru Report and if these clauses were amended, as was proposed by Jinnah, it would be impossible for him to persuade his friends to refrain from once more urging "their violent and arrogant claims." He said that the Report was already accepted by many organisations and if these amended clauses were incorporated there was a chance of its being rejected. He believed that Jinnah is far too patriotic to break away from the Convention even if his demands were rejected.

In reply to the debate, Mohammad Ali Jinnah explained that the

reason why no other delegate from the Muslim League was taking part in the debate was that they had come to the Convention, which was composed of something like 1,200 delegates, not with a purpose of raising controversies which would lead to bad feelings. They had already placed their proposals before the Convention and their grounds for supporting them, and on the hypothesis which must be admitted on all hands that communalism existed in the country. They had not come there to apportion blame for it.

Jinnah, then, drew attention to constitutional developments in Canada and Egypt, where he said political adjustments were made not on population basis but on principles of equity. "These are big questions," he said, "and they can be settled only by statesmanship and political wisdom."

The amendments were then put to vote and were lost. Jinnah returned to the League with a sad heart and he adjourned it to a later date.

In March 1929, the Report of the Nehru Committee came up for discussion in the Central Legislative Assembly and Jinnah delivered a most pathetic piece of oration. He gave a detailed account of the events of the past years. He outlined the causes of the various All-Parties and Unity Conferences and the eventual appointment of the Nehru Committee. But he was sadly disappointed by the recommendations of the Committee and characterised them as nothing but Hindu counter-proposals which, he said, were against the letter and spirit of the Muslim proposals. In this way the question of the Nehru Report and with it the attempt of making an agreed constitution for India became a dead issue. The Hindu leaders maintained that Jinnah represented a small minority of Muslims and that the bulk of the Muslim population had accepted the Report. The Nationalist press opened a volley of attacks and usual misrepresentations and vilifications followed.

The adjourned session of the All-India Muslim League met at the end of March 1929 at Delhi. It was now the turn of the League to be divided within itself. A group of Muslims had already dissociated itself on the question of the boycott of Simon Commission and was led by Mohammad Shafi. Another formed a separate Muslim Conference under the presidentship of the Agha Khan. The third separated itself on the question of the Delhi Muslim Proposals

as it did not agree with the system of joint electorates and received a further impetus when Jinnah's amendments to the Nehru Report were rejected by the National Convention. The fourth stood for unconditional support to the Nehru Report and later in July 1929 formed itself into an All-India Nationalist Muslim Party. The fifth group desired conciliation and harmony not only between the various schools of opinion among Muslims but also between Hindus and Muslims, but would not lend their support to the Nehru Report unconditionally. This last group was headed by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who appealed to every Muslim to set aside his personal differences and invited him under the banner of the All-India Muslim League. During the course of his address to the delegates of the League he remarked: "Are you or are you not going to formulate your policy and programme as regards the future constitution of the Government of India? If you are going to shoulder any responsibility, if your decisions are going to command any weight, if you wish the will of Muslim India to be registered, then it can only be accomplished by a united decision." In order to accommodate all the schools of thought, Jinnah had drafted a resolution for the purpose of placing it before the open session, containing "fourteen points" which subsequently became famous. The resolution ran thus:

Whereas the basic idea, on which the All-Parties Conference was called in being and a Convention summoned at Calcutta during Christmas week 1928, was that a scheme of reforms should be formulated and accepted and ratified by the foremost political organisations in the country as a National Pact;

and whereas the Report was adopted by the Indian National Congress only constitutionally for the one year ending 31st December, 1929, and in the event of the British Parliament not accepting it within the time limit, the Congress stands committed to the policy and programme of complete independence by resort to civil disobedience and nonpayment of taxes;

and whereas the attitude taken up by the Hindu Mahasabha from the commencement through their representatives at the Convention was nothing short of an ultimatum, that, if a single word in the Nehru Report in respect of the communal settlement was changed they would immediately withdraw their

support to it;

and whereas the National Liberal Federation delegates at the Convention took up an attitude of benevolent neutrality, and subsequently, in their open session at Allahabad, adopted a non-committal policy, the Non-Brahman and depressed classes are entirely opposed to it;

and whereas the reasonable and moderate proposals put forward by the delegates of the All-India Muslim League at the Convention in modification were not accepted, the Muslim League is unable to accept the Nehru Report.

The League after anxious and careful consideration, most earnestly and emphatically lays down that no scheme for the future constitution of the Government of India will be acceptable to Muslims of India until and unless the following basic principles are given effect to and provisions are embodied therein to safeguard their rights and interests:

(1) The form of the future constitution should be federal with the residuary powers vested in the provinces.

(2) A uniform measure of autonomy shall be granted to all provinces.

(3) All legislatures in the country and other elected bodies shall be constituted on the definite principle of adequate and effective representation of minorities in every province without reducing the majority in any province to a minority or even equality.

(4) In the Central Legislature, Muslim representation shall not be less than one-third.

(5) Representation of communal groups shall continue to be by means of separate electorates as at present: provided it shall be open to any community, at any time, to abandon its separate electorate in favour of joint electorate.

(6) Any territorial redistribution that might at any time be necessary shall not, in any way, affect the Muslim majority in the Punjab, Bengal and N.W.F. Province.

(7) Full religious liberty, *i.e.*, liberty of belief, worship and observance, propaganda, association and education, shall be guaranteed to all communities.

(8) No bill or resolution or any part thereof shall be passed

in any legislature or any other elected body if three-fourths of the members of any community in that particular body oppose such a bill, resolution or part thereof on the ground that it would be injurious to the interests of that community or, in the alternative, such other method is devised as may be found feasible and practicable to deal with such cases.

(9) Sind should be separated from the Bombay Presidency.

(10) Reforms should be introduced in the N.W.F. Province and Baluchistan on the same footing as in other provinces.

(11) Provision should be made in the constitution giving Muslims an adequate share along with the other Indians, in all the Services of the State and in local self-governing bodies having due regard to the requirements of efficiency.

(12) The constitution should embody adequate safeguards for the protection of Muslim culture and for the protection and promotion of Muslim education, language, religion, personal laws and Muslim charitable institutions and for their due share in the grants-in-aid given by the State and by the self-governing bodies.

(13) No cabinet, either Central or Provincial, should be formed without there being a proportion of at least one-third Muslim Ministers.

(14) No change shall be made in the constitution by the Central Legislature except with the concurrence of the States constituting the Indian Federation.

The draft resolution also mentioned an alternative to the above provision in the following terms:

That, in the present circumstances, representation of Muslims in the different legislatures of the country and other elected bodies through the separate electorates is inevitable and, further, the Government being pledged over and over again not to disturb this franchise so granted to the Muslim community since 1909 till such time as the Muslims choose to abandon it, the Muslims will not consent to joint electorates unless Sind is actually constituted into a separate province and reforms in fact are introduced in the N.W.F. Province and Baluchistan on the same footing as in other provinces.

Further, it is provided that there shall be reservation of seats according to the Muslim population in the various provinces; but where Muslims are in a majority they shall not contest more seats than their population warrants.

The question of excess representation of Muslims over and above their population in provinces where they are in a minority is to be considered hereafter.

It was hoped that all the groups would accept the resolution and that complete harmony would once again prevail within the ranks of the League.

CHAPTER X

Round Table Conference

The Simon Commission concluded their work by April 1929 but before they could submit their report to Parliament, the Conservative Government in England was replaced by Labour as a result of the general elections in May 1929 with MacDonald as the Prime Minister and Col. Wedgwood Benn as the Secretary of State for India.

In June Irwin had taken four months' leave and proceeded to England to "devise some means whereby the constitutional question might be clarified, and a greater degree of co-operation obtained from all sections of Indian political opinion before Parliament was asked to pronounce upon whatever scheme of Reforms might be laid before it as a result of the Statutory enquiry." Mohammad Ali Jinnah seized the opportunity to press forward India's claim and addressed the following letter to the Prime Minister of England:

June 19, 1929.

Dear Mr. MacDonald,

I think you will remember our conversation in July last while I was in London. In view of what you said to me then and the great kindness with which you treated me I am encouraged to feel that I must place before you the situation as it presents itself to me. In the solution and settlement of this question vital interests of Great Britain and India are involved which I think you appreciate and understand more than anybody else as you possess personal knowledge of India during the time you were

on the Islington Commission. But much water has run down the Thames and the Ganges since then. The present position is a very serious deadlock and if allowed to continue it will, in my judgment, prove disastrous both to the interests of India and Great Britain.

The Simon Commission was boycotted by political India, of which there can be very little doubt. The exclusion of Indians from the personnel of the Commission from the start to the finish relegated the Indians to the position of suppliants and assessors, and let me tell you, whatever you may hear to the contrary, you will never get political India to co-operate with the scheme further if the various stages of the scheme are adhered to strictly. But the task of the Simon Commission, as it was repeatedly declared by responsible men and the press in England, was that of a 'rapporteur.'

So far as India is concerned, we have done with it and when its report, whatever it may be, is published in due course, every effort will be made in India to damn it. Of course, this is on the assumption that it will not be satisfactory, which is already assumed in India. After the publication of the report, if the programme and the plan of the scheme of the Commission as announced are adhered to, as I understand they will be, His Majesty's Government will wait until they get the considered opinion of the Government of India on that report and after that they will formulate their definite proposals and place them before Parliament to be referred to the Joint Parliamentary Committee without the House definitely committing itself with regard to those proposals of His Majesty's Government; and that at this stage the Indian representatives will be given the opportunity to place their views before the Joint Parliamentary Committee. What chance of success is there in their efforts to get at that stage any modifications of a substantial character at the hands of the Joint Parliamentary Committee?

It strikes me, and I think you will agree, that in the normal course there will be no chance of getting the Joint Parliamentary Committee to make any radical change, and my reasons are as follows:

The Joint Parliamentary Committee will be in this position. They

will have, in the first instance, before them the recommendations of the Simon Commission; secondly, the views and the proposals of the Government of India, which I assume will be reactionary—and that is the opinion and feeling in India—and with these materials before them the definite proposals which will be formulated by His Majesty's Government will be reffered to the Joint Parliamentary Committee. I should have thought that at that stage so far as the principles underlying the proposals are concerned we shall stand not only precluded but barred from suggesting any modification of the fundamental principles of the proposals as referred to the Joint Parliamentary Committee by the House, and all that can at that stage be done reasonably and with any success would be to discuss and, if possible, to modify the details of these proposals. If that is all the advantage that is still open to the Indian representatives, can you conceive that political India having boycotted the Simon Commission and the scheme at the stage of enquiry and investigations could now be induced to co-operate directly or indirectly with the further stages of the scheme when, as I have pointed out, no real useful purpose would be served?

India has lost her faith in the word of Great Britain. The first and foremost thing that I would ask you to consider is how best to restore that faith and revive the confidence of India in the *bona fides* of Great Britain. His Excellency the Viceroy, Lord Irwin, addressing the Legislature on the 28th January, 1929, attempted to perform this task. This is what he says:

"But I tell this Assembly again, and through them India, that the Declaration of 1917 stands and will stand for all time as the solemn pledge of the British people to do all that can be done by one people to assist another to attain full national political stature, and the pledge so given will never be dishonoured. And as actions are commonly held more powerful than words, I will add that I should not be standing before you here today as Governor-General if I believed that the British people had withdrawn their hand from that solemn covenant. Those therefore, who preach that a new generation has arisen in England which seeks to explain away the significance of the 1917 declaration are, consciously or unconsciously, but none the less

really misrepresenting the purpose of Great Britain and poisoning the wells by which the common life of India and Great Britain is supported and sustained."

You will notice from this quotation that I am not singular in my opinion that India is fast losing her faith in Great Britain. The reason again for this is not far to seek. In 1924 in the course of an important debate in the Legislative Assembly on a resolution urging the Government to take steps to review the Government of India Act with a view to establishing full responsible government in India, Sir Malcolm Hailey, in the course of his speech on behalf of the Government of India, in effect, repudiated that the Declaration of 1917 and the preamble to the Government of India Act mean that Great Britain was committed to the policy of granting full self-governing Dominion Status to India. He said: "The pronouncement of August 1917 spoke of the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India. That is also the term used in the preamble to the Act; that is the term used in the Royal Warrant of Instructions which adds that 'thus will India be fitted to take her place among the other Dominions.' The term has its significance. We know that it was deliberately chosen. The Congress and the League had asked the Imperial Government to proclaim its intention to confer self-government on India at an early date and the Cabinet chose the present term. The expression used in the Act is a term of precision, conveying that Executive in India would be responsible to the Indian Legislature instead of to the British Parliament. If you analyse the term 'full dominion self-government' you will see that it is of somewhat wider extent conveying that not only will the Executive be responsible to the Legislature but the Legislature will in itself have the full powers which are typical of the modern Dominion. It may be there is some difference of substance because responsible government is not necessarily incompatible with a legislature with limited or restricted powers. It may be that full Dominion Self-Government is the logical outcome of responsible government, nay, it may be the inevitable and historical development of responsible govern-

ment, but it is a further and a final step."

Further, you know in the recent publication of the memoirs of Lord Curzon, I think, it was discovered that there was some difference of opinion as to the significance of the words which were finally adopted in the declaration of August 1917 between Lord Curzon and Mr. Montague. Along with this the policy of the Government of India and His Majesty's Government since 1924 in turning a deaf ear to all reasonable demands has led almost every political party to come to the conclusion that there is no hope of getting any fairplay and thus there is a section in India that has already declared in favour of complete independence, and I may tell you without exaggeration that the movement for independence is gaining ground, as it is supported by the Indian National Congress.

This being a short summary of the position, I would most earnestly urge upon you at this moment to persuade His Majesty's Government without delay to make a declaration that Great Britain is unequivocally pledged to the policy of granting to India full responsible government with Dominion Status. The effect of such a declaration will be very far-reaching and go a great way to create a different atmosphere in the country and will be a very severe antidote to the movement for independence. But, here again, I must admit, in the words of the Viceroy, that we must not forget that actions are held more powerful than words. Naturally, therefore, the next question that presents itself to all thinking men is what action or actions should be taken, and may I quote again from the same speech of Lord Irwin? This is what he says:

"It would seem evident, however, that what all people must desire is a solution reached by mutual agreement between Great Britain and India, and that, in the present circumstances, the friendly collaboration of Great Britain and India is a requisite and indispensable condition to obtain it. On the one side it is as unprofitable to deny the right to Parliament to form its free and deliberate judgment on the problems as it would be shortsighted of Parliament to underrate the importance of trying to reach a solution which might carry the willing assent of political India."

May I suggest a solution, which I think would most probably be acceptable to India? His Majesty's Government before they formulate their proposals and after they are in receipt of the Simon Commission Report and the views of the Government of India, and so, before they formulate their proposals, should invite representatives of India, who would be in a position to deliver the goods (because completely unanimous opinion in India is not possible at present), to sit in conference with them with a view to reaching a solution which might carry, to use the words of Viceroy, the "willing assent of the political India." If such an invitation comes directly from the Prime Minister on behalf of His Majesty's Government, I feel that it will be irresistible, and if such a conference is held with men who are in the front and foremost rank of political India, I am not unhopeful that a solution may be reached satisfactory to Great Britain and India.

Will you, therefore, consider these proposals of mine with the care and attention that you can give them? In short it comes to this: (1) declaration of policy, (2) followed up with an invitation from His Majesty's Government with a view to arriving at an agreement as to the future constitution of India before His Majesty's Government formulate any definite proposals and place them before Parliament. His Majesty's Government will be, as I have said before, armed already with the Simon Report and the Government of India dispatch on it, both of them, I assume, will not be satisfactory.

As to the personnel of the representatives of India to be invited you may well ask me by what method are we to get them. I have very carefully considered the pros and cons and I have come to the conclusion that if we are to elect our representatives in the Assembly and confine ourselves to the members of the Assembly, there are men outside the Assembly whose presence would be indispensable for a conference of the kind I am contemplating. On the other hand, if it is thrown open to non-members, it might lead to a great deal of canvassing and rivalry and we may not get the personnel we may desire. I think you yourself are fairly well acquainted with the names of prominent political leaders in India. But besides that His

Excellency the Viceroy, I think, by now knows pretty well who is who in the political world of India and further the members of the Government of India would be able to guide you, if necessary. But you must take upon yourself to invite such men as you may be advised, to go over to London and confer with His Majesty's Government and sit in conference with the Cabinet. Of course, the number should be, as far as possible, not very large. I should restrict the number to about fifteen.

This shortly is the scheme which I would put before you, and I have no doubt that you will give your most earnest consideration to it.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,
M. A. Jinnah.

Lord Irwin came back to India in October and on the 31st issued the declaration for which Jinnah was waiting eagerly and for which he had appealed to the Prime Minister of England. The Viceroy's announcement ran thus:

The goal of British policy was stated in the declaration of August 1917 to be that of providing for the "gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire." As I recently pointed out, my own instrument of instruction from the King-Emperor expressly states that it is His Majesty's will and pleasure that the plans laid by Parliament in 1919 should be the means by which British India may attain its due place among his Dominions. Ministers of the Crown, moreover, have more than once publicly declared that it is the desire of the British Government that India should in the fullness of time take her place in the Empire in equal partnership with the Dominions, but in view of the doubts which have been expressed both in Great Britain and India regarding the interpretation to be placed on the intentions of the British Government in enacting the Statute of 1919, I am authorised on behalf of His Majesty's Government to state clearly that in their judgment it is implicit in the

declaration of 1917 that the natural issue of India's constitutional progress, as there contemplated, is the attainment of Dominion Status.

The declaration also referred to Simon's letter to the Premier in which he suggested that what might be required, of the Joint Parliamentary Committee, would be the setting up of a conference in which His Majesty's Government should meet representatives both of British India and of the States for the purpose of seeking the greatest possible measure of agreement for the final proposals which it would later be the duty of His Majesty's Government to submit to Parliament. The statement continued:

When, therefore, the Commission and the Indian Central Committee have submitted their reports, and these have been published, and when His Majesty's Government have been able in consultation with the Government of India to consider these matters in the light of all the material then available, they will propose to invite representatives of different parties and interests in British India and representatives of the Indian States to meet them separately or together as circumstances may demand for the purpose of the conference and discussion in regard both to the British Indian and the all-Indian problems. It will be their earnest hope that, by this means, it may subsequently prove possible on these grave issues to submit proposals to Parliament which may command a wide measure of general assent. It is not necessary for me to say how greatly I trust that the action of His Majesty's Government may evoke response from, and enlist the concurrence of, all sections of opinion in India, and I believe that all who wish India well, wherever and whoever they are, desire to break through the webs of mistrust that have lately clogged the relations between India and Great Britain. I am firmly assured that the course of action now proposed is the method by which we may best hope to handle those high matters in the way of constructive statesmanship.

Irwin's declaration created a stir in India. Congress leaders and a few of their sympathisers gathered at Delhi. Those belonging to Jinnah's school of thought assembled at Bombay and stated that the declaration that the natural issue of Indian constitutional pro-

gress was the attainment of Dominion Status, was satisfactory. "We appreciate the fundamental change of procedure whereby the representatives of India will be invited to meet His Majesty's Government in conference for the purpose of arriving at the greatest possible measure of agreement regarding the proposals to be submitted to Parliament for the attainment of Dominion Status by India and thereby reaching a solution which might carry the willing assent of political India."

Congress leaders on the other hand laid down conditions for the co-operation, firstly that all discussions were to be on the basis of full Dominion Status for India, secondly that representation should be predominantly of the Congress members, thirdly they demanded a general amnesty of political prisoners and fourthly that from now on the Government of India was to be carried on as if India were already a dominion.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah had seen the absurdity of such an attitude from the very beginning and suggested that the principle of the Round Table Conference should be accepted and details outlined in the Delhi manifesto could be adjusted later, particularly in view of the criticism by the House of Lords of the progressive policy of the Labour Government regarding India. It was, in his opinion, disastrous to stick to such demands and precipate matters. In addition to this India's English friends appealed to Indian leaders not to reject the hand of friendship offered by MacDonald's Party. Irwin was himself anxious for co-operation and had wished to meet Indian leaders personally.

Jinnah tried his best to persuade Congress leaders to keep an open mind and leave questions of far-reaching importance to be thrashed out at the Conference itself but they insisted upon the fulfilment of these conditions. The Viceroy was, however, not in a position to discuss beyond the implications of his proclamation and negotiations came to an end without any tangible result.

The next session of the Congress at Lahore on the 31st of December 1929 marked the end of the period given to British Parliament for the acceptance of the Nehru Report and a programme of "national offensive" was in the offing. It declared "the entire scheme of the Nehru Committee Report to have lapsed." Complete Independence was once again adopted as a creed and the All-India

Congress Committee was authorised, "whenever it deems fit, to launch upon a programme of Civil Disobedience including non-payment of taxes, whether in selected areas or otherwise, and under such safeguards as it may consider necessary."

The decision of the Lahore Congress came as a rude shock to all those who had hoped for peaceful negotiations. The Viceroy had warned the Congress leaders that the Government of India intended to deal with subversive activities very severely and, in February 1930, while addressing a Durbar at Lucknow had dwelt at length upon the "sinister possibilities of Civil Disobedience." Jinnah was disappointed too and believed that it was calculated to do enormous harm to the interests of India. He was of the opinion that Gandhi's influence over the Congress was responsible for this sudden outburst of political hysteria, and said that the Hindu leader was "mentally and constitutionally incapable of learning and unlearning things" and that his "Himalayan miscalculation" in the past had failed to open his eyes to realities. Jinnah advocated that India should make use of the opportunity for what it was worth and threw in all his weight at the Council of the All-India Muslim League which met in February. The League Council consequently welcomed Viceroy's declaration.

In February 1930 the Congress Working Committee decided to launch the Civil Disobedience movement, and in March Gandhi gave ultimatum that unless within seven days the Viceroy was willing to meet his eleven points he would advise the country to begin the programme. The movement was intended to be a "fight to a finish," and high sounding slogans were raised to excite and attract the public. In April next, however, Gandhi began to feel uncomfortable and by the end of the month he said, "The present campaign is not designed to establish independence but to arm the people with the power to do so." On the 5th of May he was arrested.

Soon after the Simon Commission's report was published, the Viceroy made a statement before a joint session of the two Houses of the Central Legislature in which he referred to the status of Indian representatives at the Round Table Conference and the scope of its discussions, making it clear that it was not going to be a conference merely for the sake of academic discussion, but that His Majesty's Government intended to pay every attention to the views

of all the delegates that would attend it. Jinnah along with other leaders of his group felt that this assurance was satisfactory and with full optimism he sailed for England to attend the Conference.

The proceedings of this first Round Table Conference, which met on the 12th of November, 1930, are available in detail and need not be reproduced here. The important part that Mohammad Ali Jinnah played and the contribution that he made to it, and indeed to all its subsequent sessions, are fairly well known. One cable, from its special correspondent published in *The Bombay Chronicle* dated 15th November, 1930, is noteworthy:

> I understand that Muslims were willing to accept joint electorates and reservation of seats on the population basis upon making a separate province of Sind and North West Frontier Province. Other communal demands were not insisted upon by Muslims under the leadership of His Highness the Agha Khan and Mr. Jinnah who are willing to unite in the demand of Dominion Status at the Conference, if Muslims are granted above terms. All Hindus except the Mahasabhaites are agreeable. Jayakar's attitude is rendering impossible a united Indian offensive which is much regretted. Jayakar's persistence in forcing the small communal issue is endangering Indian unity in the political demand in which Liberals and Muslims have agreed not to work the constitution if Dominion Status is not granted.

In February 1930, Mohammad Ali Jinnah had succeeded in uniting the various groups of Muslims under the League. The nationalist Muslims, however, separated themselves for good. Most of the Muslim leaders, after the sad breakdown of negotiations on the communal question and the abrupt ending of the National Convention, were suspicious of the Congress Civil Disobedience programme, and the Muslim Conference under Maulvi Mohammad Yakub had already expressed this feeling. In the past, the communal question had been tackled from all angles and attempts were made to draft a constitution which could be acceptable to every one. But they had proved abortive. Hasrat Mohani and Lajpat Rai had given their due consideration to this aspect and had initiated thinking in a different direction.

In December 1930 the All-India Muslim League met at Allahabad

for its plenary sessions under Allama Iqbal who had also been, for some time past, anxiously studying the possibilities of a communal settlement, and, during the course of his presidential address, he put forward the principle of partition from the authoritative Muslim platform. "To base a constitution," said he, "on the conception of a homogeneous India or to apply to India the principles dictated by British democratic sentiments is unwittingly to prepare her for a civil war."

Iqbal said that the national idea was racialising the outlook of Muslims and thus materially counteracting the humanising work of Islam. The construction of a policy on "national" lines, if it meant displacement of Islamic principles of solidarity, was simply unthinkable to a Muslim. The unity of the Indian nation, therefore, must be sought not in the negation but in mutual harmony and co-operation of the many. He was pained that the attempts of the Indian leaders to discover such a principle of internal harmony had failed so far. He asked: "Why have they failed? Perhaps we suspect each other's intentions and inwardly aim at dominating each other." He, for his part, held that events seem to be tending in the direction of mutual harmony, and declared that if the principle that the Indian Muslim was entitled to full and free development on the lines of his own culture and tradition in his own Indian homelands was recognised as the basis of a permanent communal settlement, he would be ready to stake his all for the freedom of India.

To achieve this idea Iqbal believed that communalism in its higher aspects was indispensable to the formation of a harmonious whole in a country like India. The Muslim demand for the creation of Muslim India within India was perfectly justified. "Self-government within the British Empire or without it, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to be the final destiny of Muslims at least of North-West India." This centralisation of the most living portion of the Muslims of India whose military and police service had (notwithstanding unfair treatment from the British) made British rule possible would eventually solve the problem of India as well as of Asia. Thus possessing full opportunities of development within the body-politic of India, the North-West Indian Muslims would prove the best defenders of India against foreign invasion both of ideas and bayonets. "I, therefore,

demand the formation of a consolidated Muslim State in the best interests of India and Islam. For India it means security and peace resulting for an internal balance of power; for Islam an opportunity to rid itself of the stamp that Arabian Imperialism was forced to give it, to mobilise its laws, its education, its culture, and to bring them into closer contact with its own original spirit and with the spirit of modern times."

In the federal sphere Iqbal said redistribution of provinces must precede the introduction of the new constitution. The existing structure of provinces was largely responsible for the communal controversy, and Muslim India could have no objection to purely territorial electorates if the provinces were demarcated so as to secure comparatively homogeneous communities possessing linguistic, racial, cultural and religious unity. "But the discussion at the Round Table Conference of the communal question has demonstrated, more clearly than ever, the essential disparity between the two great cultural units of India. Yet the Prime Minister of England apparently refuses to see that the problem of India is international and not national. Obviously he does not see that the model of British democracy cannot be of any use in a land of many nations."

Iqbal advised Muslims of India never to agree to a system, whether British or of Indian origin, which virtually negatived the principle of true federation or failed to recognise them as a distinct political entity. He saw a menace to Islam in India in the scheme of federation which was being discussed at the Round Table Conference and remarked: "The truth of the matter is that participation of Indian Princes among whom only a few are Muslims in a federation scheme serves a double purpose. On the one hand it serves as an all-important factor in maintaining the British power in India practically as it is. On the other hand it gives an overwhelming majority to Hindus in an All-India Federal Assembly. In other words, the scheme appears to be aiming at a kind of understanding between Hindu India and British Imperialism. You perpetuate me in India and I, in turn, give you a Hindu oligarchy to keep all other Indian communities in perpetual subjection. If Muslims silently agree to any such scheme it will simply hasten their end as a political entity in India."

Iqbal, therefore, emphasised that the main demand of Muslims

must be the redistribution of provinces to secure a permanent communal settlement. But if that demand was ignored, then Muslims could not agree to give up separate electorates or their majority rights in the Punjab and Bengal, or 33 per cent representation in the Central Legislature. He doubted whether the Minorities Sub-Committee of the Round Table Conference would reach any settlement on the basis of the Delhi resolution. "If these demands are not agreed to, then a question of very great and far-reaching importance will arise for the community. Then will arrive the moment for independent and concerted political action by the Muslims of India." He held definite views regarding what the concerted political action would be, but he thought it proper to postpone their expression till the apprehended situation had actually arisen.

The Round Table Conference had concluded its sessions and the general principles regarding the Hindu-Muslim question and the All-India Federation had been agreed upon. MacDonald addressed the Conference on the 19th of January, 1931, and laid down the bare outlines of the future constitution for India. A few days later, the Viceroy announced that the Government of India were pleased to order the release of Gandhi and members of the Congress Working Committee with a view to creating a friendly atmosphere so that the Congress leaders may discuss the Prime Minister's announcement on its merits and may prepare themselves for participation in the forthcoming session of the Conference. The Congress leaders after release hastened to review the Indian political situation *de novo*.

The Liberal delegates to the Round Table Conference were on their way to India and appealed to the Congress leaders once again that no decision should be taken before they were able to place their views before the country. But the appeal went unheeded. Irwin's term of viceroyalty was ending in summer, and Willingdon was to relieve him. Mohammad Ali Jinnah had decided not to return to India but to practise his profession in the Privy Council in England. He hoped to enter Parliament in order to "fight India's battle in England."

The Muslims of India had now become more active than before. In March, the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim Conference, formed for the express purpose of putting forward the

Muslim claim before the Round Table Conference, demanded that in view of the proceedings of the Conference and the attitude of Hindu delegates towards the communal question, no constitution for India should be framed without the previous settlement of the Hindu-Muslim problem; and that the Federal structure as envisaged by the Round Table Conference was unsatisfactory and should be improved. The Working Committee also held that the London Conference should be boycotted by the Muslims, in case their political aspirations were not fully met. At this juncture Hasrat Mohani declared that Hindus were out for Hindu *Raj* and that their insistence on the principle of democracy of the Western type was nothing but a cloak to hide their real sentiment of perpetuating the political power of Hindus to the utter detriment of Muslims and minorities.

In the meantime, however, the Congress retraced its steps and agreed to participate in the Round Table Conference even without the fulfilment of the conditions that were insisted upon earlier. Subsequently its insistence that Muslim point of view should be represented by Congress Muslims aggravated Muslim feelings against it. Within a short time Muslims began to condemn the Congress publicly that it was purely a Hindu body.

During the intervening period the attitude of the Conservative Party in British Parliament had become hostile towards the Indian Reforms, and Baldwin was being pressed to withdraw his compromising neutrality. The revolt was led by Churchill, already a powerful element in British politics.

The Conservative Party was in favour of provincial autonomy, but was opposed to the transfer of power at the Centre and, by the middle of March, prominent Tories declined to co-operate with the Round Table Conference on the ground that the question of Indian constitution was entirely in the hands of Indians themselves and that unless there was an agreement among the various sections of India's public opinion the matter was beyond the scope of Parliament. The Conservative Party even went to the extent of demanding the dissolution of the Round Table Conference. But Wedgwood Benn, Secretary of State for India, passionately appealed for allowing the Conference to proceed with its work and ultimately carried the day, especially as the Viceroy was despatching favourable reports from India.

At home, in India, things were moving in a different direction. But the main question on which attention was mostly riveted was that of Hindu-Muslim relations. The League had already made a friendly gesture by inviting Congress leaders to address its sessions. But the Hindu Mahasabha was challenging the representative character of the Congress and its eligibility for negotiating on behalf of Hindus. The All-India Muslim Conference, on the other hand, through its secretary, Shafi Daoodi, was voicing the sentiments of that group. He, in a statement, declared that Muslims were more hardened on the question of separate electorates "having regard to the unfortunate mentality displayed by the Hindu community even in recent times." Congress, he said, was out to mislead the world by saying that Muslims were divided.

The history of the Muslim demands has been traced in the previous pages. It will be recalled that since the publication of Jinnah's fourteen points very little was left, over which Muslims could be said to be divided, especially when the resolution embodying the fourteen points was drafted with a view to accommodating all groups within and without the League. The proceedings of the Round Table Conference had made it clear that the questions of Sind and Frontier Reforms had been finally agreed upon and the only hitch that remained in the communal settlement was that of representation at the Centre and that of separate electorates. Muslims of India were, however, unanimous in their demand of one-third representation in the Centre, and the question of separate electorates was favoured by a majority.

Early in September Mohammad Ali Jinnah returned to India for a few days prior to his attending the second Round Table Conference. At Bombay he expressed the view that the present age was an age of organisation and unless the Muslims organised themselves there was no salvation for them. "I am an Indian first and a Muslim afterwards," he said. "But at the same time I agree that no Indian can ever serve his country if he neglects the interests of the Muslims." Jinnah emphasised that no government could succeed by keeping the minorities under bondage and perpetual subjugation, and people trying to indulge in such manoeuvres were only leading India to a weak and degrading position from which it would be hard for her to recover. "I have said this openly. I have

no eye on any party. I have no mind for popularity. I can tell you honestly that the Hindus are foolish, utterly foolish in the attitude that they have adopted to-day. The bulk of the Hindus have lost their heads and their mentality, perhaps you may not know, but I know it. I assure you that unless Hindus will have the courage and confidence—they are afraid of Muslims—this India will never get *Swaraj*. It is not the joint or separate electorates or five or ten seats. Hindus have not the necessary courage and Hindus are afraid of Muslims." He emphasised the need of discipline among Muslims and said even in the Punjab and Bengal where they were in a majority they must organise themselves. He said, in the Punjab and Bengal, Hindus were refusing to give Muslims a statutory majority. "I like straight play. Tell me that I do not want to give you a majority in the Punjab and Bengal. Hindus do not say that. They say, you can have a majority with joint electorates. Hindus know well that Muslims have got only forty per cent of voters in these provinces." Jinnah contended that unless certain reasonable safeguards and brakes were provided for the purpose of preventing any undue mischief, the constitution would never work.

At the Round Table Conference, as has been pointed out, the question of the minorities came up for discussion before its special Committee. But the attitude of the Hindu delegates made the agreement of any sort utterly impossible. A suggestion was put forward by the Prime Minister that if all the delegates signed a pledge to abide by his verdict he would be willing to use his discretion and give his judgment. That was done and the result was the Communal Award. MacDonald had realised that the minorities were vehement in their demand of self-expression and that they wanted to remain as separate entities, and that agreement was not impossible if Hindus were willing to face facts. The subsequent agreement between the minorities out of the Committee, without the help of the Hindu delegates, confirmed his observations.

This also confirmed Jinnah's assertions at Bombay that Hindus were afraid of Muslims and by the end of October Gandhi's utterance at Oxford left no doubt in anybody's mind. Asked how Congress would defend the North-West Frontier, he replied that the only danger was the possible disloyalty of the Indian Muslims to India, but he was sure that they would never combine with a foreign

invader from the North-West. The implication was obvious. To counteract such a possibility, and to safeguard against such a contingency, suggestions had been made by Lajpat Rai. Democracy, indivisible unity of India, responsibility to the Legislature elected through an adult suffrage, and a show of anti-British sentiment, keeping loopholes for negotiation, would do the trick, and Muslims or other groups could be put in the wrong without much effort.

After the Round Table Conference Jinnah stayed on in England as a practising lawyer and came back to India in April 1934. Within the course of these few years India had passed through hard times. Movements were launched and abandoned by the Congress. Attempts were made for a communal settlement and the parties became more and more suspicious of each other. The White Paper was published and awaited verdict of the parties concerned. Muslims also faced manifold questions. During 1933 an attempt had been made to bring about greater unity in their ranks. Early in the year the Muslim League had split into two rival sections over the question of fusing the League with the other big Muslim organisation—the Muslim Conference. An attempt to achieve unity was made by the Agha Khan during the first quarter of 1934. He failed in this particular object but to some extent composed differences between individual leaders of the two main organisations by a reshuffling of office-bearers.

In April 1934 the Council of the All-India Muslim League met to consider the situation. Mohammad Ali Jinnah once again made a bid to convince all Muslim groups that the League was the only organisation which could guard the interests of Muslims and he succeeded to a great measure. The Council was, therefore, one in which were seen all the shades of Muslim opinion. The League resolved "that the Council accept the Communal Award so far as it goes until a substitute is agreed upon by the various communities and parties to secure such future constitution for India as would be acceptable to the country." A resolution for sending a deputation to the Viceroy in connection with Palestine was also adopted. It was decided that the constitution of the All-India Muslim League be revised to suit the prevailing political conditions of the country and to strengthen and revive its provincial branches.

After the conclusion of the meeting of the League Council, a

strong plea for Hindu-Muslim unity was made by Mohammad Ali Jinnah in the course of an interview to a press representative:

> After two days' deliberations of the Council meeting, which was the most representative I have seen during my connection with the League, extending now for more than twenty years, I must say that I was immensely impressed with most of the speeches made there by the various leaders, who had come from different provinces in India. To condemn the White Paper one does not require argument or reasons, but one has only got to read the White Paper proposals and understand them. While many of us feel that this treacherous scheme is almost at our door—and I for one have not hesitated to declare my views with regard to the scheme—the problem of problems which still confronts us is how to avert its being foisted upon India. That cannot be achieved and will not be achieved until there is unity between Hindus and Muslims. Nothing will give me greater happiness than to bring about complete co-operation and friendship between Hindus and Muslims and in this desire my impression is that I have the solid support of the Muslims . . .
>
> The emphasis which the Muslims place on the Communal Award is only an indication of their desire to make sure that any national demand, which they join to put forward on behalf of the country will incorporate the safeguards which the Muslims consider as the minimum. The Muslims are in no way behind any other community in their demand for national self-government. The crux of the whole issue, therefore, is whether we can completely assure Muslims that the safeguards to which they attach vital importance will be embodied in the future constitution of India.

Soon after Jinnah again left for England.

The Central Assembly elections came off at the end of the year 1934. At this juncture it was once again the fate of the Congress to be divided within itself. The Congress Socialist group became more and more active and the Swarajist Party was once again revived. The Hindu Mahasabha became antagonistic to the Congress and threatened to set up its own candidates. The ultimate result was that Malavya and Aney resigned from the Congress Parliamentary Board over the communal issue and, having decided to set up their own

party, proceeded to hold its inaugural meeting at Calcutta. The fire of the Pandit's enthusiasm, however, which was to kindle into being a Nationalist Party embracing Indians of all castes and creeds, with the Pandit himself as the Hindu champion against the Communal Award, had died down considerably in the weeks which had elapsed since the Benares meeting. When Bhai Parmanand, on behalf of the Hindu Mahasabha and the President of the National Liberal Federation, arrived in Calcutta on invitation, they found that the projected all-embracing Nationalist Party had crystallised into a "Congress" Nationalist Party, with membership restricted only to good Congressmen. This naturally caused indignation among the non-Congressmen who had been invited. The Nationalist Party, a Liberal paper declared, "went up like a rocket, but has come down like a stick."

In contrast to this chaotic state of the Hindus, Muslim politics during this period present a measure of consistency. With the approach of the Assembly elections the desire for effecting some sort of combination for electioneering purposes resulted in a joint session in Simla of the executives of the two organisations. The meeting passed a number of joint resolutions on the 13th of August, 1933, followed by a joint election manifesto which made it clear how signally Congress had failed to appeal to Muslim opinion. The Muslim community was exhorted to present a united front to opponents of the Communal Award and the principle of separate electorates; to vote only for such candidates as subscribed to the principles and policy of the All-India Muslim League, particularly with regard to the Communal Award and separate electorates, the safeguards demanded by Muslims in the constitution, and adequate representation by special reservation for Muslims in all Services. The manifesto emphasised the ultimate identity of interests between the Hindu Mahasabha who openly condemned MacDonald's Award and the Congress who were out to procure its lapse by the total rejection of the White Paper. Among special demands set forth in the resolutions was that Sind should immediately be constituted a separate province, and reforms granted in Baluchistan; that the Muslim proportion in the Central Services should be 33 per cent instead of 25 per cent as proposed in the Government of India Resolution.

At this time Mohammad Ali Jinnah was still in England, but Muslims of Bombay once again pressed him that he should accept their representation and when the nomination papers were scrutinised on the 11th of October, 1934, it was found that his was the only nomination. He was consequently returned unopposed. The first session of this new Assembly met in January 1935 and Jinnah came out to India to participate in it. The strength of the various parties in this new Assembly was as follows: Congress Party 44, Congress-Nationalist Party 11, Independent Party 22 out of which 18 were Muslims, European Group 11, officials 26, nominated non-officials 13. The Government could normally rely on about 50 votes; the Congress Party and the Congress Nationalist Party combined, on 55. Thus the results of most of the divisions depended upon the attitude of the Independent Party which functioned under the leadership of Jinnah.

The report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee, which was published in India in November 1934, was debated during three days. On the 4th of February 1935, the Leader of the House moved "that the report of the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform be taken into consideration." A large number of amendments to this motion were tabled and the outcome of the debate was eagerly awaited by the public outside. The first amendment on which a division was taken was that moved on the 7th February by the Leader of the Congress party, Bhulabhai Desai. This amendment was to the effect that, as the proposed new constitution had been "conceived in a spirit of Imperialist domination" and would transfer "no real power to the people of India," it should not be introduced. Mohammad Ali Jinnah also moved an amendment and for the purpose of voting he had divided it into three parts. The first related to the Communal Award, the second to the scheme of Provincial Government, and the third to the scheme of Central Government. It ran thus:

(1) That this Assembly accepts the Communal Award, so far as it goes, until a substitute is agreed upon by the various communities concerned.

(2) As regards the scheme of Provincial Government, this House is of opinion that it is most unsatisfactory and disappointing inasmuch as it includes various objectionable features, parti-

cularly the establishment of Second Chambers, the extraordinary and special powers of the Governors, provisions relating to Police rules, Secret Service and Intelligence Departments, which render the real control and responsibility of the Executive and Legislature ineffective, and, therefore, unless these objectionable features are removed, it will not satisfy any section of Indian opinion.

(3) With respect to the scheme of the Central Government, called "All-India Federation," this House is clearly of opinion that it is fundamentally bad and totally unacceptable to the people of British India, and therefore recommends to the Government of India to advise His Majesty's Government not to proceed with any legislation based on this scheme and urges that immediate efforts should be made to consider how best to establish in British India alone a real and complete Responsible Government, and, with that view, take steps to review the whole position in consultation with Indian opinion without delay.

To the first part of Jinnah's amendment Bhulabhai Desai again moved an amendment that the Assembly should "refrain from expressing any opinion at the present juncture either accepting or rejecting the Communal Award." Desai's first amendment was rejected by 84 votes to 44. Jinnah was then asked to move his amendment and he said:

It may be that our Hindu friends are not satisfied with the Communal Award, but at the same time I can also tell the House that my Muslim friends are not satisfied with it either, because it does not meet their full demand. And speaking for myself, personally, I am not satisfied with the Communal Award, and, again speaking as an individual, my self-respect will never be satisfied until we produce our own scheme. But I can tell the House that I accepted it because we have done everything that we could so far to come to a settlement, and though, so far, we have not been able to come to a settlement, therefore, whether I like it or whether I do not like it, I accept it, because unless I accept that, no scheme of Constitution is possible.

The first part of the amendment was put to vote and was adopted by 68 votes to 15, the Congress remaining neutral. The House then

divided on the second and third parts of Jinnah's amendment taken together and they were adopted by 74 votes to 58. The result of the debate was hailed as a personal triumph of Mohammad Ali Jinnah. "Mr. Jinnah convinced the Congress Party," says O. N. Nambiyar in his *From India's Press Gallery*, "that Indian Muslims had no faith in the Congress and that, whether in the Central Legislative Assembly or outside, they would refuse to support any line of action that ignored the interests of Indian Muslims."

Speaking at a Delhi College on the 18th of February, 1935, Jinnah declared: "If I can achieve this unity, believe me, half the battle of the country's freedom is won . . . So long as Hindus and Muslims are not united, let me tell you, there is no hope for India and we shall both remain slaves of foreign domination." Jinnah had been widely criticised for his attitude in the Assembly in regard to the unofficial amendments to the resolution on the Report tabled by the Leader of the Opposition in the House. He had been accused of exploiting the key position of his party for communal advantage and of allowing his personal vanity to jeopardise the country's interests. To these charges he replied with unusual humility: "It is not my victory: it is a national victory." He acknowledged the support he had received from other groups. He went a step further and pointed out that subsequent developments had shown that his was merely a "paper victory," adding: "Is Parliament going to honour that resolution of ours? Is it going to have the slightest effect on the mind of His Majesty's Government."

Why, then, did he press his amendment on the Award? The answer to this was to be found in the peculiar position which he occupied in the Indian political world. A man of superb independence, he was also a sound patriot, and had been in the vanguard of every truly national movement. At the same time, commonsense had forced on him the conviction that without Hindu-Muslim unity no progress was possible in India. Here, again, he occupied a difficult position. Extremist Hindus, who were ready to admire his patriotism and independence, were reluctant to tolerate his advocacy of the Muslim cause. On the other hand, left wing Muslims, who naturally regarded with suspicion every utterance of the Hindus, complained that he was not sufficiently firm on Muslim demands.

Before the report was debated in the House negotiations between

Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Rajendra Prasad, the President of the Congress, had been conducted to find an alternative formula in place of the Communal Award.

A curious mixture of earnestness and suspicion characterised the negotiations in Delhi which was to bring about a settlement of the communal problem and to substitute the resultant agreement in place of the Communal Award. There was little doubt that the principal participants, Rajendra Prasad and Mohammad Ali Jinnah, were keen on carrying their negotiations to a successful conclusion. So were most of the Congress men and right wing of the Muslim section. The distrust came, however, from the Hindus of the Punjab and Bengal and the Sikhs who were the bitterest opponents of Award.

Rajendra Prasad's task was no less difficult. His position was analogous to that of Jinnah. As President of the Congress, which had pledged itself not to accept any settlement which did not carry with it the consent of all parties and communities, he felt called upon to pull with him the Muslims no less than the Hindus. It was in this spirit that he started negotiations with Jinnah even before the Assembly debate. Indeed, as *Advance* observed, "the Congress has not done well in sitting idle for so many months, especially when it adopted a resolution stating that every endeavour would be made to bring about a settlement between the communities concerned."

The negotiations were started rather late, and there was not much time left between then and the date fixed for the debate. In view of the shortness of time at their disposal it was suggested by some that they should bend their efforts first to an arrangement as far as the debate was concerned and postpone for later consideration the larger issues. But this was not acceptable to the Muslims, who were unwilling to miss the opportunity to secure the Assembly's formal approval to the Award in the absence of a general agreement. A comprehensive settlement was not possible then, and a party-understanding for purposes of the debate was not acceptable. The whole thing therefore fell through, with the result that Jinnah had to adopt the attitude he did towards the Communal Award. All parties bowed to the inevitable, but Jinnah and Rajendra Prasad were anxious to pick up the threads left loose in the debate. The

Muslims at first insisted on having a definite set of proposals from the other side, but when it was pointed out that negotiations must begin with a clean slate and in a spirit of mutual give-and-take, unhampered by predetermined proposals, Mohammad Ali Jinnah yielded.

So anxious was he for this settlement that he absented himself from the debates of the Assembly so as to be free to take part in the conversations. The special correspondent of *The Indian Nation* saw some political significance in Jinnah's "non-participation in the Agha Khan dinner either as a host or as a guest," and concluded that "he is anxious to retain the freedom for communal understanding through his talks which are now on."

The communal talks, however, once again failed and the two leaders parted as good friends.

Jinnah tried his best to settle with Rajendra Prasad the Hindu-Muslim question, but did not succeed. The position of the Muslims, both in the Assembly and in the public life, was a difficult one. If they did not agree with the Government or were opposed to the Government they were incurring their displeasure although the Government did not say so openly.

The position of Muslims *vis-a-vis* Hindus, on the other hand, was still more difficult. There existed two schools of thought among the Hindu politicians. One consisted mainly of the leaders of the Congress and the other of those of Mahasabha. So far as the Congress was concerned it had realised more than ever that without Hindu-Muslim unity, there was no hope of any great achievement in the country in regard to constitutional advance. But, unfortunately, in this school also there were some who thought that the Muslims were not sufficiently patriotic.

The position of the Hindu Mahasabha made not only the position of the Muslims difficult but also that of the Congress. So far as the Hindu Mahasabha was concerned, every pronouncement it made, or any course of action it adopted, was calculated to show to the Muslims that the Mahasabha was dominated by one consideration—that in India there should be complete supremacy and ascendancy of Hindus. When Muslims realised that that was the mentality of Hindu Mahasabha, their position became difficult.

Jinnah, however, still hoped the leaders of the Congress, with

their wider experience and very good training, would overcome that section and assure the Muslims that "it is not going to be a Hindu government, but an Indian government in which the Muslims will not only have a fair and just treatment but also that they will be treated as the equals of the Hindus." Muslims were willing to co-operate with the Hindus. But they could not be forced to swerve from their path of doing what they considered right. They were in no mood to allow anyone to achieve supremacy and ascendancy. How far they would be able to maintain that position depended upon their own merits.

On 23rd April 1935 Mohammad Ali Jinnah again sailed for England by *s. s. Conte Verde*.

CHAPTER XI

The New Constitution

On October 24, 1935 *s.s. Strathnavar* brought Mohammad Ali Jinnah back to the shores of India to face fresh problems under changed conditions. The Government of India Act of 1935 had already been passed by Parliament and an anxious country awaited him. But before he expressed his views he had to make up for his long absence from India and therefore the concluding period of the year was spent in ascertaining popular opinion and to pick up the threads of local politics. The next year started with much activity.

On the legislative front he got busy in supporting and censuring the Government as the occasion, in his judgment, demanded, and emphasised the need of a complete reorientation of the Government's policy. Particular attention is, however, invited to the debates on the Ottawa Agreement and the refusal of grants regarding the Executive Council and Defence. The results of his speeches on these subjects brought added honour to Mohammad Ali Jinnah and he was hailed as the greatest patriot in the country capable of independent judgment. Even the Hindu press showered unlimited praise on him. On the home front he was face to face with a terrific crisis in the shape of Shahidganj agitation in the Punjab. A dispute arose over a mosque which was believed to have belonged to Muslims and was now in possession of Sikhs. Punjab Muslims had put forward a claim for its restoration which culminated in a movement of civil disobedience conducted by Muslims and a counter-movement conducted by Sikhs. Punjab was very much vexed and the situation went almost out of control. In the opinion of Jinnah it was an unfortunate affair specially at a time when all energy was required to harness Muslim strength for utilising what little opportunities

were provided to India by the Act of 1935, and when he was called upon to settle the Shahidganj dispute he lost no time in proceeding to Lahore. There he laboured for a number of days talking and discussing the problem with the leaders of all the groups and communities.

Success crowned Jinnah's efforts to restore a peaceful atmosphere in the Muslim ranks as a preliminary to the restoration of communal harmony. While Muslims endorsed and accepted his advice to stop civil disobedience and confine the agitation to lawful means, Government on their part fully met the Muslims' demand as far as it concerned them. The Punjab Government decided to release all prisoners convicted of offences directly connected with the agitation, and not involving serious violence to person or property or abetment of such violence. They also decided to withdraw the pending cases falling within the same category, and further gave an undertaking that they would revoke action taken under the Indian Press Act where this action was directly in connection with the Shahidganj agitation. This followed a declaration by Jinnah in the Badshahi Mosque on behalf of all Muslims that, after consultations with leaders, it had been decided that civil disobedience was to be stopped.

Jinnah delivered his speech before a huge congregation at the Badshahi Mosque and said he had been in Lahore for some days during which he had the opportunity of exchanging views with Muslims of all schools of thought. He had reached the conclusion that civil disobedience should now be stopped, and that the agitation for the restoration of Shahidganj Mosque should be by legal and constitutional methods. He had been negotiating with the Sikhs, and wished to come to some honourable settlement with them. Jinnah assured them of his full support to a constitutional agitation, and concluded that now it was the duty of Government to announce a general amnesty to the Shahidganj prisoners. He further said:

> While we are not going to give up our claim for Shahidganj, we are going to make every effort for an honourable understanding with the sister community. We shall seek all remedies by means of constitutional and peaceful methods, and there are many avenues and channels open to us. There is no question of defiance to or intimidation of the sister community. They

fought against us and we fought against them in the past, but the Sikhs are a great community, and nothing will please me more than an honourable settlement with them, and we shall spare no pains for this.

In this congenial atmosphere, Jinnah set his heart on the problem and began his work of reconciliation with renewed vigour. For more than a week he met the Muslim, Hindu and Sikh leaders and considered their views in order to find out a *via media* that would bring the two communities together. He met a great response from every party and brought about a considerable change in the situation for the better. But the work on hand was not so easy as it seemed in the beginning and Jinnah could not stay more in Lahore in view of his other political engagements.

The Shahidganj dispute, therefore, remained, and Jinnah left for Delhi on the 7th March, 1936, leaving the unfinished work to the Shahidganj Conciliation Committee consisting of representatives of the three communities.

A tribute to Jinnah for his peace efforts and an appeal to the Sikhs to make a generous gesture were the features of the Governor's speech at the European section dinner on the same night. If stability was to be secured, there had to be a large measure of co-operation and co-operation meant closer contacts, wider sympathies and better understanding.

Referring to the hopeful situation he said:

I am greatly indebted to the efforts of Mr. Jinnah for this improvement and I wish to pay an unqualified tribute to the work he has done and is doing. Mr. Jinnah succeeded in his first task, namely, bringing the Muslim agitation to strictly constitutional and legal lines, and thus made it possible for Government to take action for which they had been awaiting an opportunity. There remained the second part of his task. It is no secret that so far his efforts have not been crowned with success, but this does not mean that they have failed. His efforts continue, and in several respects they are being carried on in conditions far more favourable than when they began.

As regards the general situation in the country, Jinnah had to grapple with different problems altogether. The Congress point of view had to be considered in regard to the new constitution. It had

in the beginning adopted a peculiar attitude of postponing the expression of any opinion and there existed within itself several groups. The question of contesting the elections under the new Act hung in the balance for some time but ultimately the leaders decided in favour of sending to the provincial assemblies their candidates. This brought Muslims face to face with a new problem especially in view of the fact that Hindu opinion including that of the Congress was openly antagonistic to the Communal Award. Muslims had lost what little faith they had in the Congress and became a target of the Hindu press. A vindication of the honour and prestige of Muslims was badly needed. Mohammad Ali Jinnah was in a position to do so, and he utilised the opportunity when he was invited to attend the Jamiat-ul-Ulama Conference held at Delhi in the beginning of April 1936 and explained the Muslim position with authority and confidence.

The eighty million Muslims of India were willing and even more anxious than any other community to fight for the freedom of Mother India, hand in hand with other sister communities, declared he. Nearly ten thousand Muslims were present and his speech was heard with rapt attention. Explaining the "Policy for Muslims," he said Muslims who were not a negligible community had to play a very prominent part in the near future. The new Reforms and, especially, the scheme of Federation were not acceptable to them. The Government had foisted these Reforms against the will of all parties, because Indians were not united and they failed to settle their domestic quarrels.

He pointed out that it was for the first time that a Representative Government was being established in India and this meant, in other words, the rule of the majority, and naturally minorities had apprehensions as to what the majority would do. Majorities were likely to be tyrannical. Power and authority were likely to intoxicate people; therefore provisions for safeguards were essential for the minorities in any scheme of a democratic constitution. "Are we going to move on and apply our minds to larger questions affecting India? Close the controversy over the Communal Award for the time being, and, God willing, we would produce a better settlement."

Jinnah reiterated his views against the Federal scheme and said, "We will fight until we have that replaced by a constitution which,

we think, is the right one." Muslims, he said, "must think of the interests of our community. Unless you make the best efforts, you will fail and will command no respect and nobody will bother to consult you. Organise yourselves and play your part." There was nothing wrong in working for one's own community Jinnah declared: "The Hindus and Muslims must be organised separately and once when they are both organised they will understand each other better and then we will not have to wait for years for an understanding. Do not listen to the taunts. I am helping eighty million people and if they are more organised they will be all the more useful for the national struggle." He appealed to Muslims to select the best men for the new Reforms and leave it to them to work as they pleased. He appealed to the Hindus to inspire confidence and a sense of security among the Muslims.

Soon after this the All-India Muslim League was assembled at Bombay under the presidentship of Syed Wazir Hasan. The Congress simultaneously held its sessions at Lucknow. But while the Congress postponed its decision in regard to office acceptance, the League took a definite decision.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah moved the following resolution:

The All-India Muslim League enters its emphatic protest against forcing the Constitution, as embodied in the Government of India Act of 1935, upon the people of India, against their will and in spite of the repeated disapproval and dissent expressed by various parties and bodies in the country. The League considers that, having regard to the conditions prevailing at present in the country, the Provincial Scheme of the Constitution be utilised for what it is worth, in spite of the most objectionable feature contained therein, which renders the real control and responsibility of the Ministry and the Legislature over the entire field of Government and the Administration nugatory. The League is clearly of the opinion that the All-India Federal Scheme of the Central Government, embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, is fundamentally bad; it is most reactionary, retrograde, injurious and fatal to the vital interests of British India *vis-a-vis* the Indian States, and it is calculated to thwart and delay indefinitely the realisation of India's most cherished goal of complete responsible government and is

totally unacceptable.

The League considers that the British Parliament should still take the earliest opportunity to review the whole situation afresh regarding the Central scheme before it is inaugurated; or else the League feels convinced that the present scheme will not bring peace and contentment to the people, but on the contrary it will lead to disaster if forced upon and persisted in as it is entirely unworkable in the interests of India and her people.

There were, said Jinnah, four major parties sitting, as it were, at a chess-board. There were the British people as a collective entity. There were the Indian Princes, the Hindus and the Muslims. The object of Great Britain was to maintain, inviolable and intact, the power and authority of Great Britain, as a dominant party. The object of the Indian Princes was that they did not want any kind of democratic government. They seemed to think that if the British Government hand over certain powers to the people of British India it would be better that the Princes should come in to keep a control over it. The object of Hindus and Muslims was common to a certain extent. Muslims were anxious, as any Hindu nationalist, to stand by the country and struggle for her freedom. But this was the first time the people were trying a Constitution by which the government was to be carried on by a majority rule and the Muslims were a minority community. It was not a religious question. It was a question whether they should not have sufficient safeguards which would inspire confidence in them. Unfortunately, he said, there was no agreement between the Hindus and the Muslims on this question.

Jinnah agreed that the only way left open to them was constitutional agitation. It was a comprehensive term, and meant that they should work the legislatures with a view to creating such forces within and without the legislatures as would make the British Government bend to their wishes. But that, said he, was not a task which the Muslims alone could accomplish. It could be done only by the two major communities standing shoulder to shoulder and working together. Unfortunately, however, "the largest organisation," the Indian National Congress, was behaving like an ostrich, putting its head in the sand and thinking that nobody was observing it. The Congress claimed to represent the entire nation and stated that it did not care about individual communities. The Congress

attitude was: "If you like to come with us, you may; or stay away, if you choose. We will remain neutral and we are marching towards our goal." It was wrong to adopt such an attitude. "I venture to say, that the Congress will never reach the goal they desire and we desire unless they appeal to the Muslims." If the Congress wanted to prolong the British domination in India, then let it continue its present policy. So far as the Muslims were concerned, Jinnah stated, they owed not only a duty to the community but also to the country. Whether the Congress wanted them to join that body or not, they should organise themselves and compel the Congress to approach them for co-operation. He believed that if eighty millions of Muslims could unite, the Muslims could arrive at a settlement with the Hindus as two nations, if not as partners.

The League also set up a machinery to contest the elections and a resolution authorised Mohammad Ali Jinnah to form a Central Election Board. The resolution stated:

> Whereas the Parliamentary system of government which is being introduced in this country with the inauguration of the new constitution presupposes the formation of parties with a well-defined policy and programme which facilitate the education of the electorate, and co-operation between groups with proximate aims and ideals and ensures the working of the Constitution to the best advantage; and whereas in order to strengthen the solidarity of the Muslim community and to secure for the Muslims their proper and effective share in the provincial governments, it is essential that the Muslims should organise themselves as one party, with an advanced and progressive programme, it is hereby resolved that the All-India Muslim League do take steps to contest the approaching provincial elections, and for this purpose appoint Mr. Jinnah to form a central election board under his presidentship, consisting of not less than 35 members, with powers to constitute, and affiliate provincial election boards in various provinces, having regard to the condition of each province, and devise ways and means for carrying out the aforesaid objects.

Towards the end of April 1936, Lord Linlithgow came out to India to assume the charge of Viceroyalty and broadcast a message to India. Linlithgow's pronouncement contained nothing more than

the usual denials and promises, hopes and fears, threats and assurances that Viceregal announcements generally contained, but emphasis on the need of working the new Constitution and its justification as a measure of political advance for India was likely to be misunderstood in view of the Muslims' decision at Bombay. Jinnah felt the need of making the Muslim position clear and issued the following statement:

> I have seen the report of the speech of His Excellency the Governor-General of India. I do not wish to deal with the parts referring to the Indian Civil Service, the Police and the problem of unemployment. It is partly the usual appreciation of service and encouragement. It is from the head of the Government, and the expression of sympathy towards the unemployed in India. But what is of real importance to the people of India, the immediate issue, is law and order, the so-called provincial autonomy and the contemplated All-India Federation at the Centre. With regard to law and order, I would respectfully draw the attention of His Excellency that he must look to the causes which disturb law and order and not take it for granted that suddenly large classes of people in India have become criminals and therefore the ordinary judicial procedure should be departed from and that the only method of dealing with it is by repressive measures, executive orders and detention of people without trial.
>
> As I have often said, the factors which threaten law and order in India are mainly due to the policy that has been adopted by the British Government in India for the last ten years. Even now it is surprising that His Excellency forgets altogether the history of the last ten years, and he quietly takes it for granted that the people should accept the provincial scheme laid down by the Government of India Act of 1935, and to put it in his language, "whose natural crown and summit will be the All-India Federation" as now prescribed in the same Statute. Surely, His Excellency must have some information that the scheme of so-called provincial autonomy is not acceptable to the people, and that the natural crown of All-India Federation has been totally condemned by every section of public opinion. His pronouncement amounts to this: That the British Parlia-

> ment has forced the Constitution upon India, therefore, we must accept it. The Government of India Act is a result brought about not with the help of India. It was enacted in the teeth of the opposition of India and contrary to the solemn declaration made by His Majesty's Government before the first Round Table Conference that only those proposals which received the greatest common measure of agreement of the people of India would be placed before Parliament. It is not a question of doubts nor half-heartedness. It is not a question of this or that element in the plan of constitutional difference of basic principles with regard to the central scheme. And the opposition to the provincial scheme is the most highly objectionable feature which renders real autonomy nugatory. I hope His Excellency will not follow the usual definition of co-operation and goodwill, namely, "submit and do so as we tell you." That is not my idea of co-operation. There cannot be the real respect and trust that His Excellency desires unless India is treated on a footing of complete equality and on the basis of true partnership as a member of the British Commonwealth.

To carry out the behests of the League and to set up effective machinery for fighting out the elections was no easy task. With no definite goal before them Muslims were either supporting the administrations or siding with the Congress in its struggle for supremacy. They behaved according to their light in different parts of India, but in both cases they remained nothing more than the henchmen of the parties towards which they had natural leanings. There was no central policy and no central control. Mohammad Ali Jinnah was open to attack from both of them, either because of his attitude towards the Federation and Reforms or on account of his support to the Communal Award. He, however, started his work and undertook an extensive tour of the country to contact influential leaders so that he could hope for a fair success at the polls for the League. It was, therefore, natural that at first wherever he went he found that Muslims were planning on a provincial basis and the parties they had built up, more particularly in the Muslim majority provinces, bore the colour of the particular influence under which they had found themselves. A few of the Muslim leaders from the

Muslim minority provinces remained independent or, to be more correct, wavered in an atmosphere of uncertainty. It was in the minority Muslim provinces that the real strength of Muslims and the League rested.

In the Punjab Fazl-i-Hussain had built up a Unionist Party. In Bengal a Krishak Proja Party functioned under Fazlul Haq. In U.P. the Nationalist Agricultural Party was a creation of the Nawab of Chhatari. In Sind Abdulla Haroon refused to join hands with the League. In Bihar Syed Abdul Aziz followed suit. In the North-West Frontier Province the Congress forces under Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his celebrated brother were loose. But in the midst of all this darkness there shone a flickering light in Lahore; he was the only consolation of Jinnah. A great philosopher, whom India never bothered to claim, and whom Muslims learnt to appreciate when he was already gone never to return, was keeping Jinnah advised how an independent Muslim was thinking and should have thought.

In June 1936, Jinnah called the first meeting of the Parliamentary Board at Lahore and there he received the following letter from Iqbal:

> I am sending you my draft. Also a cutting from *The Eastern Times* of yesterday. This is a letter from an intelligent pleader of Gurdaspur. I hope the statement issued by the Board will fully argue the whole scheme and will meet all the objections so far advanced against it. It must frankly state the present position of the Indian Muslims as regards both the Government and the Hindus. It must warn the Muslims of India that unless the present scheme is adopted the Muslims will lose all that they have gained during the last 15 years and will seriously harm, and, in fact, shatter their own solidarity with their own hands.
>
> *P.S.* Will feel much obliged if you send the statement to me before it is sent to the press. Another point which should be brought out in the statement is as follows:
>
> (1) Indirect election to the Central Assembly has made it absolutely essential that the Muslim representatives returned to the Provincial Assemblies should be bound by an all-India Muslim policy and programme so that they should return to the Central Assembly only those Muslims

who would be pledged to support the specific Muslim questions connected with the Central subjects and arising out of their position as the second great nation of India. Those who are now for Provincial policies and programmes were themselves instrumental in getting indirect elections for the Central Assembly introduced into the Constitution obviously because this suited a foreign Government. Now when the community wants to make the best use of this misfortune (*i.e.*, indirect elections) by proposing an all-India scheme of elections (*e.g.*, League scheme) to be adhered to by the Provincial candidates, the same men, again at the instance of a foreign Government, have come out to defeat the community in their efforts to retain its solidarity as a nation.

(2) Question of Wakf Law arising out of Shahidganj, culture, language, mosques and personal law.

The Parliamentary Board met and issued a lengthy statement and outlined a policy for the legislators that were to be elected on the League tickets. Mohammad Ali Jinnah then proceeded to supervise the work of the Board and constitute the provincial branches. Under these arrangements the elections were contested and the League achieved a success which bewildered its own workers. But this remarkable success was by no means one that could place the League and its leaders in a position to dictate terms to other parties. The Congress had also returned in a thumping majority.

The year 1937 opened with little change in the attitude of the Hinduised Congress which continued in its airs of superiority. It had not yet decided to accept office. The All-India Muslim League was nevertheless hoping that the Hindus would work the Reforms and the League was willing to co-operate with them. Jinnah had given this indication both in private and in public. But Congress leaders became obsessed with the idea that they could ignore the League altogether and arrogate power for the Hindu majority. The tactics of avoiding the League, it seems, were actuated by a motive of giving a suitable reply to the protagonists of the Communal Award and to those who were responsible for its acceptance in India. This was in fact a personal affront to Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Fortunately for the Muslims and unfortunately for the Hindus the

leadership of the Congress was at the time in the hands of Jawaharlal Nehru, the Westernised Shankaracharya, and he declared in Calcutta that the parties that mattered in India were the Congress and the British and that others should line up implying thereby that the working or the wrecking of the new Constitution rested in the hands of the Congress alone. It was a threat to the British and a reproach to the League. The Congress had now come out openly to contest the Muslim seats in opposition to the League.

Such a sweeping claim could, naturally, not go unchallenged. Jinnah at the time was in Calcutta. A public meeting was called in his honour and he utilised the opportunity to warn the Congress that interference with Muslim affairs would mean complete disaster. Replying to the statement of Jawaharlal Nehru he said, "There is a third party, namely the Muslims. We are not going to be dictated to by anybody. We are willing to co-operate with any group of a progressive and independent character provided its programme and policy correspond to our own. We are not going to be camp-followers of any party. We are ready to work as equal partners for the welfare of India."

In the third week of March the Congress President called a National Convention at Delhi with a view to obtaining the "verdict of the country" over the question of office acceptance. Mohammad Ali Jinnah explained, on the eve of this Convention, the position of the League in the hope that better counsels may after all prevail with the leaders of the Congress. He said:

> We have decided to contest the seat which was won by the Muslim League at Bahraich, as the member who won the seat, I sorrowfully have to say, is no more with us. So we have to capture that seat again. The Congress, I believe, is going to contest the seat. It will be a great mistake on the part of the Congress to do so. There is really no substantial difference now at any rate between the League and the Congress as plan of the wrecking of the Constitution has disappeared from the Congress programme. I have often said that I am trying to see that Muslims should whole-heartedly and sincerely adhere to the policy and programme of the All-India Muslim League, which is both national and patriotic, and we shall always be glad to co-operate with the Congress in their constructive programme.

> It is no use encouraging individual Muslims to come into the fold of the Congress for the sake of a prize. In conclusion I say: Let us now concentrate on those causes which stand in the way of a united front.

But the Congress President went ahead, full speed, in the direction in which he was careering. In his presidential address he dwelt at length misrepresenting Muslim politics and made an attempt to explain the reasons why the Congress had hitherto failed to enlist Muslim sympathies. One of the principal reasons, in his opinion, was that the Congress had neglected the Muslims so far. A Muslim Mass Contact scheme was, therefore, chalked out and free expression was given to the opinion that Muslim leadership was not up to the mark and patriotism was a virtue that could not be expected from them. This was too much, yet Mohammad Ali Jinnah preferred to give the Congress a long rope and kept quiet. But Iqbal was very much disturbed by this pronouncement and wrote to Jinnah:

> I suppose you have read Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's address to the All-India National Convention and that you fully realise the policy underlying it in so far as Indian Muslims are concerned. I believe you are also aware that the new Constitution has at least brought a unique opportunity to Indian Muslims for self-organisation in view of the future political developments both in India and Muslim Asia. While we are ready to co-operate with other Progressive Parties in the country, we must not ignore the fact that the whole future of Islam as a moral and political force in Asia rests very largely on a complete organisation of Indian Muslims. I therefore suggest that an effective reply should be given to the All-India National Convention. You should immediately hold an All-India Muslim Convention in Delhi to which you should invite members of the new Provincial Assemblies as well as other prominent Muslim leaders. To this Convention you must re-state as clearly and as strongly as possible the political objective of the Indian Muslims as a distinct political unit in the country. It is absolutely necessary to tell the world both inside and outside India that the economic problem is not the only problem in the country. From the Muslim point of view the cultural problem is of much greater consequence to most Indian Muslims.

At any rate, it is not less important than the economic problem. If you could hold this Convention it would test the credentials of those Muslim legislators who have formed parties contrary to the aims and aspirations of Indian Muslims. It would further make it clear to the Hindus that no political device, however subtle, can make the Indian Muslim lose sight of his cultural entity.

Soon after this, all the other forces of the Congress were also let loose and a volley of attacks was opened on Muslims. On the 20th April, 1937, Jinnah issued a press statement in reply to Rajendra Prasad who had started a controversy about the unity talks he had had with Jinnah some time ago and of which the reader is well aware. Jinnah said:

What surprises me most is Babu Rajendra Prasad's satisfaction. He says that the Muslims of Bihar joined the *hartal* demonstration on April 1, in spite of my opinion to the contrary, but I think Babu Rajendra Prasad knows that my expression of opinion was not followed up by any organised effort. Does he want me to make such an effort in future? Besides, with his experience as a practical man, does he not realise that Muslims love any demonstration or *tamasha* and always enjoy excitement? But, is this all that he can say of the co-operation and support of Muslims? I am afraid he has grievously misunderstood the Muslims.

The controversy developed at great length and went on till the end of July. Rajendra Prasad, forgetting the history of recent years, continued to accuse Jinnah of his unwillingness to tackle the problem of Hindu-Muslim unity. By the end of July the Muslim leader, therefore, had to make the following revelation in a statement:

I assure the Muslims and the public at large that I am not in the slightest degree affected by anything that has happened in the past, and nobody will welcome an honourable settlement between the Hindus and the Muslims more than I, and nobody will be so ready to help it, and as an earnest on my Part I sent a message to Mr. Gandhi when he was at Tithal only in the month of May last appealing to him to take up the question of Hindu-Muslim settlement and concentrate his great influence and efforts to which I received the following reply on May 22,

> 1937: "Dear Mr. Jinnah, Kher has given me your message. I wish I could do something but I am utterly helpless. My faith in unity is bright as ever; only I see no daylight out of the impenetrable darkness and in such distress I cry out to God for light. Yours sincerely, M. K. Gandhi."

It is clear that in spite of the Congress leaders' attitude towards the League, Mohammad Ali Jinnah had hardly deviated from his path of making attempt after attempt for bringing the two sections of Indian population nearer to each other, and, as a paper commented, he was never tired of seeking Hindu-Muslim settlement. Throughout his public career Jinnah's record is full of these attempts and as late as July 1937 he was hoping that at least a working arrangement between the Congress on the one part and the League on the other would be brought about. But the Congress under the guidance of Gandhi, who had raised a great fuss over the so-called special powers of the Governors of provinces in his usual manner, had nevertheless decided to accept office and to form the Ministries, even without the assurances from the Governors asked for by him that they would not use these powers. The Congress decision was put into effect almost immediately and the Congress High Command proceeded to form monopolist Ministries without taking any heed of the hand of co-operation extended by other parties. Jinnah's hope for a working settlement was thus shattered once for all.

CHAPTER XII

The Clash

It was clear now that unless Muslims made their existence felt, organised themselves into a power, had a united platform and a clear programme, it would be difficult for them to continue independent existence for which they had been fighting so long and for which they had earned taunts and reproaches from the Hindus over the Communal Award. It was also clear that if the Congress was to be allowed to carry on its normal activities, the effect and spirit of the Award, without which Muslims did not feel secured, would be nullified, and perhaps in any future scheme of Constitution their existence as a separate entity would be entirely blotted out. The League session was to be held shortly and it was expected that it would be completely overhauled and its policy reorientated. Iqbal was in continuous private correspondence with the League leader and was influencing his views which were becoming more and more confirmed in the light of his own experience and observations. Wrote the Muslim Poet:

> I am glad to hear that you will bear in mind what I wrote to you about the changes in the Constitution and programme of the League. I have no doubt that you fully realise the gravity of the situation as far as Muslim India is concerned. The League will have to finally decide whether it will remain a body representing the upper classes of Indian Muslims or Muslim masses who have so far, with good reason, taken no interest in it. Personally, I believe that a political organisation which gives no promise of improving the lot of the average Muslim cannot attract our masses.

Under the new Constitution the higher posts go to the sons of upper classes; the smaller ones go to the friends or relatives of the Ministers. In other matters too, our political institutions have never thought of improving the lot of Muslims generally. The problem of bread is becoming more and more acute. The Muslim has begun to feel that he has been going down during the last 200 years. Ordinarily he believes that his poverty is due to Hindu money-lending or capitalism. The perception that it is equally due to foreign rule has not yet fully come to him. But it is bound to come. The atheistic socialism of Jawaharlal is not likely to receive much response from the Muslims. The question therefore is: How is it possible to solve the problem of Muslim poverty? And the whole future of the League depends on the League's activity to solve this question. If the League can give no such promises I am sure the Muslim masses will remain indifferent to it as before. Happily there is a solution in the enforcement of the Law of Islam and its further development in the light of modern ideas. After a long and careful study of Islamic Law I have come to the conclusion that if this system of Law is properly understood and applied, at least the right to subsistence is secured to everybody. But the endorsement and development of the Shariat of Islam is impossible in this country without a free Muslim State or States. This has been my honest conviction for many years and I still believe this to be the only way to solve the problem of bread for Muslims as well as to secure a peaceful India. If such a thing is impossible in India the only other alternative is a civil war which as a matter of fact has been going on for some time in the shape of Hindu-Muslim riots. I fear that in certain parts of the country, *i.e.,* North-West India, Palestine may be repeated. Also the insertion of Jawaharlal's socialism into the body-politic of Hinduism is likely to cause much bloodshed among the Hindus themselves. The issue between social democracy and Brahminism is not dissimilar to the one between Brahminism and Budhism. Whether the fate of socialism will be the same as the fate of Budhism in India I cannot say. But it is clear to my mind that if Hinduism accepts social democracy it must necessarily cease to be Hinduism. For Islam the acceptance of

social democracy in some suitable form and consistent with the legal principles of Islam is not a revolution but a return to the original purity of Islam. The modern problems, therefore, are far more easy to solve for the Muslims than for the Hindus. But as I have said above in order to make it possible for Muslim India to solve these problems, it is necessary to re-distribute the country and to provide one or more Muslim States with absolute majorities. Don't you think that the time for such a demand has already arrived? Perhaps this is the best reply you can give to the atheistic socialism of Jawaharlal Nehru.

Anyhow I have given you my own thoughts in the hope that you will give them serious consideration either in your address or in the discussions of the coming session of the League. Muslim India hopes that at this serious juncture your genius will discover some way out of our present difficulties.

I know you are a busy man, but I do hope you won't mind my writing to you so often, as you are the only Muslim in India today to whom the community has a right to look up for safe guidance through the storm which is coming to North-West India, and perhaps to the whole of India. I tell you that we are actually living in a state of civil war which, but for the police and military, would become universal in no time. During the last few months there has been a series of Hindu-Muslim riots in India. In North-West India alone there have been at least three riots during the last three months and at least four cases of vilification of Prophet by Hindus and Sikhs. In each of these four cases, the vilifier has been murdered. There have also been cases of burning the Quran in Sind. I have carefully studied the whole situation and believe that the real cause of these events is neither religious nor economic. It is purely political, *i.e.*, the desire of the Sikhs and Hindus to intimidate Muslims even in the Muslim majority provinces. And the new Constitution is such that even in the Muslim majority provinces, the Muslims are made entirely dependent on non-Muslims. The result is that the Muslim Ministry can take no proper action and are even driven to do injustice to Muslims partly to please those on whom they depend, and partly to show that they are absolutely impartial. Thus it is clear that we have our specific reasons to

reject this Constitution. It seems to me that the new Constitution is devised only to placate the Hindus. In the Hindu majority provinces, the Hindus have of course absolute majorities, and can ignore Muslims altogether. In Muslim majority provinces, the Muslims are made entirely dependent on Hindus. I have no doubt in my mind that this Constitution is calculated to do infinite harm to the Indian Muslims. Apart from this it is no solution of the economic problem which is so acute among Muslims.

The only thing that the Communal Award grants to Muslims is the recognition of their political existence in India. But such a recognition granted to a people whom this Constitution does not and cannot help in solving their problem of poverty can be of no value to them. The Congress President has denied the political existence of Muslims in no unmistakable terms. The other Hindu political body, *i.e.*, the Mahasabha, whom I regard as the real representative of the masses of the Hindus has declared more than once that a united Hindu-Muslim nation is impossible in India. In these circumstances it is obvious that the only way to a peaceful India is a redistribution of the country on the lines of religious and linguistic affinities. Many British statesmen also realise this, and the Hindu-Muslim riots which are rapidly coming in the wake of this Constitution are sure further to open their eyes to the real situation in the country. I remember Lord Lothian told me before I left England, that my scheme was the only possible solution of the troubles of India, but that it would take 25 years to come. Some Muslims in the Punjab are already suggesting the holding of North-West Indian Muslim Conference, and the idea is rapidly spreading. I agree with you, however, that our community is not yet sufficiently organised and disciplined, and perhaps the time for holding such a conference is not yet ripe. But I feel that it would be highly advisable for you to indicate in your address at least the line of action that the Muslims of North-West would be finally driven to take.

To my mind the new Constitution with its idea of a single Indian Federation is completely hopeless. A separate Federation of Muslim provinces, reformed on the lines I have suggested

above, is the only course by which we can secure a peaceful India and save Muslims. Why should not the Muslims of North-West India and Bengal be considered as nations entitled to self-determination just as other nations in India and outside India are?

Personally I think that the Muslims of North-West India and Bengal ought at present to ignore Muslim minority provinces. This is the best course to adopt in the interest of both Muslim majority provinces. It will therefore be better to hold the coming session of the League in the Punjab, and not in a Muslim minority province. The month of August is bad in Lahore. I think you should seriously consider the advisability of holding the coming session at Lahore in the middle of October when the weather is quite good in Lahore. The interest in the All-India Muslim League is rapidly growing in the Punjab, and the holding of the coming session in Lahore is likely to give a fresh political awakening to the Punjab Muslims.

The Congress had now been in power for some time and Muslims were seriously thinking what should be their policy. Since the acceptance of office by the Congress, Muslims felt themselves unable to indict Hindus with proofs of communal partisanship and yet to all intents and purposes they felt they were not welcome in Hindu circles. The only hope, therefore, was in the forthcoming session of the League which came off in October 1937 at Lucknow. Mohammad Ali Jinnah's position was of great responsibility. The League's fate was hanging in the balance. Muslims were earnestly looking up to him, as most of their leaders had betrayed their cause. The Punjab, Bengal, North-West Frontier Province, Sind, the United Provinces were left only with a few men loyal to Muslim interests. Others were either already in ministerial parties or hankering after them, playing the tune of Hindu Congressmen in power. The Muslim majority provinces, although not altogether at the mercy of the Congress, were nevertheless much too afraid of their British masters. Mohammad Ali Jinnah in fact tried his best to hold the League session in one of these provinces, as Iqbal was constantly pressing him, but Muslim leaders in office would not agree to it and the annual League had to be postponed from month to month. At last Jinnah accepted the long-standing invitation of the Raja of Mah-

mudabad to summon the League session at Lucknow. The author was then present there. Muslims had no volunteer organisations and students were not willing to jeopardise their future by dabbling in "communal politics." But Muslims in general were groaning under a state of helplessness.

It was about three weeks before the League session that Lucknow Muslims were asked to make all necessary arrangements for the purpose. There was a talk in the town that some "broadminded" Muslims would throw in all their weight to create disturbance during the League sessions, and it was feared that the Pandal pavilion would be burnt to ashes before the League could make use of it. The Congress Government in the United Provinces had foreshadowed trouble but Muslims were not willing to accept help from the police. All vigilance and maintenance of peace and order had to be done by a small batch of volunteers. At last the day came when Mohammad Ali Jinnah arrived. His procession was to be taken out through the streets of Lucknow in spite of all the threatened trouble. The processionists knew that the League opponents were going to throw bombs over the crowd and the League President, and that arrangements were made by a few individuals to stage a demonstration with black flags.

Jinnah's procession was a wonderful pageant. The vanguard was a train of young men dressed in green uniforms. Then came the huge crowd of men that had foregathered from the villages and insisted on being included in the procession. The League President was seated in a well-decorated open car. The Raja of Mahmudabad walked on foot in front of the presidential carriage. It took the procession four hours to reach its destination at Kaiserbagh where Jinnah was to stay. On the way it met with the expected demonstration. A few pieces of black cloth were seen at a distance. The young men got wild, and, but for the local leaders who controlled the situation, there would have ensued a terrible skirmish among the two parties. The demonstrators took to their heels soon.

The League session began with the unfurling of the Muslim flag. It was for the first time that the flag figured in the programme of the League. The ceremony was performed by Jinnah himself and we felt his greatness within ourselves. Maulana Zafar Ali Khan delivered an inspiring speech. It seemed to us a sort of a war-cry

and we all felt blood rising to our faces with pride and courage.

Jinnah's Presidential Address to the League is a document of very great importance inasmuch as it is a declaration of a new faith ushering in an era of activity for the League and Muslims. It marks the final clash with the Congress and envisages a complete break from its policy and programme. The Lucknow League brought with it a period which initiated among the Muslims of India a spirit of self-reliance and self-confidence and emphasised a need of self-organisation and self-reform. Jinnah made it clear that Muslims must learn to stand on their own feet and give up their role as mere supporters of one party or other. Above all he warned them from playing into the hands of hostile groups. Said he:

> The Muslim League stands for full national democratic self-government for India. A great deal of capital is made as to phrases more for the consumption of the ignorant and illiterate masses. Various phrases are used such as *Purna Swaraj*, self-government, complete independence, responsible government, substance of independence and dominion status. There are some who talk of "complete independence." But it is no use having complete independence on your lips and the Government of India Act, 1935, in your hands. Those who talk of complete independence the most, mean the least what it means. Was the Gandhi-Irwin Pact in consonance with complete independence? Were the assurances, that were required before the offices would be accepted and the Provincial Constitution could be worked, consistent with *Purna Swaraj*; and was the resolution, after the assurances were refused, accepting offices and working the Provincial Constitution enacted by the British Parliament and forced upon the people of India by the Imperialistic power, in keeping with the policy and programme and the declarations of the Congress Party? Does wrecking mean working? These paper declarations, slogans and shibboleths are not going to carry us anywhere. What India requires is a complete united front and honesty of purpose and then by whatever name you may call your government is a matter of no consequence so long as it is a government of the people, by the people, for the people.

He explained how Congress leadership was responsible for the

loss of Muslim interests in the Congress, how in North-West Frontier Province, where Congress could not find a majority, "their sacred principle" of collective responsibility disappeared, and promptly the Congress Party was allowed to coalesce with any other group. That any individual Muslim member who was willing to unconditionally surrender and sign their pledge was offered a job as a minister and was passed off as a Muslim minister, although he did not command the confidence or the respect of Muslim representatives in the legislature.

Jinnah drew attention to questions like the enforcement of Hindi, *Bande Matram* and the Congress flag and explained how Hindu governments were influencing all and sundry to obey their mandates in these regards:

> On the very threshold of what little power and responsibility is given, the majority community have clearly shown their hand that Hindustan is for the Hindus; only the Congress masquerades under the name of nationalism, whereas the Hindu Mahasabha does not mince words. The result of the present Congress Party policy will be, I venture to say, class bitterness, communal war and strengthening of the imperialistic hold as a consequence.

Analysing the Congress attitude towards the Hindu-Muslim question and minority problem he declared:

> The Congress High Command speaks in different voices. One opinion is that there is no such thing as Hindu-Muslim question, and there is no such thing as minorities' question in the country. The other high opinion is that if a few crumbs are thrown to the Muslims in their present disorganised and helpless state, you can manage them. They are sadly mistaken if they think that the Muslims can be imposed upon. The All-India Muslim League has now come to live and play its just part in the world of Indian politics and the sooner it is realised and reckoned with the better it will be for all interests concerned.

In the end Jinnah drew the attention of the British Government to the important question of Palestine, which had "moved the Muslims all over India most deeply." The whole policy of the British Government, he said, had been a betrayal of the Arabs from

its very inception. Fullest advantage had been taken of their trusting nature. Great Britain had dishonoured her proclamation to the Arabs which had guaranteed to them complete independence of the Arab homelands, and the formation of an Arab Confederation under stress of the Great War.

> May I point out to Great Britain that this question of Palestine, if not fairly and squarely met, boldly and courageously decided, is going to be the turning point in the history of the British Empire. I am sure I am speaking not only of the Muslims of India but of the world, and all sections of thinking and fair-minded people will agree when I say that Great Britain will be digging its grave if she fails to honour her original proclamation, promises and intentions—pre-war and even post-war—which were so unequivocally expressed to the Arabs and the world at large.

Jinnah concluded his address with a passionate appeal to Muslim India to rally round the League and decide on programmes for the welfare of Muslims.

During the proceedings and deliberations of the Lucknow League, Jinnah had to face opinions of all shades and, individuals belonging to all schools of thought, and, on practically every issue that came up for discussion before the Subjects Committee, it seemed that the different elements would never agree with each other and that the verbal wrangles would continue for years. But after every section had been given full opportunity for expression, the President would rise and a pin-drop silence would reign over the entire assembly. He would say a few words touching every point of view and replying to every criticism and then he would suggest a *via media*. Every one would subscribe to this compromise and he would finally ask whether there were any objections and all, fully convinced, would cry out with one voice that there was no dissent, and in a moment the little hall that housed the Committee would seem to burst with loud cries of Jinnah's praise, and enthusiastic national slogans would fill the air.

One of the outstanding accomplishments of the League at Lucknow was that the ministries functioning in Bengal under Fazlul Haq and in the Punjab under Sikandar Hayat Khan subscribed to the League policy and its programme and Muslim members of these

ministerial parties signed the League pledge. A new orientation was given to the League and its creed was changed without any shadow of ambiguity, to full independence. Resolutions regarding Palestine and the Federal part of the Government of India Act of 1935 were also passed as indicated by Mohammad Ali Jinnah in his presidential address.

After the Lucknow League the President once again started his tour of the various important centres in India with a view to strengthening the League and consolidating its forces. The Congress, however, unmindful of the League, proceeded in its usual way and at the end of October its Working Committee at Calcutta issued long statements regarding the minorities' rights and *Bande Matram*. These statements were really meant to distract the imagination of the people and were cleverly worded. Jinnah was once more pressed from all sides that he should make the Muslim position clear. "I suppose you have already read," wrote Iqbal again, "the resolution passed by the A.-I.C.C. Your move in time has saved the situation, and we are all waiting for your observations on the Congress resolution. *The Tribune* of Lahore has already criticised it and I believe Hindu opinion will generally be opposed to it. However, it should not act as an opiate as far as Muslims are concerned. We must carry the work of organisation more vigorously than ever and should not rest till Muslim governments are established in the five provinces and reforms are granted to Baluchistan."

The clarification came on the 3rd of November when a reception was arranged by Muslims of Bombay in his honour and Jinnah criticised the Congress resolution and its statements regarding minorities and *Bande Matram*, but at the same time appealed to the Congress that it should settle with the Muslims the various issues which confronted India at the moment, as it was no use fighting with each other. The aim of the League, he pointed out, was the same as that of the Congress. Only that the Muslims did not feel secure under the future constitution of India and if they could be assured of their political freedom there was really no reason why both the great organisations should not coalesce to put forth a united programme.

The release to the press of Gandhi's message to Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the Presidential Address delivered before the League at

Lucknow necessitated Gandhi's writing to Jinnah and correspondence started between the two leaders. Gandhi complained of Jinnah's making public a "private" message and in subsequent letters accused him of declaring a war on the Congress. Jinnah defended himself and said that negotiations of this character could not be conducted through the medium of the post. The first correspondence culminated in Gandhi and Jinnah meeting each other while the other ended in vague argumentation. The reader is referred to these letters already published for a detailed study. But special attention is drawn to the letter of Gandhi dated the 24th of February, 1938, which runs as follows:

> I have read your letter to Jawaharlal also. I observe that both the letters invite not written replies but a personal discussion. I do not know whether it will take place in the first instance between you and Jawaharlal or, now that Subhas Bose succeeds him, between you and the latter. If you desire that before this there should be a talk between you and me, I would be delighted to see you in Segaon any time which is convenient to you before March 10, after which, if health permits, I might have to go to Bengal. So far as I am concerned, just on the Hindu-Muslim question I was guided by Dr. Ansari, now that he is no more in our midst, I have accepted Maulana Abul Kalam Azad as my guide. My suggestion, therefore, to you is that conversation should be opened in the first instance as between you and the Maulana Sahib. But in every case, regard me at your disposal.

To this Jinnah replied in his letter dated the 3rd March, 1938:

> In your letter I missed the note of response. First, whether you are of opinion that you see light now and the moment has come, and, secondly, if so, whether you are prepared to take the matter up in right earnest. I find that there is no change in your attitude and mentality when you say you would be guided by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad as Dr. Ansari is no more. If you pursue this line you will be repeating the same tragedy as you did when you expressed your helplessness because Dr. Ansari, holding pronounced and diehard views, did not agree, and you had to say that you were willing, but what would you do? This happened, as you know, before you went to the

Round Table Conference.

At the Round Table Conference the tragedy was repeated by you when you seemed to be willing to accept provisionally certain terms; but you, there also, expressed that you were helpless as the Hindus were unwilling and you, as a representative of the Congress, would have no objection if the Hindus and Muslims came to an agreement. We have reached a stage when no doubt should be left that you recognise the All-India Muslim League as the one authoritative organisation of Muslims of India and, on the other hand, you represent the Congress and other Hindus throughout the country. It is only on that basis that we can proceed further and devise a machinery of approach. Of course, I shall be glad to see you, although I shall be equally glad to see Pandit Jawaharlal or Mr. Bose as you may desire. The matter, as you know, will not be clinched without reference again to you by either of them. Therefore, I will prefer to see you first. In any case, I am sorry to say that I cannot come to Segaon to see you before March 19. I have to go to Bombay and also I have fixed various other engagements of my tour, but we can fix up time and place that may suit us both.

Gandhi sent the following reply on the 8th March:

Your letter revives painful memories. I will not discuss at this stage, at any rate, the various debatable points raised in your letter. Suffice it to say that I am at your disposal. If you cannot come to Segaon and my health permits, I will gladly go to Bombay to meet you when you are there. At present I have to go to Bengal and then for a while to Orissa. This will take me through the whole of this month. The earliest, therefore, that we can meet will be in April. Two questions arising from your letter demand a reply. You ask me whether I have now seen the light. Much to my regret, I have to say, "No". If I had, I would proclaim the news from the house-tops; but that limitation does not debar me from taking advantage of the slightest opportunity of finding a way out of the present difficulty. You expect me to be able to speak on behalf of "the Congress and other Hindus throughout the country." I am afraid I cannot fulfil the test. I cannot represent either the Congress or the Hindus in the sense you mean; but I would

> exert to the utmost all the moral influence I could have with them in order to secure an honourable settlement.

On the 17th of the same month Jinnah replied:

> As you do not wish to discuss the various points mentioned in my letter and the two questions which you have answered are far from hopeful, I am helpless. However, as you say, "suffice it to say that I am at your disposal," I gather, you would nevertheless like to take advantage of the slightest opportunity of finding a way out of the present difficulty. In these circumstances, I beg to inform you that I shall be glad to see you in Bombay sometime in April as suggested by you.

After Jawaharlal's statement at Calcutta that the Congress enjoyed the confidence of Muslims more than the League did, the point of contention shifted to the right of representation of Muslims interests. It was therefore necessary for the League President that prior to any talk of this character he should establish the representative character of the League and to this effect he made himself quite clear in his letter to Gandhi, and the latter's suggestion that Maulana Abul Kalam Azad should in the first instance meet Jinnah for the solution of the communal problem was naturally resented. The suggestion was twice made during this period and was twice politely refused.

Side by side with the stupendous task of organising the Muslims and rallying them round the League, Jinnah pursued his campaign of bringing the two great communities together in spite of the bitter experiences he had during the past few months. In January 1939 he visited Allahabad and all his public utterances there emphasised but one main point. He appealed to Congress leadership to join hands with the League and settle the communal problem, which, he said, was essential for unity and for the political advancement of India. Continually and consistently, he pleaded that he had nothing nearer and dearer to his heart than the general welfare of India and the amelioration of his countrymen. Both in private and in public he had been making incessant efforts to convince the Congress leaders that their policy was disastrous and would lead them nowhere. In fact he criticised the activities and policy of the Congress with the legitimate hope that he would be able to right the wrong.

During the Lucknow Session, Mohammad Ali Jinnah had succeeded in gaining the support of the Muslim members of the Punjab and Bengal Legislative Assemblies, but he had not succeeded elsewhere. The work had to be accomplished and in March the Council of the All-India Muslim League resolved that the "President be authorised to take all necessary steps to form a Muslim League party in the Central Legislature at an early date with power to the party so formed to coalesce with any other party or group whose policy and programme is approximately the same as that of the All-India Muslim League." The resolution was given effect to immediately. Simultaneously the Provincial Muslim Leagues were being formed and affiliated to the centre and when the special session of the League met at Calcutta in April 1939 the situation was much improved.

Jinnah's Presidential Address at Calcutta is important because it gives a summary of the current events. It is, therefore, proper to give the relevant portions of the Address here as briefly as can be possible.

> We have to a certain extent freed our people, from the most undesirable reactionary elements. We have in no small degree removed the unwholesome influence and fear of a certain section who used to pass off as Maulanas and Maulvis. We have made efforts to take our women with us in our struggle and in many places that I visited they took enormous interest and participated in various functions and gatherings. We have to carry on and maintain the policy and the programme of the Muslim League on a political plane. Within less than six months we have succeeded in organising Muslims all over India as they never were at any time during the last century and a half. They have been galvanised and awakened in a manner which has astounded and staggered our opponents. Muslims have shaken off torpor and shed their miserable state of despair and demoralisation into which they were sunk so deep. They are beginning to realise that they are a power. They possess the strength, the potentialities of which they have not yet realised, and if only they will take their affairs in their own hands and stand together united there is no power that can resist their will . . .

There are Muslim League parties functioning inside the seven out of the eleven Provincial Legislatures. The large majority of Muslim members in all these seven Provincial Assemblies belong to the Muslim League parties and the membership of these parties is increasing every day. The Muslim League contested with great success a number of by-elections to the Legislative Assemblies in various provinces. The Council of the League appointed a committee to chalk out an economic, social and educational programme for Muslims. The report of the committee is being awaited with great interest.

We greatly deplore the communal riots that have taken place in the United Provinces and other provinces. It is being publicly stated by the Congress Ministers in these provinces that the responsibility for those riots rests on the shoulders of the Muslim League. It is most deplorable that a Minister of the Government should make such loose and untrue statements. These allegations against the Muslim League are absolutely without any foundation, and are being used as a blind against the incapacity of the Congress Governments in these provinces. All sorts of malicious propaganda is being carried out to discredit the Muslim League. But, God willing, the Muslim League in spite of all this will go on getting stronger every day . . . Numerous representations and complaints have reached the Central Office, of hardship, ill-treatment and injustice that is meted out to Muslims in the various governments of the Congress provinces, and particularly to those who were workers and members of the All-India Muslim League, and therefore the Council were obliged to appoint a special committee under the chairmanship of Raja of Pirpur to make all necessary inquiries and to take such steps as may be considered proper and to submit their report to the Council and the President . . .

At Calcutta Mohammad Ali Jinnah also hinted that as far as the future constitution of India was concerned, Muslims would not be satisfied unless their rights and interests were completely safeguarded. He declared:

Muslims have made it clear more than once that besides the question of religion, culture, language and personal laws, there is another question equally of life and death for them, that their

future destiny and fate are dependent upon their securing definitely their political rights, their due share in the national life, the government and the administration of the country. They will fight for it till the last ditch and all the dreams and notions of the *Hindu Raj* must be abandoned. They will not be submerged or dominated and they will not surrender so long as there is life in them. The Muslim League claims the status of complete equality with the Congress or any other organisation and we have our problems to solve.

At the end of April, 1939 Gandhi met Jinnah in Bombay and, after a short talk, he realised that as he had no sanction of the Congress behind him it was but fair that the Congress President must meet the League President. He consequently wired to Subhas Bose who had succeeded Nehru to the presidentship of the Congress. Jinnah had already given an indication that he would insist on establishing the representative character of the League, and when the President of the Congress was asked to meet the President of the League, this question became more acute. The two leaders were meeting in their representative capacities and if a pact for the settlement of the communal problem was arrived at between the two, on whom would it be binding? Which organisation was to assume responsibility on behalf of Muslims and which of Hindus? And if Jinnah were to represent the Muslim case, who was to do so from the other side? In the first stage of the communal negotiations with Bose, therefore, Jinnah put forward the claim that the League must be accepted as the authoritative and representative organisation of Muslims. To this Bose had made the following observation in the note which he handed over to Jinnah:

The Congress cannot possibly consider itself or function as if it represented one community only, even though that might be the majority community in India. If doors must inevitably be open to all communities it must welcome all Indians who agree with its general policy and methods. It cannot accept the position of representing one community and thus itself becoming a communal organisation. At the same time the Congress is perfectly willing to confer and co-operate with other organisations which represent minority interests. It is obvious that the Muslims of India, though a minority in the whole country,

form a very considerable part of the population and their wishes and desires must be considered in any scheme affecting India. It is also true that the All-India Muslim League is an organisation representing a large body of Muslim opinion which must carry weight. It is for this reason that the Congress endeavoured to understand the viewpoint of the League and to come to an understanding with it. The Congress, however, would be bound to consult other existing Muslim organisations which have co-operated with the Congress in the past. Further, in the event of other groups of minority interests being involved, it will be necessary to consult representatives of such interests.

The League Executive Council discussed this note in June 1939 and declared that the League President could not proceed to discuss matters with the head of the Congress except on the basis outlined by him already. The Council also considered the suggestion of Gandhi that both the organisations should appoint committees for the purpose of the communal settlement and resolved that it would not be desirable for the Congress to include any Muslim in the proposed committee that might be appointed to represent the Congress. The Executive Council of the League also made it clear "that it is the declared policy of the All-India Muslim League that all other minorities should have their rights and interests safeguarded so as to create a sense of security amongst them and win their confidence, and the All-India Muslim League will consult the representatives of such minorities and any other interest as may be involved, when necessary."

It was now the turn of the Congress President to reply and on the 25th July 1939 when Jinnah's letter and enclosures were placed before the Congress Committee, Gandhi dictated the following reply on behalf of the Congress President:

The first resolution of the League Council defines the status of the League. If it means that, before we proceed to set up a machinery for considering the terms of settlement of the communal question, the Congress should recognise the status as defined in that resolution, there is an obvious difficulty. Though the resolution does not use the adjective 'only,' the language of the resolution means that the adjective is understood. Already the Working Committee has received warnings against recognising

the exclusive status of the League. There are Muslim organisations which have been functioning independently of the Muslim League. Some of them are staunch supporters of the Congress. Moreover, there are individual Muslims who are Congressmen, some of whom exercise no inconsiderable influence in the country. Then there is the Frontier Province which is overwhelmingly Muslim and which is solidly with the Congress. You will see that in the face of these known facts it is not only impossible but improper for the Congress to make the admission which the first resolution of the League Council apparently desire the Congress to make. It is suggested that the status of organisations does not accrue to them by any defining of it. It comes through the service to which a particular organisation has dedicated itself. The Working Committee therefore hopes that the League Council will not ask the Congress to do the impossible. Is it not enough that the Congress is not only willing but eager to establish the friendliest relations with the League and to come to an honourable understanding over the much vexed Hindu-Muslim question?

At this stage it may perhaps be as well to state the Congress claim. Though it is admitted that the largest number of persons to be found on the numerous Congress registers are Hindus, the Congress has a fairly large number of Muslims and members of other communities professing different faiths. It has been an unbroken tradition with the Congress to represent all communities, all races, and all classes to whom India is their home. From its inception it has often had distinguished Muslims as Presidents and as General Secretaries who enjoyed the confidence of the Congress and of the country. The Congress tradition is that though a Congressman does not cease to belong to the faith in which he is born and bred up, no one comes to the Congress by virtue of his faith; he is in and out of the Congress by virtue of his endorsement of the political principles and policy of the Congress. The Congress, therefore, is in no sense a communal organisation. In fact it has always fought the communal spirit because it is detrimental to the growth of pure and undefiled nationalism. But whilst the Congress makes this claim, and has sought, with more or less success, to live up to

the claim, the Working Committee asks for no recognition from the League Council. The Committee would be glad if your Council would come to an understanding with the Congress in order that we might achieve national solidarity and wholeheartedly work for realising our common destiny.

At the end of July the League Executive Council again met and on the 2nd August, 1938, Jinnah was authorised to send the following reply:

The Council is fully convinced that the Muslim League is the only authoritative political organisation of the Muslims of India. This position was accepted when the Congress-League Pact was arrived at in 1916 at Lucknow and ever since, till 1935 when Jinnah-Rajendra Prasad conversation took place, it has not been questioned. The All-India Muslim League, therefore, does not require admission or recognition from the Congress and nor did the resolution of the Executive Council passed at Bombay. But in view of the fact that the position—in fact the very existence—of the League had been questioned by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the President of the Congress, in one of his statements wherein he asserted that there were only two parties in the country, namely, the British Government and the Congress, it was considered necessary by the Executive Council to inform the Congress of the basis on which the negotiations between the two organisations could proceed.

Besides, the very fact that Congress approached the Muslim League to enter into negotiations for a settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question, it pre-supposed the authoritative and representative character of the League and as such its right to come to an agreement on behalf of the Muslims of India.

The Council are aware of the fact that there is a Congress Coalition Government in North-West Frontier Province and also that there are some Muslims in the Congress organisation in other provinces. But the Council is of opinion that these Muslims in the Congress do not and cannot represent the Muslims of India, for the simple reason that their number is very insignificant and that, as members of the Congress, have disabled themselves from representing or speaking on behalf of the Muslim community. Were it not so, the whole claim of

the Congress alleged in your letter regarding its national character would fall to the ground.

As regards "the other Muslim organisations" to which reference has been made in your letter, but whom you have not even named, the Council considers that it would have been more proper if no reference had been made to them. If they collectively or individually had been in a position to speak on behalf of the Muslims of India, the negotiations with the Muslim League for a settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question would not have been initiated by the President of the Congress and Mr. Gandhi. However, so far as the Muslim League is concerned, it is not aware that any Muslim political organisation has ever made a claim that it can speak or negotiate on behalf of the Muslims of India. It is, therefore, very much to be regretted that you should have referred to "other Muslim organisations" in this connection.

The Council is equally anxious to bring about a settlement of "the much vexed Hindu-Muslim question" and thus hasten the realisation of the common goal, but it is painful to find that subtle arguments are being introduced to cloud the issue and retard the progress of the negotiations.

In view of the facts stated above, the Council will hope that the representative character of the Muslim League will not be questioned and that the Congress will proceed to appoint a committee on that basis.

With reference to the second resolution, the Council wishes to point out that it considered undesirable the inclusion of Muslims in the Committee that might be appointed by the Congress, because it would meet to solve and settle the Hindu-Muslim question, and so in the very nature of the issues involved they would not command the confidence of either Hindus or the Muslims and their position indeed would be most embarrassing. The Council, therefore, requests you to consider the question in the light of the above observation.

With reference to the third resolution it was the memorandum of the Congress referred to in your letter, dated the 15th of May, 1936, in which mention of other minorities was made and the Muslim League expressed its willingness to consult

them, if and when it was necessary, in consonance with its declared policy.

In reply to this letter the Congress President on the 2nd of October wrote as follows:

Though there are inaccuracies in your letter, no purpose will be served by dwelling on them. The substance of your letter seems to be that the League does not expect the Congress whether implicitly or explicitly, to acknowledge its status as the authoritative Muslim organisation of India. If this view is accepted by the League, I am authorised to state that the Working Committee will confer with the Committee that may be appointed by the League to draw up the terms of settlement.

The Working Committee will be represented by at least five of its members at the sittings of the Conference.

The Executive Council of the League was meeting at Karachi on the 8th of October and Mohammad Ali Jinnah placed Bose's letter before it. The Council considered it and authorised the League President to send the following reply:

The Executive Council of the All-India Muslim League regret very much that the Working Committee of the Congress would have entirely misread my letter, dated the 2nd of August, 1938, which is quite clear and does not require any elucidation or further interpretation. The Muslim League are still ready to proceed with the negotiations for settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question on the basis defined by my letter referred to above and would appoint its representatives to meet the committee that may be appointed by the Congress on the footing indicated by us in our three resolutions of the 5th of June, 1938, already communicated to you.

With this all chances of bringing the Congress nearer to realities were frustrated as the Congress did not make a response.

CHAPTER XIII

Deadlock Ahead

The Congress High Command was now subjected to criticism from all sides. The depressed classes on the one hand and disillusioned Congressmen on the other hand openly came out and criticised the central policy of the Congress. Some incidents in the Congress camp and some quarrels over the distribution of ministerial portfolios and party adjustments had given rise to personal and political animosity between the Congressmen themselves. Too much interference by the Congress central organisation in the administration of the provinces had also generated a considerable amount of bitterness in the minds of those who were expected to be responsible for the conduct of provincial activity.

The League had by this time acquired considerable influence and its strength was being felt by every one. A provincial Muslim League Conference was called by the province of Sind at Karachi, and Mohammad Ali Jinnah was elected its President. The royal reception given to him at Karachi had somewhat heightened the significance of this Conference more than its venue did. The Conference opened on the 8th of October, 1938, amidst enthusiastic scenes. On the platform were seated the Premiers of Punjab and Bengal and leaders of the All-India Muslim League. Abdulla Haroon read the welcome address and drew attention to the oft-repeated attempts made by Jinnah for the solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem which had proved that his opponents were not inclined to listen to him. Haroon also drew attention to the atrocities committed by the Congress governments in the various provinces, and to the Sind

ministerial tangle and declared that the Congress Party had conspired with Hindu Mahasabha to deprive the Muslims of Sind of their right of having a ministry enjoying their confidence. He maintained there was no use shutting their eyes to the realities of the situation and ignoring the fundamental factors. He assured the minorities in Sind that if they played their part rightly the Muslim League would afford all facilities to have their legitimate rights safeguarded.

Then rose Mohammad Ali Jinnah amidst thundering cheers and applause. "Now that your province is an independent entity," said he during his famous Presidential Address, "the greatest responsibility rests on the shoulders of the Muslims of Sind for the welfare and progress of your province." He continued:

> You must remember that it is your duty and responsibility which calls upon you to conduct the affairs of the Government of Sind. The Constitution enacted by the Government of India Act of 1935, incorporates many objectionable features but still you should utilise it with your majority strength successfully for the economic, social, educational and political uplift of the people of Sind and in particular of Muslims. I feel confident that mainly the Muslims of Sind and the right-thinking Hindus will realise that the progress and the welfare of the province lies in maintaining the high principles of justice, fairplay and friendly co-operation amongst the people of Sind.
>
> The Muslims of Sind have another sacred duty to perform and a far graver task in front of them and it is that aspect which I want to impress upon you. In the all-India Muslim struggle against the various forces which are out to destroy and divide the Muslims by means of corruption and dishonest propaganda you have to guard yourselves against it and stand solid behind the All-India Muslim League which is the only authoritative organisation of the Muslims of India . . . Do not believe when you are told that the policy and programme of the League is reactionary. No honest man who has studied the policy and programme of the League can conscientiously and truthfully say that it is anything but fully national and most progressive.

Referring to the tragedy of Palestine and the ruthless repression that was practised against the Arabs because of their struggle for the freedom of their country, Mohammad Ali Jinnah declared:

> During the recent times Great Britain has thrown her friends to the wolves and broken her solemn promises. Only those succeed with the British people who possess force and power and who are in a position to bully them. They have also let down and thrown the Muslims of India to the wolves. I am sure that there will be no peace in the Near East unless they give an honest and square deal to the Arabs in Palestine.

The Sind Provincial Muslim League Conference, among other resolutions, passed one which gave forebodings of a future movement among the Muslims of India. It recommended to the All-India Muslim League that it should review and revise the entire question of a suitable constitution for India, which would secure the honourable status due to Muslims. Sind resolution also suggested that Hindus and Muslims were two different nations.

During the course of this Conference, Jinnah made an attempt to enlist the support of the Muslim members of the Sind Legislature to the League. But the tripartite clique of the Congress, the Hindu Mahasabha and the Governor of Sind had developed into a formidable force. A vote of no-confidence against the Ministry was pending before the Sind Assembly, and Allah Bakhsh, the then Prime Minister of Sind, utilised the opportunity to his advantage, and emphasising the possibility of the formation of a League Ministry wired to the Congress High Command appealing to them to allow Congressmen to exercise their individual discretion in voting over this issue. The Congress High Command readily accepted for obvious reasons. This apparent failure of Jinnah was jubilantly exploited by the Hindu press. It was regarded as a death-blow to the League and a great victory for the Congress. But Jinnah swallowed the reverse quietly biding his time, more determined than ever, to pursue his line of action as and when the League became more organised and developed more strength. With the insinuations and vilifications that followed the Congress President also did not fail to join hands.

Time went on and Mohammad Ali Jinnah made continued efforts for organising the Muslims and acquiring more and more strength for the League. The plenary session of the All-India Muslim League was being held at Patna in the month of December and the situation was being keenly watched both by the Muslims and the Congress.

So busy was the League leader in his work that he had to refuse the invitation of the Defence Secretary to serve on the Indian Sandhurst Committee, although the matter of Army Reform, as has been explained in the foregoing pages, was part of Jinnah's life-work. Jinnah had no time even to prepare his presidential address for the Patna session of the League, and, by felicitously delivering it extempore, he established a precedent which was unparalleled in the history of a political organisation, at any rate in India.

The 26th Annual Session of the All-India Muslim League was held at Patna on the 26th of December, 1938. It was an imposing demonstration of the powerful position that the League had come to build up, the like of which was unknown since the Lucknow League session. It is worthy of mention that at this session, delegates coming from the remotest corners of India participated. Great enthusiasm prevailed. Many had traversed long distances on bicycles to be able to attend the session. The President was recieved in a unique style. It was a State Drive through a long road of seven miles, from the Patna City Railway Station to the lawn where the session pandal was situated and near which Mohammad Ali Jinnah was to stay. Along the road were arrayed, on either side, the admirers and the followers of the great leader, with green flags in their hands waiting to greet him. The streets were crowded to capacity and to accommodate one more person would have been impossible. The pandal, too, was filled to suffocation, and thousands of men remained outside. Such was the zeal and enthusiasm of the people. Syed Abdul Aziz, who had sometime back resigned from the League Parliamentary Board on the question of forming mixed parties for the legislatures, was the Chairman of the Reception Committee and welcomed the popular tribune and leader of Muslim India.

Delivering his Presidential Address Mohammad Ali Jinnah began by expressing his sense of appreciation for the growing strength of the Muslim organisation and his deep sorrow over the death of the three great Muslim Leaders—Maulana Shaukat Ali, Mustafa Kamal Pasha and Mohammad Iqbal. He then addressed his audience as follows:

> It was only three years ago that we laid down the policy and programme of the All-India Muslim League at Bombay. The

position at that time was this. Of the intelligentsia of the Muslims who were in the forefront of what is called political life, most—I do not say all—were careerists. They chose their places according to their convenience either in the bureaucratic camp or in the other camp, that is, the Congress camp . . .

I am glad to say that things have now changed. One thing has been demonstrated beyond doubt, namely, that the Congress High Command wanted the Muslims to be a mere understudy of the Congress, mere foot-pages of the Congress leaders, to be used, governed and brought under the heels when they had served the purpose of the Congress. The Congress leaders wanted them to submit unconditionally to their Hindu *Raj*. That game has been fully exposed. We have got ample proof of it . . . The Congress has now, you must be aware, killed every hope of Hindu-Muslim settlement in the right royal fashion of Fascism . . . The Congress High Command declares that they will redress the grievances of Muslims, and they expect the Muslims to accept the declaration. I want to make it plain to all concerned that we Muslims want no gifts. Muslims want no concessions. We Muslims of India have made up our minds to have our fullest rights but we shall have them as rights, not as gifts or concessions. As I have said before there are four forces at play in this country. Firstly, there is the British Government. Secondly, there are the rulers and people of the Indian States. Thirdly, there are the Hindus and, fourthly, there are Muslims. The Congress press may clamour as much as it likes, they may bring out their morning, afternoon, evening and night editions, the Congress leaders may cry as much as they like that Congress is a national body. But I say it is not true. The Congress is nothing but a Hindu body. That is the truth and the Congress leaders know it.

Proceeding the League President declared that he had no hesitation in saying that the genius behind the Congress attitude and the Congress policy was no other than Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi who was out to destroy the ideal with which the Congress was started. He was the one man responsible for turning the Congress into an instrument for the revival of Hinduism. His ideal was to revive Hindu religion and establish Hindu *Raj* in India, and he was

utilising the Congress to further this object.

Of the outcome of the Patna League two things must be mentioned. A resolution for direct action against the atrocities committed by the Congress governments on the Muslims was tabled before the League session and occupied most of the time of the League. The provinces concerned were asking for an authority to be given to them for such an action. But Mohammad Ali Jinnah's political sagacity would not allow it as he foreshadowed a complete rift between the Hindus and Muslims which was not in the larger interests of India, and he argued with the Subjects Committee. Finally his arguments carried the day and authority was vested in the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League for emergency action.

The second important outcome of this session was the appointment of a Ladies' Sub-Committee, which was entirely due to the efforts of Jinnah himself. But the reader will have occasion to learn about this later.

It now looked like a game of hide-and-seek between the Congress and the League. The Congress leaders were out to justify every action of the Congress. The League President was bent upon exposing them. Mohammad Ali Jinnah was now sure of his strength. A series of events in the shape of Wardha Scheme of Education, the Rajkot affair, the Shia-Sunni dispute at Lucknow, Hyderabad *Satyagraha* had convinced Muslims that the Congress had no intention of respecting their feelings. All this had driven the Congress to a state of desperation. Gandhi had already started writing about his failures and blunders, and he frequently hinted at the Congress corruption, deprecating the use of the police and military in support of the Congress Ministries for the conduct of their normal activities. In fact, Hindus had realised that if the Congress was allowed to continue in office the whole organisation might tumble down like a house of cards, and they were biding their time to get a suitable opportunity to retrace their steps and enable the Congress, once more, to gain its lost prestige.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah also was not quite satisfied with his position. His exposition of the Congress game, although purely in self-defence, was not without benefit to the forces of British Imperialism who were also waiting to make use of every grain that might

be available, and under the circumstances he had no alternative but to conduct a double-sided battle. During his speech on the Finance Bill in March 1939 he made the position of the League clear and once for all told the officialdom that they could not expect the Muslims to play to their tune.

> In the past we have been following the principle that if the Government brought in a measure which was really for the good of the people, then we would support it. If it is not in the interests of the people we would oppose it. But, sir, I see now that that policy must be altered. It really means this: When the Congress is right, support the Congress; when the Government is right, support the Government. But when we are right, nobody supports us . . .

Jinnah drew the attention of the House to the happenings in Palestine, Waziristan, Jaipur and other places and enquired:

> Where is the Paramount Power? What is the Paramount Power doing? . . . Why do you expect us—I ask the Government—to draw the chestnuts out of the fire on your behalf? Why do you expect us to continue to be subservient on the specious pleas which you put forward before us? We have, therefore, so far as the Government are concerned, made up our mind that we will render no assistance to you so far as this Finance Bill is concerned. You may go on your own way. On the other hand, as regards the Congress Party, I do not want on this occasion to go into details, but I do maintain that the Congress Party is not only hostile to the Muslim League but they are inimical. Therefore, I say to them that co-operation between you and us is not possible . . . But let me tell you—and I tell both of you—that you alone or this organisation alone or both combined will never succeed in destroying our souls. You will never be able to destroy that culture which we have inherited, the Islamic culture, and that spirit will live, is going to live and has lived. You may overpower us; you may oppress us; and you can do your worst. But we have come to the conclusion and we have now made a grim resolve that we shall go down, if we have to go down, fighting.

The progress of the League was nevertheless proceeding at great speed. Muslims throughout India had realised that they had ulti-

mately to depend upon their own inherent strength. Every important leader had come back to the fold of the League. Provincial workers had already been busy chalking out programmes for the ameloiration of the conditions of local Muslims. Thinkers were busy formulating schemes of educational, industrial and social reforms. Jinnah was flooded with letters from all parts of India containing suggestions and opinions supported with facts and figures. The rule of the Congress governments in some provinces had given considerable impetus to the idea of separate notionhood for Muslims. The Sind Conference had also encouraged the thought. Jinnah had successfully repudiated the charge that the League was a body of the henchmen of the foreign rulers, and Muslim intelligentsia was slowly but steadily being attracted to the League. Serious thinking had already started, and early in the year 1939 no less than five schemes of Pakistan were published by different individuals laying down principles and details of the future constitution according to their conceptions.

The question uppermost in Jinnah's mind was that of the Federal part of the Indian Constitution. Hindu silence on this point for sometime past was suspected by Muslims to mean that Congress might ultimately accept the Federation. The question naturally arose as to what the Muslim position would be then. Hitherto the Congress and the British Government both treated the Muslim League with indifference and it was feared that there might be another gentlemen's agreement against the League. A number of political conferences were, therefore, held throughout India and Muslims expressed their unequivocal disapproval of the Federal Scheme and warned the Government that any decision without their consent and approval would be utterly disastrous.

The Palestine question on the other hand had not been solved and Muslims were pressing for a speedy settlement of this question. The war clouds hovering over the world due to the deterioration of the international situation in Europe had made matters worse and the progress that Muslims of India were making under the banner of the All-India Muslim League was likely to be obstructed. At home, in India, the Congress was now resorting to the extraordinary tactics of "contacting" the provincial leaders of the League for piecemeal pacts without any reference to Mohammad Ali Jinnah

and without attempting to arrive at a settlement on an all-India basis. The policy was pursued through the agency of Abul Kalam Azad, Congress President. British reactionaries were also not quiet. They were inciting the Muslim provinces where provincial governments were working under Muslim premiers, most important of them being the Punjab, that in the event of the League taking up a firm attitude about the war, they should stand aloof and give full support to war effort. Sikandar Hayat Khan had made public announcements that could be taken as militating against the League and its authority. Capital was made out of Sikandar's utterrances by the Congress and the Hindu press to show that the Punjab was revolting against the League and that it was not the authoritative organisation of Muslims of India.

In short, there was now a complete clash between the League and the Congress and the two organisations were fighting openly against each other—the former for self-assertion and upholding its rights, and the latter for complete supremacy in *Akhand Hindustan* or paramountcy for Hindus in the whole of India.

The declaration of war on the 3rd of September, 1939, by Great Britain and France on Germany brought India to the threshold of a new era. The Viceroy simultaneously declared war on Germany on behalf of India and in a broadcast speech made an appeal for unity. Linlithgow immediately invited Gandhi and Jinnah to discuss with them the possibility of evolving a system by which a united effort for the prosecution of war could be ensured. It was declared that the Federal part of the Government of India Act of 1935 was suspended. The suspension of Federation was undoubtedly decided upon by the British Government as a gesture of good-will so that India's co-operation in the stupendous task of waging the war against Germany could be obtained with the consent of the Indian people, and Linlithgow went out of his way to emphasise the need for unity among the different elements of India's political life. But as far as the Congress was concerned, this appeal went as much unheeded as those of Mohammad Ali Jinnah during the past few years.

The growing popularity among the Muslims of the idea of their being a separate nation had been received not without a protest by Hindu leaders, particularly by Gandhi. The only way to nip it

in the bud, was to accept the Federation as contemplated by the Act of 1935. But the previous utterances of Gandhi had made it impossible for the Congress to decide in favour of such a course in an off-hand manner. The suspension of Federation, therefore, came as a rude shock to the Hindu Congress; and while the League welcomed the suspension the Congress had to swallow it without uttering a word of opposition.

With the reorientation of Muslim opinion under the able leadership of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who had won as a mark of appreciation and respect the title of *Qaid-e-Azam* (the great leader), the problems confronting Muslims had tended to be absolutely separate from those that confronted the Hindus. The past experiences of Muslims during Congress rule in the provinces had made it necessary for them to insist on safeguarding their position in the future scheme of things, especially in the abnormal conditions created by the war.

The Working Committees of the Congress as well as of the League met soon after the declaration of war to review the situation and passed lengthy resolutions. The Congress complained that India had been declared a belligerent country without the consent of the people of India "whose declared wishes in such matters have been deliberately ignored by the British Government." It declared its "entire disapproval of the ideology and practice of Fascism and Nazism and their glorifications of war and violence and the suspension of the human spirit." The Congress Committee "further laid down that the issue of war and peace for India must be decided by the Indian people, and no outside authority can impose this decision upon them, nor can the Indian people permit their resources to be exploited for imperialist ends." It demanded that Britain should state what her war aims were, and put forward the claim that India should be immediately declared independent and the right of self-determination should be granted to her in order to frame a constitution for her through a Constituent Assembly based on adult franchise.

The League Working Committee on the other hand passed the following resolution:

The Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League appreciate the course adopted by His Excellency the Viceroy in

inviting Mr. M. A. Jinnah, President of the All-India Muslim League, and apprising him of the international situation resulting in war, and his own views, to be conveyed to the Muslim League. The Working Committee have given their most earnest consideration to His Excellency the Viceroy's views conveyed to them by the President and also to the pronouncement made by the Viceroy since the declaration of war by Great Britain as also His Excellency's address to the Members of the Central Legislature on the 11th of September, 1939.

The Committee are of opinion that the views expressed by the Council of the All-India Muslim League by its resolution No. 8 of the 27th of August, 1939, in the following words—"While deploring the policy of the British Government towards the Muslims of India by attempting to force upon them against their will a Constitution, and in particular the Federal Scheme as embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, which allows a permanent hostile communal majority to trample upon their religious, political, social and economic rights and the utter neglect and indifference shown by the Viceroy and the Governors in the Congress-governed provinces in exercising their special powers to protect and secure justice to the minorities; and towards the Arabs in Palestine in refusing to meet their demands, holds the view that in these circumstances if the British Government desires to enlist the support and the sympathy of the Muslims of the world, and particularly of the Indian Muslims in future contingencies it must meet the demands of the Muslims of India without delay."—are the true sentiments and opinions of the Muslims of India.

The Working Committee appreciate the declaration of His Excellency the Viceroy, which is in the interest of India and particularly the Muslims, that the Federal Scheme embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, has been suspended. They wish that instead of its being suspended it had been abandoned completely and desire to convey to His Majesty's Government that they should do so without further delay. The Committee desire to make it clear that they do not endorse the "Federal objective" of His Majesty's Government referred to by His Excellency in his address to the members of the Central

Legislature and strongly urge upon the British Government to review and revise the entire problem of India's future Constitution *de novo* in the light of the experience gained by the working of the present provincial constitution of India and developments that have taken place since 1935 or may take place hereafter.

The Committee in this connection wish to point out that Muslim India occupies a special and peculiar position in the policy of India and for several decades it had hoped to occupy an honourable place in the national life, government and administration of the country and worked for free India with Free and Independent Islam in which they could play an equal part with the major community with complete sense of security for their religious, political, cultural, social and economic rights and interests; but the developments that have taken place, and specially since the inauguration of the provincial constitution based on the so-called democratic parliamentary system of government, and the recent experiences of over two years, have established beyond doubt that it has resulted wholly in a permanent communal majority and the domination of the Hindus over the Muslim minorities, whose life and liberty, property and honour are in danger, and even their religious rights and culture are being assailed and annihilated every day, under the Congress governments in various provinces.

That while Muslim India stands against exploitation of the people of India and has repeatedly declared in favour of "Free India" it is equally opposed to the domination of Hindu majority over Muslims and other minorities and vassalisation of Muslim India and is irrevocably opposed to any "Federal objective" which must necessarily result in a majority community rule under the guise of democracy and parliamentary system of government. Such a constitution is totally unsuited to the genius of the peoples of the country which is composed of various nationalities and does not constitute a national State.

The Muslim League condemns unprovoked aggression and the doctrine that "might is right" and upholds the principles of freedom of humanity and "that the will of the strongest irrespective of right and justice cannot be allowed to prevail."

The Committee express their deep sympathy for Poland, England and France. The Committee, however, feel that real and solid Muslim co-operation and support to Great Britain in this hour of her trial cannot be secured successfully if His Majesty's Government and the Viceroy are unable to secure to the Muslims justice and fairplay in the Congress-governed provinces where today their liberty, person, property and honour are in danger and even their elementary rights are most callously trampled upon. The Committee strongly urge upon His Majesty's Government and the Viceroy and Governor-General to direct the Governors to exercise their special powers, where any provincial ministry fails to secure justice and fairplay to the Muslims or where they resort to oppression or interference with their political, economic, social and cultural rights in accordance with the sacred promises, assurances and declarations repeatedly made by Great Britain in consequence of which these special powers were expressly embodied in the Statute. The Committee regret to say that so far these special powers have remained dormant and obsolete and the Governors have failed to protect the rights of the Muslims under the threat by the "High Command" of the Congress that the exercise of these special powers on the part of the Governors will lead to crises in all the Congress-governed provinces, where they are in a solid majority.

While the Muslim League stands for the freedom of India the Committee further urge upon His Majesty's Government and ask for an assurance that no declaration regarding the question of constitutional advance for India should be made without the consent and approval of the All-India Muslim League nor any constitution be framed and finally adopted by His Majesty's Government and the British Parliament without such consent and approval.

The policy of the British Government towards the Arabs in Palestine has wounded deeply Muslim feeling and sentiment and all representations in that behalf have had no real effect so far. The Committee once more urge upon His Majesty's Government to satisfy the Arab national demands.

If full, effective and honourable co-operation of the Muslims is

desired by the British Government in the grave crisis which is facing the world today and if it is desired to bring the war to a successful termination it must create a sense of security and satisfaction amongst the Muslims and take into its confidence the Muslim League which is the only organisation that can speak on behalf of Muslim India.

At this critical and difficult juncture the Committee appeal to every Muslim to stand solidly under the flag of the All-India Muslim League with a solemn and sacred determination, to make every sacrifice, for on it depend the future destiny and the honour of the ninety millions of Muslims of India.

It is clear from the above that as the outlook of the two organisations differed on fundamentals, their decisions regarding the war were bound to be different and their respective views on the problem were naturally in conflict with each other. But while the Muslim League proceeded to suggest and demand remedies for the wrong already done to Muslims of India and while it asked for safeguards for them, the Congress went out of its way to propose things on the assumption that it represented the whole of India, without paying any attention to the views of the League. Such an attitude was bound to aggravate Muslim feelings. To Mohammad Ali Jinnah, however, the Congress policy was the ruin of its own self, and the League leader strongly believed that the growing strength of the League would ultimately compel the Congress to realise that without the support of Muslims nothing could be done.

Nevertheless, he had an unflinching faith in the prospects of a Hindu-Muslim settlement which would result when Muslims were sufficiently organised. Speaking on the occasion of the annul dinner of the Old Boys of the Osmania University, on the 28th of September, 1939, Mohammad Ali Jinnah expressed this hope in the following words:

I did not expect that, even at that festive board where a galaxy of intellects had assembled, I would be involved in discussing political problems confronting India. But as a reference has been made to the matter, I must assure you that I yield to none in the determination to safeguard the interests of my country, nor would I yield to anybody in striving for the attainment of freedom for my country. I am essentially a prac-

> tical man, I have been in practical politics for over a quarter of a century. The words "Nationalism" and "Nationalist" have undergone many changes in their definition and significance. Some people have a dictionary of their own, but within the honest meaning of the term, I still remain a nationalist. I have always believed in a Hindu-Muslim pact. But not a pact which will mean the destruction of one and the survival of the other. The Congress High Command, unfortunately, are not prepared to grasp the hand of friendship, but would like to destroy the very hand which offered friendship. One does not see much light at present but you never can say when the two communities would unite. I say to every Muslim that Islam expects you, one and all, to do your duty. Stand by your people as one nation.

On the 22nd October, 1939, the Congress asked its ministries to resign on the plea that they could not carry on in view of the unsatisfactory attitude of the British Government towards India and consequently Section 93 of the Indian Constitution came into operation in most of the Congress provinces. It was now the turn of Mohammad Ali Jinnah to strike and prove to the world that the Congress did not in fact represent the Muslims, and on the 2nd of December after careful consideration he issued an appeal that the 22nd of December should be celebrated as the "day of deliverance and thanksgiving as a mark of relief that the Congress regime has at last ceased to function." Consequently, Muslims celebrated the Day of Deliverance throughout the length and breadth of India and various other parties, who were mainly non-Muslim, collaborated with them. The overwhelming success of this bold move baffled the Congress High Command and for a time the Hindus did not know what to do. Gandhi wrote an article in the *Harijan* and forwarded an advance copy to Jinnah, who sent the following reply on the New Year's Day, 1940:

> I not only thank you for your courtesy but also for your anxiety to further the end you have been reading in my messages and actions. I, however, regret to have to say that your premises are wrong as you start with the theory of an Indian Nation that does not exist, and naturally, therefore, your conclusions are wrong. I should have thought, however, that you at least

would not be led away by one-sided newspaper reports and canards. There is so much in your article which is the result of imagination. It is due partly to the fact that you are living a secluded life at Segaon, and partly because all your thoughts and actions are guided by "inner voice." You have very little concern with realities, or what might be termed by an ordinary mortal "practical politics." I sometimes wonder what can be common between practical politics and yourself, between democracy and the dictator of a political organisation of which he is not even a four-anna member. But that is, I suppose, because you do not consider the Congress worthy of your membership.

I am glad to learn that you were not ruffled by the Deliverance Day greetings sent to you from Gulbarga. It was indeed noble of you to join in the silent prayer, "Long live Qaid-e-Azam, Jinnah." Although these are trivial matters, I nevertheless appreciate that you have realised the true inward meaning and significance of the Deliverance Day.

It is true that many non-Congress Hindus expressed their sympathy with the Deliverance Day in justice to our cause, so also the leaders of the Justice Party and the Scheduled Castes, and the Parsis who had suffered. But I am afraid that the meaning which you have tried to give to this alignment shows that you have not appreciated the true significance of it. It was partly a case of adversity bringing strange bed-follows together, and partly because common interest may lead Muslims and minorities to combine. I have no illusions in the matter, and let me say again that India is not a nation, nor a country. It is a sub-continent composed of nationalities, Hindus and Muslims being the two major nations. Today you deny that religion can be a main factor in determining a nation, but you yourself, when asked what your motive in life was, *the thing that leads us to do what we do, whether it was religious, or social, or political, said*:

"*Purely religious. This was the question asked me by the late Montague when I accompanied a deputation which was purely political. 'How you, a social reformer,' he exclaimed, 'have found your way into this crowd?' My reply was that it was only an extension of my social*

activity. I could not be leading religious life unless I identified myself with the whole of mankind, and that I could not do unless I took part in politics. The gamut of man's activities today constitutes an indivisible whole. You cannot divide social, economic, political and purely religious work into watertight compartments. I do not know any religions apart from human activity. It provides a moral basis to all other activities which they would otherwise lack reducing life to a maze of sound and fury signifying nothing."

More than anyone else, you happen to be the man today who commands the confidence of Hindu India and are in a position to deliver the goods on their behalf. Is it too much to hope and expect that you might play your legitimate role and abandon your chase after a mirage? Events are moving fast, a campaign of polemics, or your weekly discourse in the *Harijan* on metaphysics, philosophy and ethics, or your peculiar doctrines regarding *khaddar, ahimsa* and spinning are not going to win India's freedom. Action and statesmanship alone will help us in our forward march. I believe that you might still rise to your stature in the service of our country and make your proper contribution towards leading India to contentment and happiness.

Lastly, I thank you for your anxiety to respect my wishes in the matter of prefix you should use with my name. What is in a prefix after all, a rose called by any other name smells just as sweet. So I leave the matter entirely to you, and have no particular wish in the matter. I really do not know why you are worried so much about it. I, however, notice that the present prefix you are using is according to usage taught to you by the late Hakim Saheb. But, surprisingly enough, during his life-time and till long after his death, you addressed me as Mr., then quite recently you addressed me as Shree, and in between as friend, but please do not bother about this matter.

The opinions expressed by the League Working Committee were put forward before the Viceroy, when Jinnah met him. They were, as Jinnah himself said later, five-fold. The League had asked that Indian troops should not be used against any Muslim power or country outside India. This did not imply that Indian troops were not to be used for the defence of India. If any country attacked

India, the Indian army had to fight to safeguard Indian boundaries. The League had also demanded a clear statement that the Act of 1935 would go lock, stock and barrel, and the entire scheme of constitutional reform would be examined *de novo* in the light of experience gained from the working of the Constitution. Another demand of the League was that Muslims would not agree to any declaration or enactment of any constitution, unless their consent had been obtained for it nor was any interim settlement to be made under threat or at the behest of any other party, however strong it was, without the previous approval of the Muslims. The fourth demand was for the settlement of the Arab question and Jinnah urged on behalf of the League that "endeavours to reach a settlement" would not do, and the British Government must reach a settlement to the satisfaction of the Arabs forthwith. The last demand of the League related to the Muslim grievances in the Congress-governed provinces.

To all these the Viceroy, in his letter of the 23rd of December, 1939, replied as follows:

> I am now in a position to reply to your letter of November 5th, in which you submitted certain points for my consideration. You will, I am sure, appreciate that more than one of your questions, if considered in the light of all the implications involved in it, would raise issues affecting other communities in India, and that this correspondence between us would not be an appropriate medium for making pronouncements on them. But I hope that my answers, limited though their scope may be by this consideration, will nonetheless serve to remove your difficulties.
>
> My answer to your first question is that the declaration I made with the approval of His Majesty's Government on October 18th last does not exclude examination of any part either of the Act of 1935 or of the policy and plans on which it is based.
>
> With reference to your second point, I can assure you that His Majesty's Government are not under any misapprehension as to the importance of the contentment of the Muslim community to the stability and success of any constitutional developments in India. You need, therefore, have no fear that the weight which your community's position in India necessarily

gives their views, will be under-rated.

In framing their policy for Palestine, His Majesty's Government had endeavoured to meet all reasonable Arab demands, and they continue to be fully alive to the importance of that issue.

Finally, you asked for an assurance that Indian troops will not be used outside India against any Muslim Power or country. This question is fortunately hypothetical, since His Majesty is not at war with any Muslim Power. You will appreciate, however, that it is impossible to give a guarantee in terms so wide as those of your letter which would have the effect of limiting India's fight to use its own army in its own defence in circumstances which cannot now be foreseen; in the present situation, however, as you are aware, every precaution has been taken up by His Majesty's Government at the instance of the Government of India to ensure that Muslim feeling in India on this matter is fully respected.

In the meantime, the Congress, having put forward a suggestion that the question of the future constitution of India should be decided by a Constituent Assembly, conducted the usual propaganda in foreign countries and a studied programme of vilification was launched in India against the League and the Muslim leader. Muslim India had no press of its own, and in view of the biased news that reached England and other foreign countries public opinion abroad did not gain a happy impression about the Muslims. There was no effective machinery within the League to combat these forces and the onus of counteracting them fell solely on Mohammad Ali Jinnah himself.

A study of the various statements that Jinnah issued to the foreign press during this time is worthy of note as they give the reader some idea as to how uncalled for attacks were levelled against the Muslims. The following is the text of one of the statements:

I am obliged to *The Manchester Guardian* for the courtesy shown to me in giving me an opportunity to place my views briefly before the British public. It is difficult to make an average Englishman understand fully the position which is facing us Muslims today. But I shall mention a few salient points which will give some idea of the difficulties that are confronting us. The Muslims had always had their fears and apprehensions of

even a representative form of government, and far more of democracy in its strict application to India. Since the time of the Minto-Morley Reforms of 1908 and the historical Lucknow Pact between Hindus and Muslims in 1916, their insistence on separate electorates, weightage and statutory safeguards have been a clear indication of those fears. But since the inauguration of the new provincial constitutions, it has been established beyond doubt, particularly by the way in which the Congress High Command has pursued its policies and programmes, that the sole aim and object of the Congress is to annihilate every other organisation in the country, and to set itself up as a Fascist and authoritarian organisation of the worst type.

Having regard to the 35 millions of voters, the bulk of whom are totally ignorant, illiterate and untutored, living in centuries-old superstitions of the worst type, thoroughly antagonistic to each other, culturally and socially, the working of this constitution has clearly brought out that it is impossible to work a democratic parliamentary government in India. It has definitely resulted in a permanent communal majority government ruling over minorities, exercising its powers and functions and utilising the machinery of Government to establish the domination and supremacy of the majority communal rule over the minorities. Therefore, in my judgment, apart from other reasons into which I need not go in detail, democracy can only mean Hindu *Raj* all over India. This is a position to which Muslims will never submit. Besides, there are 60 millions of untouchables and other minorities such as six million Christians, Jews, Parsis and the Domiciled British. Therefore, the Muslim League, after very careful consideration, has come to the conclusion that the entire problem of India's future constitution must be considered; and that no declaration or commitment should be made by His Majesty's Government without the approval and consent of the Muslim League which is the only authoritative and representative organisation of the Muslims of India.

The British public may be misled by certain propaganda that the Muslims are against the freedom of India. We want freedom and liberty, but the question is, whose freedom and liberty?

Muslim India wants to be free and enjoy liberty to the fullest extent and develop its own political, economic, social and cultural institutions according to its own genius, and not to be dominated and crushed, while wishing Hindu India well and giving it fullest scope to do likewise. I know that the Englishman who has developed in his own country a system of parliamentary government cannot think of anything else but what has worked and been developed through the centuries as the only pattern for every other country in the world. But he must dismiss from his mind the experiments tried in Canada and Australia, where after all the foundations of government are suited to the genius of the people, mainly British in stock. It is very doubtful as to how it will work in South Africa where there are two powerful rival communities like the Boers and the British, and over there the differences between them are not so fundamental as those between Hindus and Muslims. Even Ireland, after decades of union, did not submit to the British Parliament in spite of the close affinity with the English and Scotch. I may refer to Lord Morley's dictum that the fur coat of Canada would not do for the extremely tropical climate of India.

The Congress insistence that they, and they alone, represent the people of India is not only without any foundation, but is highly detrimental to the progress and advancement of India. They know that they do not represent the whole of India not even all the Hindus, and certainly not the Muslims, who are often wrongly described as a minority in the ordinary sense as understood in the West. They are in a majority in the North West and in Bengal, all along the corridor stretching from Karachi to Calcutta. That part of the Indian continent alone has double the population of Great Britain and is more than ten times in area. Until the Congress came down to earth and face realities, they will be wholly responsible for blocking the progress of India, and unless they give up the Fascist and authoritarian basis of their policy and programme which they are vigorously following, there cannot be any peace in India.

In November the Viceroy once again made an attempt to bring about unity between the Congress and the League and invited the

Presidents of the two organisations together with Gandhi. The Viceroy put before these leaders the proposition that given the great importance of ensuring harmonious working at the Centre, they should enter upon discussions between themselves with a view to discovering whether an agreement could be reached in the provincial fields after which proposals which would result in representatives of the League and Congress participating in the Centre could be entertained.

In reply Rajendra Prasad, the President of the Congress, stated at the outset that both he and Gandhi missed at the interview any reference to the "main and moral issue" raised by the Congress about clarification of war aims, without which it was impossible for the Congress to consider any subsidiary proposal. Rajendra Prasad insisted on the declaration suggested by the Congress Working Committee sometime ago and resented "the communal question being dragged in, in this connection."

Mohammad Ali Jinnah, on the other hand, replied that he had been informed by leaders of the Congress that they had come to the conclusion that they could not discuss any questions relating to the provincial field or at the Centre, until the British Government had complied with their demand as embodied in the resolution of the All-India Congress Committee.

This was the story of the official attempt at unity. Unofficially Jawaharlal failed to discover a "common ground" between him and the League leader, and after an exchange of a few letters the matter was dropped.

CHAPTER XIV

Demand for Homeland

The All-India Muslim League was now entering a different phase altogether. Mohammad Ali Jinnah had become the living symbol of Muslim unity and Muslim politics had so completely centred round him that he had become almost an institution in himself. People had learnt to repose confidence in the League. The fear of exploitation by others of the Muslim platform and sentiment had vanished. Those who were expecting to use the League for their own personal ends were disillusioned and Muslim intelligentsia had regained the hope of making the League into a really national organisation.

In 1940 the annual session of the League opened at Lahore on the 22nd March amidst scenes of great enthusiasm. Thousands met in the huge pandal which was tastefully decorated. Mohammad Ali Jinnah arrived in the afternoon and was conducted directly to the pandal. Nawab of Mamdot welcomed the session and pointed out that the greatest achievement of the League during recent years was the suspension of the Federal part of the Government of India Act of 1935.

The Presidential Address delivered by Mohammad Ali Jinnah extempore gave a summary of the events and activities of the League during the last few months.

He explained the position in which Muslims found themselves and said they were between the devil and the deep sea. The Congress on the one hand and the British Government on the other were trying to put Muslims in an awkward position. The Congress rule during the past two and a half years had been most objectionable

and declaration of war had brought increased trouble and worry. But the Federal scheme was not abandoned and they had to think for the future. Said he:

> As soon as circumstances permit or immediately after the war at the latest, the whole problem of India's future constitution must be examined *de novo* and the Act of 1935 must go once for all. We do not believe in asking the British Government to make declarations. These declarations are really of no use. You cannot possibly succeed in getting the British Government out of this country by asking them to make declarations.

Jinnah, then, criticised the Congress attitude towards the constitutional problem and various Hindu suggestions for the establishment of a Constituent Assembly. Finally, he outlined the Muslim demand in most emphatic terms:

> The problem in India is not of an inter-communal but manifestly of an international character and it must be treated as such. So long as this basic and fundamental truth is not realised, any constitution that may be built will result in disaster and will prove destructive and harmful not only to Muslims but to the British and Hindus also. If the British Government are really in earnest and sincere to secure peace and happiness of the people of this sub-continent, the only course open to us all is to allow the major nations separate homelands by dividing India into autonomous national States. There is no reason why these States should be antagonistic to each other. On the other hand the rivalry and the natural desire and efforts on the part of one to dominate the social order and establish political supremacy over the other in the government of the country will disappear. It will lead more towards natural goodwill by international pacts between them, and they can live in complete harmony. This will lead further to a friendly settlement all the more easily with regard to minorities by reciprocal arrangements and adjustments between Muslim India and Hindu India, which will far more adequately and effectively safeguard the rights and interests of Muslims and various minorities.
>
> It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to understand the real natures of Islam and Hinduism. They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in

fact, quite different and distinct social orders, and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality. This misconception of one Indian nation has gone far beyond the limits and is the cause of most of our troubles and will lead India to destruction if we fail to revise our notions in time. The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literature. They neither inter-marry nor inter-dine and, indeed, they belong to two different civilisations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their outlook on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Muslims derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other, and, likewise, their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single State, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a State.

On the next day the open session of the All-India Muslim League passed the following resolution:

(1) While approving and endorsing the action taken by the Council and the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League, as indicated in their resolutions dated the 27th of August, 17th and 18th of September and 22nd of October, 1939, and 3rd of February, 1940, on the constitutional issue, this session of the All-India Muslim League emphatically reiterates that the scheme of Federation embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, is totally unsuited to, and unworkable in the peculiar conditions of this country and is altogether unacceptable to Muslim India.

(2) It further records its emphatic view that while the declaration dated the 18th of October, 1939, made by the Viceroy on behalf of His Majesty's Government is reassuring in so far as it declares that the policy and plan on which the Government of India Act, 1935, is based will be reconsidered in consultation with the various parties, interests and communities in India, Muslim India will not be satisfied unless the whole constitutional plan is reconsidered *de novo* and that no

revised plan would be acceptable to the Muslims unless it is framed with their approval and consent.

(3) Resolved that it is the considered view of this session of the All-India Muslim League that no Constitutional Plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principle, namely, that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the north-western and eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute "Independent States" in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.

That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in these units and in these regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them; and in other parts of India where Muslims are in a minority adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specially provided in the constitution for them and other minorities for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them.

This session further authorises the Working Committee to frame a scheme of constitution in accordance with these basic principles, providing for the assumption finally by the respective regions of all powers such as defence, external affairs, communications, customs and such other matters as may be necessary.

One of the outstanding features of the Lahore League was the masterly handling by Mohammad Ali Jinnah of the unfortunate situation that developed due to a clash between the Khaksars and the Punjab Government, which had resulted in the loss of life of some Khaksars. The position of Sikandar Hayat Khan, the Punjab Premier, had become rather awkward. Muslim opinion from which he drew most of his support had been excited against him and he was even exposed to personal danger. The opponents of the League had not failed to use this incident to incite public opinion against

the leadership of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, for he, according to them, was unmindful of what was happening to Muslims in the Punjab. Khaksars and their sympathisers threatened him with all sorts of things. They insisted that the League must take the matter up and deal with Sikandar in a befitting manner. The lieutenants of Jinnah suggested that he should interview some of the Khaksar leaders. The conduct of the regular business of the League was more and more being exploited by the League opponents, and Khaksars were made to believe that Jinnah would leave Lahore after having successfully evaded the issue. In the midst of all this excitement, and uncertainty, Jinnah announced that he would address an open meeting of Khaksars and the Muslim public at large. Hundreds of thousands of people gathered to listen to him and every thoughtful Muslim believed that Jinnah had taken an impolitic step, looking to the highly pent-up public feelings. The huge gathering showed every sign of a probable riot. But Jinnah, well-groomed, well-dressed, tall and slim, with experience and courage written on his face, came and ascended the pedestal from which he was going to speak to the crowd. Calm in his demeanour, he cracked a few jokes with those sitting around him and, in the midst of imminent rowdyism, gracefully lighted a cigarette with complete equanimity. In a few minutes the eyes of everyone present were riveted on him and an atmosphere of strange expectancy prevailed upon the great mass of the people. Loud shouts demanding justice filled the air.

After some moments, Mohammad Ali Jinnah stood up and raised his hand bidding his audience to remain calm, and pin-drop silence ensued. This was the time when Jinnah, perhaps, gauged his strength for the first time. The demonstration was enough to hearten any man. Armed with self-reliance and courage of convictions and with a determination to give the right lead to his followers he spoke, though not without being quite excited himself, a few words assuring everyone that he had the cause of his people at heart, and that he would do everything in his power to see that justice is meted out to Khaksars. The League was assembling at Lahore and there was no cause for anxiety. The meeting terminated in a peaceful atmosphere and Jinnah enlisted support of thousands of more Muslims.

As a result of this the League passed the following resolution:

This session of the All-India Muslim League places on record its deep sense of sorrow for the unfortunate and tragic occurrence of March 19, 1940, owing to a clash between the Khaksars and the police resulting in the loss of a large number of lives and injuries to many more, and sincerely sympathises with those who have suffered and with their families and dependents.

This session calls upon the Government to appoint forthwith an independent and impartial committee of inquiry, the personnel of which would command perfect confidence of the people with instructions to them to make full and complete investigation and inquiry in the whole affair and make their report as soon as possible.

This session authorises the Working Committee to take such action in the matter as they may consider proper immediately after the publication of the report of the committee.

This session urges upon the various Governments that the order declaring the Khaksar organisation unlawful should be removed as soon as possible.

The Lahore Resolution was indeed a landmark in the history of India and of the Muslims. Before this, Muslim India had no goal in view and Muslim politics remained in the hands of individuals, with conflicting interests and inclinations. Very often the collective good of the nation suffered either at their hands or of their agents and wire-pullers. Iqbal and his followers had tried to place before the Muslims their rightful goal but they could not do it effectively. It required a Jinnah to fulfil the aspirations of a nation and that too at the most psychological moment. Muslims of India were now organised and learnt to know that their organisation was more important than those individuals who had hitherto conducted their affairs. The British Government had declared that the policy underlying the Government of India Act of 1935 was to be revised. The Federal Scheme of this Act had already been suspended and, in any future constitution, the views of Muslim India were to be taken into consideration. It was therefore in the fitness of things that they expressed their views regarding the kind of the constitution they would like to have and the result was the Lahore Resolution. It was in fact the spirit of Iqbal that showed itself through Mohammad Ali Jinnah. The Muslim Poet had recognised in Jinnah as the only

leader who could accomplish the stupendous task of bringing the scattered forces of Muslim India to a common field for unified action. Jinnah knew it and was waiting for the opportunity to hit the mark at Lahore. "Iqbal is no more amongst us," said Jinnah to the author once, "but had he been alive he would have been happy to know that we did exactly what he wanted us to do."

The Lahore Resolution of the League was followed by an immediate and intensified campaign of misrepresentation of the League demand. Every scrap of Hindu opinion rose in opposition and some of the Hindu Leaders even went to the length of using undignified words. Judgments were passed the day after the publication of the League Resolution. Facts and figures were quoted in utter contradiction of truth. Contorted narrations of incidents of history were made. Examples with no bearing were cited. Dissimilar analogies were employed. Frothy sentiments were surging up. Muslims were warned against their own decision and their own leadership. Overnight the Hindu leaders became champions of Muslim interest. Overnight they began to think in terms of a world order. Some said that the League wanted the Muslim minorities in Hindu areas to migrate to Muslim areas. Others opined that Sikhs would never agree to this proposal. A few were of the opinion that the Muslim proposition would not suit the Indian States and therefore it was useless to pursue the matter. Wardha spoke in the same strain, and hoped that Great Britain would not allow it to materialise.

Undeterred by this volley of attacks Jinnah hoped "that at any rate the better mind of the Hindus will give earnest and serious consideration to our proposals as therein lies the achievement of India's freedom at the earliest possible period. This freedom we shall be able to retain peacefully both internally and externally."

To Jinnah it was amazing that "men like Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Rajagopalacharia should talk about the Lahore resolution in such terms as 'vivisection of India' and 'cutting the baby into two halves.' Surely, to-day India is divided and partitioned by Nature. Muslim India and Hindu India exist on the physical map of India. I fail to see why there is this hue and cry. Where is the country which is being divided? Where is the nation which is denationalised? India is composed of nationalities, to say nothing about the castes and sub-castes. Where is the central national government whose

authority is being violated?" India was, he said, held by the British power and that was the hand that held and gave the impression of a united India and a unitary government. Indian nation and central government did not exist. It was only the convenient imagination of the Congress High Command. It was a pure intellectual and mental luxury, in which some of the Hindu leaders had been indulging so recklessly.

"The issues involve," said Mohammad Ali Jinnah, "the future fate and destiny of ninety million of Muslims and I am sure that Muslim India to-day is fully alive to the gravity of the situation both internal and external that is facing us. Our ideal and our fight is not to harm or injure any other community or interest or block the progress but to defend ourselves. We want to live in this country an honourable life as free men, and we stand for free Islam and free India."

Hindudom gave the Lahore Resolution of the League the name of Pakistan and it was gratefully accepted by the Muslims.

It will be recalled that the Viceroy's proposals at Delhi in November 1939, that the Congress and the Muslim League should enter upon discussion between themselves with a view to discovering whether they could reach a basis of agreement in the provincial field which would be followed up by the representatives of the two organisations immediately participating in the Central Government as members of the Executive Council, were summarily rejected by the Congress. But the Viceroy had resolved to continue his efforts to enlist India's support for the successful prosecution of the war. Negotiations between the Viceroy and Mohammad Ali Jinnah were proceeding apace through correspondence and personal interviews. On the first of July 1940, Jinnah, while in Simla, forwarded the following suggestions marked as "Tentative Proposals":

That no pronouncement or statement should be made by His Majesty's Government which would in any way militate against the basic and fundamental principles laid down by the Lahore Resolution of division of India and creating Muslim States in the north-west and eastern zones; and it may be stated that that ideal now has become the universal faith of Muslim India.

That His Majesty's Government must give a definite and categorical assurance to the Muslims of India that no interim or

final scheme of constitution would be adopted by the British Government without the previous approval of Muslim India. In view of the rapid developments in Europe and the grave danger that is facing India it is fully realised that everything should be done that is possible to intensify war efforts and mobilise all the resources of India for her defence, for the purpose of maintaining internal security, peace and tranquillity, and to ward off external aggression. But this can only be achieved provided the British Government are ready and willing to associate Muslim leadership as equal partners in the Government both at the Centre and in all the Provinces. In other words, Muslim India leadership must be fully trusted as equals and have equal share in the authority and control of the Governments, Central and Provincial.

Provisionally and during the period of the war, the following steps should be taken to comply with the formula, namely, co-operation with the Government with equal share in the authority of the Government:

(*a*) That the Executive Council of the Viceroy should be enlarged, within the framework of the present constitutional law, the additional number to be settled after further discussion but it being understood that Muslim representation must be equal to that of the Hindus if the Congress comes in; otherwise they should have the majority of the additional members as it is obvious that the main burden and the responsibility will be borne by Muslims in that case.

(*b*) That in the provinces where Section 93 of the Act has to operate, Non-official Advisers should be appointed, the number to be fixed after further discussion, and the majority of the Non-official Advisers should be the representatives of Muslims; and where the provinces can be run by a combination of parties or "coalition," naturally it would be for the parties concerned to adjust matters by agreement among themselves.

(*c*) That there should be a War Council consisting of not less than fifteen members including the President, to be presided over by His Excellency the Viceroy. I do not like the

expression "War Consultative Committee." This Council should regularly meet to deal with, and review the general situation as it may develop from time to time, and advise the Government with regard to matters in connection with the prosecution of the war generally, and, in particular, the fullest development of defence possible and of finance and to make a thorough economic and industrial drive. On this body it will not be difficult to secure the representation and full co-operation of the Indian Princes, and as far as I can judge they would have no difficulty in joining it. It is through this body that the association of the Princes can be secured. Here again the representation of the Muslim India must be equal to that of the Hindus if the Congress comes in, otherwise they should have the majority.

Finally, the representatives of Muslims on the proposed War Council and the Executive Council of the Governor-General and the additional Non-official Advisers of the Governors, should be chosen by the Muslim League.

The reader is familiar with the fact how Mohammad Ali Jinnah's famous letter written to the Prime Minister of Great Britain regarding condition of business in the Round Table Conference served as a helpful suggestion to His Majesty's Government. In 1940 the phenomenon was repeated, and the "Tentative Proposals" found an echo in the Viceroy's announcement of August 8, 1940. Jinnah was, therefore, to a great extent, satisfied with the announcement and set himself to work out the details in consultation with the Viceroy. But the latter could not supply details as to the number of representatives, the creation of portfolios, and parties that were likely to come in the Executive Council; he could only inform that two seats could be given to the League. The negotiations, therefore, fell through.

The August pronouncement and its amplification by the Secretary of State for India contained certain departures from the conventional attitude of His Majesty's Government towards India's constitutional advance. "His Majesty's Government's concern," said the Viceroy, "that full weight should be given to the views of the minorities in any revision, has also been brought out. That remains the posi-

tion of His Majesty's Government. It goes without saying that they could not contemplate the transfer of their present responsibilities, for the peace and welfare of India, to any system of government whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in India's national life." Dealing with this aspect of the problem and the political importance of the Indian Congress, Amery said:

> The Congress leaders are men inspired by an ardent national patriotism. They have built up a remarkable organisation, by far the most efficient political machine in India, of which they are justly proud. They have striven to make that organisation national and all-embracing. If only they had succeeded, if the Congress could, in fact, speak as it professes to speak for all main elements in India's national life then, however advanced their demands, our problem would have been in many respects far easier than it is to-day. It is true that they are numerically the largest single party in British India. But their claim, in virtue of that fact, to speak for India is utterly denied by very important elements in India's complex national life. These other elements assert their right to be regarded not as mere numerical minorities but as separate constituent factors in any future Indian policy, entitled to be treated as such, in any discussions for the shaping of India's future constitution.

> The foremost among these elements stands the great Muslim community, of ninety million strong and constitutes a majority both in North-Western and North-Eastern India, but scattered as a minority over the whole sub-continent. In religious and social outlook, in historic tradition and culture, the difference between them and their Hindu fellow-countrymen goes as deep as, if not deeper than, any similar difference in Europe. That need not and does not prevent pleasant social intercourse of fruitful political co-operation. It has not, in fact, prevented individual Muslims taking an active part in the work of the Congress Party. But, as a body, the Muslims have stood aloof. Their quarrel with the scheme of the existing Act is not that it fails to give that clear majority rule which the Congress asks for, but that it would give too great powers to a Hindu majority at the Centre. They will have nothing to do with a constitution framed by a constituent assembly elected by a majority

> vote in geographical constituencies. They claim the right in any constitutional discussions to be regarded as an entity and are determined only to accept a constitution whose actual structure will secure their position as an entity against the operations of a mere numerical majority.

Emphasising the need of agreement between the main political groups in India, Amery declared:

> Agreement, consent, is indeed the foundation of all free government, of all true democracy. Decision by majority is not so much of the essence of democracy as a practical convenience, which presupposes for its proper working an antecedent general consent to the constitution itself. It has, indeed, in most federal constitutions been limited in various ways in order to safeguard the separate interests of the federating elements. To describe the need for such agreement as a veto on constitutional progress is, I think, to do an injustice to the patriotism and sense of responsibility of those concerned. Agreement means not veto by any elements but compromise, and willingness to compromise in India as elsewhere, is an essential test of the sense of responsibility on which free government must be based.

This was in fact an indication that Muslims had made themselves felt, and that the growing strength and influence of Jinnah were slowly being realised. This was a bitter pill for the Congress to swallow and a peep into the current events of India's political history shows that the Congress engaged itself in a desperate struggle for winning power and supremacy over the League. There were two courses open. The first was to give a vigorous opposition to the British Government and to threaten them with obstructing the war effort. The second was to contact League leaders in the various provinces and decoy Jinnah's lieutenants into co-operation with the Congress. The first course was adopted soon after the August pronouncement and the Congress Working Committee called upon "all Congress organisations to carry on their activities with full vigour and, in particular, to explain the Congress position and recent developments to the public. *Satyagraha* Committees must see that those who have taken the pledge act in terms of this pledge and carry on the constructive and other activities of the Congress." In these words the programme of individual civil disobedience was streng-

thened under the garb of national assertion, and on the pretext that it was conducted for the purpose of obtaining freedom of speech to carry on anti-war propaganda, because the Congress being a non-violent organisation was opposed to war.

The inspiration for the second course came from the British Government itself, who had followed a similar policy in connection with the establishment of the War Committees. A prominent Congressman had suggested that should the international situation worsen appreciably, Britain would make a strong bid for Congress goodwill by trying to meet its demands, very much more than half-way. Jinnah would not be overpleased with this development and would in all probability resort to obstruction. Britain would then turn to her faithful friend Sikandar Hayat Khan. Perhaps the good offices and the powerful support of the Agha Khan would also be available. Nor would Fazl-ul-Haq, the Bengal Premier, be found unwilling. Jinnah would still be left a good enough following, but then would come to him the tragic realisation, how so many of the Khan Bahadurs and Knights and titled gentry, who were dancing attendance on him, would drop away in an instant, at a sign from the British Government whose creatures they were, Jinnah would still be a notable factor, but only a factor, not the sole determinent. A Gandhi-Agha Khan-Sikandar-Fazl-ul-Haq understanding would have a more far-reaching effect than the Lucknow Pact of 1916. Jinnah would either have to toe the line or stand in haughty aloofness, unable to change the course of history.

Consequently the Congress President, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, unknowingly, played into the hands of his Hindu colleagues and approached the Muslim Premiers of the Provinces. This was naturally resented by Jinnah and he warned both the Congress and the British Government against making such an attempt:

> I am unable to accept that the Hindus and the Congress are fighting for the independence or freedom of the people of the country. We know why they have launched the civil disobedience movement. The British Government also know why. It is to coerce the British Government to recognise the Congress as the only authoritative and representative organisation of the people of India. The Congress says: "Come to a settlement with us. We are your friends; we desire to maintain your

supremacy in this country. Come to terms with us and ignore the Muslims and minorities."

In the same month speaking on the floor of the Legislative Assembly Jinnah declared that the reason why there had not been a settlement between the Hindus and the Muslims was that the Congress was a Hindu organisation, and that Hindu Congress leaders had had always at the back of their minds the basis that Muslims had to come within the ken of the Congress, that they were a minority, and all that they could justly press for was merely safeguards as a minority. Developing his argument and analysing Congress politics, Jinnah remarked:

What they want is, under the overlordship of Britain, power and patronage to dominate the Muslims and rest of the minorities. This is what Mr. Gandhi himself says, and it is a thing to which I cannot subscribe. It is my conviction and I am satisfied that that is his objective and aim.

The article he wrote on the 29th of October is a proof positive thereof. Of course, Mr. Gandhi's articles and speeches are such that you can derive support for any proposition; he is like the oracle of Delphi—but in order to understand Mr. Gandhi you have to study and go deep into the thing. This is what Mr. Gandhi said on the 29th of October last year after he had rejected the offer of the Viceroy: "If to-day the British leave India, the Punjabis from the Punjab"—he might have honestly said Muslims—"and Gurkhas from the East will destroy the country. If, therefore, there could be anyone desirous of maintaining the supremacy of the British in India"—mark the words—"if, therefore, there could be anyone desirous of maintaining the supremacy of the British in India, it can only be the Congress."

Now comes the other operative part. "It is the only authoritative and representative body of Indian people and of those Hindus who are, in spite of their majority, weak."*

*This quotation is not verbatim and is somewhat different from the original text of Gandhi's article. The mistake crept in because the correspondent who sent this quotation to Jinnah had perhaps obtained an Urdu version of the article and therefore its rendering into English was bound to be different from the typical phraseology employed by Gandhi. The correct version of the article in question, which Gandhi wrote in the *Harijan* on the 21st October, 1939, under the caption of "The Fiction of Majority" is as follows:

> I ask this House, I ask any intelligent man, what does this mean. On the 29th October last year, after the resolution of the All-India Congress Committee of the 10th October, within less than 20 days, Mr. Gandhi writes this article. That resolution, if you honestly believe in it, asks for complete independence, the right of the people of India to frame their own constitution by a constituent assembly to be elected by adult franchise.

After this, Jinnah's statements were either in the shape of appeals to the Congress leadership for better sense and wisdom, or consisted of protests against their policy of civil disobedience which went unheeded; and his visit to Karachi at the end of the year 1940 confirmed his views that the "one aim of the Congress in this province seems particularly to create disruption and disunity between Muslims, although a large body of Hindus disapprove of it and in fact are opposed to such manoeuvres. This is most unfortunate and, what is more, it is perfectly futile and will not succeed. There is not the slightest doubt that Muslims are solidly behind the Muslim League in this province and Hindus of this province will not encourage or support these machinations of the Congress. I sincerely hope that thoughtful and better mind of Hindus will work together with Muslims peacefully and for a real advance and betterment of the people of this province."

In March 1941 he was invited by the Punjab Muslim Students' Federation to Lahore, who had organised a Special Pakistan Session and soon after had to go to Aligarh to address the Muslim University Union. In April Muslims of Cawnpore were impatient to hear him and he had to accede to their request. At Cawnpore his programme of engagements was so crowded that he had hardly any

"Consider for one moment, what can happen if the English were to withdraw all of a sudden and there was no foreign usurper to rule. It may be said that the Punjabis, be they Muslims, Sikhs or others, will overrun India. It is highly likely that the Gurkhas will throw in their lot with the Punjabis. Assume further that non-Punjabi Muslims will make common cause with the Punjabis. Where will the Congressmen, composed chiefly of Hindus, be? If they are still truly non-violent, they will be left unmolested by the warriors. Congressmen won't want to divide power with the warriors, but will refuse to let them exploit their unarmed countrymen. Thus, if any body has cause to keep the British rule for protection from the stronger element, it is the Congressmen and those Hindus and others who are represented by the Congress. The question, therefore, resolves itself into not who is stronger. Surely there is only one answer. Those who raise the cry of minority in danger have nothing to fear from the so-called majority which is merely a paper-majority and which, in any event, is ineffective because it is weak in the military sense.

time for rest. No less than thirty-two addresses were presented to him in one day, and, as he told the author, he had never before seen so many people as gathered there to hear him. These busy days told upon his health and when he reached Bombay he had a touch of fever. The annual session of the All-India Muslim League was being held at Madras in April and Jinnah had to attend it. Notwithstanding his indifferent health he started for Madras. The heat of South India and the inconvenience that a war-time journey involved further aggravated the effects of the strain from which he was already suffering. On the way he fainted in the railway compartment. Immediate medical aid was, however, provided by the railway authorities and he was advised that he should not undergo further strain. At Madras, he left the special train in which he was travelling and boarded the car that was kept ready for his reception. The state drive and procession organised by the people of Madras in his honour were led by other leaders in his stead.

The Madras League and subsequent events in the Presidency showed to what length the message of Jinnah and his influence had already spread. People had come to the city from hundreds of miles and many had even walked long distances to have a glimpse of their leader. And when they were told that he was not well enough to see them, they bowed before the Almighty to pray for his recovery.

In the midst of popular demonstrations, Jinnah opened his presidential address orally in English, and kept his audience in a state of rapt attention for nearly two hours. In this speech Jinnah rose to the heights of his oratorical powers. He took in his sweep the entire gamut of the Indian political situation with pertinent references to the world situation. He elucidated beyond all shadow of doubt the goal, the ideology, and the policy of the Muslim League, surveyed the five-year progress of the League, and its attitude towards the war situation, foreshadowed the next five-year plan, and made pointed criticism of the policy of the British Government, and also the policy and manoeuvres of the Congress, the Mahasabha and the latest offshoot of the Congress, the Sapru Conference.

During the intervening period Indian political activity had progressed fast. The Congress attitude towards war had softened and then became stiff again. A No-Party Leaders' Conference had been

set up at Bombay under the leadership of Tej Bahadur Sapru in order to cultivate the British Government on behalf of the Congress under the pretext of finding a suitable solution of the political deadlock. Rajagopalacharia, a prominent member of the Congress from Madras, had flung a "sporting offer" to the Secretary of State for India, that Hindus would not mind Mohammad Ali Jinnah becoming the Prime Minister of India, provided he was made responsible to the legislature in a "national government."

Jinnah referred to the Sapru Conference and its proposals. He said that the Hindu Mahasabha had already repudiated and disowned it.

> But I am afraid, the Sapru Conference was like a Dutch army without any privates and I think the correct answer of the League was given in that very Conference by the clear-headed, Hindu, experienced political leader, Sir Chimanlal Setalvad. If Sir Tej Bahadur had only followed his advice, he would have saved himself. What shall I say to this pose which is now thrust upon him by the wire-pullers from behind? The Bombay proposal is nothing but, in another name, the flanking movement and a second edition of the Poona proposal of a so-called National Government.

Winding up his speech, Jinnah uttered what he himself characterised as "a note of warning" to the British Government in slow and deliberate accents:

> Please stop your policy of appeasement towards those who are bent upon frustrating the war effort, doing their best to oppose the prosecution of the war and the defence of India at this critical moment. Change the corner-stone of the British policy in this country. You are not loyal to those who are willing to stand by you and who sincerely desire to support you. You are trying to get on with those who do not want to get on with you. If you want honestly the support and the co-operation of Muslim India, place your cards on the table and take action.

After the Madras session of the League a long controversy arose between Jinnah and Sapru. The latter's release of the correspondence between himself and Gandhi on the question of a Hindu-Muslim settlement brought out that Hindus were in no mood to encourage or take part in the solution of the problem and that they were biding their time for something else.

CHAPTER XV

Attempts for Compromise

The Viceroy was in a fix. The policy of expanding the Executive Council had been laid down. The Congress had "refused even to discuss the matter and proceeded to launch a curious campaign." The Muslim League was willing to take the responsibility but it did not go well with Britain to take Muslim leadership alone into confidence. The proposals of the Sapru Conference had no sanction behind them. The only course, therefore, was to proceed with the expansion of the Council in spite of these organisations and approach individuals who could be made to stand by the British policy regardless of public opinion and their party affiliations. India was a country where persons of this non-descript character were found in abundance. They were products of sustained and systematic British efforts. The result was that on the 21st of July, 1941, a communique announced the names of the members of the expanded Executive Council and the new "National Defence Council."

The Viceroy, however, wished to communicate his decision to Mohammad Ali Jinnah before its publication and his message came through the Governor of Bombay, Roger Lumley, who was at the time at Ganeshkhind, the summer headquarters of Bombay. Lumley made a telephone call to Jinnah and requested him to see him, but the latter being indisposed could do so only after he had recovered his health. Lumley then sent the Viceregal message through an official messenger in the form of a letter.

Jinnah protested that the decision regarding the expansion of the Viceroy's Executive Council and the so-called National Defence Council was to be most deeply regretted. It could not secure the

whole-hearted, willing and genuine support, if that was what was honestly required of Muslim India, for the simple reason that the persons chosen and nominated by the Viceroy were neither real representatives of the people nor commanded the confidence and trust of the Muslims. The statesmanship of the Viceroy, said Jinnah, was leading him from one mistake to another, and it was unfortunate, that he should have canvassed members of the Muslim League over the head of the leader and the executive of the party, and it was still more painful, that some of the members of the League should have succumbed. When the offer of the Viceroy was made last August it was not acceptable to the All-India Muslim League on the unanswerable ground that it did not give the representatives of the Muslim League a real and substantial share in the authority and power of the government. How could anyone consider that the present retrograde decision would secure the approval and co-operation of Muslim India?

The question concerning the members of the League joining the Executive Council and the National Defence Council was discussed at the meeting of the League Working Committee in August. It was a matter now of the prestige of the Muslim organisation and the test of the strength of Jinnah. Hindus were eagerly looking forward to a clash between the League and the British Government or at any rate between Jinnah and his lieutenants. It was hoped that Sikandar Hayat Khan of the Punjab, Mohammad Saadullah of Assam and Fazl-ul-Haq of Bengal would revolt against the League. Punjab officialdom had already managed to send a few members of the Punjab League in the form of a delegation to the President of the All-India Muslim League with a view to vindicating the action of Sikandar in joining the Defence Council under the pretext that the Muslim Premiers joined in their official capacity and that their action did not amount to flouting the mandate of the League, since it had allowed its Provincial Branches to continue their activities in support of the war effort. But the letter from the Governor of Bombay containing the message of the Viceroy to Jinnah had a different story to tell. L. S. Amery, the Secretary of State for India, had also made frank statements in the House of Commons that the inclusion of these Muslims was meant to demonstrate to the world that "the great Muslim community" was behind the war

effort in spite of the Viceroy turning down the offer of the All-India Muslim League. The position was, therefore, quite clear. During the meeting of the Working Committee, the League President had no difficulty in convincing the Muslim Premiers that they were wrong in joining the National Defence Council. Sikandar resigned from the Council forthwith. Mohammad Saadullah also followed suit. Fazl-ul-Haq, who could not attend the Working Committee, hesitated a little, but ultimately fell in with the others.

The Government of India tried to explain away the whole affair and issued a communique. In reply to that Mohammad Ali Jinnah issued the following statement to the press:

> The explanation that has been given, presumably on behalf of Lord Linlithgow, in the communique dated August 27, 1941, from Simla, regarding the recent decision of the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League, and the statement which has been issued by Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, consequent on his resignation from the National Defence Council, is a lengthy and wordy explanation of points, other than the real and vital one, which forms the basis of the resignation of Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, namely, that according to the text of the message of His Excellency the Viceroy, Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan was appointed as a representative of the great Muslim community. This message I received through the Governor of Bombay on the morning of July 21 and replied to it on the same day. It is surprising that no reference whatever has been made to it in the whole of the communique.
>
> The statement of Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan runs as follows: "I was surprised, however, to find that in the letter dated July 21 last, from the Governor of Bombay to Mr. Jinnah, communicating to him a message from His Excellency the Viceroy, an entirely different complexion had been put on the basis of appointment of the Muslim Premiers on this Council, and *inter alia* it was stated that we were being appointed to the Defence Council as representatives of the great Muslim community . . . I could not, in fairness to my province or the Muslim League, continue to serve on this Council."
>
> According to Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, the Viceroy was double-crossing him. That point is not met in the whole of the

communique. Had he asked Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan to join the Council in his personal capacity, the probability is so obvious that he would have refused, or, at any rate, asked for time to consult the leader and the Executive of the Muslim League organisation.

This, evidently, did not suit the Viceroy to put it to him in that way, and he was sworn to strict secrecy.

It is somewhat difficult to understand why the Working Committee has been dragged in the communique. The position of the Working Committee has been made quite clear by its resolution that the gentlemen concerned had clearly associated themselves with the scheme and thereby gone against the express decision and mandate of the League and without any reference to the leader or the Executive of the organisation. The decision of the Working Committee, therefore, was that they should resign from the National Defence Council. It is quite immaterial whether they accepted the invitation in their official capacity or otherwise.

The various stages of the development of this plea that these gentlemen were appointed in their official capacity as Premiers, ending with the statement of the Secretary of State for India, which he was at pains to make on August 19, 1941, were merely intended to create confusion among the Muslim public and in the deliberations of the Working Committee, which was called upon to decide as to what action should be taken in the matter.

Lastly, there is a reference of His Excellency the Viceroy in the communique, to the conversation that he had with me on August 16, 1941. It is quite correct that he informed me that these gentlemen were invited in their official capacity; but in fairness to me it also ought to have been stated as to what was my reply. Here I give the substance of it. I said: "It was quite immaterial to the real issue nevertheless, it is the first time I hear, on your authority, that they were invited in their official capacity; and even after my reply to your message which you must have received on the 21st or the 22nd, you did not suggest that they were appointed in their official capacity till to-day." I pointed out to him that this was quite contrary to the message that he was good enough to send to me through the Governor

of Bombay. The text of the message did not leave the slightest doubt that they were appointed essentially as representatives of the great Muslim community, because they were Muslims of the highest eminence and capacity. I asked him to send for the copy of his message that he had sent to me and verify what I was saying, to which he replied that he would look it up.

I think, in fairness to all parties concerned, I should release to the press the full text of his message and my reply to it.

Confidential. Government House
Ganeshkhind, July 20, 1941.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

His Excellency the Viceroy has asked me to let you know his intentions on the matters which follow. I had hoped that I would be able to see you myself in order that I might convey this message to you personally, as was his desire, but, unfortunately, now that I am in a position to give you the message, I am not entirely fit, and I am therefore writing to convey it to you by this letter, which I am sending down to Bombay by messenger.

The Viceroy has continued to have very much in mind the whole situation in regard to the war effort and the association of non-official opinion with the prosecution of the war. The obstacles, however, to any settlement on the basis of the complete offer of August last, which emerged so clearly during the discussions last autumn, still exist, to his very great regret, as the last few months, and the reactions to the Secretary of State's statement in the House of Commons on April 22, have made clear. In these circumstances, it is equally clear that he cannot look for that degree of support from the major parties, for the proposals embodied in the August offer, which he desires. Nevertheless, the burden of the conduct of the war on the Central Government has greatly increased, and for administrative reasons it is essential to proceed with some increase in the membership of the Viceroy's Council within the terms of the August offer. The Viceroy, accordingly, is anxious that you should know that he is now, with the approval of His Majesty's Government, creating five new portfolios.

These new portfolios, and the names of the gentlemen by whom they have been accepted, are as follows: Supply: Sir Homi Mody, Information: Sir Akbar Hydari, Civil Defence: Mr. Raghavendra Rao, Indians Overseas: Mr. Aney, Labour: Sir Firoz Khan Noon.

The Viceroy would also like you to know that he proposes to fill the vacancies arising in the portfolio of Law when Sir Zafarullah Khan goes to the Federal Court, and in the portfolio of Education when Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai takes up a mission overseas, by the appointment of Sir Sultan Ahmad and Mr. Sarkar.

In addition, the Viceroy does not feel that, because of the difficulty in securing the support of the major political parties, it is possible to delay further the more active association of non-official Indian opinion with the prosecution of the war. He is accordingly establishing, with the approval of His Majesty's Government, a National Defence Council. The Council will consist of some thirty members, nine of whom will be drawn from the Indian States. The Viceroy regards it as essential that the great Muslim community should be represented on that Council by persons of the highest prominence and capacity. He has, accordingly invited the Premiers of Assam, Bengal, the Punjab and Sind to serve as members on it, and he has extended invitations also to certain other prominent Muslims, such as Sir Mohammad Usman. He has considered whether he should invite you to let him have any suggestions as to the possible personnel for this Council, but being aware, as he is, of your general attitude, he has concluded that it would be preferable not to embarass you by inviting you to make suggestions.

It is intended that an announcement about these changes will be made on the morning of Tuesday, July 22, and the Viceroy is anxious that you should have, through me, this advance information of what is proposed. I would have much preferred to have given you this message orally, but this letter contains the substance of it.

I hope that you have now fully recovered from your recent illness.

Yours sincerely,
Roger Lumley

(*Jinnah's Reply*)

Mount Pleasant Road
Malabar Hill, Bombay
July 21, 1941.

Dear Sir Roger,

I am in receipt of your letter of July 20, 1941, which embodies the message of His Excellency the Viceroy. I deeply regret the decision taken by him with the approval of His Majesty's Government. I appreciate when he says that he does not wish to embarrass me by inviting me to make suggestions, knowing, as he does, not only my general attitude but that of the All-India Muslim League. Further, I cannot approve of his having invited the Muslim League Premiers or any other Muslim Leaguer under the scheme of the expansion of the Viceroy's Council as well as what is now called the National Defence Council, because it is obvious that it would embarrass the Muslim League organisation and I do hope and trust that His Excellency will avoid such a contingency. Besides, it is hardly fair or proper that they should be approached by His Excellency over the head of the President and the Executive of the All-India Muslim League, knowing full well the position and the attitude that the All-India Muslim League has adopted.

It is stated in his message that the Viceroy regards it as essential that the great Muslim community should be represented by persons of the highest prominence and capacity. Would it be creditable for any individual prominent or capable Muslim, belonging to an organisation, to accept the invitation contrary to the position and the attitude taken up by that organisation, and would it do any credit to the Government if they succeed in alluring him and create a breach in the organisation, in the hope that he may throw up his allegiance to the party to which he belongs in order to accept the invitation of His Excellency? I maintain that the great Muslim community is represented authoritatively only by the All-India Muslim League organisation. Persistence in the course will not improve matters, but, on the contrary, it will lead to bitterness on the part of the Muslim League which up to the present moment, fortunately,

does not exist, however emphatically we have disapproved of the policy which has been pursued by His Majesty's Government and the Viceroy.

Before I conclude, I am extremely sorry to hear that you are not well and I hope that you will soon recover from your illness.

Thanking you for your kind inquiries. I am now much better.

Yours sincerely,
M. A. Jinnah

The Hindu Press, Hindu leaders and the British Government were aghast at the result of the League decision, and political circles were bewildered at the statesmanship and political sagacity of Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the remarkable strength that the incident demonstrated was behind him. Innumerable messages of appreciation came from all parts of India including his Hindu friends and some very prominent Congressmen. The Hindu press in many cases could not but admire the independent character and patriotism of the great Muslim Leader.

The position for the All-India Muslim League was, however, none too pleasant. The events that followed were unparalleled in the history of India. All forces that were directly or indirectly affected had combined together against the League. It so happened that although Fazl-ul-Haq had resigned he had given indication that he had done so most reluctantly and not out of conviction; and almost immediately he showered epithets on the League and its President. Haq had been indirectly assured of the support of other elements that were against the League. The members of the League took great exception to Haq's outburst and Jinnah was once again flooded with letters. There were two groups in Bengal—one favoured the postponement of any definite decision, the other demanded Fazl-ul-Haq's immediate expulsion from the League. Mohammad Ali Jinnah personally was inclined to give a long rope to the Bengal Premier in order to enable him to retrace his steps. And some time later at Jinnah's instance the League Working Committee after having received a letter from Fazl-ul-Haq of implied apology treated the matter as closed.

But for Fazl-ul-Haq, obviously, the matter remained still open

and towards the close of the year 1941, he along with one of his colleagues, the Nawab of Dacca, deserted the League Party in the Bengal Assembly and started a new party in coalition with the Congress and other Hindu groups without any reference to the League either local or central. The European Group in the Bengal Assembly too threw in their lot with him. The new coalition, therefore, demonstrated beyond doubt that the Congress on the one hand and the British Government on the other were out to destroy the influence that the League had come to acquire in Bengal. Jinnah, therefore, demanded from Fazl-ul-Haq an explanation of his conduct and the latter adopted his usual dilatory tactics. The whole of Bengal had now stood up against the "Bengal Tiger." It had become almost impossible for him to come out in public, and so much was the public disapproval of him that one of the Bengal leaders said that in future Muslims would dread to give the future sons of Bengal the name of Fazl-ul-Haq. Mohammad Ali Jinnah was pressed by Muslim Bengal to do away with him and consequently he expelled him from the League in the month of December after due opportunities given for defence.

The curious attitude adopted by the Congress in Bengal in supporting Fazl-ul-Haq was not surprising to those who understood the Congress game. The Congress High Command had followed a similar policy in other Muslim provinces.

After the expulsion of Fazl-ul-Haq from the League the situation in Bengal had become very acute. The Bengal Muslim leaders had hitherto thought that as they were in the seat of power it would not be difficult to organise their province whenever they wished, and had neglected the work of rousing political consciousness among the people. But when they found they could be betrayed by their own men they woke up to the realities and in order to achieve the object in the shortest possible time appealed to Mohammad Ali Jinnah to visit Bengal and preside over the Provincial Muslim League Conference in February 1942, which he consequently did at Serajgunj. During the course of his presidential address, Mohammad Ali Jinnah outlined the various forces that were working against the League. He explained at length the tactics that Fazl-ul-Haq had adopted in his political game in order to maintain his leadership in the Bengal Assembly. He pointed out the character

of the Haq Ministry that was then functioning in Bengal and exposed the hand that the local Governor had in it. Jinnah placed before his audience the position of the League, and gave an account of the League activities, elucidated the Muslim goal of Pakistan and the Muslim attitude towards the future constitutional problem of India. In fact his Serajganj speech shows what remarkable grasp Jinnah had over Indian politics and in view of the autobiographical importance of this speech it is appended at the end of this book.[1]

The entry of Japan into the war and the dangers that were brought to India by the Japanese successes mark the early part of the year 1942. The surrender of Singapore on February 15, the withdrawal from Rangoon on March 7, the capture by the Japanese of the Andaman Islands on March 23 and the bombing of Vizagapatam and Cocanada on April 6, had already tended to influence the Congress opinion and of the British. Further, the growing menace of Japanese aggression in the East Indies and Philippines and on the Burma front, the escape from India of Subhas Chandra Bose, probably to Japan, and the claim of a few Hindu leaders for a cultural affinity with Asiatic and Oriental countries had to a great extent changed the complexion of Indian politics, and consequently the war began to be viewed from a different angle altogether. It had moved the Congress High Command to relax their policy toward non-violence, but the fundamental question of forming a so-called national government at the Centre was not given up. The attitude of ignoring the wishes of other important elements in India, particularly of the Muslims was also not altered. In fact, some of the Congress Hindus were seriously considering the alternative of a possible occupation of India by the Japanese.

The British Parliament was much perturbed and it was contemplated that an all-out attempt must be made for consolidating and mobilising all forces of India for the successful prosecution of the war. It was rumoured that under the impact of the Japanese onslaught, the British Parliament would make a departure from their declared policy towards Indian constitutional problem. The declaration made by Mohammad Ali Jinnah regarding such a move, therefore, came as a timely warning to all concerned:

If any new declaration is made on the part of the British Govern-

1. Appendix III.

ment, departing from the declaration of August 8, 1940, as to the future constitution of India, or any proposal or move, which in any way would militate against the Muslim demand for Pakistan, or prejudge it, or denounce it in any way, as seems to be the main effort of the Hindu leaders, it will not only create an unprecedented catastrophe but result in grave disaster at this critical juncture of the war and war efforts, apart from the fact that it will constitute a gross breach of faith with Muslim India. Muslim India is fighting and struggling for survival and for its right to self-determination, whereas the Congress and other Hindu organisations are speeding to assume supremacy and domination over the Muslims as an all-India minority by establishing one central government over the whole of India, and thus to dominate and control even those zones where the Muslims are in a solid majority and interfere even in their internal affairs by virtue of the vital powers which must remain vested in the Central Government, such as Defence, Communications, Customs and Finance and various other executive and administrative powers.

It was in these circumstances that the British Prime Minister announced in the House of Commons that Stafford Cripps was to proceed to India with the Draft Declaration that embodied the unanimous views of the War Cabinet regarding the Indian deadlock.

The announcement of Cripps Mission created a sense of triumph in the Congress ranks, as Cripps had many friends among the Congressmen including Jawaharlal Nehru. His remarks in the past about the Muslim League criticising its policy had, on the other hand, alarmed Muslim India considerably.

The document which Sir Stafford Cripps brought to India and published on March 30, covered two periods—the immediate period after the end of hostilities, when a constitution-making body was to establish an Indian Union, and the interim war period, when the Executive Council, under the existing constitution was to be composed, with the exception of the Defence Member, of leaders of the Indian political parties, until such time as the constitution-making body had completed its work. The Draft Declaration ran as follows:

His Majesty's Government, having considered the anxieties ex-

pressed in this country and in India as to the fulfilment of the promises made in regard to the future of India, have decided to lay down in precise and clear terms the steps which they propose shall be taken for the earliest possible realisation of self-government in India. The object is the creation of a new Indian Union which shall constitute a Dominion, associated with the United Kingdom and the other Dominions by a common allegiance to the Crown, but equal to them in every respect, in no way subordinate in any aspect of its domestic or external affairs.

His Majesty's Government, therefore, make the following declaration:

(*a*) Immediately upon the cessation of hostilities, steps shall be taken to set up in India, in the manner described hereafter, an elected body charged with the task of framing a new constitution for India.

(*b*) Provision shall be made, as set out below, for the participation of the Indian States in the constitution-making body.

(*c*) His Majesty's Government undertake to accept and implement forthwith the constitution as framed subject only to:

(*i*) the right of any Province of British India that is not prepared to accept the new constitution to retain its present constitutional position, provision being made for its subsequent accession, if it so decides. With such non-acceding Provinces, should they so desire, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to agree upon a new constitution, giving them the same full status as Indian Union, and arrived at by a procedure analogous to that here laid down;

(*ii*) the signing of a Treaty which shall be negotiated between His Majesty's Government and the constitution-making body. This Treaty will cover all necessary matters arising out of the complete transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands; it will make provision, in accordance with the undertakings given by His Majesty's Government, for the protection of racial and religious minorities; but will not impose any

restriction on the power of the Indian Union to decide in the future its relationship to the other Member States of the British Commonwealth.

Whether or not an Indian State elects to adhere to the constitution, it will be necessary to negotiate a revision of its Treaty arrangements, so far as this may be required in the new situation;

(*d*) the constitution-making body shall be composed as follows, unless the leaders of Indian opinion in the principal communities agree upon some other form before the end of hostilities:

Immediately upon the result being known of the provincial elections which will be necessary at the end of hostilities, the entire membership of the Lower Houses of the Provincial Legislatures shall, as a single electoral college, proceed to the election of the constitution-making body by the system of proportional representation. This new body shall be in number about one-tenth of the number of the electoral college.

Indian States shall be invited to appoint representatives in the same proportion to their total population as in the case of the representatives of British India as a whole, and with the same powers as the British Indian members.

(*e*) During the critical period which now faces India and until the new constitution can be framed, His Majesty's Government must, inevitably, bear the responsibility for and retain control and direction of the defence of India as part of their world war effort, but the task of organising to the full the military, moral, and material resources of India must be the responsibility of the Government of India with the co-operation of the people of India. His Majesty's Government desire and invite the immediate and effective participation of the leaders of the principal sections of the Indian people in the counsels of their country, of the Commonwealth, and of the United Nations. Thus they will be enabled to give their active and constructive help in the discharge of a task which is vital and essential for

future freedom of India.

Throughout the negotiations the provision of the non-accession of Provinces of British India formed the crux of the controversy, specially in view of the fact that Stafford Cripps had in his broadcast speech on the 30th of March declared that in the great sub-continent of India there were more than one people—there were many peoples and races—as there were in the great sub-continent of Russia. "Our object is to give to the Indian peoples full self-government, with complete freedom as to how they will devise and organise their own constitution."

For the Congress it was quite enough, and soon after the Draft Declaration was published, the Hindu press started a powerful campaign against it, and under its shadow the Congress objected from the very beginning to "several important and far-reaching proposals for the future." It "had imagined that the new government would function with full powers as a Cabinet with the Viceroy acting as a constitutional head." But in public its leaders took great pains to create an impression that the final breakdown of negotiations came on account of the portfolio of Defence. On the authority of Stafford Cripps himself it is clear that "none of these things were the real cause of the breakdown of the negotiations. In their final letter addressed to me, the Congress Working Committee stated that the temporary form of government envisaged during the war was not such as to enable them to join the government. They have two suggestions to remedy the situation: First, an immediate change of the constitution, a plan which everyone else has admitted to be wholly impracticable while the war is proceeding and, second, that there should be full national government with a Cabinet of Indian leaders, untrammelled by any control by the Viceroy or the British Government. Realise what this means. Government for an indefinite period by a set of persons nominated by Indian parties responsible to no legislature, nor any electorate, incapable of being changed and a majority of whom would be in a position to dominate large minorities. It is easy to understand that great minorities in India would never accept such a suggestion. Nor could His Majesty's Government, who have given pledges to those minorities, consent to their being placed unprotected while the existing constitution lasts under a central and possibly inimical majority rule. It would

be breach of all the pledges given. Such a solution may sound simple and effective to those who have no knowledge of the deep, communal divisions in India, but it is in fact wholly impracticable and would never be accepted by very large sections of the Indian peoples."

The resolution of the Congress Working Committee also laid emphasis on this point. It recognised that future independence might be implicit in the proposals, but the accompanying provisions and restrictions were such that real freedom might well become an illusion. The Congress, in fact, went a step further and opined that "the British War Cabinet's new proposals relate principally to the future, upon the cessation of hostilities. The Committee, while recognising that self-determination for the people of India is accepted in principle in an uncertain future, regret that this is fettered and circumscribed and that certain provisions have been introduced which gravely imperil the development of a free and united national government and the establishment of a democratic State. Even the constitution-making body is so constituted that the people's right of self-determination is vitiated by the introduction of non-representative elements." It is, therefore, clear that the Congress still regarded the League as a "non-representative element" and by putting forward the claim of Pakistan vitiated the right of self-determination of the people of India, of which the Congress regarded itself as the sole spokesman. This was a position which no understanding person could accept.

The position of the Muslims and Mohammad Ali Jinnah as their spokesman had been none too enviable. Dealing with this, Prof Coupland says: "The adoption of Pakistan as the League's objective has tended to stiffen the political deadlock. It was already difficult enough for Mr. Jinnah to co-operate with the Government's war effort, unless Congress did, for it would expose him to the charge—a wholly false charge, as his record shows—of being a poorer Indian patriot than Pandit Nehru and his colleagues. But there was now another difficulty. To join the existing Central Government, associated as it is with a Central Legislature, both based on the principle of a united India, would prejudice the future of the Muslim cause. It would seem like a tacit acceptance of a constitutional system which foreshadowed the imposition, not only on seven Provinces but on

India as a whole, of that Hindu majority rule which Pandit Nehru, in an unguarded moment, had once described as a *Congress Raj*[1] a system which flatly negatived Pakistan." The Professor, however, is not quite correct to say that Mohammad Ali Jinnah had to wait for the Congress to come in for co-operation with the Government's war effort, for as far back as November 1939, when Lord Linlithgow made the first attempt to secure India's co-operation, Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the League were willing to pool all resources of Muslim India for the successful prosecution of war and consequent events, of which the reader is well aware, prove beyond doubt that it was the British who were unable to accept the Muslim hand of co-operation.

Professor Coupland continues:

> The purpose of the non-accession provisions was manifest, they embodied the British Government's considered reply to the Muslim claim of Pakistan. It was unfair to say, as Hindu critics promptly said, that they directly encouraged the partition of India. On the contrary, they pointed the way by which alone (in the present writer's view) partition can be avoided. The story of the forbidden fruit applies to great affairs of life as much as small. The certain method of whetting a nation's or a community's appetite for something is to say that it is the one thing they may not have. Thus, just as there is small chance of India wanting to stay in the British Commonwealth unless she is free to go out, so the best hope of a single Indian Union is to assure the people of the predominantly Muslim areas that they need not join it unless they wish. As Sir Stafford had said in his broadcast, the door must be left open.[2] And, besides this point of principle, there was the practical question. How did the Hindus propose to compel the Muslims into the Union? Only, it would seem, by civil war.
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> The reaction of Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League to this part of the scheme was naturally favourable. They can scarcely have expected, indeed, that the British Government would go so far to meet their claim, since for months past they had made no

1. *The Unity of India*, p. 63.

2. Professor Coupland in a footnote says: "In many of my conversations with Hindus, I urged this method of dealing with Pakistan; and several of them, including two leading Congressmen, agreed with me."

secret of their anxiety lest the Congress demand for the ruling out of Pakistan from all discussion on the future should be satisfied. Owing to the "weightage" given to the minorities in the electoral arrangements in the Punjab, the proportion of Muslims in the legislature does not exactly correspond with the proportion of their population. In the legislature it is 50.9 per cent, of the population 57.1 per cent. The position in Bengal is still less well-balanced: the corresponding figures there are 49.9 per cent and 54.7 per cent. Since it seemed improper that so momentous a decision should depend on so narrow a margin of votes, Sir Stafford proposed that, if the majority in favour of accession was less than 60 per cent of the legislature, the minority should be entitled to demand a plebiscite of the adult male population. This proposal was not, of course, acceptable to the non-Muslims. The scales, they said, were being weighed still more heavily in favour of partition. But it apparently contented Mr. Jinnah. It was understood that he and his Working Committee were now prepared to accept the Draft Declaration and bring the League into the National Government for the whole-hearted prosecution of the war, provided that the Congress Working Committee did the same.

When in the event Congress rejected the Draft Declaration, Mr. Jinnah, as had always been expected, followed suit. But the tone of his rejection was markedly less hostile than that of the Congress President. Nor did he reject it all along the line. His one serious complaint was that it did not explicitly pronounce in favour of Pakistan. He expressed satisfaction of the recognition of its possibility implied in the non-adherence scheme; but the establishment of a single Indian Union "appears to be the main object of His Majesty's Government, the creation of more than one Union being relegated only to the realm of remote possibility." Nor did the granting of the right of non-accession, such as it was, do full justice to the Muslims; it was unfair, to base it on the existing Provinces, whose frontiers had been drawn for administrative convenience only. The Draft Declaration, in fact, went some way to meet the Muslim case, but not far enough.

CHAPTER XVI

"Open Rebellion"

A fortnight after the Mission's departure, the Congress "stage-management" summoned a session of the All-India Congress Committee at Allahabad. This endorsed the resolution of the Working Committee rejecting the Cripps proposals at Delhi. The Allahabad meeting is important from the point of view of Muslims. Shortly before the session, Rajagopalacharia, ex-Premier of Madras, had summoned in Madras a meeting of Congressmen belonging to the Provincial Legislature and of other local Congress leaders, and obtained their support for a programme which was totally opposed to that of the Working Committee. This meeting urged that "it is impossible for the people to think in terms of neutrality or passivity during an invasion by an enemy Power; neither is it practicable to organise any effective defence independently and unco-ordinated with the defence measures of the Government." Therefore a national administration should be framed; and for that end the claims of the Muslim League for recognition of the right of separation of certain areas from united India upon the ascertainment of the wishes of the people of such areas should be acknowledged, if it were persisted in when the time comes for framing a constitution for India; and the Muslim League should be invited for a consultation for the installation of a national government to meet the emergency.

Another resolution urged that, in view of the imminent danger to Madras, a popular government should be established there, and the Muslim League should be invited to participate in it. Rajagopalacharia had resigned from the Congress Working Committee in order to lead this movement. The more important of his aforetime

colleagues violently denounced him in public; and the obedient A.-I.C.C. on May 2, rejected the proposal for the negotiations with the Muslim League and the very idea of self-determination for any part of India. Thus the same leaders, who a few weeks before were negotiating with the emissary of the British War Cabinet for the control of the armed defence of the country, now wrapped themselves in the formula of "non-violent non-co-operation"; and all professions of consideration for minorities were belied by a flat refusal to discuss the main claim of the Muslim League. There was nothing new in this. This record shows that the aim of the Congress had been to use the war for wresting power for itself. In place of Rajagopalacharia's resolution the Congress passed another one moved by Jagat Narain Lal, which for all intents and purposes completely negatived the Muslim claim for self-determination.

The purpose of the Cripps Mission may have been anything. But its result went to some halting extent in favour of Muslim India. The fact that Mohammad Ali Jinnah represented the Muslim case authoritatively as President of the All-India Muslim League was demonstrated and added to the great popularity of the League. The Congress President, Abul Kalam Azad, was invariably accompanied by Jawaharlal Nehru and even then greater weight was given to the opinion of Gandhi than that of the Congress President. All these factors clearly exposed the fiction that the Congress was a national body, and led to the final conclusion that, "broadly speaking, Hindu public opinion is Congress opinion, and Muslim public opinion is League opinion."

The statesmanlike policy that Jinnah had laid down for Muslim India in regard to the war by allowing the Muslim provinces to continue their normal activities conduced to the consolidation of his position both in India and abroad. To the Muslims it meant a greater security of their interests. To the British it demonstrated that Jinnah's politics were realistic and that he was no mere visionary. The continued practical suggestions that he advanced during this period for the better understanding and better co-operation which would result in the greatest benefit to India and in the most successful prosecution of the war made a considerable impression on the British mind. In this he was helped by various factors. As a matter of fact, the Congress policy of repeated blunders beginning

by their resignations from the ministries and of pursuing the vague course of hollow idealism coupled with impossible demands, very often militating against the interests of important sections of the vast population of India, specially against those of Muslims; the Congress game of using the war as an instrument to wrest power for itself, and of refusing to recognise the existence of problems, contributed a great deal to Jinnah's phenomenal success.

The extraordinary strength and prestige that Mohammad Ali Jinnah had achieved, during the last few years, by organising the scattered forces of Muslim India, and earning their gratitude and following, on the one hand, and on the other by bringing home to the British Government the justice of the Muslim demand of Pakistan by slow but steady degrees had served to drive the Congress to a point of desperation. The Cripps offer was indeed an indication that the British policy was inclined to take a turn for the better. For Jinnah, therefore, things were becoming more and more satisfactory.

For the Congress, however, it was now necessary to get out of the rut in which it found itself and something had got to be done to keep its present leadership intact. In this connection the growing threat to India of Japanese aggression had to be taken into account. There were two courses open—either to retrace the steps and go back to the legislatures and work the constitution, or to start a programme with a dual policy and keep every thing in suspense. As far as the former course was concerned it was obviously fraught with difficulties. In the first place after the failure of the Cripps Mission it would not be easy to convince Hindu India that such a move would not amount to a complete surrender. Secondly the British Government would now dictate its own terms for such an arrangement. Thirdly, it would necessarily introduce the Muslim League as, an important factor to be reckoned with. Fourthly, due to the uncertainty of the war situation, it would be futile for the Congress either to take a "pro-imperialist" attitude or to adopt an anti-Axis policy. It was, therefore, natural that the Congress should have decided upon something which would in the first instance give the Hindus something to keep themselves engaged and forget the blunders committed by their leaders. It would also perhaps divert the attention of Muslim India from the possibility, however remote,

of the establishment of Pakistan.

Against this background the next move of the Congress was conceived and carried out. In May, Gandhi declared that he considered "the vivisection of India to be a sin." What was more, he was firmly of the opinion "that there was no unity whilst the third party was there to prevent it." The British Government, he said, had "created the artificial division and it kept it up." In its presence, he declared, both Hindus and Muslims and for that matter "all seemingly conflicting or disgruntled interests would look to it for support and would get it." He said, their interest was greater than the independence of the country. The implied meaning was that whoever did not coalesce with the Congress programme was essentially selfish, and consequently against India's independence. As far as the Muslims were concerned Gandhi committed another big mistake in so far as he under-rated the strength of Jinnah and his organisation.

Gandhi went on developing this theme in spite of protests and objections raised by the Muslims of India, and, in August, in a speech before the All-India Congress Committee at Bombay, he remarked that Mohammad Ali Jinnah had been a Congressman but now he seemed to be misguided. "Mr. Jinnah." said he, "does not seem to believe in the Congress demand. But I cannot wait any longer for India's freedom. I cannot wait till Mr. Jinnah is converted, for the immediate consummation of Indian freedom." The implication was that Jinnah did not stand for the independence of India—a thing which Gandhi himself knew to be the greatest libel on the Muslim leader.

The Congress at Bombay adopted "the formula of inviting the British power to withdraw." There was obviously nothing wrong in doing that. But in view of the false charges against the Muslims it had come to be regarded by them with acute suspicion. The confirmation of Muslim apprehension came from Gandhi himself when a few days later he qualified this amazing invitation. He wrote: "If, however, the withdrawal is orderly and voluntary, the British not only gain a moral height but secure the ungrudging friendship of a great nation." It was clear—and subsequent correspondence between Gandhi and the Viceroy left no doubt—that this so-called invitation was meant to induce the British to withdraw "in an orderly manner" and hand over power to the Hindus, whose un-

grudging friendship he had promised. Gandhi said, he was fighting for liberty in order to evolve a National Government suited to the genius of India. But explaining the character of this National Government he declared, "Whatever it is, in order to be stable, it has to represent the masses in the fullest sense of the term." This would virtually mean the *Hindu Raj*. When viewed in the proper perspective it would mean that in the event of Axis' entry into India this National Government would be in a position to decide the fate of India. In the event of the defeat of the Axis and British remaining in India it would be in a position to decide the fate of Muslims of India.

It must, however, be said to the credit of Gandhi that this "Quit India" move created a great deal of sensation in the country. There was a feeling among the Hindus that it meant a complete annihilation of the leadership of Jinnah as after the movement being in full swing Muslims would fall out of his influence. The British Government were concerned with the impending threat to the administration of law and order and were making arrangements to tighten the police control in order to prevent a civil war. Mohammad Ali Jinnah himself was apprehensive of such a consequence and had appealed to Muslims to view the Congress move with equanimity and calmness and wait for the decision of the League Committee which was due to meet in the middle of August.

On the morning of 9th of August, 1942, the author was the first to break the news to Mohammad Ali Jinnah that the Congress leaders were rounded up in Bombay and that most of them were already despatched to the destinations of their respective prisons. Jinnah received the news with surprise and took away from the author's hand the special edition of a local newspaper which carried it and after enquiring a few details engaged himself in perusing the columns of the paper. Soon after this the disturbances began and news poured into Jinnah's office of various outrages that were committed by Hindus in Bombay. Telephonic enquiries followed from all over the city when Muslim shops were surrounded by angry Hindu mobs. Jinnah had already made arrangements regarding such contingencies through the local Muslim League, who handled the situation with great tact and courage.

The Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League met on

the 16th of August, although a few of its members were not able to come in time owing to acts of sabotage committed on the way. The Committee considered the situation from every angle and passed a lengthy resolution deploring the Congress decision of August 8, and gave a detailed account of the Congress policy during the last few years. The Committee also criticised the attitude of the British Government for appeasing the Congress "with barren and sterile results," which had "now culminated in the open defiance of law and order." The League Committee reiterated its faith in Pakistan, as the only peaceful solution of India's constitutional problem and made it clear that it stood not only for the freedom of Muslim India but also that of Hindu India. The Working Committee declared once over again that the League was ready and willing to consider any proposals and negotiate with any party for the setting up of a provisional government on the basis of equality. In these circumstances the Committee called upon the Muslims to abstain from any participation in the movement initiated by the Congress and to continue to pursue their normal peaceful life, and hoped that "no attempt shall be made from any quarter to intimidate, coerce, molest or interfere in any manner with the normal life of the Muslims."[1]

The "Quit India" movement subsided soon and after a few acts of madness on the part of certain Hindu individuals and misguided youths the situation eased within a few days. If Muslims had joined the Congress movement, beguiled by the slogan of freedom or independence, it would have meant that the Congress alone represented the whole of India and that its demand was also supported by Muslim India. Muslims could not have committed a greater folly. As a matter of fact, as Jinnah himself said, this movement was the gambler's last throw.

The part that the British Government played in arresting the movement in time and nipping the evil in the bud was in a way beneficial to the interests of the Muslims, and also of the British since it was directed against them also. But as Jinnah pointed out, Muslim India could not trust the British either. They were playing their own game. "Let them fight it out," declared he. "This is one of those cases where neutrality is the most effective policy on our part." And such was the effect of this policy and so clearly Muslims

1. See Appendix IV.

understood it that the Congress movement lost even the slightest Muslim sympathy. The Government of India themselves had to admit this fact and exempted the Muslims from the punitive tax that was later levied in certain areas on the saboteurs.

After the arrest of the Congress caucus, those Hindus who still enjoyed the fresh air outside the prison walls began to feel active as usual and initiated the customary move for the release of the political prisoners. Appeals were issued both to the Government of India and the Government of Britain for help. America, China and Russia were taken into confidence and political manoeuvres once again came in vogue. But the main plank of the Hindu policy—of ignoring the Muslims of India—was not abandoned even by these individuals who called themselves most liberal and considered themselves outside the much detested pale of communalism. New parties sprang up and unattached leaders were let loose to negotiate a peace between the Congress and British Government. It was once again a trying time for the Muslims. It was feared that the Congress after having seen the aftermath of its policy might retrace its steps on the plea that it had never started the movement, and the British Government might submit to the Congress demands under the stress of the impending dangers to India from the eastern theatre of war. It was, indeed, the right time for Mohammad Ali Jinnah to assert himself and in November he made this bold and courageous statement:

> If the British Government after all their solemn pledges attempt to sacrifice us, let us down and throw us at the mercy of the Congress Raj, believe me, they will not succeed if we are united and organised. Now we are able to stand up and make such a government impossible. Even the combined forces of China and America cannot impose on us a constitution which will sacrifice Muslim India. But if such a mad blunder is committed by the United Nations, remember even a worm turns, and notwithstanding the foreign bayonets upholding the Congress Raj, we shall make the administration of the country impossible, for it is far too grave an issue for us to submit to.

The Congress being behind the bars Mohammad Ali Jinnah was now free to pursue his programme of action. About a year before this, when the war situation in India had worsened, he had appointed a League Committee to make an extensive tour of the sub-continent

with a view to contacting Muslims residing in the affected areas as well as others in order to explain to them the League programme of Civil Defence and explore the possibilities of how help could best be rendered to them. Incidentally the League Committee, side by side with its work in hand, gathered a store of useful information about the various places that it visited. Secondly, in March 1942, Jinnah had issued an appeal for funds and in spite of the difficult system of collection adopted by him had received, within a year, a considerable amount. The main question that engaged his attention now was the improvement of the internal organisation of the League and with this view he concentrated his efforts in the Pakistan areas. In November, he proceeded to the Punjab and made contacts with the Sikh and other non-Muslim leaders of that province and explained to them the implications and beneficial aspects of the Muslim demand of Pakistan. He made an attempt to reform the Muslim politics of Punjab and to bring the Punjab Muslim League on to a high standard of efficiency. All this, however, was not easy and he had to redouble his endeavours in this direction.

Jinnah's attention was not altogether undivided. The British Government was making an attempt to placate the non-Congress Hindus in order to carry on the functions of the Government of India with their help. The Viceroy and the Secretary of State for India were making statements about the indivisibility of India in order to achieve that end. Some of their speeches went so far as actually to prejudge India's future constitutional position and to militate against the Muslim demand. But, in general, things were satisfactory and Jinnah had plenty of time to proceed with his programme of work. During this period he had good occasions to correct the wrong impression which American and British public had come to acquire through the continued and studied propaganda conducted by Hindus and their agents. A number of foreign correspondents kept in regular touch with him and the entire burden of these corrective measures fell on the shoulders of Jinnah himself. The result was that the smoke screen which the Congress and Hindus had raised in order to prevent others from seeing the justice of Muslim claim of Pakistan, vanished in no time and most of the important elements of foreign public opinion became alive to the real Indian political situation.

During this time Mohammad Ali Jinnah made many important pronouncements and practically in all cases disproved the false allegations made against him by his vindictive opponents and also to dispel doubts existing in the minds of others about the Muslim goal of Pakistan. His speech at the plenary session of the All-India Muslim League at Delhi, in April 1943, was perhaps the most important and most weighty. In his presidential address he gave at the outset an account of the position and strength that the Muslim organisation had come to acquire during the past years with special reference to the Muslim majority provinces. He traced at length the history of the political movement and constitutional advance of India since the year 1861 and the growth of Hindu nationalism that was brought about by the introduction of democratic institution in India. He outlined how Hindu mind reacted to the decision of the British Government that the people of India would be associated with the day-to-day administration of the country, and how Muslims, after a few years of working of the reforms, in 1906 demanded the right to separate entity in the form of separate electorates. He briefly traced the course of the events during all these previous years, with which the reader would now be familiar.

He traced the causes that underlined the movement of Civil Disobedience by individuals and then that of "Quit India." He characterised all these manoeuvres as futile and said that they were conducted against the Muslim demand of Pakistan and to blackmail the British. The primary duty of the Congress leadership was to declare truce and retrace their steps. "Nobody would welcome it more than myself," said the Muslim leader, "if Mr. Gandhi is even now really willing to come to a settlement with the Muslim League on the basis of Pakistan." Explaining further, Jinnah said: "Mr. Gandhi gets all the information, all the newspapers and knows and understands what is going on. If there is any change of heart on his part he was only to drop me a few lines when, I assure you, the Muslim League will not fail, whatever may have been our controversies in the past."

So much for the Congress. Jinnah criticised also the policy of the British Government towards the League for refusing to grasp the hand of co-operation extended by the Muslims for the purpose of the successful prosecution of the war. He explained the constitu-

tional position of Pakistan and the place of minorities in it and cited examples from the world history that supported the Muslim contention. He also examined the various counter-suggestions that were put forward by various organisations and individuals and analysed their various implications making it clear how they failed to meet the Muslim demand.

The conciliatory note that Mohammad Ali Jinnah struck during his speech had unfortunately an adverse effect on Gandhi. He made it an instrument as a Hindu paper suggested to put Jinnah and the British Government in the wrong. Gandhi wrote to Jinnah saying that he wanted to meet the Muslim leader without signifying his attitude towards "the internecine war" and Muslim goal of Pakistan to which reference was made by Jinnah in his speech. The Government of India, therefore, in accordance with their declared policy of not allowing the prisoner to carry on correspondence with the outside world, withheld the letter but forwarded its substance to Jinnah. When the news of this letter was published there was an uproar from the "nationalist" press. The game was that either the Muslim League and its leader should be embroiled into an unnecessary clash with the Government of India or that Muslims should be made to think that their leaders were in an unholy alliance with the British. Both these attempts utterly failed. Mohammad Ali Jinnah cleared the position and said that he still hoped that a communication of the nature he outlined in his speech would not be withheld by the Government of India. "Some of the responsible Hindu leaders," said he, "pressed upon me that Mr. Gandhi has now realised that he had made a mistake and that he would be prepared to consider and retrace his steps if he was given an opportunity to do so, and that he had changed his attitude towards Pakistan and would be willing to come to a settlement on the basis of Pakistan, but the British Government were preventing the Hindu-Muslim settlement by refusing people of position and standing to establish contact with him for this purpose. I, therefore, suggested that if Mr. Gandhi were to write to me a letter indicating that he was prepared to retrace his steps and abandon his policy and programme culminating in the resolution of the A.-I.C.C. of August 8, and was even now willing to come to a settlement with the Muslim League on the basis of Pakistan, we were willing to bury the past

and forget it. I still believe that the Government will not dare to stop such a letter if it came from Mr. Gandhi."

Interested parties, however, continued to say that this was Jinnah's afterthought and he wanted to evade the issue. But the original text of Gandhi's letter subsequently published cleared every doubt, as Gandhi himself recognised that there was an "if" in Jinnah's speech and that what was required was a change of heart and not change of tactics. But during the intervening period between the news of Gandhi's letter and the publication of its actual text the regular campaign of vilification and vituperation had considerably strengthened the hands of the Congress agents. Some of the Madras Congressmen had, it seems, won over the Khaksar leader, Allama Mashriqi, who happened to be in Madras at the time, and got him to issue instructions to his followers to adopt every means to "influence" Mohammad Ali Jinnah and make him realise the so-called importance of "oneness." The result was that a fanatic from the Punjab, fired with the enthusiasm of becoming the most faithful follower of the Allama, went to the residence of the Muslim leader and found an occasion to assault him with a knife. The incident is well known and need not be retold here.[2] But it, nevertheless, demonstrated how misguided and thoughtless propaganda can and does produce undesirable effects.

Jinnah's attention was riveted on the Muslim Provinces. His primary aim now was to see that in Muslim areas the authority of the League was maintained and that in the provincial legislatures League parties functioned properly and systematically. He now resolved that the Provincial Governments which had been hitherto functioning under the name of the All-India Muslim League should in fact act under the control of the League and be a source of strength to the Muslim organisation instead of serving as mere agents for the good conduct of governmental business, as some of them were tending to be. He wanted to inculcate in them the idea that they should carry on their affairs under a Muslim national policy and bring their respective governments on to a higher standard of public service in pursuance of the nobler cause of public good and public well-being.

2. A full account of this incident will be found in *Jinnah Faces an Assassin*: by A Bar-at-Law.

The sterile policy of the British Government to conduct the affairs of the Government of India with the help of men with little or no public support and the consequent apathy and lack of foresight shown by them in dealing with the acute food problem that was developing for some time past on the one hand, and on the other the refusal of the Congress to devote attention to the real interest of the people instead of party gains, based partly on the miscalculation of the relative strength of the Allies and Axis, brought about one of the most severe calamities the people of Bengal and adjacent tracts had experienced for a long time. An acute famine in the fertile agricultural land of Bengal connected with a net-work of railways on all sides would seem an unthinkable monstrosity. But that is what exactly happened. On top of this there was the ruthless Banya capitalist, always posing as a "nationalist" who hoarded and held back foodstuffs and cared little for the hundreds of thousands of lives that were being lost in the bargain. Fortunately, at this moment a Muslim League Ministry came in power in Bengal and Lord Wavell assumed the Viceroyalty of India. The popular support that the League Ministry got from the people of Bengal and Jinnah's valuable endeavours in bringing the various organisations together for the purpose of relief and above all the unprecedented co-operation between the civil and military authorities which was possible through the good offices of Wavell served a great deal to control the situation and Bengal was saved from the impending mass annihilation. The manner in which this public calamity was used by some of India's foremost politicians to advance their own ends and to further party politics clearly demonstrated the type of texture of which India's "national" life was woven and how far reliance could be placed on a democratic co-operation and goodwill of the heterogeneous political elements even when the existence of millions of lives was at stake.

The plenary session of the All-India Muslim League was held at Karachi in the month of December 1943. Mohammad Ali Jinnah was now determined in the first place to organise the internal machinery of the League both in the Centre and in the provinces and in the second place to plan the future of Muslim activity within the political field and outside. The appointment of Committee of Action and also the setting up of a body for the purpose of future planning

were steps taken for the realisation of these objects. Muslim India was now entering a new phase. In fact it was now coming into its own. Reforms were needed everywhere and the Muslim intelligentsia was getting impatient for their early introduction, especially in view of the fact that their trusted leader had already taken big strides in that direction.

The Presidential Address delivered by Mohammad Ali Jinnah at Karachi is profusely punctuated by notes of deep pathos showing how much moved he was by the wrong meaning that were generally attributed to his utterances, and false motives associated with his political actions. For this he had no less complaint against the British than against the Hindus. But he said he must face these allegations with boldness and courage for his conscience was absolutely clear. Nevertheless he bore no ill-will towards any organisation, group or individual. He was advocating a cause in which he thoroughly believed and he was voicing a sentiment which he knew was just and reasonable. His arguments and appeals were, therefore, not only directed to Hindus alone but also to the British, although he believed that if the former agreed to the principle underlying the Muslim claim, the British authority would be easy to handle in view of the joint effort that would follow. He hoped such a state of affairs was sooner or later bound to come.

The hopes of Mohammad Ali Jinnah were not altogether unfounded. During the next budget session of the Central Legislative Assembly the Congress Party joined hands with the League in defeating the official bloc. The news was welcomed by all. Choudhry Khaliquzzaman rightly said that "a healthy change in the outlook of Congressmen is taking place and the realities of the situation have begun to be appreciated." The Assembly incident was hailed by Hindus and Muslims alike as an augury of better understanding and consequently better results, and it was hoped that it might lead to a permanent settlement of a long-standing problem. All eyes were now turned towards the League which had always been eager to coalesce with any party on the basis of equality without prejudice to the major political problem.

It was now for the Government of India to act. Immediately in the following month came the unconditional release of Gandhi, and the attention of the Hindu public was once again focussed on Poona

where Gandhi stayed. Once again the leaders, who led no one, began to feel active. Once again appeals and messages were addressed to the Whitehall direct. Once again the policy of ignoring Muslim interests and even the existence of the League came into play. Once again requests were made to the India Office that the British Government should "follow Gandhi's release with a friendly gesture." All this suited the British very well, but the Hindu intelligentsia continued to play into the hands of the detested "imperialists" as usual, and when Amery refused to have any truck with Gandhi it was again driven to a point of desperation.

The tactics of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi were, however, quite different. After he had noticed the reaction of Amery to the appeals of the Hindu agents he decided to embark on a "fact-finding mission," on the plea that he had been out of touch with politics for a long time and he was not in a position to decide anything definite. But the events that followed, facts about which were brought to light later, throw light upon the actual motive of this mission. It seems that this so-called fact-finding mission was undertaken actually to seek an opportunity by means of which Gandhi would be in a position to negotiate a settlement with the British Government over the head of the Muslim League. He saw, probably, a ray of hope in the ill-advised statements of the Viceroy and the Secretary of State for India and other British statesmen, who had been unduly emphasising their belief in the "essential unity" of India. The first thing that Gandhi did, therefore, was to write to the Viceroy for an interview. The Viceroy, however, could not see his way to grant the interview because of the "radical difference in our points of view." But he was willing to consider "any definite and constructive policy" that Gandhi put forth "on further reflection."

What was now to be done? Gandhi hit upon a novel idea. A number of jurists were set up to give their legal opinion on the Congress resolution of August 1942. Soon the expected verdict came that the resolution in question had lapsed; and this decision was given a wide publicity in India and abroad. Gandhi closely watched the situation and when he found that this could not serve his purpose either, he retraced his steps saying that the August resolution was innocuous and stood as it was, but his authority

under the resolution had lapsed.

At this time an English paper sent out to India one of its representatives, Gelder by name, with a view to seeing Gandhi and to providing facilities to the latter for political negotiations. The reader is familiar with a similar incident during the non-co-operation days when another paper had sent out its representative for the same purpose. But this time, Gelder's mission was more or less unnecessary. This time Gandhi was outside the prison and his release was not without a purpose. On the contrary the exclusive interview that Gandhi granted to Gelder without inviting the Indian journalists, who perpetually kept hovering round his quarters, roused bitter resentment among them. His action, they thought, was very much against his own preachings of Swadeshi. In fact a well-known Parsi journalist of Bombay could not find the reason why Congress leaders should behave in this manner and why there should be "such a big misfire from the biggest gun of them all."

Gelder's interview published in India was followed by a studied campaign conducted by a score of Hindu leaders led by Rajagopalacharia that Gandhi had changed his attitude towards what they called the communal problem. At times it was even stated that the liberal-minded leaders such as Rajagopalacharia and others had triumphed over Gandhi. A formula for the Hindu-Muslim settlement designed by the Madras leader and having the "blessings" of Gandhi was put forth before the public together with the text of the correspondence that passed between the former and Mohammad Ali Jinnah. The Muslim leader in the course of this correspondence had stated that he would put the formula before the League Committee to which the Hindu leader had objected on the ground that it was first to be accepted by Jinnah and then by the League. Rajagopalacharia's statement that accompanied the release of this correspondence to the press was to the effect that Jinnah had no desire for a settlement.

A resume of the circumstances that prompted Rajagopalacharia to publish this correspondence was given by Mohammad Ali Jinnah in the course of his statement before the Council of the All-India Muslim League which met at Delhi at the end of July 1944. Tracing the course of the events as to how attempts of Gandhi to get into touch with the British authorities failed and coming down to the

failure of Gelder "as a go-between to link him up with Lord Wavell," Jinnah proceeded:

> At this psychological moment Mr. Rajagopalacharia was at Poona and suddenly I received a telegram from him on June 30 as another go-between, complaining without any reason that his letter of April 8 remained unanswered although he knew perfectly well that it required no answer, as the answer was already given to him—and threatening me that he would like to publish the formula and my rejection. He said he had sent the telegram with Mr. Gandhi's approval and further warned me that he would like me at this juncture to reconsider my rejection. In my reply I pointed out to him that his version that I had rejected the formula was wrong and I am glad that he does not contradict the true facts as stated by me but confirms them. The correspondence was, however, abruptly released to the press, so that I should stand on my trial before the bar of public opinion of the world and of India and especially of the Muslims. Immediately the word had passed, and the Congress press framed various grave charges against me.
>
> My only sin was, that I requested Mr. Rajagopalacharia to allow me to place his proposal before my Working Committee and that as Mr. Gandhi was no longer in prison I requested that he should directly communicate to me whatever proposals he may choose to put forward, assuring him that I would place them before my Working Committee. What was the objection to such a course? I fail to appreciate the line adopted by Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Rajagopalacharia and I am willing to face the verdict of the Muslim League or any other independent and impartial man in India or abroad.

Jinnah then proceeded to discuss the details of the Formula and explained at length how in effect it did not meet the Muslim demand. At the close of his statement he disclosed to the House that he had received a letter from Gandhi written in Gujerati together with a translation in Urdu wishing to see him. Jinnah said he had written back to Gandhi in English—"the only language in which I can make no mistake"—signifying his pleasure to receive him at Bombay. The news caused a sensation in the political circles of India and for the time being everything remained in suspense. But the publication of

Gandhi-Wavell correspondence, the last link of Gandhi's fact-finding mission, was to a certain extent damping. It demonstrated that even though Gandhi was meeting the Muslim leader for a political settlement his hope in bringing the British round to his point of view had not been shaken. He was obviously persisting in his futile attempt to blackmail the British against the Muslim interests in spite of protests and objections from the side of Muslim India. The outcome of this meeting, therefore, could be anything but settlement.

The leaders met in the middle of September 1944 and continued their discussion for about a fortnight through personal talks and letters. Both Rajagopalacharia's formula and Lahore Resolution of the League were discussed. Side by side a counter-proposal was also made by Gandhi and ultimately they parted without arriving at any final decision. A study of the letters that passed between Jinnah and Gandhi during these talks reveals that the meeting was more a battle of wits and words than anything else. The Hindu leader insisted that he came in his personal capacity and did not represent any particular point of view than his own. Jinnah on the other hand reminded him that he had not accepted that position as a basis for negotiations but was willing to convert Gandhi to his point of view if he were open for conviction. Jinnah pointed out to Gandhi that even though the latter denied his being "clothed with representative authority" it was strangely clear that "your representative capacity comes into play when you are making counter-proposals," as he had kept on saying that Sikhs and other elements would not agree to the Muslim demands. Gandhi's circuitous argumentation, shifting from Rajagopalacharia's formula to Lahore Resolution of the League and then back again and then over again to the League Resolution, punctuating the discussions by his own suggestions and those of others whom he did not claim to represent, had made the breakdown of these talks inevitable. Jinnah had called this break-down unfortunate, and in his final letter anticipated a storm of vituperation, as he himself put it, "to pillory me when the word goes."

The word passed and soon after scores of statements were published in the press, but in the midst of this camouflage the clear outlines of an important fact were discernible—that while Gandhi posed as an individual without having any representative authority

vested in him, he had, prior to opening his negotiations with Jinnah, already committed himself to several organisations, not excluding those of the Punjab and Bengal, to the effect that he would never agree to anything without consulting them.

The Hindu public reaction to the Gandhi-Jinnah talks was not unusual. The Hindu press continued to support the attitude of Gandhi, while more outspoken elements of Hindu opinion even reproached him for having let down the Hindus by signifying his assent even to the formula of Rajagopalacharia. But the saner opinion was rather disappointed as to why he made so much fuss about a trifling. If the principle of self-determination was to be accepted, as he professed he did accept it, then why qualify it and beat about the bush until the very essence of it is lost. If a settlement had got to be arrived at on this principle, then why bargain for it and let India's fate hang in the balance? But few could muster courage to raise their voice and things went on as usual. The British had gained their end and the unfortunate deadlock continued as ever. Muslim opinion, however, emerged out stronger and more united than even before and a considerable number of British statesmen had come to appreciate the Muslim claim.

Gandhi had now once again to focus Hindu opinion on himself and out of the two of his favourite stunts—the fast and the constructive programme—he had, under the advice of his friends, abandoned the first. The opportunity for the second was afforded by the "National Fund" that was being raised by his followers in the name of the late Mrs. Kasturba Gandhi and he set himself the task of utilising it for the "national welfare."

Yet another "national" machinery came to the forefront. A set of "nationalist" capitalists put forth a scheme endeavouring to "nationalise" industry and above all to nationalise British capital in India. Muslims did not fail to see through the game and the scheme died its own natural death.

At the close of the year 1944 the unattached leaders came once again on the political scene for the purpose of exploring the channels of compromise. It is noteworthy that in this they were enthusiastically encouraged by the Hindu leadership. It was obviously a manoeuvre to influence the British mind, at the time when vital changes were being wrought in the political life of Great Britain

and of the world. Britain was naturally inclined to pay good heed to it.

Sapru proposals were published in April 1945 and were embodied in no less than fifteen resolutions. It was suggested that the centre should consist of representatives elected on the basis of a parity between Muslims and caste Hindus while minorities should be separately provided for. But this was made subservient to the condition that Muslims should accept the principle of a united India and joint electorates. It was obvious that these proposals aimed at a gradual political annihilation of Muslims, but they unconsciously accepted the question of Muslims being a separate entity and the principle of parity loomed large on the political horizon for a long time to come.

Another important event during this period was the return to power of the Congress in the Frontier Province which was supposed to have tacit blessings of Gandhi. What was behind this move? "It is recognised," suggested a Bombay newspaper, "that the Frontier Province is a special case. The Frontier with an overwhelming majority has always been handled with extra consideration by the Congress High Command. Much of the Congress claim to represent Muslims as well as Hindus results from its hold on the Frontier Province. It has, therefore, been treated as a pet child." Dr. Khan Saheb, on his assuming the charge of office, was reported to have said that he did so "to alleviate the misery of the people and to eliminate corruption," and when asked to reconcile his position with the 1939 decision of the Congress to withdraw from office, he said: "Don't you see the changes? Are they not before your eyes?" It was generally believed that Gandhi was agreeable in principle to the formation of a Congress ministry in the Frontier Province. "Serve the people; that is your duty," was believed to have been the advice given by him to Dr. Khan Saheb.

What happened to Gandhi's invitation to the British power to withdraw? Why was that noble sentiment of serving the people lying dormant ever since 1939? And why was that sense of duty awakened suddenly in Frontier alone? The times had changed, said Dr. Khan Saheb. The implication was that the war situation had improved; the British victory was no more an uncertainty; the Japanese fate was now sealed and an attempt to blackmail the British

Government from without had been foiled. Some other tactics had to be adopted. It was, perhaps, more useful "to wreck the constitution from within," or, perhaps, to make a Muslim mass contact from the seat of authority.

"God only knows man's heart," said Gandhi. Was a change of heart possible? Jinnah was never tired of making an honest effort for bringing about that change.

CHAPTER XVII

Interim Advance

In the subsequent months rapid changes took place both in India and in Great Britain. In April 1945 Wavell had left for England to confer with British Government to formulate the future Indian policy, and the local Hindu leaders along with their agents in the United Kingdom redoubled their efforts to secure a declaration from the British Government to ignore Muslim opinion. The local press instituted a vigorous propaganda and one of the Bombay newspapers went to the length of publishing forged letters purporting to have been exchanged between Mohammad Ali Jinnah and L. S. Amery, Secretary of State for India.

In May 1945 the Labour Party in Great Britain rejected Winston Churchill's request to continue the Coalition and soon after the British Parliament was dissolved and fresh general elections ordered. In the middle of June Wavell announced his historic proposals. At the outset he explained that these proposals did not constitute an attempt to impose a constitutional settlement but were made without prejudice to the future. He said whatever changes were being proposed were to be worked out strictly within the framework of the Government of India Act of 1935. In so doing, however, the intention of His Majesty's Government was to accelerate the prosecution of war against Japan, to devise ways and means in consultation with Indian leaders for the post-war development of the country, and to make the long term solution of the Indian political problem easier.

Keeping these basic principles in view the Viceroy proposed to reconstitute his Executive Council by the inclusion of accepted

leaders of the Indian opinion for which he suggested a parity between Muslims and caste Hindus. It was intended to hand over all departments of the Government of India to Indian hands including foreign affairs and finance. He further announced that India would henceforth be free to appoint High Commissioners in the various Dominions. To discuss this plan Wavell invited at Simla "those now holding office as Premiers in Provincial Governments; or, for Provinces now under Section 93 Government, those who last held the office as Premiers, the Leader of the Congress Party and Deputy Leader of the Muslim League in the Central Assembly; the Leaders of the Congress Party and the Muslim League in the Council of State; also the leaders of the Nationalist Party and European Group in the Assembly; Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah as the recognised leaders of the two main political parties; Rao Bahadur Shiva Raj to represent the Scheduled Castes; and Master Tara Singh to represent the Sikhs." The Simla Conference was to represent British India only and one of the questions to be discussed was the holding of general elections in India.

As was expected, Wavell proposals provided Gandhi ample material for twisting them to suit his convenience and turning them to the best advantage of Hindu interests. The first thing he did was to disclaim representative capacity placed by the Viceroy on him and suggested the name of Abul Kalam Azad as he was the President of the Congress. Nevertheless, he assumed for himself the charge of an adviser to the Conference outside it. Secondly, as if in spite of the lack of his representative capacity, he asked the Viceroy to explain the implication of the term "Caste Hindus," and obtained from him a declaration that it meant Hindus other than the Scheduled Castes, which helped him to maintain the fiction of Hindu majority.

The Conference continued its deliberations for about three weeks during which it was adjourned twice in order to enable the League and Congress leaders to arrive at an amicable settlement but no tangible result ensued. Mohammad Ali Jinnah had put forward on behalf of the Indian Muslims two points for the consideration of the Viceroy. Firstly, that all the representatives from amongst the Muslims should be chosen by the Viceroy in confident consultation with the President of the All-India Muslim League. Secondly, that

since Muslims, by virtue of minorities present in the Executive Council, would be reduced to the position of a minority, some safeguards should be provided other than the usual veto power of the Governor-General, to enable them to watch effectively over the rights and interests of Muslims. The Viceroy rejected all these demands and thus fell back upon the word of honour given to Muslims by his predecessor who had accepted these very conditions in principle.

What actually transpired in this conference is evident in detail from the lengthy correspondence that passed between Jinnah and Wavell. The Simla Conference ultimately failed in its object and it demonstrated that neither Lord Wavell nor the Congress were in a mood to give any consideration to the demands of the Muslims, but that both were out to create disruption among the ranks of Muslims. Unionist leaders from the Punjab were put up to divide Muslim quota further than what was actually being demanded by the Congress for the so-called "nationalist" Muslims. Jinnah said in a statement:

> On a final examination and analysis of the Wavell plan we found that it was a snare. There was the combination consisting of the Gandhi-Hindu Congress, which stands for India's Hindu national independence as one India, and the latest exponent of geographical unity, Lord Wavell, and Glancy-Khizr axis, who are bent upon creating disruption among the Muslims in the Punjab, and we were sought to be pushed into this arrangement, which, if we had agreed to, as proposed by Lord Wavell, we should have signed our death warrant; for let us honestly examine the Wavell plan.
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> Our stand has been, and we have repeatedly made it clear to the British Government, times out of number, since 1940, that we cannot consider or enter into any provisional interim government unless a declaration is made by the British Government guaranteeing the right of self-determination of Muslims, and pledging that, after the war, or so soon as it may be possible, the British Government would establish Pakistan, having regard to the basic principles laid down in the Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League, passed in March 1940 . . . We are not a minority but a nation, and we can only enter into a provi-

sional arrangement, having regard to the necessities and exigencies of the moment created by the war, and fully co-operate in the prosecution of war, and that in this arrangement we claimed an equal number in the proposed Executive.

The Wavell proposals set at nought both these conditions and called upon us to make the severest sacrifice. I know in his broadcast he said that these proposals are without prejudice to any future constitution or constitutions of India. While in one breath it is impressed upon us that these proposals are without prejudice to and do not prejudge the Pakistan issue, yet the plan contradicts this in the next breath by its very terms. It is obvious to any intelligent man that if we accept the arrangement, the Pakistan issue will be shelved and put into cold storage indefinitely, whereas the Congress would have secured under the arrangement what they want, namely, a clear road for their advance towards securing a Hindu national independence of India: because the future execution will work as a unitary government of India, and we know that this interim or provisional arrangement will have a way of settling down for an unlimited period, and all the forces in the proposed Executive, plus the known policy of the British Government and Lord Wavell's strong inclination towards a united India would completely jeopardise us; for I will quote Mr. Amery, who has tried his best, but, in the result, has given us cold comfort and his statement is a very clear indication and a pointer to the British policy.

Speaking in the House of Commons where he presented the White Paper he said as follows: "The ideal to which we have always looked is that of an all-India union in which the states will play their full part. At the same time we have also recognised the possibility that agreement between Hindus and Muslims on any form of Indian unity may be unattainable. Any interim advance, therefore, must in no way prejudge the question whether an ultimate settlement is based on a united or a divided India."

For the Congress the Simla Conference marked the complete swerving of policy. Hitherto its attitude towards all British declarations had been that of suspicion and hostility. After Simla, the Congress became extremely friendly and co-operative not only with

the British Government but with the Government of India also. Evidently that was due to the personal impressions that Wavell made upon the Hindu mind and the Congress made a unique departure from convention of withholding the publication of letters that were exchanged between the Congress President and the Viceroy. Subsequently, Hindu leaders even went to the extent of curbing strikes and putting down popular uprisings which they had so far been mainly instrumental in initiating. Sardar Vallabbhai Patel's intervention in the revolt made by the ratings of the Royal Indian Navy who had appealed to him for help and his consequent advice for surrender, completely surprised those who believed in the bombastic professions of Congress leadership.

Late in July 1945 the general elections in Great Britain returned an over-whelming majority of Labour candidates and within a few days Pethick-Lawrence replaced Amery as the Secretary of State for India. The Labour victory in Parliament was hailed by the Hindu press as a triumph for the Congress and attempts were renewed to assure that Muslim opinion should be completely ignored in shaping the Indian policy. Almost immediately came the news of the Allied victory over Japan, which was followed by the decision to hold general elections in India.

The announcement that elections would be held soon was regarded by Muslims as a matter of great relief. For, it was by this means that they hoped to settle, once for all, the question as to who was their rightful representative—the All-India Muslim League or the Indian National Congress. At Simla Conference the League emphatically demanded new elections. But the Congress remained conveniently quiet. As a matter of fact a few Hindus suggested postponement.

As was expected the League secured unprecedented sucess in the elections and from one end of the country to the other Muslims returned their verdict in favour of the League candidates. Most of the opposing candidates lost their deposits. In many constituencies the Congress did not put up a contest and in most cases it could not find suitable candidates. The elections were naturally followed by the installation of Party Governments. In some provinces the Congress parties became divided among themselves, while in others they proceeded to form governments of their own. But in the case of

Muslim provinces Hindus spared no efforts to see that Muslim ministries were not formed. While in the Hindu provinces the Congress made no gesture of forming coalition with others, in Muslim provinces it relaxed its attitude either for the purpose of forming an official group or opposition. Bribes and temptations were offered and all ethics of public morality were waived off.

During the close of 1945 and towards the beginning of the following year a Parliamentary Delegation toured through the country and submitted its report later to the British Cabinet. On the 15th of March 1946, Prime Minister Clement Attlee announced in the House of Commons that three Cabinet Ministers—Pethick-Lawrence, Secretary of State for India, Stafford Cripps, President of the Board of Trade and A. V. Alexander, First Lord of Admiralty—would come to India in order to facilitate self-government in conjunction with the Viceroy and in consultation with the recognised party leaders. Said he:

> I am well aware that when I speak of India I speak of a country containing congeries of races, religions and languages, and I know well the difficulties thereby created but these difficulties can only be overcome by Indians. We are mindful of the rights of the minorities and the minorities should be able to live free from fear. On the other hand we cannot allow a minority to place veto on the advance of a majority. We cannot dictate how these difficulties shall be overcome. Our first duty is to get a machinery of decision set up, and that is the main purpose of the ministerial mission and the Viceroy. We want to see set up an interim government to give the Viceroy greater freedom in order that in the period which is to elapse while a constitution is worked out you may have a government enjoying the greatest possible support in India.

The Mission reached Karachi on the evening of March 23, 1946 and pending the results of the most of the elections going on at the time in the country it decided to begin consultations after a week. In the meantime the three members busied themselves in getting acquainted with the situation and bringing their knowledge up-to-date in conferring with the Viceroy and Governors of the Provinces who came to see them at Delhi.

In the first half of April 1946 while still carrying on conversations

with the visiting British Ministers, Mohammad Ali Jinnah added the most important chapter in the history of Muslim India by calling a Convention of Legislators returned to the Central and Provincial Legislatures on the Muslim League ticket. Over 500 members gathered at Delhi. Some 200 journalists represented the world press to report the proceedings. Among the visitors were some Akali leaders including Giani Kartar Singh.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah inaugurated the meeting and in an inspiring speech put forward the Muslim case for Pakistan. He analysed the various suggestions put forward on behalf of the Congress particularly by Jawaharlal Nehru and Vallabbhai Patel that India should be granted independence before finding a solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem and that power should be transferred to an interim government. If such a proposal was given effect to and a government of this type was set up, said he, it would not hold for 48 hours. For, it was inconceivable that the Congress—a Fascist Grand Council—should be vested with full powers immediately to decide and decree the fate and destiny of one hundred millions of people and that the existing governmental machinery be used against Muslims and millions of minority and other interests. The Muslim League proceeded on the basis of reality. There existed fundamental and vital differences between Muslims and Hindus, and there had never been, for all these centuries, either social or political unity between the two nations. The so-called existing unity was merely physical and was maintained by force of the British civil and military power.

In a lengthy resolution the Convention greatly emphasised that "different historical backgrounds, traditions, cultures, social and economic orders of the Hindus and the Muslims have made impossible the evolution of a single Indian nation inspired by common aspirations and ideals" and that after centuries they still remained the distinct major nations. The Convention demanded an unequivocal undertaking for the establishment of sovereign and independent state for zones in which Muslims were in majority and that two constitution-making bodies should be set up by the peoples of Pakistan and Hindusthan for the purpose of framing their respective constitutions. It further declared that any attempt to impose a constitution on a united India basis or to force any interim arrangement

at the centre contrary to the Muslim League demand would leave the Muslims "no alternative but to resist such imposition by all possible means for their survival and national existence."

After the convention each member present signed the famous pledge declaring "my firm conviction that the safety and security and the salvation and destiny of the Muslim Nation inhabiting the Continent of India lie only in the achievement of Pakistan which is the one equitable, honourable and just solution of the constitutional problem and which will bring peace, freedom and prosperity to the various nationalities and communities of this great subcontinent. I most solemnly affirm that I shall willingly and unflinchingly carry out all the directions and instructions which may be issued by the All-India Muslim League in pursuance of any movement launched by it for the attainment of the cherished national goal of Pakistan, and believing as I do in the righteousness and the justice of my cause, I pledge myself to undergo any danger, trial or sacrifice which may be demanded of me."

Early in April 1946 the Cabinet Delegation in conjunction with the Viceroy started their conversations with the leaders of the various groups. Various formulas were suggested by different leaders, mainly on behalf of the Congress in order to create confusion in the shape of alternatives to the Pakistan scheme but Mohammad Ali Jinnah stood firm. At last the Cabinet Mission invited representatives of the Muslim League and the Congress to a joint meeting at Simla, which also bore no fruit. Ultimately the Mission made their own decision and recommended that the constitution should take the following basic form:

(1) There should be a Union of India, embracing both British India and the States, which should deal with the following subjects: Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications; and should have the powers necessary to raise the finances required for the above subjects.

(2) The Union should have an Executive and a Legislature constituted from British India and State representatives. Any question raising a major communal issue in the Legislature should require for its decision a majority of the representatives present and voting of each of the two major communities as well as a majority of all the members present and

voting.

(3) All subjects other than the Union subjects and all residuary powers should vest in the provinces.

(4) The States will retain all subjects and powers other than those ceded to the Union.

(5) Provinces should be free to form groups with executives and legislatures, and each group could determine the provincial subjects to be taken in common.

(6) The constitutions of the Union and of the groups should contain a provision whereby any province could, by a majority vote of its Legislative Assembly, call for reconsideration of the terms of the constitution after an initial period of ten years and at ten yearly intervals thereafter.

The Cabinet Mission then detailed the basis for the formation of a constitution-making body to be elected from amongst the provincial legislatures which would decide the details of the constitution for the Centre as well as those of the various groups.

As soon as Cabinet Ministers' declaration was published Gandhi began its interpretation according to his own conception and to suit the Congress politics. It was open, he said, for the Constituent Assembly to abolish the distinction of Muslims and non-Muslims, which the Mission had felt forced to recognise. The provinces, he said, were free to reject the very idea of grouping. The Mission according to him had suggested certain subjects for the Centre and it was open to the Constituent Assembly, which he said was a sovereign body, to add to these subjects or even to reduce them with the majority vote of Muslims and non-Muslims separately.

This indicated that the Congress was inclined to accept the Mission's proposals with some reservations, and, on May 24, when its Working Committee passed a resolution, it was made clear. There was no vital change, it opined, envisaged during the interim period, when the provisional government would function. If the independence of India was aimed at then the functioning of provisional government must approximate closely in fact, even though not in law, to that independence and all obstructions and hindrances to it should be removed. The continued presence of a foreign army of occupation was a negation of independence. The Congress was, therefore, not so much after independence as it was after the form

of that independence, and while expressing its opinion on the provision in the Mission's statement for the so-called communal issues, it unequivocally declared that it had no mind to give up its nefarious desire of establishing a Hindu regime to the detriment of Muslims and minorities. "The statement issued by the Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy," ran the resolution, "contains certain recommendations and suggests a procedure for the building up of a Constituent Assembly, which is sovereign in so far as the framing of the constitution is concerned. The Committee do not agree with some of these recommendations. In their view it will be open to the Constituent Assembly itself at any stage to make changes and variations, with the proviso, that in regard to certain major communal matters a majority decision of both the major communities will be necessary."

Mohammad Ali Jinnah also issued a lengthy statement regretting that the Mission should have negatived the Muslim demand for the establishment of a complete sovereign State of Pakistan, which the Muslim League still held was the only solution of the constitutional problem of India and which alone could secure stable governments and lead to the happiness and welfare not only of the two major communities, but of all the peoples of this sub-continent. It was all the more regrettable that the Mission should have thought fit to advance common-place and exploded arguments against Pakistan and resorted to special pleadings couched in deplorable language which was calculated to hurt the feelings of Muslim India. It seemed to him that this was done by the Mission to appease and placate the Congress, because when they came to face the realities, they themselves made the announcement that they were greatly impressed by the "very genuine and acute anxiety of the Muslims lest they should find themselves subjected to a perpetual Hindu majority rule. This feeling has become so strong and widespread amongst the Muslims that it cannot be allayed by mere paper safeguards. If there is to be internal peace in India, it must be secured by measures which will assure to the Muslims a control in all matters vital to their culture, religion and economic or other interests." Mohammad Ali Jinnah criticised the details of the scheme too.

The Cabinet Mission at once took notice of it and issued a statement seeking to clarify the various points raised. It stated that the

interpretation put by the Congress resolution on the provinces being able to make the choice whether or not to belong to the section in which they were placed did not accord with the Delegation's intentions.

The references that the preamble of the Mission's original statement contained against Pakistan and in favour of a united India sent a current of jubilation through the Hindu press and Hindu leadership. Amongst Muslims there was outspoken resentment and strong condemnation of its provisions was showered from all quarters. It was feared that the All-India Muslim League would reject these proposals outright. But so great was the personal effort made by Mohammad Ali Jinnah and such great was the "earnest desire for a peaceful solution, if possible, of the Indian constitutional problem," that the League put on record its willingness "to co-operate with the constitution-making machinery proposed in the scheme outlined by the Mission, in the hope that it would ultimately result in the establishment of a complete sovereign Pakistan and in the consummation of the goal of independence for the major nations, and all the other peoples inhabiting this vast sub-continent."

The League reserved the right to modify and revise the policy and attitude set forth in this resolution at any time during the progress of deliberations of the constitution-making body or the Constituent Assembly or, therefore, if the course of events so required, bearing in mind the fundamental principles and ideals to which the Muslim League was irrevocably committed. As regards the arrangements for the proposed interim government at the Centre, the Council of the All-India Muslim League authorised its President to negotiate with the Viceroy and take such decisions and actions as he deemed fit and proper.

The decision made by the League was hailed by the British press as "wise and statesmanlike," but unfortunately by the local press and leadership it was misconstrued to mean that Muslims of India had "climbed down" under compulsion and that it was the time when they should be more pressed in order to yield more.

The Congress had not yet declared its willingness to work the Mission's plan. In the previous resolution it had only pointed out some aspects of it which from the point of view of Hindus seemed to be defective. In the meantime the Viceroy had announced his

intention to go ahead with the reconstitution of his Executive Council in accordance with the Mission's statement. Five seats had been allocated to the Congress Hindus and one to the Congress Scheduled Castes. Five were offered to the Muslim Leaguers and the rest to the three minorities—one to Parsis, one to Christians and one to Sikhs. There were in all fourteen and list of the names announced included those of Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Jawaharlal Nehru. It was also announced on behalf of the Mission and the Viceroy that the long-term and short-term proposals formed an integral part of each other and they must be accepted or rejected together, and that if any of the two parties happened to reject the proposals, then the Viceroy would go ahead to form his Executive Council with those who accepted them.

When the Congress Working Committee met to consider the proposals it passed a rather ambiguous resolution about the long term but rejected the proposal for the interim provisional government. But the Working Committee of the Muslim League which was already in session accepted the interim government also "in the light of clarifications and assurances given by the Viceroy in consultation with the Mission in his letter of June 20 to Mr. Jinnah." As subsequent events proved the Congress decision was made mainly to centre attention round itself and at the same time to study various reactions of the public particularly to elicit British public opinion, and how far the Viceroy and the Cabinet Delegation would go to placate the Congress.

Strangely enough and contrary to the letter and spirit of official announcements the Viceroy postponed the formation of an interim government in view of the Congress rejection and announced, instead, the setting up of a 'caretaker' Executive Council composed of officials. With this the Cabinet Ministers who had been in India for over three months left after having expressed "their cordial thanks for all the courtesy and consideration which they have received as guests in the country" with the most sincere trust that the steps which had been initiated would lead to a speedy realisation of the hopes and wishes of the Indian people.

This extraordinary step shocked Muslims of India to the core. Mohammad Ali Jinnah issued a statement exposing the whole game and gave therein details as to what actually happened. Originally,

he said, the Viceroy proceeded on the basis of the formula: five on behalf of the Muslim League, five on behalf of the Congress, one Sikh, and one Indian Christian or Anglo-Indian; and that, as regards the portfolios, the most important of them would be equally divided between the Congress and the Muslim League, further details being left open for discussion. After that the Viceroy wanted to change the basis of the original formula to 5 : 5 : 3. The Muslim League was not prepared to accept it, but since Muslims were anxious to secure an amicable settlement, Jinnah informed the Viceroy that if the Congress were finally to agree to this new formula he would place it before the League Working Committee for their consideration. But even this second formula was turned down by the Congress and the Viceroy informed Jinnah that he had failed to negotiate an agreement. Jinnah emphasised that "the delegation and the Viceroy were in honour bound to go ahead with the formation of the interim government immediately with those who were willing to come into the interim government on the basis and principle set out in their statement."

The postponement of the formation of the interim government was taken by Muslim India as a great affront and Muslims were not willing to take it lying down. The Council of the All-India Muslim League met in July 1946 at Bombay to reconsider their acceptance of the Mission's plan. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, during his presidential address, analysed the issues before the League. Referring to the part the Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy had played in handling the proposal of the interim government he said: "They have gone back on their plighted word and abandoned what was announced as their final proposals." Their plea that the Congress had accepted these proposals was unjustified and against facts. Jinnah characterised Pethick-Lawrence's statement in the House of Lords that he had faith and hope in the Indian people doing the right thing as "most unconvincing optimism" in view of the Congress stand. "I feel," he said, "we have exhausted all reasons. It is no use looking to any other source for help or assistance. There is no tribunal to which we can go. The only tribunal is the Muslim nation." He asserted that out of the three parties, the Muslim League acted, throughout the negotiations, as an honourable organisation. They negotiated on high principles. They made concessions after con-

cessions, not because they were overawed, but because of their extreme anxiety for an amicable and peaceful settlement which would lead not only Muslims and Hindus but also other communities to the achievement of freedom in the shortest possible time. But the Congress stood there, as what may be called "like a mule." It had no other consideration except one—how to put down the Muslim League.

Demanding a categorical reply from the Viceroy, Jinnah asserted that on the night of June 24 the Congress Working Committee had rejected both the long-term and the short-term proposals. Early on the morning of June 25, he said, "the indefatigable Sir Stafford" went and woke up Gandhi in the *Bhangi* Colony. But it seemed he did not cut much ice. He came back and Lord Pethick-Lawrence was then "put on the scent of Mr. Vallabbhai Patel, the strong man of the Congress." He waylaid Patel on the road and took him to his house and there they concocted a device. The Congress were persuaded to accept the long-term proposal even with their own interpretations and reservations and the Mission assured the Congress that it would abandon the interim government scheme of June 16.

"It is again like a drowning man catching a straw," he declared, "They wanted somehow or other to say that their Mission was not a complete failure. This is exactly what happened. Now I ask the Viceroy to issue a statement, giving a categorical explanation on this point. This is a grave charge against the honour, integrity and character of the members of the Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy."

The League Council passed two lengthy resolutions—the first withdrawing its "acceptance of the Cabinet Mission's proposals which was communicated to the Secretary of State for India by the President of the Muslim League on 6th June, 1946," and the other adopting the policy of Direct Action, which concluded as follows:

> The Council of the All-India Muslim League is convinced that now the time has come for the Muslim nation to resort to direct action to achieve Pakistan and to get rid of the present slavery under the British and contemplated future Caste Hindu domination. This Council calls upon the Muslim nation to stand to a man behind their sole representative organisation—the

> All-India Muslim League—and be ready for every sacrifice. This Council directs the Working Committee to prepare forthwith a programme of direct action to carry out the policy initiated above and to organise the Muslims for the coming struggle to be launched as and when necessary. As a protest against and in token of their deep resentment of the attitude of the British, this Council calls upon the Muslims to renounce forthwith the titles conferred upon them by the alien Government.

The Bombay Meeting of the Muslim League was, indeed, a landmark in Muslim history. One by one every Muslim title-holder present walked to the presidential dais and renounced his title. Frenzied cheers greeted the renunciations. All others followed from the rest of the country in response to the League mandate. The League decision created a considerable sensation in India and abroad. The Government of India began to apply their mind to the measures that they thought would be necessary if the League decision took a serious turn. The Congress also passed a resolution which was, according to Mohammad Ali Jinnah, a mere "repetition of the Congress stand put in different language and phraseology." This was, it seems, followed, as one of the Muslim papers pointed out, by "clandestine propaganda offensives" that the highest quarters of the Government of India planned "to feed selected sections of the Indian and the foreign press in order to create a favourable impression for the Congress and a hostile impression against the Muslim League."

In the meantime an invitation to Jawaharlal Nehru was issued by the Viceroy to form the interim government. But, as the Hindu press suggested, "the whole procedure of tripartite talks has been changed," and the Viceroy had placed the responsibility of forming the government solely on the shoulders of the Congress. The Congress Working Committee, had, of course, now decided that Jawaharlal Nehru, Congress President, should "be prepared to make proposals for the formation of the interim government." Nevertheless, he went and saw Mohammad Ali Jinnah to enlist co-operation of Muslims. This was the position the League President could never accept and the leaders' meeting ended without any tangible result, and Nehru proceeded to Delhi to form, what he called, "the interim government which would not merely be the Executive Council, but

a free government."

On August 16, the All-India Muslim League had decided to observe a "Direct Action Day," for the purpose of explaining to the Muslim public all over India the resolutions that were passed by the League Council at Bombay. The day was observed throughout India and passed off peacefully except in Calcutta, where communal rioting took place and unprecedented mob fury was let loose. But Hindu press howled with malignant and malicious outburst publishing unauthorised and exaggerated reports of incidents, not infrequently fabricated. It had its repercussions and soon the communal fury spread almost to the entire country, although the predominantly Muslim areas were free from it.

On August 14, 1946 an official *communique* from New Delhi announced the setting up of the much awaited interim government formed by Nehru. The Executive Council now contained three Muslims as chosen by the Congress President and it was announced that two more would soon be appointed. The event was hailed by the Hindu press as a great triumph for the Congress and it was felt that now Hindus would be in a position to deal with Muslims as they liked. Soon after their entry into the Central Government its members started to change the entire complexion of the Government of India and to resolve it instead into, what the Hindu press already called, a "national government." The feelings amongst the Hindu and Muslim Government employees ran high. The Central Secretariat resolved itself into two distinct groups. The subordinates of one community refused to do the work of the officers of the other. An atmosphere of stalemate developed. But the ruthless hand of repression worked its usual course.

In September 1946, however, the Viceroy had realised that the purely one-party government that was now installed at the Centre could not function as smoothly as it was desired. He, therefore, invited Mohammad Ali Jinnah to hold discussions with him on the question of the League's entry into the interim government. After a few meetings with the Viceroy, Mohammad Ali Jinnah had several meetings with Jawaharlal Nehru also. The meeting between the Hindu and Muslim leaders was arranged on the basis of a formula which was suggested by Gandhi. It ran thus:

The Congress does not challenge and accept that the Muslim

> League now is the authoritative representative of an overwhelming majority of the Muslims of India. As such and in accordance with democratic principles they alone have today an unquestionable right to represent the Muslims of India. But the Congress cannot agree that any restriction or limitation should be put upon the Congress to choose such representatives as they think proper from amongst the members of the Congress as their representatives.

But during discussion with Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Nehru changed the wordings of this formula thus changing the very basis of negotiations, which soon broke down.

Simultaneously negotiations were going on with the Viceroy and in the final stage Jinnah wrote to him that the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League after careful consideration authorised him to state that they did not approve of the scheme of setting up the interim government which had been decided by the Viceroy. Therefore, they did not, and could not, agree with Viceroy's decision already taken, nor with the arrangements already made. The Committee considered and maintained that the imposition of this decision was contrary to the declaration of August 8, 1940. But since, according to the decision of the Viceroy, the League had the right to nominate five members of the Executive Council on behalf of the Muslim League, the Committee had for various reasons come to the conclusion that in interests of Muslims and other communities it would be fatal to leave the entire field of administration of the Central Government in the hands of the Congress. Besides, the League Committee felt that the Viceroy might be forced to have in this interim government Muslims who would not command the respect and confidence of Muslim India. This would lead to various serious consequences. The following were the names:

Liaquat Ali Khan
I. I. Chundrigar
Abdur Rab Nishtar
Ghazanfar Ali Khan
Jogendra Nath Mandal

The names were soon announced officially and the portfolios of Finance, Commerce, Post and Air, Health, and Legislative were

allocated to them respectively. The first four took charge on the 26th of October and the fifth joined later, when he was released from Bengal where he was a member of the League Ministry.

By this decision Mohammad Ali Jinnah displayed an extremely sagacious statesmanship. In the first place he paid the Viceroy and members of the Cabinet Delegation in their own coins. While, previously, the League was kept out of the interim government, in spite of having accepted the long-term and short-term plans, it has now walked in, in spite of having rejected both. Secondly, the selection of Jogendra Nath Mandal who was a member of the Scheduled Castes was a fitting affront to the Congress insistence on representing the so-called nationalist Muslims. Thirdly, the League was now assured that its members would be in a better position to watch the interests of Muslims of India. Fourthly the League bloc within the Executive Council would provide a suitable check to the Congress for introducing vital changes into existing constitution, thus prejudicing the Muslim case for Pakistan.

Political circles in India and in Great Britain were flabber-ghasted and a famous cartoonist of Fleet Street depicted Jinnah as a juggler and enquired what more he had up his sleeves.

CHAPTER XVIII

The Goal Achieved

As has been said before, the Congress had been concentrating its attention on the North-West Frontier Province. The maintenance of its hold on this province meant to it the justification of its claim that as a national organisation it was capable of representing the views of Muslims of India as well as those of the Indian Hindus. Secondly, Frontier remaining outside the League influence meant the weakening of the League claims to Pakistan. For the Congress, it had both a positive and a negative value, and consequently it was a regular haunt of the Congress propagandists—professional and missionary. Little wonder that as soon as Pandit Nehru assumed the reins of the department of External Affairs in the interim government, he planned an official tour of the semi-independent territory of Waziristan with a view to negotiating with the Pathans a settlement for the future. Nehru had obviously been assured of his grounds by the Congress leaders of the province who kept insisting that Frontier Pathans were with the Congress. But when Nehru reached there, the story was quite different. Contrary to all expectations, the Pathans received him with black flags and demanded the visit of Mohammad Ali Jinnah. This was too much. Nehru lost his temper and had to return to the Capital with all his paraphernalia.

The Frontier incident exposed the anxiety of Hindu leadership to utilise all means and authority in securing the nefarious ends of the Congress under the garb of goodwill and fraternisation, and to change without further delay the entire complexion of the Government of India Act of 1935 under which the interim Executive Council was formed. Nehru's hasty step brought disgrace to the

Congress and the Khan Brothers who accompanied him, and in the bargain established the position that Mohammad Ali Jinnah had come to acquire in Frontier. Above all it demonstrated that the partial success of the Congress during the elections had been purely accidental.

Soon after the Frontier incident, the League representatives joined the interim government.

In the meantime there occurred some communal flareup at Noakhali in Bengal, and the Hindu press, as if out of spite to the League's entry at the Centre, made a tremendous uproar about the alleged atrocities, supposed to have been committed by local Muslims upon Hindus. Extremely exaggerated reports were given wide publicity and Hindu feelings were naturally accentuated. After some time Bihar Hindus observed a "Noakhali Day" during which inflammatory speeches were delivered and Hindus were openly incited against their Muslim "brethren." The consequence was obvious. There followed a terrific "retaliation" and an unprecedented bloodshed in Bihar. It was estimated that over 50,000 Muslims were ruthlessly butchered including women and children, and property worth over two crores was destroyed and looted. Hindu leaders themselves deplored these riots and admitted that Bihar had "eclipsed" Noakhali. Jawaharlal Nehru, when he himself visited the scene, could not believe his eyes that human beings could be capable of perpetrating such inhuman crimes.

These riots were in no way "communal." In fact, they were nothing less than a civil war. Hindus were now obsessed with the idea that sooner or later political powers would be transferred to a united democratic India in which by virtue of their numbers they would be in a position to dictate terms to the other political elements in the country. And now with the investiture of power in the newly formed government this process was accelerated with renewed vigour.

Evidently the situation now created in India was in no way cordial to political negotiations which were going on between the British Government and Indian political parties. The possibility of bringing about a settlement between the Congress and the Muslim League had now receded to the background and Mohammad Ali Jinnah rightly suggested that it was no use going ahead with the various

political institutions, recently set up to tackle the major constitutional issues and that "all energy should be concentrated in restoring peace and order." He therefore wrote to the Viceroy to postpone the Constituent Assembly, scheduled to take place early in December. The Viceroy evidently consulted the Congress High Command, which was in no mood to accept the suggestion and decided to carry on with the constitution-making in spite of the Muslim representatives abstaining.

The resulting stalemate was a source of great discomfiture to His Majesty's Government and they decided to make a final attempt to find out a solution. It will be recalled that as far as the Constituent Assembly was concerned the differences between the Muslim League and the Congress arose on the question of interpretation of certain clauses in the Statement of the Cabinet Mission offering the establishment of this body. These differences pertained to grouping and minority rights. His Majesty's Government presumed that if an official interpretation is put upon these provisions, the differences might end for good. They, therefore, invited an Indian delegation to London consisting of two representatives of the Muslim League, two of the Congress and one of the Sikhs together with the Viceroy for the purpose of discussing the Mission Statement further. The League nominated Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, while the Sikhs chose Baldev Singh, a member of the Interim Government. The Congress, however, refused the invitation but on the personal request of the Viceroy, it finally agreed that only Jawaharlal Nehru should participate in the Conference.

The Indian Delegation reached London early in December 1946. Many official and non-official conferences took place, but, as was expected, no settlement could be reached between the representatives of the Congress and the League. His Majesty's Government was, therefore, obliged to give their own interpretation to the clause under dispute. The statement reaffirmed His Majesty's Government's view that no constitution which would cover India as a whole would be forced against the decision and will of a large section of India's population. It contended that the Cabinet Mission had throughout maintained the view that the decisions of the sections should, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, be taken by a simple majority vote of the representatives in the sections.

"This part of the statement, as so interpreted, must, therefore, be considered an essential part of the scheme of May 16, for enabling the Indian people to formulate a constitution which His Majesty's Government would be prepared to submit to Parliament. It should, therefore, be accepted by all parties in the Constituent Assembly."

Jinnah's visit to Great Britain at this juncture was important in many ways. The interpretation as clarified by the British Government upon the clauses of grouping and minorities' rights was a personal triumph for him and a tribute to his abilities for negotiations. It was equally a compliment to the quick and correct perception and understanding on the part of the British statesmen. The statement upheld the stand taken up by the League and threw the Hindu Congress into the wrong position. During this visit Jinnah took his message not only to the recognised leaders of the British public opinion but to the public itself. Hitherto Indian Hindus and their agents in Great Britain had presented the wrong side of the League case. Consequently there existed a considerably hostile opinion against the League in Great Britain. Jinnah's visit greatly improved matters and, while there, he had made a successful attempt to establish an Information Centre in London. During the break of the journey at Cairo the League leaders met prominent Egyptian leaders and also the King of Egypt and the Grand Mufti of Palestine.

On Jinnah's return to India, Sind was in the midst of new elections. The last elections in Sind, due to the eleventh-hour dishonourable tactics of certain parties, disruptive elements had been returned to the provincial legislative assembly and it had become impossible for the Muslim League to conduct a stable ministry. They were being played against the League by the Congress in which the latter's Central High Command took no mean interest. The Sind Governor had, therefore, no choice but to dissolve the Assembly and order fresh elections. These elections registered a complete victory for the Muslim League, in which Jinnah's presence and guidance played no small part. Thereafter he himself took interest in the formation of a suitable and stable ministry in Sind and for the first few weeks of their taking office he directed the commencement of a huge constructive programme which stands to the credit of Sind as an exemplary demonstration of the future democratic Muslim rule.

In the meantime the Congress had gone ahead with the constitution-making plan, and on the 10th December, 1946, it opened with a big bombast, although pandemonium often ensued among the Congress benches which was the only party attending it.

In the first week of January 1947, the Congress Working Committee met to consider the implications of the statement issued by the British Government in December and accepted its provisions and clarifications but not without usual reservations. This hardly altered the position as far as the League was concerned, but the various organisations, which had hitherto sided with the Congress in the hope and belief that the Congress was really keen on dealing with the various problems fairly and justly, were completely disillusioned and were now thinking to reorientate their respective policies.

Simultaneously with this, Punjab situation was fast changing. The ministry that was working there under a coalition, composed of the few Unionists, who were elected mainly from highly franchised landholders' constituencies, and their Sikh and Congress collaborators, was not popular, and Punjab public was not satisfied with the administration. The largest single group which the Muslim League Party formed in the provincial legislative assembly was kept out of office and performed the functions of the Opposition. It was, therefore, quite natural that unless the government ruthlessly suppressed the popular movements, which took place frequently, administration of the province was impossible. But towards the end of January 1947 the government took the unique step of declaring the organisation of the Muslim National Guards—an official volunteer corps within the League—unlawful. This set on edge the nerves of Punjab Muslims and provincial leaders refused to let the police search the League office, but offered themselves for arrest. This was the first step towards the Muslim League Direct Action movement that was subsequently started in the Punjab.

The movement soon took a serious turn and thousands of Punjab Muslims courted arrest. It was more or less an experiment for the League leaders, by means of which they could gauge their own strength and their capacity to conduct a purely political movement. It was the first time the Muslims had launched upon a movement of this kind. And now in the light of the Bombay resolution adopting

the policy of Direct Action, Punjab became a testing ground. The way the Punjab Civil Disobedience movement was conducted was, indeed, creditable. It lasted for over two months and not a single communal incident took place. As a matter of fact there had been occasions when Muslim mobs and processions were intentionally provoked. But such was the discipline among Muslim ranks that nothing untoward happened and the movement was conducted strictly on lines of its being essentially political and against the existing provincial regime. Leaders of every shade of opinion spoke in appreciation, including those Sikhs who were opposed to the establishment of a Muslim League government in the Punjab.

The situation now obtained in India was no less alarming. The Congress had not changed its attitude of arrogance and had gone ahead with the constitution-making in spite of Muslim opposition. The Constituent Assembly was made a mere sideboard for Congress propaganda. In the Punjab the League was conducting a Direct Action against the government. Most of the other provinces had emerged out of communal riots and in almost all cases Muslims had suffered considerably. On the constitutional side there seemed to be no possibility of a League-Congress settlement. In North-West Frontier Province methods adopted by the Congress ministry threatened a serious repercussion.

Ever since the break of war the Congress had been insisting that the British Government should either declare India independent or to name a date by which political power should be transferred to Indian hands. Muslims and minorities, on the other hand, felt that unless the future constitution of this sub-continent contained express and mandatory safeguards for them they would not be a party to its establishment and working. For the British it was of course out of question to leave India to its fate and let it undergo a threatening civil war. All these matters were considered by His Majesty's Government, and, in the third week of February 1947, they made a historical declaration that they intended to transfer power to India by June 1948 and that Lord Louis Mountbatten had agreed to relieve Lord Wavell as the "last Viceroy of India." The British statement envisaged the lack of possibility of a final solution and absence of an agreement between the League and the Congress over the final shape of the constitution. If, therefore, it should appear that

such a constitution would not have been worked out within the stipulated time, it would then be the concern of His Majesty's Government to make a decision as to who should be the rightful owners of India's political power—that is to say, whether power should be given to a united India or a divided India. In the meantime it was said that the new Viceroy would go on finding out ways and means as to how power should be transferred, and at the end of the period envisaged in the above declaration the Viceroy would report to His Majesty's Government his plan which would be given fullest consideration.

This latest declaration of the British Prime Minister created a new situation altogether. In the first place it threatened to expose the Congress that it was not capable of finding a solution even if the British made it clear to the people of India that they were finally leaving the country. In fact the Congress never meant its demand for such a declaration seriously. All that it wished was that the British should hand over power to the Congress gradually and systematically so that it may, by virtue of its being dominated by Caste Hindus, monopolise power for such Hindus. The statement, therefore, gave quite a shock to the Congress leaders. Secondly, the statement brought to light the real question of Hindu-Muslim relationship in all its clearness. Muslim sections of opinion that had hitherto believed the Congress propagandists that the British Government was responsible for encouraging one party against the other were now faced with the real danger. If the British Government happened to pass all the political power to Hindus it would, indeed, be disastrous to Muslim interests. Even the smallest groups, therefore, felt that it was time that Muslims should be completely united and they began to reconsider their position.

In the meantime came the historic budget that Liaquat Ali Khan, General Secretary of the All-India Muslim League and a League nominee in the Viceroy's Executive Council presented to the Central Assembly as India's Finance Member, at the time. It was the first budget that was introduced by a representative of the people, and since the Finance Member happened to be a Muslim the budget was keenly awaited, especially by the Hindu press. It had hoped that the budget would contain ample material that would give the press a lever to attack the very basis of Pakistan and a subsequent

probable rule in Muslim India. But when the budget provisions were revealed they disclosed a complete departure from all expectations. It was in fact a "people's budget" as the Finance Member himself called it. The budget abolished the levy of Salt Tax which happened to have a sentimental value for Gandhi. The resultant deficit had to be made up and, in the true spirit of economic uplift, measures had to be taken up for the abolition of economic exploitation by the few rich. The budget, therefore, restricted the profits of business houses. A scheme for the establishment of a Commission to enquire into the cases of evasion of payment of taxes was also proposed.

It is obvious that the revolutionary provisions of the budget hit the *bania* capitalists hard and there followed a tremendous uproar from all capitalist quarters. The very existence of the Congress was threatened. The budget was, it was rumoured, going to be opposed by the Congress members of the Assembly and a complete deadlock was feared. But Liaquat Ali Khan piloted the budget with such tact and skill that subsequently a settlement was reached and the percentage of taxation on business profits was lowered than was originally contemplated in the budget proposals. A few more suggestions from the Congress and independent benches were also accepted. The budget proposals established the *bona fides* of the Muslim League that it did stand for general uplift, and strengthened the Muslim belief in its future policies.

These developments had their effect on the politics of the North-West Frontier Province. Pathans had by now decided to give a fitting reply to the oppressive rule that the Congress ministry was conducting in that province. Early in March the people of the province launched upon a movement of civil disobedience for the purpose of restoring civil liberties. Soon after the position of the Punjab Ministry under the Unionist Coalition became precarious and it fell to the popular demand. But as soon as Khan of Mamdot, the leader of the Muslim League Party, was invited by the Punjab Governor, the Sikhs and Hindus combined in an unholy alliance to obstruct the formation of a popular ministry. The result was that a tremendous clash occurred in the principal cities between Sikhs and Muslims and for a very long time there was a complete chaos.

True to his principles, Mohammad Ali Jinnah issued instructions

to the Punjab Muslims that all energy must be concentrated in restoring peace and order after which efforts could be renewed for the establishment of a popular regime in the province. Punjab Muslims did make an all-out effort for the speedy restoration of normal conditions, but, strangely enough, Hindus and Sikhs refused to co-operate with them. Nevertheless, normality was slowly restored and endeavours were made to end the Governor's regime in the Punjab.

In the fourth week of March 1947 Lord Louis Mountbatten, the new Viceroy, arrived in India and Lord Wavell left the country and soon after invitations were issued to prominent leaders of Muslim and Hindu opinions to renew efforts for an amicable settlement of India's constitutional problem, according to the indication given by the British Prime Minister in his statement of February.

Formal and informal interviews followed almost immediately and in the midst of the fast tempo of events several points cleared out.

The growing unrest in India on the one hand and Britain's diminishing resources as a result of the last war on the other, had convinced Britain that it was no longer possible for her to retain her supremacy over such a vast territory in the East. In the first place the cost of the Indian administration to the British national exchequer was enormous. Secondly the shortage of men and material both at home and throughout the empire was alarmingly low. It was neither possible to retain administrative hold on India nor to disguise the decreasing power for long or replenish strength for the maintenance of law and order in the near future. In this background was set the decision of His Majesty's Government to leave India as soon as possible, and Mountbatten's consequent despatch to liquidate the Indian Empire and yet retain the possession of its markets. Wavell's fear that India might in any case assert herself and plunge into a civil war was strengthened during the Governors' conference held soon after Mountbatten's arrival at Delhi and apprehensions about the danger to the life and property of the European community residing in India were freely voiced and discussed.

Britain's decision to quit, however, presented a dilemma to the Indian National Congress. In the past it had insisted on a time limit within which Britain should hand over power to Indians. But now that the declaration to that effect was already made by the

British Prime Minister, the question was whether it would be in a position to maintain law and order and conduct a strong government at the centre without the active help of British forces, specially in view of the fact that Muslims demanded partition and the States would be in a position to take their own decision as soon as British paramountcy lapsed. Congress leaders were, therefore, seriously engaged in devising a formula by means of which British influence could still be maintained and, through the medium of individuals who came to see Mountbatten during early days, a wave of political courtship was let loose to impress upon him that British connection with Hindu India was vital to its interests.

On the other hand the uncompromising attitude of the Muslims in respect of their demand for partition was convincing enough that no agreement was possible on a united India basis. As soon as, therefore, the new Governor-General made it clear to the Hindus that there was no question for the British to remain in India even at their sincere invitation, he found Hindu opinion inclining to accept, though reluctantly, the inevitability of partition and compromising its own position internally with a Dominion Status. It even went to such an extent as to suggest that since the Congress had been insisting on India becoming an independent sovereign State, it could not retain initiative unless the formula for compromise emanated in some form from Mountbatten himself.

In contrast to this humiliating cordiality from the Hindus on a national scale, the downright, matter-of-fact legal astuteness of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and above all the concentration of national qualities in a single sheath of individuality seemed to "chill" Mountbatten restricting his sidelights for publicity. From the very beginning, a sort of phobia developed round the Viceregal Court at Delhi which gave rise later to ugly insinuations and betrayal and bent him on the side of more profitable friends, as was proved by subsequent events. The obsession was enhanced by the gradual realisation of Jinnah's political strength, specially in the North-West Frontier Province, which was claimed by the Congress as its own stronghold.

The overall position of Mohammad Ali Jinnah in Indian political life must have presented to Mountbatten a problem for his aspiration to dominate the Indian political scene, as it seemed to appear

to him suddenly in sharp contrast to the continuous tutoring efforts by Jinnah's political opponents to portray him as a diminutive character. Here is a gem:

> Nehru said that the essential thing to realise about Jinnah is that he is a man to whom success has come very late in life—at over sixty. Before that he had not been a major figure in Indian politics. He was a successful lawyer but not an especially good one, and Nehru stressed the necessity of making this particular distinction in Jinnah's case.

Whatever might have been the intentions of the new Viceroy the tidal wave of events definitely flowed in the direction of partition. Jinnah's supreme importance prevailed continuously, and with his proved powers of advocacy, and patient and tactful handling, he had already put Pakistan on to the map of the world. In the early stages of negotiations, when all efforts for unity were exhausted, the inevitable alternative of Pakistan began to take shape, and various suggestions and counter-suggestions were put forward in the shape of tentative agreements. Throughout these negotiations Mountbatten's extreme anxiety to satisfy Congress leadership continued to play its part. Then came the most dramatic move. In a questionnaire submitted by a correspondent of Reuters, Jinnah was asked whether in view of the two wings of Pakistan being wide apart he would demand a corridor. Jinnah replied, "Yes". That little monosyllable proved to be "a carefully timed and placed bombshell." The demand for corridor loomed large on the political horizon for quite a while and although not fulfilled during the life of the creator of Pakistan, it sealed for ever the fate of a united India. For, it diverted all resistance to itself and under its shadow the foundations of the larger demand for Pakistan were substantially strengthened.

In the meanwhile Gandhi had given renewed vigour to the movement of Pathanistan in the Frontier. It was a clever move calculated to sow the seed of discord and to disguise the armed preparations that Sikhs in the Punjab were making to strike in case Pakistan became irresistible. Sikhs were subscribing profusely to funds for "warlike and unconstitutional purposes," and collecting substantial amounts from wealthy Hindus all over India. The Governor of the Punjab, Evan Jenkings, and Mountbatten were aware

of this.

On the 18th of May, 1947, Mountbatten, flew back to London to discuss matters with His Majesty's Government. The impressions he took home convinced the home government that a quick decision was necessary in the interest of all parties concerned and that the only solution of the Indian constitutional tangle was in agreement to partition. It was given out later that although His Majesty's Government was inclined to stick to the date originally stipulated in Mr. Attlee's February announcement, Mountbatten insisted that the final transfer of power must take place at once. This was partly due to his knowledge of the preparations for an armed conflict that were going on in the Punjab and partly because he believed that the sudden creation of a weak centre in Pakistan would still have a need for a joint governor-generalship in his own person.

Mountbatten returned on the last day of the month and on the 3rd of June, 1947, handed over the final plan to the leaders,[1] for the purpose of ascertaining the wishes of the people of India for the transfer of power. In view of the fact that Muslim League members were not participating in the existing Constituent Assembly, His Majesty's Government made it clear that any constitution so framed could not apply to those areas of the country which were unwilling to accept it. The plan, therefore, envisaged that the Legislative Assemblies of Bengal and the Punjab should meet in two parts—one representing the Muslim majority districts and the other the rest of the province—to vote whether the province should be partitioned or remain united. A simple majority vote from either side in favour of partition would be sufficient to decide the issue. Sind was also likewise given the choice whether to participate in the existing Constituent Assembly or to join the newly created one. North-West Frontier Province and the district of Sylhet in Assam were to decide by a referendum. As for Baluchistan, the Governor-General was to make an announcement later how this province was to be given an opportunity to reconsider its position. The plan further announced that these decisions should be made immediately as His Majesty's Government were willing to anticipate the date of June 1948 and proposed to introduce legislation during the current session of the Parliament for the transfer of power on a Dominion Status basis

1. See Appendix V.

either to one or two succeeding authorities as the case may be. During the press conference that followed the next day Mount batten disclosed that the date for the final transfer of power was likely to be 15th of August, 1947.

The plan was announced with the virtual agreement of all parties concerned. Mohammad Ali Jinnah spoke to his people over the All-India Radio in a calm and clear voice. "It is the first time, I believe," he said, "that a non-official has been afforded an opportunity to address the people directly through the medium of this powerful instrument on political matters. It augurs well and I hope that in the future I shall have greater facilities to enable me to voice my view and opinions which will reach you directly, life warm, rather than in the cold print of the newspapers."

At the moment of this greatest of a series of successes in life, it was perhaps the first occasion when Mohammad Ali Jinnah was faced with an overwhelming feeling of his own greatness and personal triumph. On the occasion he must have realised the unlimited extent of his own genius of advocacy and his enormous contribution to practical politics. In a few weeks he was to be elated from the domestic platform to a higher and wider international plane, not merely as the head of a nation but as the creator of a new and progressive State. He was not to be a successor to an existing power but a founder of a new order in the Muslim world. In true humility which must accompany all great accomplishments he said, "I pray to God that at this critical moment, He may guide us and enable us to discharge our responsibilities in a wise and statesmanlike manner."

Although Jinnah's word was enough to signify acceptance on behalf of the entire Muslim India, the democrat and the constitutionalist in him would not permit him to prejudge the decision of the Council of the All-India Muslim League, scheduled to meet on the 9th, which he said was the final authority "according to our constitution, precedent and practice." Jinnah appealed for the maintenance of peace and order and with characteristic sincerity requested the Muslim League of the Frontier Province to withdraw the movement of peaceful civil disobedience which they had perforce to resort to and face the referendum with hope and courage, as it should be the anxiety of everyone to obtain a fair, free and true

verdict of the people of the Frontier.

With the publication of the Plan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah naturally received the largest number of messages. Sovereigns and Heads of the Muslim countries sent him personal congratulations, and to Mountbatten, still at the helm of affairs, must have come with renewed vigour the realisation of the unique strategic importance of Pakistan in the Middle East. To him went, of course, the credit of bringing about the fullest measure of agreement to the Plan of His Majesty's Government, but under the shadow of Division he was working out, at a break-neck speed, the details that the creation of Pakistan would be nothing more than mere cessation of a territory from a recognised government. For this he had previously entered into a pact with Nehru and Gandhi. "Administratively," said Mountbatten, "it is the difference between putting up a permanent building, a nissen hut or a tent. As far as Pakistan is concerned we are putting up a tent." He saw to it that it was no more than a tent.

The Muslim League resolved to give full authority to its President to accept the fundamental principles of the Plan as a compromise and to leave it to him to work out all the details of the Plan in an equitable and just manner with regard to carrying out the complete division of India including Defence, Finance, Communications, etc., and to take all steps and decisions which may be necessary in connection with and relating to the Plan.

The Bengal and the Punjab Assemblies returned their verdict in favour of partition. So did Sind. The referendums in Frontier, Baluchistan and the district of Sylhet also went in favour of Pakistan. A Partition Council was set up and Boundary Commission was appointed with Sir Cyril Radcliffe as its Chairman. Arrangements were made for the "reconstitution" of the Army and Defence Forces. All this happened in quick succession.

Meanwhile the "Indian Independence Bill" was ready for introduction in the Parliament and the question of Governor-Generalship of the two Dominions arose. The Bill, an advance copy of which was handed over to the leaders, had provided for two Governors-General unless both the Dominions agreed to have a joint one. Muslim League leadership was from the beginning unanimous with the national opinion that Mohammad Ali Jinnah should be the Governor-General of Pakistan. But it also wished to

retain Britain's goodwill by associating Mountbatten with the new Dominion. The question became more acute when the Congress expressed the wish that Mountbatten should remain as the first Governor-General of India. To accept a joint governor-generalship for both the Dominions was completely discounted by Muslim leadership as it meant the retention of the sting of unity. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, therefore, proposed the most practical solution that there should be two separate Governors-General for the two Dominions and Mountbatten should stay on as a sort of Supreme Arbitrator between both. This suggestion, although rejected in Britain as impracticable, found favour there when it was unfortunately too late. Consequently Mountbatten was left with the invitation from the Congress only.

This arrangement, although proving harmful to the larger interests of Pakistan, nevertheless, raised her prestige in the eyes of the world. It vindicated the national character of Muslims in favour of independence while it exposed Hindu India and established the fact that phrases like "Independent Sovereign Republic" were mere counters to increase the bargaining power of the Congress.

The League decision, however, came as a rude surprise to Mountbatten who was unwilling to accept a unilateral position, and he asked for advice from London. The consensus of opinion there was that it would be both in his personal and Britain's national interests to continue as the first Governor-General of India and the question was settled accordingly at that.

The Indian Independence Act became law on the 18th of July, 1947, and provided that "as from August 15, 1947, two independent Dominions shall be set up in India to be known respectively as India and Pakistan." With this phrase, forming the opening clause of the Act, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah became, for ever, the immortal symbol of the unity and determination of a verile and living nation.

To Mohammad Ali Jinnah, however, Mountbatten remained an institution representing British sense of justice and fairplay in which he had great hopes. In fact his acceptance of Radcliffe and Auchinleck as the Chairman of the Boundary Commission and Supreme Commander of the Forces respectively was a further demonstration of that hope. On several occasions he frankly consulted Mountbatten

on the suitability of British officers on some of Pakistan's key positions, and in the case of East Bengal he even went to the extent of requesting Mountbatten to nominate a Governor for him. To him even the creation of Pakistan without a major political revolution was the fulfilment of the great hope that Britain would after all not throw Muslims "to the wolves," and that once the pressing unanimity of Muslim opinion became convincingly evident the judicious quality of the British character would come into play. In fact he publicly stated so on many occasions long before the justification of the idea of Partition took shape in the British mind.

CHAPTER XIX

Father of the Nation

The inauguration of Pakistan was a momentous occasion for all Muslims. On August 14, 1947, Mohammad Ali Jinnah took oath as the first Governor-General of the new State of his own creation. It was no small honour that he should be chosen to head the largest Muslim country with a population of nearly 80 million strong. Hundreds of thousands of messages—telegraphic and postal—poured in for him from all over the world and the big event was celebrated in all Muslim countries.

For Pakistanis, at home and abroad, the occasion was a hilarious one. Houses were lit up throughout the country. Public buildings and institutions, decorated with flags and flowers during the day, presented an appearance of bouquets of lights during the night. Crowds of happy people paraded the streets of principal cities and farmers in rural areas held large community feasts. The shouts of Quaid-i-Azam Zindabad and Pakistan Zindabad echoed from the remotest corners of the country. Jinnah's assumption of the responsibilities as the first Governor-General of Pakistan had a special meaning for all Muslims and created a unique sense of independence among them, specially when India still clung to the old ties through the person of Mountbatten, in spite of the Hindu propaganda of their anti-British attitude.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah had now to turn himself to the problems of administration which devolved on him. His first consideration was naturally to ensure peace and reassure every citizen of Pakistan that the new State brought a message of progress and prosperity. In a broadcast speech on August 15, 1947, the very first day the

State of Pakistan came legally into existence, he outlined the principles of Administrative Conduct:

> This day marks the end of a poignant phase in our national history and it should also be the beginning of a new and noble era. Let us impress the minorities by our words, deed and thought that as long as they fulfil their duties and obligations as loyal citizens of Pakistan, they have nothing to fear.
>
> To the freedom loving tribes on our borders and the States beyond our borders we send our greetings, and assure them that Pakistan will respect their status, and will extend to them its most friendly co-operation in preserving peace.
>
> We have no ambitions beyond the desire to live honourably and let others live honourably.

The happiness of independence was, however, soon to be damped by the cold and calculated announcement of the Radcliffe Boundary Award. For sometime past and specially after the Partition Plan of June 3, Mohammad Ali Jinnah was confronted with the problem of demarcating the boundary of the two States of Pakistan and India. The Lahore Resolution of the All-India Muslim League laid down that geographically contiguous areas should be demarcated into regions which would form the new State. The Muslim League at first expected that the Sikhs would prefer to remain in Pakistan, as they would be a much more effective minority there than in a larger set-up in India. Consequently Jinnah made repeated efforts to bring home to the Sikhs the desirability of their choice for Pakistan. But Sikh leadership was in no mood to accept the possibility of partition, and when it actually did materialise they had committed themselves so much to the Hindus that they had no alternative but to demand partition of the Punjab; and thus Pakistan lost a good bit of territory. Mohammad Ali Jinnah carefully thought over the matter and himself came to the conclusion that the inclusion of the Sikhs as a permanently hostile minority would be dangerous to the interests of Pakistan and a constant threat to its integrity. He, therefore, contented himself with a smaller territory and a homogeneous population.

Relying upon the good intentions of the British people and in a spirit of goodwill, Jinnah had given his assurance that whatever the decision of the Boundary Commission, Pakistan would abide by it.

But during the proceedings of the Commission he had received the information that Sir Cyril Radcliffe was insufficiently informed on many aspects of the situation, and as he was required to take a decision in an undue hurry, was likely to arrive at a conclusion that might prove to be harmful to the economic interests of Pakistan, by leaving out certain vital tracts of land that should otherwise form part of Pakistan's territory. In fact Justice Din Mohammad's disagreement with the Commission had been known to Jinnah from the earliest stage and he was in correspondence with Mountbatten. Jinnah had not expected that Mountbatten's assurances, that due respect for the integrity of Pakistan would be paid in demarcating the boundaries on a geographically contiguous basis, were without substance.

As a direct result of the Award, a mass exodus of population began. Emigration from either side was no doubt the natural consequence of partition, but had the Boundary Award remained in abeyance for some time the much accelerated speed of mass movements would have been considerably checked and both the countries would have gained time to negotiate an agreement on a peaceful exchange of population. The Anglo-Indian alliance was, however, looking at Pakistan from a different angle. Pakistan came into being almost on paper with no established office routine and with practically no central administration. There could be no more effective weapon of strangling it into economic subjugation than to put before it the gigantic problem of rehabilitating a mass of displaced humanity with harrowing tales of atrocity across the border. This fanned feelings all the more and Jinnah went to Lahore to exercise a wholesome influence in the Punjab. No doubt, he said, the carving out of this great independent sovereign Muslim State had suffered injustices. It had been squeezed inasmuch as it was possible and the latest blow was the "unjust, incomprehensible and even perverse" Award of the Boundary Commission. "It may not be a judicial but a political Award," he added, "but we had agreed to abide by it and as honourable people we must abide by it. It may be our misfortune, but we must bear up this one more blow with fortitude, courage and hope."

At no other time the bold determination of a single individual has manifested itself throughout a nation so markedly as in Pakistan

at the time of its inauguration. Jinnah chose Karachi, the city of his birth, to be the Capital of Pakistan, and the only visible symbol of the Central Administration was the Governor-General's House. Officers and clerks who had opted out of India had to report on duty as soon as they reached Karachi. But they had nowhere to go. Not a building was available, and the first few offices that came into being were housed under trees and on pavements. Some imaginative persons pitched a few tents in open grounds, either borrowed or rented by them. Clerks bought their own stationery and started work out of nothing. The inspiration for each man to do his duty at all hazards went through like an electric current starting from Mohammad Ali Jinnah himself. In an 'Id message on August 18, 1947, the Father of the Nation had addressed his people in the following words:

> I fervently pray that God Almighty make us all worthy of our past and hoary history and give us strength to make Pakistan truly a great nation amongst all the nations of the world. No doubt we have achieved Pakistan, but that is yet the beginning of an end. Great responsibilities have come to us, and equally great should be our determination and endeavour to discharge them, and the fulfilment thereof will demand of us efforts and sacrifices in the cause no less for constructive work in building up of our nation than what was required for the achievement of the cherished goal of Pakistan. The time for real solid work had now arrived, and I have no doubt in my mind that the Muslim genius will put its shoulder to the wheel and conquer all obstacles in our way on the road which may appear uphill.

Gradually the Central Administrative institutions grew up under the direct guidance of Mohammad Ali Jinnah and a few days later the Constituent Assembly adopted as an interim measure the Government of India Act of 1935 to be Pakistan's tentative Constitution with the amendment that all appointments were to be made by the Governor-General and that all references to the Crown were to be omitted from the official oaths of affirmation. There was a general feeling of satisfaction that with Jinnah as the head of the State nothing would go wrong. From the very first day he had to shoulder the major portion of administrative responsibility. To Pakistanis he was not only their Governor-General and Quaid-i-

Azam but also a patriarch and as such he could exercise a tremendous influence in the Centre and in the Provinces. He could appeal to his people and admonish them and thus he was the main source of initiation and restraint. At the age of seventy-three he worked harder than he ever did in life and was gradually losing health.

The refugee problem became acute immediately after the partition. At Lahore he supervised the arrangements of immediate rehabilitation so as not to disturb the existing system and paralyse administration and agriculture. Serious riots broke out everywhere and early in September even Karachi had its share. But immediate and strict measures under his own orders saved the situation in time. Nevertheless this created a panic in the minds of the local Hindus and a new problem of their safe emigration presented itself. On the other hand the news that a huge mass of Muslims of Delhi were taking shelter in refugee camps in the fort and other historical buildings reached Karachi and that among them were civil servants and staff of the future Central Administration of Pakistan. Mohammad Ali Jinnah again supervised personally all arrangements for the safe transportation of outgoing Hindus and an airlift to Delhi and food supplies for Muslim refugees there. Simultaneously with this the anti-state activities of some of the Hindu organisations operating in Pakistan were unearthed and a plot for Jinnah's assassination thwarted.

As the Governor-General of Pakistan, he was to negotiate an instrument of accession with each of the States and in this he followed the more democratic principle of leaving matters entirely to the discretion of the States themselves. Junagadh was the first to accede and others soon followed suit. A standstill agreement was signed with Kashmir. But the Maharaja of Kashmir, encouraged by Indian Hindus and under constant panic from an overwhelming Muslim population of the State, could not resist the temptation of acceding to India under the pretext of an imaginary invasion of the tribal people from the north. Kashmir's accession to India and its acceptance by the Indian Government was naturally regarded by Pakistan as a hostile act, as India had sent in her own troops for the maintenance of the Hindu rulership. Mohammad Ali Jinnah was perturbed by these events.

The full inside story of the Kashmir accession must, of course,

wait until documents connected with it are published. But it has, since then, been confirmed that Mohammad Ali Jinnah while in Lahore had issued orders to march Pakistani troops into Kashmir, and that instead of obeying the orders the British Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army had consulted General Auchinleck, the Supreme Commander of the Boundary Force and invited him to Lahore to prevail upon Jinnah that these orders must be cancelled. When Auchinleck saw Jinnah he informed him that it was the considered policy of the British Government that in the event of Pakistani Army marching into Kashmir all the British officers would be withdrawn from the Services of Pakistan. Jinnah consequently cancelled the order. It has transpired that these British officers were anxious about a few hundred British men and women in Karachi. To what extent this very human sentiment justified disloyalty to Pakistan is for the history to decide. But incidentally it proved to be of immense benefit to India and Pakistan was for all intents and purposes crippled.

India's foreign policy was mainly shaped in London in consultation with Mountbatten and for this purpose top ranking British officers and residents in Pakistan had remained an effective source of information. Top secret affairs of the State including military matters continued to reach Mountbatten well in advance and in this way he and Britain had kept a close watch over Pakistan.

The preferential treatment that Britain gave to India was beyond the personal expectation of Mohammad Ali Jinnah. In one of his early speeches he had stated that voluntary and absolute transfer of power by Britain to Pakistan was the translation and realisation of the great ideal of commonwealth comradeship. Pakistan had remained within the Commonwealth which showed how much her people appreciated the high and noble ideals on which the Commonwealth was built and which must guide its members in the future. A staunch adherent to constitutional practice Mohammad Ali Jinnah believed that disputes between the member nations must be treated as Commonwealth domestic affairs and, in October 1947, he appealed to Britain and Commonwealth to help restore order in the Punjab and invited neutral observers. The answer from Britain was, however, so coldly phrased that it amounted to be little more than a snub.

Simultaneously, however, Jinnah's attention continued to be

occupied by problems of administration. Muslim League was no more a party agitating for reforms and League Ministries functioning at the Centre and the Provinces were to adopt a wider national outlook. There was a constant search for capable administrators and for ministerial appointments. It was for him to decide whether he should allocate work among his old colleagues and followers or whether he should select his team on merits. From the appointments Jinnah made during his tenure of governor-generalship it is evident that he chose the latter alternative. His capacity to withstand influence of any kind was extremely great and in national considerations he followed no principle other than service and ability. Addressing the civil servants of the State, he once said:

> Make the people feel that you are their servants and friends. Maintain the highest standard of honour, integrity, justice and fairplay. If you do that people will have confidence and trust in you and look upon you as friends and well-wishers. I do not want to condemn everything of the past; there were men who did their duties according to their lights in the service in which they were placed. As administrators they did do justice in many cases but the people did not feel that justice was done to them because there was an order of superiority and they were held at a distance and they did not feel the warmth but they felt a freezing atmosphere when they had to do anything with the officials. Now that freezing atmosphere must go; that impression of arrogance must go; that impression that you are rulers must go and you must do your best with all courtesy and kindness and try to understand the people.
>
> I keep on getting representations and memorials containing grievances of the people. Maybe there is no justification. Maybe there is no foundation for them. Maybe that they are under wrong impression. Maybe they are misled. But in all such cases I have followed one practice for many years which is this: Whether I agree with anyone or not, whether I think that he has imaginary grievance, whether I think that he does not understand, I always show patience. If you will also do the same in your dealings with an individual or any association or any organisation you will ultimately stand to gain. Let not people leave you with this bearing that you hate them, that

you are offensive, that you have insulted or that you are rude to them . . . If you follow that rule, believe me, you will win the respect of the people.

Universal education and industrial development have been his favourite subjects. With the establishment of Pakistan he set afoot a movement for speeding up of education and opening up of more schools—primary and secondary. But education in Pakistan is a provincial subject and most of the administrative units responsible for the development of education are autonomous bodies. Nevertheless his influence was felt throughout the country and educational institutions came up rapidly. Jinnah had a special regard for students and the youth, and whenever he spoke to them he did so frankly and without reserve. At the Dacca University Convocation he said:

In addressing you I am not here speaking to you as Head of the State, but as a friend, and as one who has always held you in affection . . . My young friends, hitherto you have been following the rut. You get your degrees and when you are thrown out of this University in thousands, all that you think and hanker for is Government service. As your Vice-Chancellor has rightly stated, the main object of the old system of education and the system of Government existing hitherto was really to have well-trained and well-equipped clerks. Of course some of them went higher and found their level, but the whole idea was to get well-qualified clerks. Civil Service was mainly staffed by the Britons and the Indian element was introduced later on and it went up progressively. Well, the whole principle was to create a mentality, a psychology, a state of mind, that an average man, when he passed out was to look for some job in Government. If he had it, he thought he had reached his height. I know and you all know what has been really the result of this . . . Now I want you to get out of that rut and that mentality and specially now that we are in free Pakistan. Government cannot absorb thousands. Impossible. But in the competition to get Government Service, most of you get demoralised. Government can take only a certain number, and the rest cannot settle down to anything else and being disgruntled are always ready to be exploited by persons who have their own axes to grind.

> Now I want that you must divert your mind, your attention, your aims and ambitions to other channels and other avenues and fields that are open to you and will increasingly become so. There is no shame in doing manual work and labour. There is an immense scope in technical education for we want technically qualified people very badly. You can learn banking, commerce, trade, law, etc., which provide so many opportunities now.

More manifest was his personal interest in industry. With a quick industrial development, he believed, Pakistan would be less dependent on the outside world, provide more employment to the people and increase its own resources. If Pakistan was to play its proper role in the world to which its size, manpower and resources entitled it, it must develop industrial potential side by side with its agricultural and give its economy an industrial bias. This policy was enunciated by him when he laid the foundation stone of a Karachi Textile Mill and since then almost all the State policies were dominated by considerations of industrial progress. In the administrative field Mohammad Ali Jinnah was not as outspoken as in the political, but he was still the fountainhead of all national constructive programmes. He was himself in touch with the country's business magnates, persuading them to initiate industrial enterprises of a productive nature. Even before partition he had induced many a Muslim into banking and insurance business, textile, and jute manufactures, publishing and film production, which were not popular with them before. He had formulated a number of schemes, and plans were ready at the time he assumed office as the Head of the State of Pakistan. Most of them were immediately put into operation. Others were handed over for further consideration. Every one that met him was impressed by his continued emphasis on industrial enterprise, and many of his close followers immediately took up planning new factories and new mills. While addressing the Karachi Chamber of Commerce, he drew particular attention to the statement on Pakistan's Industrial Policy. It was a keen desire of his Administration, he said, to associate individual initiative and private enterprise at every stage of industrialisation.

> The number of industries Government have reserved for management by themselves consists of arms and munitions of war,

> generation of hydel power and manufacture of railway wagons, telephones, telegraph and wireless apparatus. All other industrial activity is left open to private enterprise which would be given every facility a government can give for the establishment and development of industry. Government will seek to create conditions in which industry and trade may develop and prosper by undertaking surveys of Pakistan's considerable resources of minerals, schemes for the development of the country's water and power resources, plans for the improvement of transport services and the establishment of the ports and an industrial finance corporation. Just as Pakistan is agriculturally the most advanced nation in the continent of Asia, I am confident that if it makes the fullest and the best use of its considerable agricultural wealth in the building up of her industries, it will, with the traditions of craftsmanship for which our people are so well-known and with their ability to adjust themselves to new techniques, soon make its mark in the industrial field.

Even as a Governor-General and fully conscious of his constitutional limitations his bold leadership manifested itself on many an occasion. When partition took place India refused to pay up Pakistan's cash balances and the new country started off with no currency or monetary system of its own. The national treasury did not even exist. Consequently Pakistan's Civil Services remained unpaid for a few initial months. But such was the patriotic spirit that no one grumbled. This, however, could not obviously go on indefinitely and when he was comparatively relieved from immediate problems his attention was drawn to the financial situation of the country. Immediately he took a decision which was in itself unparalleled in the history of statecraft. "Take the public into confidence and tell them we have no money," he said coolly. He was told that it would be disastrous to the new State and enemies of Pakistan would make a capital out of it. But Mohammad Ali Jinnah was sure that the foundations on which Pakistan was built up were not to be shaken by difficulties of this kind. Three businessmen of Karachi were called in and apprised of the position. The result was obvious. An appeal from the Father of the Nation could not go without satisfactory response. A bank was authorised to honour all

government cheques and simultaneously a word went round to Muslims of substance all over the world. Within three days money flowed into Pakistan to the estimated value of rupees 60 crores.

Dearest to his heart were Pakistan's Defence Forces. They played a heroic part during the influx of refugees from the Indian side. Many of them had lost relatives who had been left over in India. Like other Services the Defence Forces also had no amenities and this was enhanced by India having refused to deliver Pakistan's share of military stores. Nevertheless, innumerable instances are cited of the troops stationed near the borders, who gave away their own meals for the sustenance of the suffering immigrants and who toiled voluntarily for days on end to build them temporary shelters. Medicines were bought and distributed by them at their own expense and medical aid provided as far as it was humanly possible. Whenever Jinnah got some time to spare he visited the different units of the forces and while addressing the establishment of *H. M. P. S. Dilawar* he outlined the truth that "the weak and the defenceless, in this imperfect world, invite aggression from others. The best way in which we can serve the cause of peace is by removing the temptation from the path of those who think that we are weak and therefore they can bully or attack us. That temptation can only be removed if we make ourselves so strong that nobody dare entertain aggressive designs against us."

For over twenty years Mohammad Ali Jinnah had advocated the right of Baluchistan to acquire a full-fledged provincial status. In the old regime Baluchistan was kept "divided in several parts, each with a different name and status, yet all bound together in shackles of backwardness," and had to content itself "with a state of political and administrative stagnation." So far as the tribal areas of Baluchistan were concerned the Governor-General exercised his executive functions in his discretion, and in regard to the areas which used to be known as British Baluchistan and leased territories, he governed to such an extent as he thought fit, through a Chief Commissioner appointed by him in his discretion. After the partition, therefore, Baluchistan became the direct responsibility of Mohammad Ali Jinnah as the Governor-General of Pakistan.

On February 14, 1948, the annual Durbar was held at Sibi at which members of the Shahi Jirga, Sardars of Baluchistan and

leaders and representatives of the people of Baluchistan assembled and Jinnah took the opportunity of attending it, as he himself said, to fulfil his earnest desire of associating the people of Baluchistan with their own administration as far as possible and exchanging views with them in order to ascertain the ideas which they might have formed about the future form of government for their province. He said the final constitution was of course to be framed by the Constituent Assembly in consultation with the representatives of the people of all the areas, but as he anticipated some delay in this regard, he decided for the interim period "to constitute a Governor-General's Advisory Council, a body which will enable the people to play their full part in the administration and governance of their province, and which will enable me as Governor-General to keep a close watch over affairs of Baluchistan and to make the problems of the people of this great province my own special care as I am bound to do under the present provisional constitution of Pakistan."

In the same spirit of democratic political advancement Mohammad Ali Jinnah took the unique step of withdrawing Pakistan's entire army, in December 1947, from the Frontier Tribal Areas, and abolished the outpost of Razmak altogether. Under the British regime the Tribal Areas were grouped into five agencies. The Political Agent held each of the tribes responsible for the maintenance of law and order and subsidies were paid to their Maliks and Chiefs. Hospitals and schools, and roads were built for them. The old British order maintained its authority by the presence of Khasadars in each tribe, which served as the local police. This was supplemented by a standing armed force of the Frontier Corps, who could be called in at the time of emergency. This force was recruited from amongst the tribesmen but paid by the Government. In addition to this three strong detachments of the Army were placed at strategic positions within the Tribal Areas, and were used to subdue the independent spirit of the tribal people.

When, therefore, Mohammad Ali Jinnah withdrew Pakistani Army from Razmak it was understood by the Pathans to be a gesture of goodwill that it was. All the Chiefs and Jirgas acceded to Pakistan and Jinnah was enthusiastically welcomed by the Maliks of the Afridi, Shinwari, Mohmand, Waziri, Mahsud and Orakzai

tribes, when he visited Peshawar in April 1948. Each one of them presented an address to him and he in his reply enunciated the policy in the following words:

> Keeping in view your loyalty, help, assurances and declarations, we ordered, as you know, the withdrawal of troops from Waziristan as a concrete and definite gesture on our part—that we treat you with absolute confidence and trust you as our Muslim brethren across the border. I am glad that there is full realisation on your part that now the position is basically different. It is no longer a foreign government that it was, but it is now a Muslim government and Muslim rule that holds the reigns of this great independent sovereign state of Pakistan. It is now the duty of every Muslim, yours and mine, and every Pakistani to see that the State, which we have established, is strengthened in every department of life and made prosperous and happy for all, especially the poor and the needy.
>
> Pakistan has no desire to unduly interfere with your internal freedom. On the contrary Pakistan wants to help you and make you, as far as it lies in our power, self-reliant and self-sufficient and help in your educational, social and economic uplift, and not be left as you are dependent on annual doles . . . We want to put you on your legs as self-respecting citizens who have the opportunities of fully developing and producing what is best in you and your land . . . Pakistan will not hesitate to go out of its way to give every possible help—financial and otherwise—to build up the economic and social life of our tribal brethren across the border.

On April 1, Mohammad Ali Jinnah saw the first symbols of Pakistan's economic system as Mr. Ghulam Mohammad, the then Finance Minister presented to him the new Coins and Currency Notes and paid glowing tributes in the following words:

> I take this opportunity of publicly expressing the appreciation of the Government and people of Pakistan of the way in which you and your Ministry have handled the finances of our young State and your untiring zeal to put them on a sound footing. When we first raised our demand for a sovereign and independent State of Pakistan there were not a few false prophets who tried to deflect us from our set purpose by saying that Pakistan

> was not economically feasible. They painted extremely dark pictures of the future of our State and its financial and economic soundness. The very first budget presented by you must have caused a shock to those false prophets. It has already demonstrated the soundness of Pakistan's finances and the determination of its Government to make them more and more sound and strong. Although it has meant the tightening of our belts to a certain extent, but I am sure that the people of Pakistan will not mind making sacrifices in order to make our State in the near future really strong and stable for the uplift of the masses. I have no doubt in my mind about the bright future that awaits Pakistan when its vast resources of men and material are fully mobilised. The road that we may have to travel may be somewhat uphill at present but with courage and determination we mean to achieve our objective which is to build up and construct a strong and prosperous Pakistan.

Three months later the State Bank of Pakistan came into being and Jinnah performed its opening ceremony himself, and was particularly pleased to note that its Research Organisation was busy in evolving banking practices compatible with Islamic ideals of social and economic life. The economic system of the West, he said, had created almost insoluble problems for humanity and to many of us it appeared that only a miracle could save the world from the disaster that faces it. It had failed to do justice between man and man and to eradicate friction from the international field. On the contrary, it was largely responsible for the two world wars in the last half century. The western world, in spite of its advantages of mechanisation and industrial efficiency, was in a worse mess than ever before in history. The adoption of the western economic theory and practice would not help us in achieving our goal of creating a happy and contented people. We must work our destiny in our own way and present to the world an economic system based on true Islamic concept of equality of manhood and social justice. We would thereby be fulfilling our mission as Muslims and giving to humanity the message of peace which alone could save it and secure the welfare, happiness and prosperity of mankind.

In the provincial field, Jinnah devoted his attention to the eradication of corruption, bribery, nepotism and jobbery which

were inherited into the administration as a legacy from the old regime. In his very first speech in the Constituent Assembly he had given indication of this. "We must put that down with an iron hand and I hope that you will take adequate measures soon as it is possible for this Assembly to do so," he said. In the Centre, legal measures were put on the parliamentary anvil almost immediately and in the provinces he began with the reorganisation of the provincial ministries. Under his instructions the Governor of the North-West Frontier Province dismissed the Ministry of Dr. Khan Saheb, which was replaced by a progressive and active administration led by Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, who later translated Jinnah's own dreams of industrial development into action. In Sind, Punjab and Eastern Pakistan he made emphatic efforts to impress upon the provinces that Pakistan's happiness lay in honest service and that provincialism must be rooted out.

The affairs of the State had put too much strain on Mohammad Ali Jinnah and since early 1948 he had been keeping extremely indifferent health. The administrative aspect of Pakistan had indeed presented to him innumerable problems and by the middle of 1948 he had discovered that even the Centre required considerable changes. Consequently he retired to a nearby hill-station to work out a scheme. But there also instead of taking rest he was working almost without break even in defiance of his doctor's advice, and when he came back to the Capital on July 1, to attend the inauguration of the State Bank of Pakistan—his last public appearance—he looked an utterly tired man.

He returned to Ziarat immediately and was overtaken by his last illness, and on September 11 he came down to Karachi a few hours before he left Pakistan behind in tears to mourn his death for ever.

Inna-Lillah-i-Wa-Inna-Ilaih-i-Rajiun

Illumined by creative effort, Jinnah's life is also full of practical achievements. In 1941, when he was convalescing in Mysore from his illness during the Madras session of the All-India Muslim League he told the author that he could visualise the establishment of Pakistan, and that although he would not live to witness the great event, the next generation would be able to accomplish it. Providence was, however, determined that he should live to see the birth of the child of his own creation and to nurse it to health. He was

to rule, in the very city of his birth, not only over a vast territory but also over the hearts of millions of his countrymen and to witness the fulfilment of his vision in which he found his people rising to great heights as an independent and sovereign nation.

Although two of his ambitions still remain to be achieved—free universal education and the assumption of a provincial status by Baluchistan—yet no other individual could have died with a greater feeling of satisfaction than did Mohammad Ali Jinnah. In his message on the occasion of the first anniversary of Pakistan, which also happens to be his last, he gave a prophetic touch of farewell:

> The result of our constructive and ameliorative work has gone far beyond the expectations of our best friends. I congratulate you all—my Ministers under the leadership of the Prime Minister, members of the Constituent Assembly and of the legislatures, officials working in various administrative departments and the members of the Defence Forces—for what you have achieved during so short a period, and I thank the people of Pakistan from whom we have received patience and genuine support in every effort that we have made to put forward the programme of the first year.
>
> Nature has given you everything. You have got unlimited resources. The foundations of your State have been laid, and it is now for you to build, and build as quickly and as well as you can. So go ahead and I wish you Godspeed.
>
> Pakistan Zindabad.

APPENDIX I

Memorandum of the Nineteen

The following is the Memorandum which was submitted in October 1916 to His Excellency the Viceroy by nineteen elected additional members of the Imperial Legislative Council with regard to post-war reforms:

There is no doubt that the termination of the war will see a great advance in the ideals of governments all over the civilised world and especially in the British Empire, which entered into the struggle in defence of the liberties of weak and small nationalities and is pouring forth its richest blood and treasure in upholding the cause of justice and humanity in the international relations of the world. India has borne her part in this struggle and cannot remain unaffected by the new spirit of change for a better state of things. Expectations have been raised in this country and hopes held out that, after the war, the problems of Indian administration will be looked at from a new angle of vision. The people of India have good reasons to be grateful to England for the great progress in her material resources and the widening of her intellectual and political outlook under British rule, and for the steady, if slow, advance in her national life, commencing with the Charter Act of India of 1833. Up to 1909, the Government of India was conducted by a bureaucracy almost entirely non-Indian in its composition and not responsible to the people of India. The reforms of 1909 for the first time introduced an Indian element in the direction of affairs in the administration of India. This element was of a very limited character. The Indian people accepted it as an indication on the part of the Government of a desire to admit the Indians into the inner counsels

of the Indian Empire. So far as the Legislative Councils are concerned, the numbers of non-official members were merely enlarged with increased facilities for debate and interpellation. The Supreme Legislative Council retained an absolute official majority, and in the Provincial Legislative Councils, a non-official majority included nominated members and the European representatives. In measures largely affecting the people, whether legislative or taxation, by which Europeans were not directly affected, the European members would naturally support the Government and the nominated members, being nominees of the Government, would be inclined to take the same side. Past experience has shown that this has actually happened on various occasions. The non-official majorities, therefore, in the Provincial Councils have proved largely illusory and give no real power to the representatives of the people. The Legislative Councils, whether Supreme or Provincial, are at present nothing but advisory bodies, without any power of effective control over the Government, Imperial or Provincial. The people or their representatives are practically as little associated with the real government of the country as they were before the reforms except for the introduction of the Indian element in the Executive Council, where again the nomination rests entirely with the Government, the people having no voice in the selection of the Indian members.

Disabilities

The object which the Government had in view in introducing the reforms of 1909 was, as expressed by the Prime Minister in his speech in the House of Commons on the second reading of the Indian Councils Bill (1st April, 1909), that "it was most desirable in the circumstances to give to the people of India the feeling that these Legislative Councils are not mere automatons, the wires of which are pulled by the official hierarchy." This object, it is submitted has not been attained. Apart from this question of the constitution of the Legislative and Executive Councils, the people labour under certain grave disabilities, which not only prevent the utilisation, but also lead to the wastage of what is best in them, and are positively derogatory to their sense of national self-respect. The Arms Act, which excludes from its operations Europeans and Anglo-Indians and applies only to the pure native of the country,

the disqualification of Indians for forming or joining Volunteer Corps, and their exclusion from the commissioned ranks of the army, are disabilities which are looked upon with an irritating sense of racial differentiation. It would be bad enough if these were mere disabilities. Restrictions and prohibitions regarding the possession and use of arms have tended to emasculate the civil population in India and expose them to serious danger. The position of Indians in India is practically this, that they have no real part or share in the direction of the government of the country, and are placed under very great and galling disabilities.

The existence, moreover, of the system of indentured emigration gives to the British Colonies and the outside world the impression that Indians, as a whole, are no better than indentured coolies, who are looked upon as very little, if at all, above the slave. The present state of things makes the Indians feel that, though theoretically they are the equal subjects of the King, they hold a very inferior position in the British Empire. Other Asiatic races also hold the same, if not a worse, view about India and her status in the Empire. Humiliating as this position of inferiority is to the Indian mind, it is almost unbearable to the youth of India, whose outlook is broadened by education and travel in foreign parts where they come in contact with the other free races. In the face of these grievances and disabilities, what has sustained the people is the hope and faith inspired by promises and assurances of fair and equal treatment which have been held out from time to time by our Sovereigns and British statesmen of high standing.

Not a Reward

In the crisis we are now going through, the Indian people have sunk domestic differences between themselves and the Government and have faithfully and legally stood by the Empire. The Indian soldiers were eager to go to the battlefields of Europe, not as mercenary troops but as free citizens of the British Empire which required their services, and her civilian population was animated by one desire, namely, to stand by England in the hour of her need. Peace and tranquillity reigned throughout India when she was practically denuded of British and Indian troops. The Prime Minister of England, while voicing the sentiments of the English people in

regard to India's part in this great war, spoke of Indians as "the joint and equal custodians of one common interest and future." India does not claim any reward for her loyalty, but she has a right to expect that the want of confidence on the part of Government, to which she not unnaturally ascribes her present state, should now be a thing of the past and that she should no longer occupy a position of subordination but one of comradeship. This would assure the Indian people that England is ready and willing to help them to attain self-government under the aegis of the British Crown, and thus discharge the noble mission which she has undertaken and to which she has so often given voluntary expression through her rulers and statesmen. What is wanted is not merely good government or efficient administration, but government that is acceptable to the people because it is responsible to them. This is what, India understands, would constitute the changed angle of vision.

If, after the termination of the war, the position of India practically remains what it was before and there is no material change in it, it will undoubtedly cause bitter disappointment and great discontent in the country, and the beneficent effects of participation in common danger, overcome by common effort, will soon disappear, leaving no record behind, save the painful memory of unrealised expectations. We feel sure that the Government is also alive to the situation and is contemplating measures of reform in the administration of the country. We feel that we should avail ourselves of this opportunity to respectfully offer to the Government our humble suggestions as to the lines on which these reforms should proceed. They must, in our opinion, go to the root of the matter. They must give to the people real and effective participation in the government of the country, and also remove these irritating disabilities as regards the possession of arms and military career, which indicates want of confidence in the people and place them in a position of inferiority and helplessness. With this view, we would take the liberty to suggest the following measures for consideration and adoption:

1. In all the Executive Councils, Provincial and Imperial, half the number of members should be Indians; the European element in the Executive Council should, as far as possible, be nominated from the ranks of men trained and educated in public life of England, so that India may have the benefit of a wider outlook and larger

experience of the outside world. It is not absolutely essential that the members of the Executive Councils, Indians or Europeans, should have experience of actual administration, for, as in the case of ministers in England, the assistance of the permanent officials of the departments is always available to them. As regards Indians we venture to say that a sufficient number of qualified Indians, who can worthily fill the office of members of the Executive Council and hold portfolios is available. Our short experience in this direction has shown how Indians like Sir S. P. Sinha, Sir Syed Ali Imam, the late Mr. Krishnaswami Iyer, Sir Shams-ul-Huda and Sir Sankaran Nair have maintained a high level of administrative ability in the discharge of their duties. Moreover, it is well known that the Native States, where Indians have opportunities, have produced renowned administrators like Sir Salar Jang, Sir T. Madhava Rao, Sir Seshadri Aiyar, Dewan Bahadur Raghunath Rao, not to mention the present administrators in the various Native States of India. The statutory obligations, now existing, that three of the members of the Supreme Executive Council shall be elected from the Public Services in India and similar provisions with regard to Provincial Councils should be removed. The elected representatives of the people should have a voice in the selection of the Indian members of the Executive Council and for that purpose a principle of election should be adopted.

2. All the Legislative Councils in India should have a substantial majority of elected representatives. These representatives, we feel sure, will watch and safeguard the interests of the masses and the agricultural population with whom they are in closer touch than any European officer, however sympathetic, can possibly be. The proceedings of the various Legislative Councils and the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League bear ample testimony to the solicitude of the educated Indians for the welfare of the masses and their acquaintance with their wants and wishes. The franchise should be broadened and extended directly to the people, Muslims or Hindus, wherever they are in a minority, being given proper and adequate representation having regard to their numerical strength and position.

3. The total number of the members of the Supreme Council

should not be less than 150, and of the Provincial Council not less than 100 for the major provinces, and not less than 60 to 75 for the minor provinces.

4. The Budget should be passed in the shape of money bills, fiscal autonomy being conceded to India.

5. The Imperial Legislative Council should have power to legislate on, and discuss and pass resolutions relating to all matters of Indian administration, and the Provincial Councils should have similar powers with regard to provincial administrations, save and except that the directions of military affairs, of foreign relations, declarations of war, the making of peace, and the entering into treaties, other than commercial should be vested in the Government of India. As a safeguard the Governor-General-in-Council or the Governor-in-Council, as the case may be, should have the right of veto which, however, should be exercised subject to certain conditions and limitations.

6. The Council of the Secretary of State should be abolished. The Secretary of State should, as far as possible, hold in relation to the Government of India a position similar to that which the Secretary of State for the Colonies holds in relation to the Colonies. The Secretary of State should be assisted by two permanent Under-Secretaries one of whom should be an Indian. The salaries of the Secretary and Under-Secretaries should be placed on the British estimates.

7. In any scheme of Indian Federation, India should be given through her chosen representatives a place similar to that of the self-governing Dominions.

8. The Provincial Governments should be made autonomous, as stated in the Government of India's Despatch dated the 5th August, 1911.

9. The United Provinces, as well as the other majority provinces, should have a Governor brought from the United Kingdom and should have an Executive Council.

10. A full measure of local self-government should be immediately granted.

11. The right to carry arms should be granted to Indians on the

same conditions as to Europeans.

12. Indians should be allowed to enlist as volunteers and units of a territorial army established in India.

13. Commissions in the army should be given to Indian youths under conditions similar to those applicable to Europeans.

APPENDIX II

Lucknow Muslim League Resolution December 1916

The All-India Muslim League, while adopting the scheme of reforms prepared by the Reform Committee of the League and approved by its Council, submits it in conjunction with the Indian National Congress to the Government for its introduction after the war as the first necessary step towards the establishment of complete self-government in India.

Reform Scheme

I.—Provincial Legislative Councils

1. Provincial Legislative Councils shall consist of four-fifths elected and of one-fifth nominated members.

2. Their strength shall be not less than 125 members in the major provinces, and from 50 to 75 in the minor provinces.

3. The members of Councils should be elected directly by the people on as broad a franchise as possible.

4. Adequate provision should be made for the representation of important minorities by election, and Muslims should be represented through special electorates on the Provincial Legislative Councils in the following proportions:

Punjab—one-half of the elected Indian members.
United Provinces—30 p.c. of the elected Indian members.
Bengal—40 p.c. of the elected Indian members.
Bihar—25 p.c. of the elected Indian members.
Central Provinces—15 p.c. of the elected Indian members.

Madras—15 p.c. of the elected Indian members.

Bombay—One-third of the elected Indian members.

Provided that no Muslim shall participate in any of the other elections to the Imperial or Provincial Legislative Council, save and except those by electorates representing special interests.

Provided further that no bill, nor any clause thereof, nor a resolution introduced by a non-official member affecting one or the other community, which question is to be determined by the members of that community in the Legislative Council concerned, shall be proceeded with, if three-fourths of the members of that community in the particular Council, Imperial or Provincial, oppose the bill or any clause thereof or the resolution.

5. The head of the Provincial Government should not be the President of the Legislative Council, but the Council should have the right of electing its President.

6. The right of asking supplementary questions should not be restricted to the member putting the original question, but should be allowed to be exercised by any other member.

7. (*a*) Except customs, posts, telegraphs, mint, salt, opium, railways, army and navy, and tributes from Indian States, all other sources of revenue should be Provincial.

(*b*) There should be no divided heads of revenue. The Government of India should be provided with fixed contributions from the Provincial Governments, such fixed contributions being liable to revision when extraordinary and unforeseen contingencies render such revision necessary.

(*c*) The Provincial Council should have full authority to deal with all matters affecting the internal administration of the province including the power to raise loans, to impose and alter taxation, and to vote on the Budget. All items of expenditure, and all proposals concerning ways and means for raising the necessary revenue, should be embodied in Bills and submitted to the Provincial Council for adoption.

(*d*) Resolution on all matters within the purview of the Provincial Government should be allowed for discussion in accordance with rules made in that behalf by the Council itself.

(*e*) A resolution passed by the Provincial Legislative Council shall be binding on the Executive Government, unless vetoed by the

Governor-in-Council, provided, however, that if the resolution is again passed by the Council after an interval of not less than one year, it must be given effect to.

(*f*) A motion for adjournment may be brought forward for the discussion of a definite matter of urgent public importance, if supported by not less than one-eighth of the members present.

8. A special meeting of the Provincial Council may be summoned on a requisition by not less than one-eighth of the members.

9. A Bill, other than a Money Bill, may be introduced in Council in accordance with rules made in that behalf by the Council itself, and the consent of the Government should not be required therefor.

10. All Bills passed by Provincial Legislatures shall have to receive the assent of the Governor before they become law, but may be vetoed by the Governor-General.

11. The term of office of the members shall be five years.

II.—Provincial Governments

1. The head of every Provincial Government shall be a Governor who shall not ordinarily belong to the Indian Civil Service or any of the permanent services.

2. There shall be in every Province an Executive Council which, with the Governor, shall constitute the Executive Government of the Province.

3. Members of the Indian Civil Service shall not ordinarily be appointed to the Executive Councils.

4. Not less than one-half of the members of the Executive Council shall consist of Indians to be elected by the elected members of the Provincial Legislative Council.

5. The term of office of the members shall be five years.

III.—Imperial Legislative Council

1. The strength of the Imperial Legislative Council shall be 150.

2. Four-fifths of the members shall be elected.

3. The franchise for the Imperial Legislative Council should be widened as far as possible on the lines of the electorates for Muslims for the Provincial Legislative Councils, and the elected members of

the Provincial Legislative Councils should also form an electorate for the return of members to the Imperial Legislative Council.

4. One-third of the Indian elected members should be Muslims elected by separate Muslim electorates in the several Provinces, in the proportion, as nearly as may be, in which they are represented on the Provincial Legislative Councils by separate Muslim electorates—*vide* provisos to Section I, clause 4.

5. The President of the Council shall be elected by the Council itself.

6. The right of asking supplementary questions shall not be restricted to the member putting the original question, but should be allowed to be exercised by any other member.

7. A special meeting of the Council may be summoned on a requisition by not less than one-eighth of the members.

8. A Bill, other than a Money Bill, may be introduced in Council in accordance with rules made in that behalf by the Council itself, and the consent of the Executive Government should not be required therefor.

9. All Bills passed by the Council shall have to receive the assent of the Governor-General before they become law.

10. All financial proposals relating to sources of income and items of expenditure shall be embodied in Bills. Every such Bill and the Budget as a whole shall be submitted for the vote of the Imperial Legislative Council.

11. The term of office of the members shall be five years.

12. The matters mentioned herein below shall be exclusively under the control of the Imperial Legislative Council:

(*a*) Matters in regard to which uniform legislation for the whole of India is desirable.

(*b*) Provincial legislation in so far as it may affect inter-provincial fiscal relations.

(*c*) Questions affecting purely Imperial revenue, excepting tributes from Indian States.

(*d*) Questions affecting purely Imperial expenditure, except that no resolution of the Imperial Legislative Council shall be binding on the Governor-General-in-Council in respect of military charges for the defence of the country.

(*e*) The right of revising Indian tariffs and custom-duties, of

imposing, altering, or removing any tax or cess, modifying the existing system of currency and banking, and granting any aids or bounties to any or all deserving and nascent industries of the country.

(*f*) Resolutions on all matters relating to the administration of the country as a whole.

13. A resolution passed by the Legislative Council should be binding on the Executive Government, unless vetoed by the Governor-General-in-Council: provided however that if the resolution is again passed by the Council after an interval of not less than one year, it must be given effect to.

14. A motion for adjournment may be brought forward for the discussion of a definite matter of urgent public importance, if supported by not less than one-eighth of the members present.

15. When the Crown chooses to exercise its power of veto in regard to a Bill passed by a Provincial Legislative Council or by the Imperial Legislative Council, it should be exercised within twelve months from the date on which it is passed, and the Bill shall cease to have effect as from the date on which the fact of such veto is made known to the Legislative Council concerned.

16. The Imperial Legislative Council shall have no power to interfere with the Government of India's discretion of the military affairs and foreign and political relations of India, including the declaration of war, the making of peace and the entering into treaties.

IV.—The Government of India

1. The Governor-General of India will be the Head of the Government of India.

2. He will have an Executive Council, half of whom shall be Indians.

3. The Indian members should be elected by the elected members of the Imperial Legislative Council.

4. Members of the Indian Civil Service shall not ordinarily be appointed to the Executive Council of the Governor-General.

5. The power of making all appointments in the Imperial Civil Services shall vest in the Government of India, as constituted under this scheme, due regard being paid to existing interests, subject to any laws that may be made by the Imperial Legislative Council.

6. The Government of India shall not ordinarily interfere in the local affairs of a province, and powers not specifically given to a Provincial Government shall be deemed to be vested in the former. The authority of the Government of India will ordinarily be limited to general supervision and superintendence over the Provincial Governments.

7. In legislative and administrative matters the Government of India, as constituted under this scheme, shall, as far as possible, be independent of the Secretary of State.

8. A system of independent audit of the accounts of the Government of India should be instituted.

V.—The Secretary of State-in-Council

1. The Council of the Secretary of State for India should be abolished.

2. The salary of the Secretary of State should be placed on the British Estimates.

3. The Secretary of State should, as far as possible, occupy the same position in relation to the Government of India as the Secretary of State for Colonies does in relation to the Government of the self-governing Dominions.

4. The Secretary of State for India should be assisted by two permanent Under-Secretaries, one of whom should always be an Indian.

VI.—India and the Empire

1. In any Council or other body which may be constituted or convened for the settlement or control of Imperial affairs, India shall be adequately represented in like manner with the Dominions and with equal rights.

2. Indians should be placed on a footing of equality in respect of status and rights of citizenship with other subjects of His Majesty the King throughout the Empire.

VII.—Military and other matters

1. The military and naval services of His Majesty, both in their

commissioned and non-commissioned ranks, should be thrown open to Indians and adequate provision should be made for their selection, training and instruction in India.

2. Indians should be allowed to enlist as volunteers.

3. Executive officers in India shall have no judicial powers entrusted to them, and the judiciary in every province shall be placed under the highest court of that province.

APPENDIX III

Bengal Provincial Muslim League February 1942

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am thankful to you for having honoured me by inviting me to preside over your provincial Muslim League Conference. I accepted your invitation all the more readily because of the political developments that have taken place during the recent months. You are in the whirlwind of a political storm in Bengal. I have come here to tell you what I think of the situation.

Ladies and gentlemen, the Muslim League has many opponents. We are going through a life and death struggle. We have made it clear over and over again that we are organising our people and have no quarrel with the Hindus or any other community, large or small, in this sub-continent. We have repeatedly declared that the cardinal principle and aim of the Muslim League is to safeguard the political rights and status of the Muslims of India. We have been on the defensive all along and what have we been wanting? We want to live in this land as free and independent people and not under the *raj* or the government of anyone else. The arrogance, the hatred and the aggressiveness that is demonstrated by the Hindu leaders that we must live as the minority people, under the domination of the Hindu majority is patent. It is that policy, that programme, that aggressiveness and that offensive and arrogant attitude against which we are fighting. The Muslims in India are a nation. They will not submit to any position other than that of complete equality with the Hindu community in this country. Now, as I have said, we have our opponents. The British Government are no particular friends of Muslims. They have their policy and their pro-

gramme just as much as the Hindus have theirs and we have ours. In the political world there is neither real justice nor fairplay. Every act and every decision is guided, unfortunately, by self-interest. We cannot look to the British Government or to anyone else for justice and fairplay. We must stand on our own legs and rely on our own strength if we are to achieve anything in this world. We must be prepared to stand alone and make our sacrifices if we are to achieve equality and then alone we shall be able to achieve and establish Pakistan in this land.

Bengal Horizon

Now let us view the political position of the day. Let us cast our eyes on the horizon of Bengal. Ladies and gentlemen, this wretched Constitution, to begin with, under which your provincial legislatures function today is not of our making. The Constitution in itself is a gross injustice to the thirty-five million of Muslims living in this Province. Of course, it will serve no useful purpose if we blame someone or other. We have to realise and we have to confess that it is our own fault to a considerable extent that the thirty-five million Muslims in one Muslim State, Bengal, had rallen and fallen to such depths that the voice of Muslim Bengal was dead. In these dreadful conditions, to our shame, the present Constitution was enacted almost *ex parte,* if I may be allowed to say, so far as Muslim India was concerned.

Ladies and gentlemen, the Bengal Legislative Assembly consists of 250 members. Of these you have 122 or 123, including the Special Constituencies. These figures will demonstrate to you that from the very word "go" we are a minority. How can this minority possibly run a government with a workable and practical majority? A Muslim League ministry cannot be formed that will be stable. For the same reason a Muslim League ministry in the Punjab or even in Sind cannot be formed. Those who are fond of arithmetical calculations misrepresent when they say that we in a Muslim majority province cannot form a Muslim League ministry.

Land of Lotus

At the time of the general elections in the year 1936-37, I came to this land of the Lotus. I toured Dacca, Mymensingh, Comilla and

other places and discovered that Muslim Bengal was practically dead. I found men who were out to exploit the people to gain their own ends; to exploit the people for the purpose of being returned to the legislatures. This was the condition of Bengal. It was the Muslim League which was admittedly till then an academic body that awakened to the realities of the situation and undertook the duty of organising the Muslims and of contesting the elections. A provincial Parliamentary Board was established and Muslim League candidates were put up for election. Remember, Bengal is a continent in herself. With our young and poor organisation we captured no less than 65 seats in the Assembly and became the largest single party that was returned to the House. The Krishak Praja Party contested the elections as well. Mr. Fazlul Haq was then the champion of the Prajas. His party won some seats. After the elections he conveniently forgot the Prajas and others and became, by joining the Muslim League, the leader of the largest party in the Assembly. Not only did he throw over the Prajas and the others but he became a member of the Muslim League and preached the creed of the League all over the province, keeping in his pocket at the same time the small Praja group.

FORMER MINISTRY

Ladies and gentlemen, the Ministry that resigned recently was never a Muslim League Ministry; it was only dominantly a Muslim League Ministry. This dominant Muslim League Ministry was in power when we were faced with a new question. You know when the scheme of the expansion of the Viceroy's Executive Council came to be considered, it was known as the eighth of August offer.[1] That offer was considered by the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League of which Mr. Fazlul Haq was a member. It was unanimously resolved that it should not be accepted and the offer was not accepted. The offer was also considered by the Council of the Muslim League and the decision of the Working Committee was endorsed by it. Mr. Fazlul Haq was also a member of the Council. The Council's decision was further confirmed by the session of the All-India Muslim League. Without reference to the President of the All-India Muslim League, His Excellency the

1. 1940.

Viceroy decided to expand his Executive Council and to set up the so-called Indian National Defence Council. It was nothing but the very offer the Muslim League had rejected. In the terms of the offer the Muslim League would have been entitled on the Executive Council whereas the Governor-General selected and nominated two Muslims on his own. This, you will agree, was adding insult to injury. I ask you if it was possible for any self-respecting organisation or for any individual with a shred of self-respect to agree to accept such an offer? Mr. Fazlul Haq accepted nomination on the National Defence Council secretly without reference to the President and without consulting the Working Committee. When the news was published it was found that there were others also who had accepted such appointment but be it said to the honour of the others that both Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan and Sir Mohammad Saadullah bowed to the decision of the Working Committee and resigned from the Defence Council.

Mr. Haq's Pet Game

The third Muslim League Premier, a Premier that Bengal had produced, I do not know how but it is certainly difficult for any part of the world to produce another like him, wanted time to consider whether he should resign from or remain on the Defence Council. Mr. Haq has a pet game that we all know so well. We know when he plays it. When in difficulty Mr. Haq always either wants time or falls ill.

The Working Committee did not refuse him time because the Working Committee is a sensible, responsible and considerate body. He was given ten days to come to a decision. He was informed that if he did not resign within that time disciplinary action would be taken against him. He decided, after resorting to many tricks which are public property, to resign from the Defence Council but with what grace? You have all read the contents of the letter that was addressed to the Secretary of the All-India Muslim League on the eighth of September, 1941. He made many vile, undignified, false and unjustified accusations against the President, the Working Committee and the Council of the All-India Muslim League. Remember, up till then the Council had not even considered the matter of Mr. Fazlul Haq's action. It was naturally impossible for any self-

respecting organisation to permit such libellous and scandalous allegations against its President, the Working Committee and the Council. He went on and on and on trying to tax the patience of every respectable Muslim in the country and ultimately, you may say, surrendered to the demand of the League in substance if not in form. He requested us after his reaffirmation of loyalty and assurance that he meant no insult or reflection on the President or any member to treat the whole incident as closed. The Working Committee in its magnanimity worthy of a great organisation complied with his request and considered the incident as closed. The file had barely been put away when most startling developments took place in Bengal from which it was as patent as daylight that Mr. Fazlul Haq had made exhaustive and elaborate preparations for many months.

The Progressives

He encouraged the formation of a "progressive" group of a few Muslim members in the Assembly with himself as leader. Remember, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Haq was at that time a member of the Muslim League, President of the Provincial League, leader of the Muslim League group in the Assembly, leader of the Coalition Party, member of the Council of the All-India Muslim League and member of the All-India Working Committee. Further he started a daily newspaper in Bengali named the *Nava Joog* which boldly displayed the following words: "Conducted by Mr. A. K. Fazlul Haq." The policy of this daily was to abuse the League and all that it stood for.

On the resignation of the last Ministry he went round collecting signatures. I was told that he collected the signatures of 119 members of the Assembly and petitioned the Governor to commission him to form a Ministry as leader of the Progressive Coalition Party, a party of multifarious and conflicting political and economic interests, a party created overnight to destroy Muslim solidarity and to bring confusion in their ranks. I ask you—I have not given you many details—I ask you for your verdict. Is this not the greatest betrayal of not only the Muslim League but the Muslims of Bengal and of the whole of India? Is this not a case of betrayal and treachery to the Coalition Party of which he was leader for over four and a

half years?

Governor and Crisis

Now let us try and understand the stand taken by His Excellency the Governor in this crisis. Can we believe that the Governor was ignorant of the facts that I have placed before you—that he did not know much more than we did of the actual situation of the time? We have no Intelligence Department but the Governor has. The Governor instead of following the course that has been established by convention in the British Parliament, to call the leader of the largest single party, called a man who had been conspiring even as the head of the Government of Bengal—a man who was canvassing for support with his hat in hand before being commissioned—an act, to my mind highly improper and derogatory to the honour and prestige of a person who claims to be a leader—a man who had actually petitioned the Governor to commission him to form a Ministry. The encouragement of such a practice is, I say with emphasis, unknown to any system of parliamentary Government in the world. Signatures are obtained, most of them at least, for the mere asking. Promises have to be made. Is this not encouraging corrupt practice among your legislators? The Coalition Party having been dissolved, His Excellency should have called the leader of the largest single party which was unquestionably the Muslim League Party. Its leader, Sir Nazimuddin, should have been commissioned first. He ought to have been the first man to tell the Government whether he could or could not form a Ministry. Sir Nazimuddin is a responsible leader with a clean reputation. He has held responsible positions long before this constitution came into operation. Since the inauguration of the present Constitution until the day that the Cabinet resigned, he was in charge of the most important portfolio, namely, Home. As I have said, his record is clean, he is a responsible man and has acquitted himself honourably throughout his career. It was for Sir Nazimuddin to decide whether he should accept the commission to form a Ministry or not. If he made a mistake and said to His Excellency, "Yes, I will" and had he failed to do so or was defeated by a vote of no-confidence, it would have been the funeral of the League and not the funeral of the Governor. The Governor did not give him an opportunity to

face a funeral and commissioned, as I have said a few minutes ago, a person holding in his hand an application over the signatures of 119 members obtained, how God alone knows. Even this "mighty" man with his mighty majority could not present His Excellency with a complete list of ministers. The names were given in instalments. Although he had sufficient time he did not face the Legislature with a full list of ministers.

Present Ministry

Today Bengal has nine ministers. Believe me, I shall not be a bit surprised if this 9 is expanded to reach astronomical figures in the course of time as and when it suits Mr. Fazlul Haq and as and when he finds power slipping through his fingers. On my arrival in Calcutta another really ingenious and ridiculous decision of the Ministry was flashed in the press. It was stated that the Government were appointing 13 whips. The number was 13 when I reached Calcutta, in Serajganj the number has risen to 17 and God alone knows how many more will be added to this list later. I put it to the Governor if he can quote any parallel in any legislature in any part of the world where 17 whips are required in a House of 250. I ask the Governor if in his own country, in a Parliament of over 600, there are 17 whips?

I do not know how many parliamentary secretaries will be appointed. Let us presume that there will be seventeen parliamentary secretaries; then the ministers plus the parliamentary secretaries plus the whips and plus a few more jobs here and there will bring the total to about 50 persons who will be kept together by virtue of direct patronage in the legislature. Therefore out of the 119 Mr. Fazlul Haq has almost 50 who will be there with him just for jobs. This, ladies and gentlemen, is the position of the Ministry that is in power today in the province of Bengal.

League Party

Now I come to another important matter because it vitally concerns the Muslims of the province. The Muslim League Party is in the opposition and is, therefore, so long as the Constitution is in operation, entitled to approach the Muslims and to appeal to their electorate against the misdeeds of the Government in power. We

are not interfering with the Hindus at all. We are going to our own people and, surely, are we not entitled to do so? We want to tell the electorate of the treachery of Mr. Fazlul Haq. We want to tell them and prove to them how Mr. Haq is doing incalculable harm to the Muslims of Bengal and to the Muslims of the whole of India. We want to tell them the truth and Mr. Haq hates this. We want to tell them to call upon the representatives they have sent to the Legislature to come to their senses. We want to tell them that these men are causing fatal injury to Muslim interests. Surely we cannot be denied this right. In no country where a constitutional form of government is in operation is this fundamental right denied. Our men are being persecuted and prosecuted. The penal codes of the country are being wrongly utilised. The Defence of India Act, the use of which is permitted only in certain cases and conditions, is being openly abused. I do not know what to say. Is it the Bengal Government or the Bengal misgovernment that is in the saddle? It is the special responsibility of His Excellency the Governor to see that his ministers do not abuse power and the sooner the Governor acts in the matter the better will it be for the peace of the province. As I have said, every effort is being made to prevent us from appealing to the people. Mr. Fazlul Haq realises more than anyone else in the province that almost 99 per cent of the Bengal Muslims are against him and those who have betrayed the Muslim cause. They dare not face openly and frankly and place their case before the people. They want to stop us. We want to tell the truth, they tell the untruth.

They wish to suppress constitutional agitation by abusing the Defence of India Act and other penal laws. Let me say from this platform and I say with full responsibility and without the least hesitation that if His Excellency does not intervene and if this shameful policy is persisted, there will arise in Bengal such a situation that no power, nor even this wretched Government of Bengal, has ever seen. In Bengal will arise a situation for which there is no parallel in her history during the British *Raj*. We shall not be suppressed, oppressed or tyrannised by this wretched Ministry, a Ministry that does not represent the Muslims, a Ministry whose Chief Minister and the Muslim Ministers do not enjoy Muslim confidence and have completely forfeited it. I also hope that the eyes of the

Viceroy will be opened soon to the new situation that has arisen in Bengal.

CALL FOR PROOF

If any party desires to challenge our assertion that we alone represent the Muslims of Bengal, let us dissolve the Assembly and go to the polls. Let us go to our people and we shall prove that our claim is not exaggerated but is fully justified. I considered it my bounden duty to leave my many commitments and to come to Bengal to appeal to the Muslims of the province; to tell them that it is in their hands to put matters right. With unity Muslims can achieve everything they desire. To defeat Mr. Haq and his Ministry will be as easy as felling off a log. I was not sure whether Muslim Bengal had grasped and realised the danger of Mr. Haq's move. That is why I came here and I am happy to find that 99 per cent of the Muslims of Bengal are with the Muslim League and they have understood the game. The Muslims of Calcutta and the Muslims assembled from all over the province at Serajganj have proved this. I am sure Muslim Bengal will stand firm and united under this great flag of ours and I am sure we shall win.

The Muslim League does not exist for Ministers and Ministries. On the other hand, it is the Ministers and Ministries who can only exist if the Muslim League approves of them. This I want to make clear. We will not allow anyone to exploit the League for the purpose of becoming a Minister and to utilise the League as the ladder of his personal ambition. I say again, let it be clear here and now and once and for all. Let there be no mistake. We shall not allow men to sneak in and before anyone takes such a step we shall see that he is hurled back.

ALL-INDIA ISSUES

Ladies and gentlemen, I have spoken enough on Bengal for today. Let me proceed to other important matters. We have got to consider all-India issues as well and I think I shall be failing in my duty if I do not express to you my views. So far as the Congress is concerned I find that in their language and in their tone there is less aggressiveness and less arrogance. In the recent speeches of Mr. Rajagopalacharia I find—I shall not express in my own language

but I shall quote his own—it is nice of him to pay me a compliment and I thank him for it: "There has been no settlement between the Government and the people and the principal political organisations, over whom such illustrious persons as Mahatma Gandhi and Qaid-e-Azam Jinnah preside. These were not small individuals—one had become as famous as the other and both of them were tremendously popular in the country. Each had a 'blind following,' let it be so; but it was a true following."

Note the words "true following." Mr. Rajagopalacharia admits that your President has a true following. I am proud of it and I am honoured. He goes on to say: "Here were, then, two powerful popular organisations of Hindus and Muslims, both at war with the Government and, therefore, with all the operations of the Government. These were facts."

This is the first time that one of the foremost leaders of the Congress has had the courage and frankness to admit that the Congress is a Hindu organisation; and he has uttered the truth. I appeal to Mr. Gandhi to bow before the truth and to declare that the Congress represents the Hindus, and the Muslim League, the Muslims of India. Then and only then there is hope for the two communities to meet on terms of equality and on no other terms can they meet.

Pakistan

Now let me proceed to the next point—Pakistan. We have heard many arguments but what do we find in the latest pronouncement of Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru who always thinks in terms of internationalism? What does he say? He does not repeat the wretched arguments that his colleagues and most of the other Hindu leaders have been repeating *ad nauseam*. He does not think in terms of India. For him India does not exist. Let me read to you an extract of his speech as reported in the press on the 2nd of this month:

"He wondered how the Muslim League talk of partitioning India and forming a separate Muslim block, when some Islamic countries, which were separate Muslim blocks, had lost their freedom. Those who talked of such partition had closed their eyes and ears to the happenings in the world and had refused to take lessons from the war. He also wondered how a Muslim block in India could stand

by itself when in the present-day world big nations could not stand alone."

All that I can say to Mr. Nehru is to let us look after ourselves and to let us see whether we can stand by ourselves. May I know from him how the whole of India can stand alone when in the present-day world big nations have not been able to stand alone?

Future Constitution

Now I shall deal with the controversy that is still going on with regard to the existing and the future constitution of India. The practical issue of immediate importance which is being emphasised is what is to be done immediately. With regard to this I shall briefly tell you how the matters stand today. On the one hand, the British Government are holding fast and tight to the August offer. The declaration of the eighth of August consists of two parts. One part is the declaration of His Majesty's policy with regard to the future constitution of India. The other part is that of the Indianisation of the Viceroy's Executive Council in the interim period by associating the major political parties by getting them to send their representatives to the Executive Council of the Governor-General. Now it came to a concrete offer, and you know what that offer was, the Congress definitely and clearly declared that they were not prepared to be party to any changes in the Centre or in the Provinces so long as these changes were within the framework of the existing constitution. They rejected the basic principle underlying this proposal of His Majesty's Government.

There are, however, other Hindu organisations, namely, the Hindu Mahasabha, the Liberal Federation, the Non-Party Conference, now called the Sapru Conference. All these Hindu organisations are one and the same. They masquerade under different names but patrol and reconnoitre on behalf of the Congress.

One brother, the Congress, wants sixteen annas, the other says fifteen annas will do for a start while another says even twelve annas may tempt him and so their game goes on. All have the same objective. If they do not succeed by a frontal attack they bank on success through a backdoor policy under the guise of what they call the setting up of a National Government. They are out to lay as many traps as they can for the destruction of the Pakistan scheme.

I declare that they will not succeed. Muslim India is awake and is determined. These Hindu parties are with great zeal encouraging the idea of establishing a National Cabinet, a Cabinet responsible to the Crown. There seems on the face of it very little difference between a Cabinet responsible to the Crown and one responsible to the Legislature. Ladies and gentlemen, this move is a sinister one. In fact, it is the introduction of the thin end of the wedge for how long will the Viceroy be able to overrule the decisions of the majority of his Cabinet supposed to be responsible to the Crown? If he does, then there will arise agitation, and the cry that there is oppression of the majority or high-handedness on the part of the Viceroy will rend the sky. Propaganda will spread like wild-fire that the will of the people—and these people will be the Hindus—is being defied by the autocratic representative of the Crown. The next step will logically be to get the Cabinet responsibility shifted from the Crown to the Legislature, thus securing a definite control over the whole country and thus keeping the Muslims in a minority position. Who cannot see through this game? At first glance, it appears to be a harmless and innocent proposition, but in reality it is subtle and all the more treacherous.

So far as the British Government are concerned, up till today they stand by the August proposals. Beyond this they will not go. The Congress have rejected these proposals. Our position is that we have accepted them in principle, but when it comes to putting the proposal into practice, they whittle it down to such an extent, that no decent self-respecting organisation can accept it. Our position is, and this we have declared more than once, that we must get a real share not only in the Centre but also in the Provinces.

The Congress today unquestionably represents the solid body of Hindu opinion in India and if this body does not accept the basic principle of the August offer, how can the next step be taken so far as they are concerned? Let them first accept this and prepare the meeting ground and then there will be room and necessity for our sitting together to devise a happy solution. We shall then say what we want and they can say what they want.

In conclusion, I say to the Muslims of Bengal to stand firm, united and consolidated under the banner of the Muslim League. Prepare yourselves, Muslims of Bengal, and I assure you that victory

will be yours. Let us declare that no amount of suppression, oppression, persecution and prosecution will frighten us or will make us deviate from our resolve and our goal. I take this opportunity of giving the authorities and those in power today fair warning that if they persist in the prosecution of the policy that they have adopted in the recent months against the Muslim League in Bengal, they will be creating a situation not only in Bengal but also in the rest of India, a situation for which there will be no equal in history. Let them know that we are not merely talking but that we shall resist coercion. I warn them not to force the issue upon us for, if they do, they will rue the day.

APPENDIX IV

Bombay Resolution of League

Resolution of the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League passed at Bombay in its meeting held in the month of August 1942:

The Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League, having their deep and anxious consideration to the present political development in the country, deplore the decision arrived at by the All-India Congress Committee on August 8, 1942, to launch an "open rebellion" by resorting to mass civil disobedience movement in pursuance of their objective of establishing Congress Hindu domination in India, which has resulted in lawlessness and considerable destruction of life and property.

It is the considered opinion of the Working Committee that this movement is directed not only to coerce the British Government into handing over power to a Hindu oligarchy and thus disabling themselves from carrying out their moral obligations and pledges given to the Muslims and other sections of the peoples of India from time to time, but also to force the Muslims to submit and surrender to the Congress terms and dictation.

Ever since the beginning of the war and even prior to that the sole objective of the Congress policy has been either to cajole or to coerce the British Government into surrendering power to the Congress—a Hindu body with a microscopic following of other communities—in utter suppression of one hundred millions of Muslims, besides millions of other peoples of this vast sub-continent of India. While claiming the right of self-determination for "India," which is a mere Congress euphemism for Hindu majority, it has

persistently opposed the right of self-determination for the Muslim nation to decide and determine their own destiny.

On May 1, 1942, the All-India Congress Committee, by their resolutions, emphatically repudiated the Muslim League demand for the right of self-determination for Muslims and thus closed the door for the settlement of the communal problem, which is a condition precedent to the attainment of the freedom and independence of India. The Congress had also recognised this as an indispensable condition and had made it a prominent plank in the Congress programme for over twenty years, but by their recent decisions have suddenly thrown it overboard and in its stead substituted the fantastic theory that the solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem can only follow the withdrawal of British power from India.

The negotiations of Sir Stafford Cripps with the Congress broke down not on the issue of Independence, but because of the refusal of the British Government to hand over the Muslims and the minorities to the tender mercies of the Congress. Any acquiescence in this on the part of the British would have been strenuously resisted by the minorities, and particularly by the Muslim nation, with memories of tyranny in the Congress-governed Provinces still fresh and vivid in their minds.

Baulked in their effort to cajole Sir Stafford Cripps to agree to the transfer of power to the Congress caucus, they decided upon a slogan—"Quit India"—accompanied with the threat of mass civil disobedience. This slogan is a mere camouflage, and what is really aimed at is the supreme control of the government of the country by the Congress.

The Muslims are not a whit less insistent on freedom for the country and the achievement of independence of the people of India, which is the creed of the All-India Muslim League. They are, however, firmly convinced that the constituent elements in the life of the country are out for the establishment of Hindu *Raj* and to deal a death-blow to the Muslim goal of Pakistan.

The Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League note with dissatisfaction the attitude and policy of the British Government towards the national aspirations of one hundred millions of Muslims of India.

While the Congress aims at ignoring and suppressing the Muslim

demand, the Working Committee regret that the British Government have been unresponsive to the Muslim League's offer of co-operation. The appeasement of the Congress has been the central pivot of the Government policy, with barren and sterile results and has now culminated in the open defiance of law and order.

Since the commencement of hostilities the Muslim League has been ready and willing, either singly or in co-operation with other parties, to shoulder the responsibility for running the administration and mobilising the resources of the country for the war efforts for the defence of India, if a real share in the power and authority of the Government at the Centre and in the Provinces was conceded within the framework of the present Constitution, and in pursuance of this policy, the Muslim League accepted the underlying principles of the August offer of 1940 of the British Government.

But the Government in implementing the offer, nullified the essential principles of it and so made it impossible for the Muslim League to co-operate with the Government on honourable terms. In spite of the fact that the British Government had spurned the offer of co-operation of the Muslim League, still, under the imminent shadow of the Japanese menace, the Muslim League once again reiterated their offer by their resolution of December 27, 1941, in the following words:

"In view of the fact that the entry of Japan in the war, on the side of the Axis Powers, has brought the danger much closer to India and has forced, into greater prominence, the question of the defence of India, the Working Committee consider it necessary to reiterate, that the Muslim League, from the very beginning, has expressed its willingness to share the responsibility of the defence of the country, is evident from the stand taken by the President of the All-India Muslim League as far back as November 1939 . . . The Working Committee once more declare that they are ready and willing, as before, to shoulder the burden of the defence of the country, singly or in co-operation with other parties, on the basis that a real share and responsibility is given in the authority of the Government at the Centre and the Provinces within the framework of the present Constitution, but without prejudice to the major political issues involved in the framing of the future Constitution."

But the British Government completely ignored the offer of the

Muslim League.

While the proposals of Sir Stafford Cripps virtually conceded the Congress demands on the right of secession from the British Commonwealth of Nations and forming of a Constituent Assembly with a preponderant Hindu majority for the framing of the post-war constitution, they merely recognised the possibility of establishing Pakistan, supposed to be implicit in the non-accession scheme.

The Working Committee are definitely of the opinion that if the Muslim masses are to be roused to intensify the war effort with all the sacrifices that are involved in it, it is only possible, provided they are assured that it would lead to the realisation of the inspiring goal of Pakistan. The Muslim League, therefore, calls upon the British Government to come forward without any further delay with an unequivocal declaration guaranteeing to the Muslims the right of self-determination and to pledge themselves that they would abide by the verdict of the plebiscite of Muslims and give effect to the Pakistan Scheme in consonance with the basic principles laid down by the Lahore resolution of the All-India Muslim League passed in March 1940.

Having regard to the oft-repeated declaration of the United Nations to secure and guarantee the freedom and independence of the smaller nations of the world, the Working Committee invite the immediate attention of the United Nations to the demand of one hundred millions of Muslims of India to establish Sovereign States in the zones which are their homelands and where they are in a majority.

The Working Committee are fully convinced that Pakistan is the only solution of India's constitutional problem and it is in complete consonance with justice and fairplay to the two great nations—Muslims and Hindus—inhabiting this vast sub-continent; whereas if the Congress demand is accepted it would bring the hundred millions of Muslims under the yoke of Hindu *Raj* which must inevitably result either in anarchy and chaos or complete strangulation and annihilation of Muslim India and all that Islam stands for.

The Muslim League, as it has been repeatedly made clear, stands not only for Pakistan and the freedom of Muslims, but also for the freedom and independence of Hindustan and the Hindus.

The Muslim League has been and is ready and willing to consider

any proposal and negotiate with any party on a footing of equality for the setting up of a provisional government of India, in order to mobilise the resources of the country for the purpose of the defence of India and the successful prosecution of the war, provided the demands of Muslim India, as indicated above, are conceded unequivocally.

In these circumstances, the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League, after anxious and careful consideration, call upon the Muslims to abstain from any participation in the movement initiated by the Congress and to continue to pursue their normal peaceful life.

The Working Committee hope that no attempt shall be made from any quarter to intimidate coerce, molest or interfere in any manner with the normal life of the Muslims; otherwise the Muslims would be compelled and justified to offer resistance and adopt all such measures as may be necessary for the protection of their life, honour and property.

APPENDIX V

Statement by His Majesty's Government June 3, 1947

Introduction

On February 20th, 1947, His Majesty's Government announced their intention of transferring power in British India to Indian hands by June 1948. His Majesty's Government had hoped that it would be possible for the major parties to co-operate in the working out of the Cabinet Mission's Plan of May 16th, 1946, and evolve for India a constitution acceptable to all concerned. This hope has not been fulfilled.

2. The majority of the representatives of the Provinces of Madras, Bombay, the United Provinces, Central Provinces and Berar, Assam, Orissa and the North-West Frontier Province, and the representatives of Delhi, Ajmer-Merwara and Coorg have already made progress in the task of evolving a new Constitution. On the other hand, the Muslim League Party, including in it a majority of the representatives of Bengal, the Punjab and Sind as also the representative of British Baluchistan, has decided not to participate in the Constituent Assembly.

3. It has always been the desire of His Majesty's Government that power should be transferred in accordance with the wishes of the Indian people themselves. This task would have been greatly facilitated if there had been agreement among the Indian political parties. In the absence of such agreement, the task of devising a method by which the wishes of the Indian people can be ascertained has devolved upon His Majesty's Government. After full consultation with political leaders in India, His Majesty's Government have

decided to adopt for this purpose the plan set out below. His Majesty's Government wish to make it clear that they have no intention of attempting to frame any ultimate Constitution for India; this is a matter for the Indians themselves. Nor is there anything in this plan to preclude negotiations between communities for a united India.

The issue to be decided

4. It is not the intention of His Majesty's Government to interrupt the work of the existing Constituent Assembly. Now that provision is made for certain Provinces specified below, His Majesty's Government trust that, as a consequence of this announcement, the Muslim League representatives of those Provinces, a majority of whose representatives are already participating in it, will now take their due share in its labours. At the same time, it is clear that any Constitution framed by this Assembly cannot apply to those parts of the country which are unwilling to accept it. His Majesty's Government are satisfied that the procedure outlined below embodies the best practical method of ascertaining the wishes of the people of such areas on the issue whether their Constitution is to be framed:

(*a*) in the existing Constituent Assembly; or

(*b*) in a new and separate Constituent Assembly consisting of the representatives of those areas which decide not to participate in the existing Constituent Assembly.

When this has been done, it will be possible to determine the authority or authorities to whom power should be transferred.

Bengal and The Punjab

5. The Provincial Legislative Assemblies of Bengal and the Punjab (excluding the European members) will, therefore, each be asked to meet in two parts, one representing the Muslim majority districts and the other the rest of the Province. For the purpose of determining the population of districts, the 1941 census figures will be taken as authoritative.

6. The members of the two parts of each Legislative Assembly sitting separately will be empowered to vote whether or not the

Province should be partitioned. If a simple majority of either part decides in favour of partition, division will take place and arrangements will be made accordingly.

7. Before the question as to the partition is decided, it is desirable that the representatives of each part should know in advance which Constituent Assembly the Province as a whole would join in the event of the two parts subsequently deciding to remain united. Therefore, if any member of either Legislative Assembly so dedemands, there shall be held a meeting of all members of the Legislative Assembly (other than Europeans) at which a decision will be taken on the issue as to which Constituent Assembly the Province as a whole would join if it were decided by the two parts to remain united.

8. In the event of partition being decided upon, each part of the Legislative Assembly will, on behalf of the areas they represent, decide which of the alternatives in paragraph 4 above to adopt.

9. For the immediate purpose of deciding on the issue of partition, the members of the Legislative Assemblies of Bengal and the Punjab will sit in two parts according to Muslim majority districts and non-Muslim majority districts. This is only a preliminary step of a purely temporary nature as it is evident that for the purposes of a final partition of these Provinces a detailed investigation of boundary questions will be needed; and, as soon as a decision involving partition has been taken for either Province, a Boundary Commission will be set up by the Governor-General, the membership and terms of reference of which will be settled in consultation with those concerned. It will be instructed to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of the Punjab on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. It will also be instructed to take into account other factors. Similar instructions will be given to the Bengal Boundary Commission. Until the report of a Boundary Commission has been put into effect, the provisional boundaries will be used.

Sind

10. The Legislative Assembly of Sind (excluding the European members) will at a special meeting also take its own decision on the alternatives in paragraph 4 above.

North-West Frontier Province

11. The position of the North-West Frontier Province is exceptional. Two of the three representatives of this Province are already participating in the existing Constituent Assembly. But it is clear, in view of its geographical situation, and other considerations, that if the whole or any part of the Punjab decides not to join the existing Constituent Assembly, it will be necessary to give the North-West Frontier Province an opportunity to reconsider its position. Accordingly, in such an event, a referendum will be made to the electors of the present Legislative Assembly in the North-West Frontier Province to choose which of the alternatives mentioned in paragraph 4 above they wish to adopt. The referendum will be held under the aegis of the Governor-General and in consultation with the Provincial Government.

British Baluchistan

12. British Baluchistan has elected a member, but he has not taken his seat in the existing Constituent Assembly. In view of its geographical situation, this Province will also be given an opportunity to reconsider its position and to choose which of the alternatives in paragraph 4 above to adopt. His Excellency the Governor-General is examining how this can most appropriately be done.

Assam

13. Though Assam is predominantly a non-Muslim Province, the district of Sylhet which is contiguous to Bengal is predominantly Muslim. There has been a demand that, in the event of the partition of Bengal, Sylhet should be amalgamated with the Muslim part of Bengal. Accordingly, if it is decided that Bengal should be partitioned, a referendum will be held in Sylhet district under the aegis of the Governor-General and in consultation with the Assam Provincial Government to decide whether the district of Sylhet should continue to form part of the Assam Province or should be amalgamated with the new Province of Eastern Bengal, if the Province agrees. If the referendum results in favour of amalgamation with Eastern Bengal, a Boundary Commission with terms of reference similar to those for the Punjab and Bengal will be set up to demarcate the Muslim majority areas of Sylhet district and contiguous

Muslim majority areas of adjoining districts, which will then be transferred to Eastern Bengal. The rest of the Assam Province will in any case continue to participate in the proceedings of the existing Constituent Assembly.

Representatives in Constituent Assemblies

14. If it is decided that Bengal and the Punjab should be partitioned, it will be necessary to hold fresh elections to choose their representatives on the scale of one for every million of population according to the principle contained in the Cabinet Mission's Plan of May 16th, 1940. Similar elections will also have to be held for Sylhet in the event of it being decided that this district should form part of East Bengal. The number of representatives to which each area would be entitled is as follows:

Province	*General*	*Muslims*	*Sikhs*	*Total*
Sylhet District	1	2	Nil	3
West Bengal	15	4	Nil	19
East Bengal	12	29	Nil	41
West Punjab	3	12	2	17
East Punjab	6	4	2	12

15. In accordance with the mandates given to them, the representatives of the various areas will either join the existing Constituent Assembly or form the new Constituent Assembly.

Administrative Matters

16. Negotiations will have to be initiated as soon as possible on the administrative consequences of any partition that may have been decided upon:

(*a*) Between the representatives of the respective successor authorities about all subjects now dealt with by the Central Government, including Defence, Finance and Communications.

(*b*) Between different successor authorities and His Majesty's Government for treaties in regard to matters arising out of the transfer of power.

(*c*) In the case of Provinces that may be partitioned, as to the administration of all provincial subjects such as the division

of assets and liabilities, the police and other services, the High Courts, provincial institutions, etc.

THE TRIBES OF THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER

17. Agreements with tribes of the North-West Frontier of India will have to be negotiated by the appropriate successor authority.

THE STATES

18. His Majesty's Government wish to make it clear that the decisions announced above relate only to British India and that their policy towards Indian States contained in the Cabinet Mission Memorandum of 12th May, 1946, remains unchanged.

NECESSITY FOR SPEED

19. In order that the successor authorities may have time to prepare themselves to take over power, it is important that all the above processes should be completed as quickly as possible. To avoid delay, the different Provinces or parts of Provinces will proceed independently as far as practicable within the conditions of this Plan. The existing Constituent Assembly and the new Constituent Assembly (if formed) will proceed to frame constitutions for their respective territories: they will of course be free to frame their own rules.

IMMEDIATE TRANSFER OF POWER

20. The major political parties have repeatedly emphasised their desire that there should be the earliest possible transfer of power in India. With this desire His Majesty's Government are in full sympathy, and they are willing to anticipate the date of June 1948, for the handing over of power by the setting up of an independent Indian Government or Governments at an even earlier date. Accordingly, as the most expeditious, and indeed the only practicable way of meeting this desire, His Majesty's Government propose to introduce legislation during the current session for the transfer of power this year on a Dominion Status basis to one or two successor authorities according to the decisions taken as a result of this announcement. This will be without prejudice to the right of the Indian Constituent Assemblies to decide in due course whether or

not the part of India in respect of which they have authority will remain within the British Commonwealth.

Further Announcement by Governor-General

21. His Excellency the Governor-General will from time to time make such further announcements as may be necessary in regard to procedure or any other matters for carrying out the above arrangements.

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